Volume 346 — Connecticut Reports

Convicted of aggravated sexual assault of a minor and risk of injury to a child in connection with his alleged sexual abuse of his stepdaughter, J, and stepniece, B, and his alleged conduct in showing them pornographic videos on an iPad, the defendant appealed to this court. Following the disclosure of the sexual abuse, J and B were interviewed by a child forensic interviewer and physically examined by a pediatrician. The physical examinations revealed no signs of sexual abuse. Prior to trial, the defendant sought the disclosure of J's and B's psychiatric records and filed a motion seeking an in camera review. During a hearing on the defendant's motion, the guardian ad litem for J and B indicated that she had reviewed the records, that she was not opposed to the court's reviewing them, and that J's records predated the disclosures of the sexual abuse by nearly three years, whereas B's records were more recent. At trial, C and D, who are sisters and the mothers of J and B, respectively, testified for the state. The defense requested permission to cross-examine C and D about their applications for U visas, which allow eligible, undocumented immigrants who are the victims of a crime to lawfully remain in the United States if they assist in the investigation and prosecution of the crime. Defense counsel specifically sought to use this information to show that both witnesses had a personal interest in the outcome of the case. After a proffer outside the presence of the jury, during which defense counsel questioned C and D, the trial court denied the request, concluding that counsel had failed to establish a nexus between the U visa applications and any possible interest that C and D might have had in the outcome of the case. The court reasoned that the proffered testimony was irrelevant insofar as it credited C's and D's testimony that they were unaware of the U visa program prior to J's and B's disclosures, and, therefore, their desire to obtain U visas could not have motivated them to report the abuse or to fabricate their testimony. After the state rested its case, the trial court informed the parties that it had found no exculpatory evidence in either J's or B's psychiatric records upon its review of those records and, therefore, determined that the records were not subject to disclosure. On appeal from the judgment of conviction, the defendant claimed that the trial court had violated his federal constitutional right to confrontation by not ordering the disclosure of J's and B's psychiatric records to the defense and requested that this court conduct an independent review of those records to determine whether the trial court had correctly determined that they contained no exculpatory or relevant impeachment material. The defendant further claimed that the trial court had violated his right to confrontation by preventing defense counsel from cross- examining C and D about their U visa applications and raised two unpreserved claims of instructional error. Held: 1. After reviewing J's and B's psychiatric records, this court concluded that the trial court improperly failed to order that the exculpatory and relevant impeachment material contained therein be turned over to the defense, and, because this court could not conclude that that error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, it reversed the trial court's judgment and remanded the case for a new trial: a. The information in J's and B's psychiatric records was probative of their ability to know and relate the truth concerning the events in question: The information in J's psychiatric records related to behavioral, cognitive, and emotional issues, which could have could have affected J's ability to observe, understand, and accurately narrate the events in question, and indicated the existence of a conflict between J and C regarding each other's reporting of the events, and the information in B's psychiatric records concerned mental health and behavioral issues, as well as a history of untruthfulness. Moreover, because J's psychiatric records predated the disclosures of sexual abuse by nearly three years and, thus, included a period of time during which the alleged abuse was occurring but had not yet been disclosed, any information or lack thereof pertaining to the defendant during that time period was necessarily relevant insofar as it may have served to elucidate the victims' relationship with the defendant prior to the disclosures. Furthermore, even inculpatory material contained in psychiatric records was relevant information and should have been turned over to the defense because such information may have differed from the evidence presented at trial or may have been inconsistent with the victims' other statements, thereby calling into question the reliability of the state's version of events. b. The trial court's failure to order the disclosure of exculpatory and relevant impeachment material contained in J's and B's psychiatric records was not harmless error: The defense was denied access to information that was compiled by trained professionals and was relevant to and probative of J's and B's ability to know and relate the truth in a case that depended on the credibility and reliability of their version of events, and J's and B's testimony was extremely important to the outcome of the case, as it was not cumulative of other evidence, there was no physical evidence of abuse, and there was an absence of corroborating evidence because C apparently inadvertently erased the data from the family's iPad follow- ing the disclosures. Although the forensic interviews of J and B provided the strongest evi- dence in the state's case, this court disagreed with the state's argument that those interviews presented consistent, detailed accounts of the rele- vant events and, therefore, constituted compelling evidence of the defen- dant's guilt, as the answers that each child gave to the interviewer's questions were generally vague and nonresponsive, and this court was not persuaded with the state's argument that J and B provided idiosyn- cratic details that strongly indicated that they were sexually abused by the defendant. 2. The trial court violated the defendant's right to confrontation by precluding defense counsel from questioning C and D about their U visa applications and thereby preventing him from exposing the jury to prototypical impeachment evidence showing that a witness or witnesses were prom- ised or stood to gain some type of benefit from the state in return for their cooperation: The U visa status carries with it important benefits to immigrants, includ- ing protections against deportation and work authorization, U visas are awarded only if the applicant has been, is being, or is likely to be helpful to a government agency investigating or prosecuting criminal activity, and that duty to remain helpful to law enforcement personnel is an ongoing responsibility that exists even after a U visa has been granted. In the present case, the trial court took an overly narrow view with respect to the relevance of C's and D's testimony about the status of their U visa applications because, to lay a foundation for the admission of impeachment evidence, the defendant was required to show only that the U visa evidence was relevant to C's and D's motive to testify in a certain manner, and, even if the jurors believed C's and D's testimony that they did not learn about the U visa program until after discovering the sexual abuse, that would not render the U visa evidence irrelevant, insofar as the structure of the U visa program and its requirement that the applicant be helpful to law enforcement personnel could create an incentive to a witness hoping to have his or her visa granted. Moreover, this court previously has concluded that a witness' immigra- tion status is a relevant subject of inquiry when there is a demonstrated link between it and the witness' bias, interest, or motive for testifying, and it agreed with the reasoning of other courts that have considered the admissibility of evidence of U visas and have held that a witness' efforts to obtain one is necessarily relevant to the jurors' assessment of the witness' bias, interest, or motive for testifying. Because this court determined that the defendant was entitled to a new trial on the basis of the trial court's failure to disclose relevant portions of J's and B's psychiatric records, a harmless error analysis in connection with the U visa claim was not necessary. 3. This court directed trial courts to refrain from instructing jurors, as the trial court did in this case, that, when the evidence is subject to two possible interpretations, jurors are not required to accept the interpreta- tion consistent with innocence or to accept the interpretation that is consistent with guilt: Such an instruction could potentially mislead or confuse jurors with respect to the state's burden of proof because it introduces into the jurors' deliberations a standard of proof at odds with the beyond a reasonable doubt standard applicable to the charged offenses and is inconsistent with the principle that, if jurors can, in reason, reconcile all of the facts proven with any reasonable theory consistent with the innocence of the accused, then they cannot find the defendant guilty. Moreover, with respect to subsidiary facts that are not subject to the beyond a reasonable doubt standard, it is sufficient for the trial court simply to instruct the jurors that they may find such facts proven if it is reasonable and logical to do so. 4. This court strongly recommend that, in cases involving multiple charges, multiple victims, or both, trial courts instruct jurors, in accordance with instruction 2.6-11 of Connecticut's model criminal jury instructions, that the jurors must consider each count separately and return a separate verdict for each count, and that a verdict reached on one count does not bind their decision on another count, and the trial court should so instruct jurors regardless of whether the court is asked to do so. Argued September 14, 2022—officially released February 6, 2023

