State v. Peloquin

428                 October 22, 2025             No. 923

   This is a nonprecedential memorandum opinion
    pursuant to ORAP 10.30 and may not be cited
         except as provided in ORAP 10.30(1).

        IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE
                STATE OF OREGON

                STATE OF OREGON,
                Plaintiff-Respondent,
                          v.
           RICHARD ROLAND PELOQUIN,
                Defendant-Appellant.
           Washington County Circuit Court
                22CR54315; A183064

  Oscar Garcia, Judge.
  Submitted September 8, 2025.
  Ernest G. Lannet, Chief Defender, Criminal Appellate
Section, and Morgen E. Daniels, Chief Deputy Defender,
Oregon Public Defense Commission, filed the brief for
appellant.
   Dan Rayfield, Attorney General, Benjamin Gutman,
Solicitor General, and Erica L. Herb, Assistant Attorney
General, filed the brief for respondent.
  Before Aoyagi, Presiding Judge, Egan, Judge, and Pagán,
Judge.
  AOYAGI, P. J.
  Affirmed.
Nonprecedential Memo Op: 

 (2025)              429

         AOYAGI, P. J.
         Defendant appeals his convictions for endangering
the welfare of a minor, ORS 163.575, and private indecency,
ORS 163.467. In his sole assignment of error, he challenges
the denial of his pretrial motion to suppress. He argues that
his statements should have been suppressed because he was
interrogated without Miranda warnings while in compelling
circumstances. We conclude that the trial court did not err
in concluding that the circumstances were not compelling
and, accordingly, affirm.
         Article I, section 12, of the Oregon Constitution safeguards the right against compelled self-incrimination. State
v. Thomas, 

, ___ P3d ___ (2025); see Or
Const, Art I, § 12 (“No person shall … be compelled in any
criminal prosecution to testify against himself.”). One manifestation of that right is that police officers must provide
Miranda warnings before interrogating someone in compelling circumstances. State v. Reed, 

, 

 (2023). Further, if a person in compelling circumstances
unequivocally invokes their right against compelled self-incrimination, the interrogation must stop. Thomas, 

.
          “Compelling circumstances exist when, taking
into account the totality of the circumstances, a reasonable
person in the defendant’s position would feel compelled to
answer a police officer’s questions.” State v. Dunlap, 

, 

 (2007). The analysis does not
turn on the subjective beliefs or intentions of the officer or
suspect but, rather, “how a reasonable person in the suspect’s position would have understood his or her situation.”
Thomas, 

 (internal quotation marks
omitted). The following nonexclusive factors are relevant
in determining whether compelling circumstances existed:
“(1) the location of the encounter, (2) the length of the encounter, (3) the amount of pressure exerted on the defendant,
and (4) the defendant’s ability to terminate the encounter.”
State v. Andrews, 

, 67, 

 (2024). In
applying those factors, courts look at the totality of the circumstances, with the “overarching inquiry” being “whether
the officers created the sort of police-dominated atmosphere
430                                                      State v. Peloquin

that Miranda warnings were intended to counteract.” State
v. Roble-Baker, 

, 

 (2006). It is the
state’s burden to prove that a person’s unwarned statements
were made under noncompelling circumstances. 

.
“Whether the circumstances were compelling is a question
of law that we review for legal error, and we are bound by
the trial court’s findings of historical fact if there is any evidence in the record to support them.” Reed, 

.
         Here, we conclude that a reasonable person in
defendant’s position would not have felt compelled to answer
questions. First, the location of the encounter being defendant’s driveway weighs against finding the circumstances
compelling. E.g., State v. Turnidge (S059155), 

, 

, cert den, 

 (2016) (that questioning occurred “at or within close proximity to [the defendant’s] home” “significantly” reduced “the likelihood that
the circumstances were inherently compelling for purposes of the Article I, section 12, analysis”); State v. Shaff,

, 

 (2007) (“[T]he fact that the
interview occurs in familiar surroundings diminishes the
police-dominated atmosphere that Miranda warnings were
intended to counteract.”). The minimal police presence also
did not create a police-dominated atmosphere. See State v.
Heise-Fay, 

, 

 (2015) (noting
that a “significant” police presence can “tend to establish
a police-dominated atmosphere” in an otherwise familiar
place). Defendant was questioned by an investigator for the
Oregon Department of Human Services (ODHS) with a single police officer silently standing by.1
         Second, the length of the encounter was short—
only 20 minutes—which also weighs against the circumstances being compelling. See Thomas, 

(that interview lasted 50 minutes was a factor that favored
the state); State v. Phillips, 

, 

, rev den, 

 (2020) (a two-hour encounter at the
defendant’s home “d[id] not weigh strongly in favor of” compelling circumstances).
    1
      It was the ODHS investigator, not the police officer, who questioned defendant in this case. The parties’ arguments assume that the compelling circumstances analysis is not altered by the questioner being a ODHS employee rather
than a police officer, and we assume the same for purposes of this case.
Nonprecedential Memo Op: 

 (2025)           431

         Third, the amount of pressure exerted was minimal
and noncoercive. The ODHS investigator asked defendant
about allegations that had been made against him, but she
did so with a nonaggressive tone and demeanor. Defendant
quickly admitted to the allegations, and the remainder of
the questioning concerned those allegations and others that
were similar. Defendant intermittently declined to answer
a question, including explicitly pointing out his right not
to answer, and the investigator accepted his choice not to
answer certain questions. Significantly, the ODHS investigator did not use defendant’s admissions coercively. See
Shaff, 

 (explaining that “what matters is not
whether evidence of guilt was apparent to the suspect; rather,
it is whether the officers used that evidence in a coercive
manner”). Further, the investigator did not press defendant
when he refused to answer certain questions, and, although
clearly concerned, she was not unduly accusatory.
         Finally, there was no indication that defendant
lacked the ability to terminate the encounter, and defendant was not physically restrained from returning to his
house until he was arrested. But it is also true that no one
affirmatively told defendant that he could terminate the
encounter. On the whole, we view the fourth factor as neutral or slightly weighing in defendant’s favor. See State v.
Rodriguez, 

, 

 (2025) (concluding that the fourth factor weighed “slightly in favor of
finding compelling circumstances” where police did not tell
the defendant she could terminate the encounter, and we
could not say that a reasonable person in the defendant’s
position would have understood she was under no obligation
to answer questions).
         Considering those nonexclusive factors and the totality of the circumstances, as captured on the officer’s bodycam footage, we agree with the trial court that defendant
was not questioned in compelling circumstances. Defendant
therefore did not need to be provided with Miranda warnings, and the questioning did not have to stop in response to
any invocation of rights by defendant.
        Affirmed.