The plaintiff, whose marriage to the defendant previously had been dissolved by a New York court, appealed to the Appellate Court from the judgment of the trial court, which dismissed her motion to open and set aside the final New York judgment of divorce for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Before their marriage, the parties entered into a prenuptial agreement, pursuant to which the plaintiff waived her interest in certain of the defendant's business interests. During the divorce proceedings, the plaintiff challenged the enforceability of the prenuptial agreement, but the New York court rejected the claim, finding no evidence of fraud or overreaching by the defendant. The parties eventually settled their dispute by way of a separation agreement, which superseded the prenup- tial agreement and resolved the parties' respective financial and property rights. The separation agreement also included a choice of law provision, which designated New York law as governing the agreement, and a provision incorporating New York's plenary action rule, which requires a party seeking to modify or vacate a separation agreement that survives a final judgment of divorce to file a plenary action on the contract instead of a motion to open, modify or vacate the divorce judgment. The final judgment of divorce incorporated the separation agreement by reference but provided that the separation agreement would survive and not be merged into the judgment. The parties both later moved to Connecticut, where the plaintiff registered the New York divorce judgment pursuant to statute (§ 46b-71 (a)). Thereafter, the plaintiff moved to open and set aside the divorce judgment in the Superior Court, claiming that it was obtained through the defendant's fraudulent conduct. The plaintiff requested that the Connecticut court open the New York divorce judgment and vacate the settlement agreement. Applying New York law, the trial court concluded that, because the separation agreement was incorporated but not merged into the divorce judgment, the plaintiff could not challenge the enforceability of the agreement by way of a motion but, rather, was required to do so by commencing a plenary action. The trial court then dismissed the plain- tiff's motion for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and rendered judg- ment for the defendant. The Appellate Court agreed with the trial court that New York's plenary action rule was substantive for choice of law purposes but disagreed with the trial court's conclusion that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, relying on, among other things, the jurisdiction conferred by § 46b-71 (b). Accordingly, the Appellate Court concluded that the trial court should have denied, rather than dismissed, the plaintiff's motion to open and set aside the divorce judg- ment. On the granting of certification, the plaintiff appealed to this court from the Appellate Court's judgment. Held that the Appellate Court correctly concluded that the New York plenary action rule is substantive, and not procedural, for choice of law purposes and that the trial court should have denied, rather than dismissed, the plaintiff's motion to open and set aside the divorce judgment: Under the conflict of law rules governing foreign matrimonial judgments registered in Connecticut, as codified in § 46b-71 (b), the plaintiff's motion to open and set aside the divorce judgment was governed by New York substantive law and Connecticut procedural law, and that approach was consistent with the well established principle that, in a choice of law situation, the forum state will apply its own rules to issues of procedure and matters of judicial administration, even if the substantive law of another jurisdiction applies, because it would often be disruptive or difficult to apply the local rules of another state. Although New York's plenary action rule, which is principally concerned with preserving the parties' vested contractual rights to enforce the separation agreement in a separate civil action, fell into a gray area between issues relating primarily to judicial administration and those concerned primarily with the rights and liabilities of the parties, this court concluded that the plenary action rule was so interwoven with the plaintiff's cause of action as to be deemed substantive for choice of law purposes. The fact that the parties explicitly incorporated the New York plenary action rule into the separation agreement, which provided that their contractual rights could not be invalidated or otherwise affected by any final judgment of divorce, was a weighty reason for applying that law rather than the local law of the forum, insofar as it demonstrated that the issue was one to which the parties had likely given thought. Moreover, the application of the New York plenary action rule would affect the ultimate substantive outcome of the case because the parties had contractual rights that could not be undone by modifying the divorce judgment, there was, to this court's knowledge, no settled precedent classifying the plenary action rule as procedural or substantive for choice of law purposes, and the application of that rule would not impose an undue burden on Connecticut courts, which have recognized that separation agreements are contracts that may be litigated independently of a divorce judgment in a civil action sounding in contract. Argued October 13, 2022—officially released February 21, 2023

The plaintiff insurance companies sought a judgment declaring that they were not obligated to defend and indemnify the named defendant, J, a business owner, under J's homeowners and umbrella insurance policies for damages awarded in a tort action brought against him by the defen- dants S and S's husband. The tort action stemmed from an incident that occurred when S, who was employed by J's construction company, P Co., was working alone in P Co.'s office, which was located in J's home. A masked individual, K, entered J's home and bound, gagged, and blindfolded S. K put a gun to S's head and told S that he would kill her and her family if she did not open the safe, of which S claimed to have no knowledge. K continued to threaten S for approximately forty- five minutes. J then returned home and was attacked by K. J was eventu- ally able to unmask K, revealing his identity as J's longtime friend. After S was untied, she asked to leave, but J prevented her from leaving or calling the police, even after S informed him of the extent of K's threats to her and her family. S returned to her own home hours later, and the police subsequently were contacted. At the time of the incident, J was covered under a personal homeowners policy and an umbrella policy, both of which were issued by the plaintiffs, but he did not hold a separate commercial liability policy. The plaintiffs provided J with an attorney to defend him in the tort action but indicated that they were reserving their right to contest liability coverage. In the tort action against J, which included a claim of false imprisonment, the jury returned a verdict for S and her husband and awarded damages. Subsequently, in the present declaratory judgment action, the trial court denied in part the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment as to the plaintiffs' duty to indemnify J, concluding, inter alia, that the plaintiffs were not entitled to summary judgment under the umbrella insurance policy, which covered ''personal injury,'' which, in turn, was defined to include false imprisonment. The declaratory judgment action proceeded to trial, and the trial court subse- quently rendered judgment for J, concluding that the plaintiffs were required to indemnify him for his liability in the tort action. The plaintiffs appealed to the Appellate Court, which reversed the trial court's judg- ment, concluding, inter alia, that the trial court incorrectly had deter- mined that the business pursuits exclusion in the umbrella policy did not apply. On the granting of certification, J appealed to this court, which concluded that both the trial court and the Appellate Court applied incorrect standards for determining whether the business pursuits exclu- sion barred coverage. In reversing the Appellate Court's judgment, this court ordered that the case be remanded to the trial court for a trial de novo on the business pursuits exclusion issue. On remand, the trial court concluded that the plaintiffs had satisfied their burden of proving that S's false imprisonment or injury was connected with, had its origins in, grew out of, flowed from, or was incident to J's business pursuits and, accordingly, that the business pursuits exclusion barred coverage for J's liability in the tort action and that the plaintiffs were not obligated to indemnify J. On appeal to this court, J claimed, inter alia, that the trial court had applied an incorrect standard when it determined that the plaintiffs satisfied their burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the business pursuits exclusion barred coverage. Held: 1. The trial court properly applied the preponderance of the evidence stan- dard to determine the factual question of whether the plaintiffs had established that the business pursuits exclusion in the umbrella policy barred coverage for J's liability in the tort action: The preponderance of the evidence standard governs factual determina- tions required by a civil statute that is silent with respect to the applicable standard of proof, and neither the statute (§ 52-29) nor any other legal authorities governing claims for declaratory relief contain a heightened standard of proof. J could not prevail on his claim that, rather than applying the preponder- ance of the evidence standard, the trial court should have construed the business pursuits exclusion in favor of J, as the insured, unless it had a ''high degree of certainty'' that the insurance policy language clearly and unambiguously excluded J's claim, as J improperly conflated the tasks of construing the umbrella insurance policy, which this court did in the prior appeal in this case, with the making of factual determinations necessary to ascertain whether the exclusion unambiguously applied under the circumstances, which the trial court properly did on remand. In light of the unusual procedural posture of this case, there was no need for the trial court, on remand, to apply the ''high degree of certainty'' standard or other principles of insurance contract interpretation, insofar as this court, in the prior appeal in this case, had previously interpreted the business pursuits exclusion and specified the factual situations in which that exclusion would clearly and unambiguously apply; rather, the trial court's task on remand from that prior appeal was to engage in a fact-specific inquiry to determine whether the plaintiffs had satisfied their burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that S's false imprisonment or injury was connected with, had its origins in, grew out of, flowed from, or was incident to J's business pursuits. 2. J could not prevail on his claims relating to whether the trial court correctly determined that the plaintiffs had carried their burden of proof with respect to whether the business pursuits exclusion applied: The trial court did not incorrectly find in the plaintiffs' favor on the ground that they had failed to produce new, credible evidence that was not raised during the first trial. Moreover, the trial court did not improperly fail to find that J's evidence, in the form of contemporaneous witness statements made on the day of the incident, was the most credible and reliable form of evidence in the record, and that the trial court's conclusion that K's actions constituted an attack on P Co. was unsupported by evidence in the record, as the record, viewed as a whole, contained evidence to support the factual findings of the trial court. Furthermore, the trial court did not improperly find in the plaintiffs' favor on public policy grounds, as the public policy discussion in the trial court's memorandum of decision was not essential to the trial court's determination of the case and, therefore, was dictum. Argued October 20, 2022—officially released February 21, 2023

Pursuant to statute (§ 14-227a (a)), ''[a] person commits the offense of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or any drug or both if such person operates a motor vehicle (1) while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or any drug or both, or (2) while such person has an elevated blood alcohol content.'' Pursuant further to statute (§ 14-227a (g)), any person who violates any provision of § 14-227a (a) shall be subject to sentence enhancement ''for conviction of a third and subsequent violation within ten years after a prior conviction for the same offense,'' and, ''[f]or purposes of the imposition of penalties for a . . . third and subsequent offense . . . a conviction in any other state of any offense the essential elements of which are determined by the court to be substantially the same as [those in § 14-227a (a) (1) or (2)] . . . shall constitute a prior conviction for the same offense.'' Convicted of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intox- icating liquor or drugs in Connecticut, the defendant appealed. After the jury found the defendant guilty of operating a motor vehicle under the influence, the trial court found the defendant guilty of being a third time offender and enhanced his sentence under § 14-227a (g). The enhancement was based on the defendant's two prior Florida convictions under that state's driving under the influence statute (§ 316.193 (1)). In enhancing the sentence, the trial court determined that the elements of the Florida statute were ''substantially the same'' as the elements of § 14-227a (a) for purposes of § 14-227a (g). The Appellate Court upheld the judgment of conviction, and the defendant, on the granting of certifi- cation, appealed to this court, claiming that the Appellate Court incor- rectly had concluded that the elements of § 316.193 (1) were ''substantially the same'' as the elements of § 14-227a (a) for enhance- ment purposes because the phrase ''actual physical control'' of a vehicle in § 316.193 (1) criminalizes broader conduct than the term ''operating'' a motor vehicle in § 14-227a (a). Held that the Appellate Court correctly concluded that the trial court prop- erly had enhanced the defendant's sentence as a third time offender under § 14-227a (g), this court having concluded that the element of ''actual physical control'' in Fla. Stat. Ann. § 316.193 (1) is substantially the same as the ''operating'' element in § 14-227a (a): 1. This court defined the term ''essential elements,'' as used in § 14-227a (g), and identified the essential elements of the Connecticut and Flor- ida statutes: Because the statutory scheme did not define either the word ''essential'' or ''elements,'' this court looked to dictionary definitions of those terms and concluded that, to determine whether a conviction in another state satisfies the requirements of § 14-227a (g), a court first must determine the basic and necessary parts of the crime, including the actus reus, mens rea, and causation, under both Connecticut law and the law of the state of the prior conviction. The plain language of § 14-227a (a) provides that the essential elements of that statute are that the defendant (1) operate (2) a motor vehicle (3) while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or drugs, or both, and this court clarified that the ''under the influence'' element could be established either by the subjective standards described in § 14-227a (a) (1) or by the objective measure of blood alcohol content described in § 14-227a (a) (2), those subdivisions having created alternative means of establishing the ''under the influence'' element but not having constituted essential elements themselves. Florida courts have explained that the essential elements of Fla. Stat. Ann. § 316.193 (1) are (1) a person driving or in actual physical control of (2) a vehicle while (3) such person was under the influence of alco- holic beverages. 2. This court determined that the phrase ''substantially the same,'' as used in § 14-227a (g), clearly and unambiguously means that the essential elements of the statutes at issue must be the same to a considerable degree: This court disagreed with the defendant's proposed construction of ''sub- stantially the same'' as meaning the essential elements must be the same ''in substance'' and, instead, concluded that a court must consider the degree of similarity between the statutory elements, as the defendant's construction would render the use of the word ''substantially'' superflu- ous, whereas a construction requiring that the basic and necessary parts of the crime be the same to a considerable degree does not render any term superfluous and, thus, was consistent with the statute as a whole. Moreover, even if there were an ambiguity, the legislative history of § 14- 227a (g) supported this court's construction of the phrase ''substantially the same,'' as the legislature's purpose in adding that language was to address the problem of repeat offenders and to prevent individuals convicted of driving under the influence in other states from being treated as mere first time offenders in Connecticut. Because there was no bright-line test for courts to apply in determining whether the elements of the statutes are the same to a considerable degree, this court clarified that courts must consider the extent to which two essential elements differ from each other on a case-by-case basis, that minor differences do not render § 14-227a (g) inapplicable if the Connecticut statute and the other state's statute criminalize conduct that is the same to a considerable degree, regardless of the facts underlying the specific out-of-state conviction, and that the elements of two statutes are substantially the same if the elements of the other state's statute are either the same or narrower than the elements of the Connecticut statute, or the elements of the other state's statute vary from the elements of the Connecticut statute but the elements, based on their definition under the statute or case law, criminalize conduct that is the same to a consider- able degree. 3. This court applied the foregoing definition of ''substantially the same'' to the essential elements of §§ 14-227a (a) and Fla. Stat. Ann. § 316.193 (1) and concluded that, although the Connecticut and Florida statutes use different terminology, a comparison of the definitions of ''operating'' in § 14-227a (a) and ''actual physical control'' in § 316.193 (1), as interpreted by the relevant case law, supported the conclusion that those elements were substantially the same for purposes of § 14-227a (g): Connecticut case law defines ''operation'' as any act that, alone or in sequence, will set in motion the motive power of a vehicle, even if there remains a temporary obstacle or impediment, and even if the engine is not running and the vehicle is not moving, so long as the defendant is in the vehicle, whereas Florida case law defines ''actual physical control'' as being physically in the vehicle and having the capability to operate the vehicle, which, in turn, is defined as taking an action to control the vehicle, even if there remains a temporary obstacle or impediment, and even if the engine is not running and the vehicle is not moving. Under neither Connecticut nor Florida case law does an individual violate the statute at issue by merely sitting or sleeping in the driver's seat of a vehicle while intoxicated, and, under both statutes, the presence of a key in the ignition supports a finding of operation or actual physical control but is not a necessary requirement if other indicia of operation under § 14-227a (a) or actual physical control under Fla. Stat. Ann. § 316.193 (1) are present; rather, under both statutes, a court is required to look at all the relevant facts to determine if the fact finder reasonably could infer that the defendant was in a position to overcome a temporary obstacle to make the vehicle operative. Argued September 9, 2022—officially released February 28, 2023

The proposed intervenors appealed from the trial court's denial of their motion to intervene in the plaintiffs' administrative appeal. The New Canann Planning and Zoning Commission had amended an existing special permit relating to certain residentially zoned property owned by G Co., allowing the operation of a philanthropic or eleemosynary institution subject to certain specifically enumerated conditions. Condi- tion six prohibited any material change in the approved use or intensifica- tion of any use, unless specifically authorized. Condition thirty permitted a former dwelling on the property to be used as an operations center. Subsequently, G Co. obtained a zoning permit authorizing the creation of new offices within the operations center. The plaintiffs appealed from the issuance of the zoning permit to the named defendant, the Zoning Board of Appeals of the Town of New Canaan, claiming that the creation of the new offices violated conditions six and thirty of the amended special permit. The board denied the appeal, and the plaintiffs then filed an administrative appeal in the trial court. Thereafter, the proposed intervenors, who owned land abutting G Co.'s property, filed a motion to intervene in the plaintiffs' administrative appeal but later withdrew it. Following a hearing in the administrative appeal, the trial court con- cluded that the board could not have properly assessed the validity of the zoning permit because it had not made a finding as to whether the construction and resulting increase in office space and employees constituted an improper intensification, change in use, or both. The trial court further concluded that the commission, rather than the board, was the appropriate body to clarify the language related to the intensifi- cation of uses in condition six of the amended special permit, and, accordingly, the court remanded the matter to the board for consultation with the commission. Pursuant to the trial court's remand order, the board held a meeting and formulated a list of questions to be referred to the commission. More than one week after that meeting, the proposed intervenors filed a second motion to intervene. The trial court denied the motion, concluding, inter alia, that it was untimely. The proposed intervenors' appealed from the trial court's denial of their motion to intervene. Held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the proposed intervenors' motion to intervene as of right was untimely: The plaintiffs' administrative appeal was commenced in November, 2019, the proposed intervenors became aware of that appeal almost immedi- ately thereafter, the trial court issued its memorandum of decision in May, 2021, more than one year after briefing and argument from the parties, the proposed intervenors waited an additional month to seek intervention a second time, and, by that point, the board had already begun its proceedings on remand. Contrary to the proposed intervenors' contention that the timeliness of their motion to intervene should have been measured from the com- mencement of the proceedings on remand insofar as their legal interests were first implicated at that time, the proposed intervenors, as statutorily aggrieved abutters, had a legal interest in the plaintiffs' administrative appeal from its inception, regardless of the level of importance they subjectively attached to it, and, although the trial court could have afforded greater weight to the proposed intervenors' increasing concerns concerning the precedential impact of the administrative appeal when it decided their motion to intervene, this court saw no reason to conclude that it was required to do so as a matter of law. Moreover, this court declined the proposed intervenors' invitation to assess additional issues that might arise in the future, as the proposed intervenors pointed to no evidence that they had formally requested, much less had been denied, the opportunity to participate in the proceed- ings on remand, such issues could afford the proposed intervenors rea- sonable grounds to renew their motion to intervene in the trial court or to pursue other avenues of relief, and principles of appellate jurisdiction counseled against consideration of those issues in the present appeal. Argued December 19, 2022—officially released February 28, 2023

Convicted of murder in connection with the shooting death of the victim, the defendant appealed to this court. The defendant had been arrested several years after the shooting, after two individuals, C and K, came forward and claimed to have witnessed the defendant shoot the victim. At trial, the state's case rested almost entirely on the testimony of C and K, who were incarcerated both at the time of trial and when they first approached the police with information about the shooting. The trial court admitted into evidence the entirety of the cooperation agree- ments that C and K had with the state, and the prosecutor used those agreements to rehabilitate C and K during their respective direct exami- nations, before either witness had been impeached. Defense counsel thoroughly cross-examined C and K, including about their cooperation agreements, but the trial court precluded defense counsel from ques- tioning K about certain details of a prior arrest, which occurred after K testified before the grand jury in the present case and while he was released on parole. The trial court also declined defense counsel's request for a jailhouse informant instruction with respect to C and K and, instead, gave the jury a special credibility instruction in which it noted that C and K had entered into cooperation agreements and urged the jury to examine their testimony with ''careful scrutiny'' and ''particu- lar care . . . .'' On the defendant's appeal from the judgment of convic- tion, held: 1. The trial court gave an adequate special credibility instruction and did not abuse its discretion in declining to give the requested jailhouse informant instruction: Although the trial court's instruction was not in the exact form of the requested jailhouse informant instruction, the substance of the requested instruction was very similar to the instruction that the jury was given, the jury having been cautioned that C and K were receiving benefits from the state in return for testifying, that they might have a motive to lie, and that their testimony therefore should be examined with ''careful scrutiny'' and ''particular care,'' and, of all the witnesses who testified, the trial court singled out C and K as the only individuals whose credibility warranted such treatment. It was no consequence that the instruction the jury was given did not explicitly mention that C and K were incarcerated or identify them as jailhouse informants because, in light of the admission into evidence of the cooperation agreements, there was no need to warn the jury about the risk that C and K might be expecting a benefit from the state when the jury knew that they were expecting such a benefit. Moreover, the requested instruction was poorly suited to jailhouse infor- mants who, like C and K, were also eyewitnesses to the charged crime, as the requested instruction invited the jury to consider the extent to which the witness' testimony contained details known only by the perpe- trator and the extent to which the details of the witness' testimony could be obtained from a source other than the defendant. 2. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the entirety of C's and K's cooperation agreements into evidence or in permitting the prosecutor to use those agreements during direct examination, before the witnesses had been impeached: The provisions in the cooperation agreements providing that, if the state's attorney's office or a judge determines that the witness is lying, then the witness will be subject to prosecution, did not serve to improperly vouch for the credibility of C and K, as those provisions did not imply that the state or the judge knew that the witnesses were telling the truth or that the state or the judge possessed information or means, unavailable to the jury, to determine the veracity of the witnesses' testimony, and the references to prosecution in those provisions were truthfully stated and were not gratuitously repeated in the remainder of the cooperation agreements. Moreover, because defense counsel made it clear that she intended to cross-examine C and K about the cooperation agreements, it was within the trial court's discretion to permit the prosecutor to use the cooperation agreements to rehabilitate C and K in advance, during direct examination. 3. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in precluding defense counsel from cross-examining K about certain details of his prior arrest: The trial court properly allowed cross-examination of K on the fact that he gave the police a false name when, prior to his arrest, the police pulled over the car that he was driving, as that fact had special significance and directly related to K's truthfulness, whereas it properly precluded cross-examination with respect to other details of K's arrest, including the fact that his car smelled of marijuana and that he resisted arrest, neither of which related directly to K's truthfulness. Notwithstanding the defendant's argument that evidence regarding the smell of marijuana coming from K's car and his resisting arrest contra- dicted his statement to the grand jury that he intended to give up his ''criminal lifestyle,'' the link between that evidence and K's truthfulness was indirect at best, and the trial court reasonably could have concluded that any limited probative value of this evidence was outweighed by the potential to sidetrack the trial. Moreover, there was no merit to the defendant's argument that the evidence surrounding the traffic stop was relevant to show that K would do anything, including falsely implicating the defendant, to avoid returning to prison, because, although the jury heard testimony that K gave a false name to the police when he was pulled over, and defense counsel was free to argue that giving false testimony was not so different, such an analogy did not extend as readily to the allegations involving marijuana and resisting arrest, and such an inference would have been too uncertain to require the trial court to admit such evidence. Argued October 13, 2022—officially released March 7, 2023

Convicted, on a conditional plea of nolo contendere, of the crime of posses- sion of narcotics with intent to sell, the defendant appealed to the Appellate Court, claiming that the trial court improperly had denied her motion to suppress certain evidence seized by the police following their warrantless entry into her apartment. Z, a police officer, had been dispatched to an apartment building in which the defendant resided in response to a 911 call from C, a resident of the building, reporting gunshots and an attempted burglary. C reported seeing a man in a hooded shirt exit a vehicle outside the building and then hearing an altercation and gunshots. C also reported that the man in the hooded shirt then exited the building's front door and fled in the vehicle, that a second man exited the building's back door and fled in a different vehicle, and that, after they had left, C found a knife with white paint chips on it in the building's laundry room. When Z arrived, C gave Z the knife and recounted the incident. C stated to Z that he had seen the man in the hooded shirt enter the building, that he heard loud banging on the defendant's door, and that an altercation then occurred in the hallway in front of the defendant's apartment. According to C, the alterca- tion moved into the laundry room, which was a few feet away from the defendant's apartment, before C heard gunshots and saw the man in the hooded shirt run out of the front door. Z then proceeded to investigate the building and, upon entering the laundry room, found, among other things, a spent shell casing, what appeared to be a bullet fragment embedded in a wall, a bullet hole in the molding around the laundry room's back door, and a fresh, blood like stain on the wall next to it. In the apartment building hallway, Z observed footprints on the wall across from the defendant's apartment, indicative of a struggle, white paint chips at the base of the defendant's door, and fresh pry marks on the door and doorframe. C informed Z that two people lived in the defendant's apartment and that he feared that one of them could have been involved in the altercation. C confirmed that the defendant's car was in the building's parking lot and expressed concern to Z that the defendant may be inside her apartment suffering from a gunshot or stab wound. Z then attempted to look inside the defendant's apartment through a window, but the blinds were drawn, and he received no response when he knocked repeatedly on the defendant's door. Con- cerned that someone inside might be injured, Z and his superior officer, without first obtaining a warrant, forced their way into the defendant's apartment. Although no one was found in the apartment, Z observed, in plain view, various drug paraphernalia. At that point, the search was stopped, and the police obtained a search warrant. A subsequent search yielded, inter alia, narcotics. After a hearing on the defendant's motion to suppress the narcotics seized from her apartment, the trial court denied the motion, concluding that the exigent circumstances and emer- gency aid doctrines justified the warrantless entry into the defendant's apartment. On appeal from the judgment of conviction, the Appellate Court reversed and remanded the case with direction to grant the defen- dant's motion to suppress, concluding that the exigent circumstances doctrine was inapplicable because there was no basis on which a reason- able police officer would believe that probable cause justified entry into the defendant's apartment and that the emergency aid doctrine was inapplicable because a reasonable police officer would not have believed that a medical emergency existed inside the apartment. On the granting of certification, the state appealed to this court. Held that, although the Appellate Court correctly concluded that the exigent circumstances doctrine did not support the officers' warrantless entry into the defendant's apartment, it incorrectly concluded that the entry was not justified under the emergency aid doctrine, and, accordingly, this court reversed the Appellate Court's judgment and remanded the case with direction to affirm the trial court's judgment: The exigent circumstances doctrine applies exclusively to situations in which the police, acting in their crime fighting capacity, have probable cause to believe that a crime has been or is about to be committed and reasonably believe that, in the time it would take for them to obtain a warrant, the suspect would be able to destroy evidence, flee, or endanger the safety of others, whereas the emergency aid doctrine, which is rooted in the police's community caretaking function, does not require that the police have probable cause to enter a home if their purpose in doing so is to render emergency assistance, provided there is an objectively reasonable basis for believing that an occupant is seriously injured or is imminently threatened with serious injury. The state did not claim that the police had probable cause to search the defendant's apartment for evidence or to make an arrest but, instead, argued on appeal that the warrantless entry was for the purpose of rendering medical aid to someone inside the apartment injured in the altercation overheard by C, and, accordingly, the warrantless entry was not supported by the exigent circumstances doctrine. Although the police were acting in their crime control function when they arrived at the apartment building, it was apparent that, by the time they entered the defendant's apartment, they were acting pursuant to their community caretaking function, as the police were responding to reports of gunshots and an attempted burglary, and, in addition to the inherent risk of violence that generally accompanies burglaries, there were numerous signs of violence, including bullet holes, shell casings, and signs of a struggle that would have heightened the officers' concerns that someone may have been injured during the commission of the crimes in question, and, given the sequence of events reported by C, it was reasonable for the police officers to have believed that the person injured in the altercation was someone from the defendant's apartment who either interrupted an attempted burglary, was the intended victim of the burglary, or had some other reason to engage in an argument that spilled out into the hallway outside of the defendant's apartment and into the laundry room. In evaluating the constitutionality of the warrantless entry under the emergency aid doctrine, the Appellate Court should have applied the reasonable belief standard, which is applied by reference to the circum- stances then confronting the officers, including the need for prompt assessment of sometimes ambiguous information concerning potentially serious consequences, and which questions whether the officers would have been derelict in their duty if they had acted otherwise. On the basis of the totality of the facts known to the police officers at the time of their entry, including the breaking and entering into the apartment building, the damage to and banging on the defendant's apart- ment door, the altercation in the hallway in front of the defendant's apartment, the gunshots, the blood stain, the knife, and the fact that, although the defendant's car was in the parking lot, she did not respond to Z's repeated knocking on her door, it was objectively reasonable for the officers to believe that someone inside the defendant's apartment was in need of emergency medical assistance, that immediate entry into the apartment was necessary to protect life, and that a failure to take such action would constitute a dereliction of duty. Argued October 19, 2022—officially released March 7, 2023

The plaintiffs, who were the putative beneficiaries of a testamentary bequest that R had made to a defunct archdiocesan school (OLM) under the auspices of the defendant archdiocese, sought, inter alia, to establish and enforce the terms of a constructive trust. The plaintiffs are the executrix of R's estate, eleven former students of OLM and their parents, and M Co., which operates a private Catholic school that purports to be OLM's successor. Before his death, R donated a large sum of money to OLM, as it was important to him that parents be able to send their children to a Catholic school in the town of Madison, where OLM was located. After R died, his residual estate was distributed to OLM pursuant to his will, which contained a residuary clause in favor of OLM ''or its successor, for its general uses and purposes.'' The defendant thereafter announced that it would close OLM and another archdiocesan school and open a new school in the town of Branford. Some parents of students attending OLM, including some of the plaintiff parents, subsequently formed M Co., intending to establish a new Catholic school in Madison that would retain OLM's mission. In their complaint, the plaintiffs alleged, inter alia, that R's bequest to OLM should be viewed as an endowment that resulted in a constructive trust benefiting the plaintiff students, with the defendant acting as trustee, and that the defendant had an equitable duty to convey the unspent portion of the bequest to M Co., as OLM's ''successor,'' or back to R's estate. The executrix of R's estate also sought a judgment declaring whether the endowment should be conveyed to M Co., or some other appropriate entity, for the benefit of the plaintiffs or if the endowment to OLM had lapsed with no clear successor, such that the funds should be returned to R's estate. The defendant moved to dismiss the action, contending that none of the plaintiffs had standing to enforce the terms of a completed charitable gift to a school. The defendant relied on the common-law rule, codified by statute (§ 3-125), that the state attorney general has the exclusive authority to bring an action to enforce the terms of a charitable gift. The plaintiffs objected on the ground that they had standing under the exception to that rule for persons who have a special interest in the enforcement of a charitable trust. The trial court, however, granted the defendant's motion to dismiss, and the Appellate Court affirmed, agreeing with the trial court that the plaintiffs lacked standing. The Appellate Court concluded that R's bequest to OLM was an outright or absolute gift to OLM, rather than an endowment that resulted in a charitable trust, and that the special interest exception did not apply when, as in the present case, the charitable gift is unencumbered by specific restrictions on its use. On the granting of certification, the plaintiffs appealed to this court. Held that the Appellate Court properly upheld the trial court's dismissal of the plaintiffs' action for lack of standing: 1. The Appellate Court correctly determined that R's bequest to OLM was an outright, unrestricted gift: When a donor specifies that a gift must be used for the donee's ''general uses and purposes,'' the only limitation on the donee's use of the gift is that the donee must use it in furtherance of the duties imposed by the donee's charter or articles of incorporation, and, because this limitation applies to all charitable gifts, regardless of whether it is expressly included in the instrument conferring the gift, the ''general uses and purposes'' language in R's bequest to OLM evinced an intent that it was unrestricted rather than restricted. Moreover, the plaintiffs could not prevail on their claim that R's gift to OLM was restricted on the ground that R specified in his will that, if OLM became incapable of possessing or using the gift, the unspent portion should go to OLM's ''successor,'' as that claim was based on allegations that R's will evinced an intent that M Co., as the entity with the mission that most closely approximates the mission of OLM, should be the cy pres beneficiary of the gift to OLM, rather than on any allegation that M Co. was OLM's successor corporation in the legal sense, and the plaintiffs' claim was inadequately briefed insofar as the plaintiffs did not refer to the cy pres doctrine in their briefs or cite to any authority for the proposition that proof of such intent means that there is an implied restriction on the trust or gift such that a potential cy pres beneficiary has standing to initiate proceedings to enforce the donor's intent. 2. The Appellate Court correctly determined that, under the specific facts and circumstances of the present case, the plaintiffs did not have standing to bring an action to enforce R's unrestricted bequest to OLM under the special interest exception to the rule that the state attorney general has exclusive authority to enforce the terms of a charitable gift: When a donor has made a gift to a charitable organization that is unrestricted by any contractual terms or qualifications, the donee organi- zation is the sole beneficiary of the gift, and the only limitation on its use is that the organization must use it in furtherance of the duties imposed on it by its charter or articles of incorporation, and this court was not aware of any case in which a court had held that the potential beneficiaries of a charitable organization have standing to bring an action to compel the organization to use an unrestricted gift in a specific manner. Moreover, even if there were rare instances in which the beneficiary of a charitable organization could be found to have a special interest suffi- cient to confer standing to bring an action to force the organization to use an unrestricted gift in a specific manner, this was not such an instance, as students enrolled in educational institutions constitute a constantly fluctuating group, and concluding that a particular student or group of students has standing to bring an action to enforce the terms of a trust created to benefit the institution would undermine the primary purpose behind the rule that the state attorney general has exclusive standing to bring such an action, which is to limit the number of persons who have standing to initiate litigation. Argued November 21, 2022—officially released March 14, 2023

Convicted, after a jury trial, of sexual assault in the first degree, risk of injury to a child, employing a minor in an obscene performance, assault in the third degree, criminal violation of a protective order, and stalking in the first degree in three cases that were consolidated for trial, the defendant appealed to this court. The defendant had been romantically involved with R, and his conviction arose from his alleged abuse of R's daughter, G. On numerous occasions, the defendant sexually assaulted G during her weekly sleepovers at the defendant's house. He also gave G a cell phone and implemented certain rules, including one requiring G to send him daily ''selfies'' and one prohibiting G from letting R see the phone. At the end of one of G's visits to the defendant's house, the police responded to a complaint that the defendant had refused to return G to R. After a subsequent visit, R reported to the police that G had returned from the defendant's house with a bruise on her buttocks, and G told her pediatrician that she had been struck with a belt numerous times. Concerned about certain content that R had found on G's cell phone, R gave it to the police. An extraction of the phone's data revealed various suggestive photographs and text messages between the defen- dant and G, including photographs of the defendant lying shirtless in bed with G, text messages from the defendant instructing G to send him photographs of G fully and partially nude in various poses, along with the resulting photographs, and text messages in which the defendant discussed his plans for punishing G for failing to send him daily selfies. Thereafter, the trial court issued a protective order prohibiting the defen- dant from, among other things, following or stalking G. On a subsequent morning, however, the defendant positioned himself on a bench near G's school and made eye contact with her as she passed by in her school van. About two weeks later, the defendant parked his car along the route of G's school van and followed it to G's school after watching it pass by. The defendant represented himself at trial. The trial court denied the defendant's pretrial motion to sever and granted the state's motion for joinder, and the sexual offenses, namely, sexual assault in the first degree, one count of risk of injury to a child based on sexual conduct, and employing a minor in an obscene performance, were tried together with the nonsexual charges of assault in the third degree and another count of risk of injury to a child unrelated to sexual conduct, which related to the incident involving the belt, criminal violation of a protective order, and first degree stalking. At trial, the defendant cross- examined G and attempted to elicit testimony regarding prior inconsis- tent statements that she had made during two forensic interviews. During the first interview, G initially denied any alleged sexual abuse by the defendant, but, during the second interview approximately six months later, G indicated that the defendant had touched her private parts with both his private parts and his hand on more than one occasion. When the defendant attempted to refresh G's recollection with her statements from her first interview, however, the trial court interjected and instructed the defendant to move on. The defendant also attempted to offer video recordings of the interviews as substantive evidence through his expert witness, but the trial court excluded them on the grounds that there was no foundation for their admission and could not be authenticated by the expert. On the defendant's appeal from the judg- ments of conviction, held: 1. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by consolidating the sexual offenses and the nonsexual offenses for trial, as the evidence relating to the sexual offenses was cross admissible to prove the nonsexual offenses: The evidence relating to the sexual offenses and the nonsexual offenses was relevant in each case, as all of the offenses involved the same victim and tended to prove the state's theory that the defendant's motive for committing all of the offenses was his sexual interest in, and obsession with, G, and specific evidence suggestive of the defendant's motive relat- ing to the sexual offenses included G's testimony recounting the sexual abuse, the defendant's gifting G with a cell phone and prohibiting R from seeing it, his tracking of G via the phone's global positioning system and asking her to send him daily selfies and photographs of her partially or fully nude, and his positioning himself along G's school van route. Moreover, it could be fairly inferred that the defendant's nonsexual conduct in following G to school and hitting her with a belt was influenced by his criminal conduct of sexually assaulting her, all of that conduct was tied together by the defendant's obsession with and desire to control G, and, on the basis of that evidence, the trial court reasonably concluded that evidence relating to each charged crime would be probative to show a genuine connection between the defendant's sexual and nonsexual conduct, to corroborate crucial prosecution testimony, and to establish the complete story of the defendant's sexual abuse of G by placing it in context. Although the evidence relating to G's sexual exploitation was more severe than the evidence relating to the nonsexual incidents involving the stalking and the striking of G with a belt, the evidence of the sexual offenses was more probative than prejudicial with respect to the nonsex- ual offense charges, and vice versa, and the prejudicial effect of joining the various charges for trial was mitigated by the fact that there was only a single victim, with the charges providing context and motive for the defendant's sexual and nonsexual actions as to that victim, and by the trial court's jury instruction, given on multiple occasions, that the evidence relating to each charge must be considered separately. 2. The defendant could not prevail on his unpreserved claims that the statute (§ 53a-196a (a) (1)) prohibiting the employment of a minor in an obscene performance was unconstitutionally vague as applied to him and that, because the photographs of G were not obscene, they were protected by the first amendment to the United States constitution: a. Section 53a-196a (a) (1) was not unconstitutionally vague as applied to the defendant's conduct, as the elements of the offense of employing a minor in an obscene performance were adequately defined and afforded the defendant fair and adequate notice that his conduct with respect to G, namely, directing her to model in suggestive poses and to take photographs partially and fully nude, was criminal: Contrary to the defendant's arguments that there was a definitional conflict in the statutory scheme governing obscenity related offenses, the text of § 53a-196a (a) (1) was clear that the defendant was prohibited from employing a minor to promote an exhibition that, among other things, depicted a prohibited sexual act, such as a ''nude performance'' showing certain body parts, and the photographs in the present case contained a nude performance. Even if, as the defendant argued, the term ''nude performance'' was itself vague in the absence of a judicial gloss that restricted its reach only to nudity of a sexual nature, decisions from this court and the Appellate Court provided ample notice that photographs like those recovered from G's cell phone were within the ambit of the statute and made clear that, when the defendant engaged in the conduct at issue, selfies in which a nine year old child, such as G, is directed to pose fully or partially nude constitute a nude performance under the statute. b. The photographs of G, in which she posed fully or partially nude at the defendant's instruction, did not warrant first amendment protection: It is well established that obscenity is not a category of expression protected by the first amendment, and § 53a-196a (a) (1) prohibits employing a minor in any material or performance that is ''obscene as to minors'' and, thus, ''harmful to minors,'' which may be established by demonstrating that the material or performance describes or represents a prohibited sexual act that predominantly appeals to the prurient, shame- ful or morbid interest of minors, is patently offensive to prevailing stan- dards in the adult community as a whole with respect to what is suitable material for minors, and taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, educational, political or scientific value for minors. Moreover, although nudity by itself is not pornographic, a photograph can be sexually explicit when it contains a lascivious image, this court has adopted a case specific approach for assessing whether a display is lascivious, and, following an independent appellate review of the photographs at issue, this court concluded that, given G's age and G's sexually suggestive poses at the defendant's direction, the photographs of G depicted a degree of sexual activity that was ''harmful to minors'' and, therefore, obscene. 3. The defendant could not prevail on his claim that the trial court's improper exclusion of the video recordings of the forensic interviews violated his constitutional rights to confrontation and to present a defense, as any claimed error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt: Although the trial court was within its discretion to ensure that the defendant's cross-examination of G was not abusive or intimidating, it should not have interjected when the defendant attempted to refresh her recollection, especially when the defendant's questions were neither tangential nor irrelevant and the prosecutor did not object, and, in this instance, the trial court's desire to protect G interfered with the defen- dant's attempts to exercise his right to represent himself. Nevertheless, the trial court's potentially incorrect rulings with respect to the admission of the video-recorded interviews were harmless, as the relevant portions of the first interview were cumulative of trial testimony that G had, on three occasions, denied any sexual misconduct by the defendant, if the recording of the first interview had been admitted, it would have established only what the jury already knew from testimony about G's initial denials, the defendant had the opportunity to highlight any inconsistencies between G's testimony and her statements during the first forensic interview when the defendant cross-examined her, and the defendant's line of questioning repeatedly made the jury aware of the existence of the inconsistencies. Moreover, G's answers during the second interview about the defendant's touching her vagina with his hand did not differ in any material way from her testimony that his ''parts'' went inside her private parts a ''little bit,'' and the statements in the second interview corroborated G's testi- mony and squarely established the necessary element of ''sexual inter- course'' in connection with the sexual assault charge by establishing that penetration, however slight, occurred, such that the admission of the recording of the second interview would have been damaging to the defendant's case. To the extent that there were any inconsistencies between the statements in the second interview and G's testimony regarding the type of penetra- tion that occurred, the exclusion of the second interview also was harm- less because the defendant focused his defense on G's credibility rather than on whether the state had proven the element of penetration, and there was substantial evidence corroborating G's testimony, including expert testimony explaining the concept of delayed disclosure, evidence of the defendant's directing G to send him photographs of G posing nude, and the photographs themselves. 4. The evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's conviction of assault in the third degree, two counts of violation of a protective order, and two counts of stalking in the first degree: a. There was no merit to the defendant's claim that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction of assault in the third degree on the ground that he lacked the necessary intent to cause G to sustain a physical injury, in view of his and G's testimony that a blanket was placed over G's buttocks so that it would not hurt her when he struck her with the belt: The jury reasonably could have inferred the defendant's intent to inflict injury from the physical characteristics of the bruise, which was the size of a ''tangerine,'' the number of times the defendant struck G, the defendant's statements in his text messages indicating that he would ''punish'' G for failing to send him selfies, and his own consciousness of guilt, as reflected in his misstatements and changes in statements he made to an official from the Department of Children and Families regard- ing the incident. b. The evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's conviction of two counts of criminal violation of a protective order, insofar as the evidence warranted an inference that, on two separate dates after the trial court issued the protective order, the defendant had the requisite intent to stalk and follow G: The jury reasonably could have inferred that, on the date of the first incident, the defendant knew that G would be in the van heading to school, watched the van's route specifically to see G, and cleared a spot on a bench that enabled him to wait there until he saw G, and that, on the date of the second incident, having parked in a nearby parking lot on the van's route and having pulled out of the lot once the van passed by, the defendant followed G to school. c. The evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of stalking in the first degree under the statutory provisions ((Rev. to 2017) § 53a-181c (a) (2) and (3)) proscribing, respectively, stalking that violates a court order in effect at the time of the offense and the stalking of a person under sixteen years of age: The jury reasonably could have inferred a course of conduct from the fact that, on the date of the first stalking incident, the defendant knowingly lay in wait for, monitored, surveilled, or observed G, and the fact that, on the date of the second stalking incident, the defendant knowingly followed, lay in wait for, monitored, surveilled, or observed G, and it was undisputed that a civil protective order, of which the defendant was aware, was in effect at the time of the stalking, and that G was under sixteen years of age when the stalking occurred. Argued October 18, 2022—officially released April 11, 2023

Pursuant to statute (§ 52-557n (a) (1)), ''[e]xcept as otherwise provided by law, a political subdivision of the state shall be liable for damages to person or property caused by . . . [t]he negligent acts or omissions of such political subdivision or any employee . . . thereof acting within the scope of his employment or official duties . . . provided, no cause of action shall be maintained for damages resulting from injury to any person or property by means of a defective road . . . except pursuant to section 13a-149.'' Pursuant further to statute (§ 13a-149), ''[a]ny person injured in person or property by means of a defective road . . . may recover damages from the party bound to keep it in repair.'' The plaintiff sought to recover damages for personal injuries he sustained in connection with an incident on a municipal road maintained by the named defendant, the city of New Haven. The plaintiff had been driving his vehicle behind a snowplow, operated by a city employee, that dis- lodged a manhole cover a few seconds before the incident. The plaintiff alleged in his complaint, pursuant to § 52-557n (a) (1), that the snowplow operator had negligently dislodged the manhole cover, which then became airborne, lodged under the plaintiff's vehicle, and caused the plaintiff to lose control of his vehicle and to sustain injuries. The city filed a pretrial motion to dismiss, claiming that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because § 13a-149 provided the exclusive remedy for the plaintiff's injuries, and the plaintiff had failed to comply with that statute's notice provisions. The trial court denied the pretrial motion, reasoning that the complaint alleged that the plaintiff's injuries were caused by the negligence of the snowplow operator rather than by a defect in the road. At trial, however, the plaintiff's testimony differed from the allegations in his complaint, insofar as he testified that his injuries occurred when he drove his vehicle into the open manhole itself and that the manhole cover never lodged under his vehicle. The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff, and the city filed a posttrial motion to dismiss, renewing the claims that it had raised in its pretrial motion. The trial court denied the posttrial motion to dismiss and rendered judgment in accordance with the jury verdict. The city thereafter appealed to the Appellate Court from the trial court's judgment. Before the Appellate Court, counsel for the city conceded that the trial court had properly denied the city's pretrial motion to dismiss. Nevertheless, the Appellate Court reversed the trial court's judgment, concluding, inter alia, that the plaintiff's sole remedy was an action pursuant to § 13a- 149 and that, because the plaintiff had failed to satisfy the notice require- ments of that statute, the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. On the granting of certification, the plaintiff appealed to this court. Held: 1. The concession by the city's counsel before the Appellate Court that the trial court had properly denied its pretrial motion to dismiss did not constitute a concession that the trial court had correctly decided the city's posttrial motion to dismiss: The rules and procedures that apply to a trial court's determination concerning its subject matter jurisdiction depend on the state of the record at the time the motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction is filed. The trial court, in deciding the city's posttrial motion, was required to consider any undisputed facts established at trial, and the facts estab- lished at trial differed from those that the plaintiff alleged in his complaint and included the plaintiff's own testimony that his injuries occurred when he drove his vehicle into the uncovered manhole and that the manhole cover had not lodged under his vehicle. Accordingly, the record before the trial court when it addressed the city's pretrial motion and the record before the court when it addressed the city's posttrial motion did not involve the same underlying facts, and, thus, there was no merit to the plaintiff's claim that counsel's concession that the trial court had properly denied the city's pretrial motion equated to a concession that the court properly denied the city's posttrial motion. 2. The Appellate Court correctly concluded that § 13a-149 was the plaintiff's sole remedy under the facts and circumstances of the case, and, because the plaintiff had not complied with the notice requirements of that statute, the Appellate Court properly reversed the trial court's judgment and remanded the case with direction to grant the city's posttrial motion to dismiss: It was of no consequence that the city employee's negligence may have caused the removal of the manhole cover, as the statutes and case law made clear that, if a plaintiff's damages result from injury to person or property by means of a defective road, irrespective of whether those means were created negligently, the plaintiff's exclusive remedy is § 13a-149. Moreover, in light of its prior holdings that depressions in roadways, such as potholes, constitute highway defects, this court concluded that an uncovered, open manhole constitutes a highway defect as a matter of law. Furthermore, there was no merit to the plaintiff's claim that requiring his action to be brought under § 13a-149 left him without a remedy, the plaintiff having confused the idea of being left without a remedy and the difficulty in successfully proving the elements of the remedy afforded to him by law, as the plaintiff plausibly could have contended, on the basis of the evidence adduced at trial, that the city might have had notice of the uncovered manhole and a reasonable opportunity to fix that defect if the snowplow driver had stopped his truck immediately after hitting the manhole cover, and the plaintiff's failure or inability to prove those elements or any other element of the statute did not negate the legisla- ture's choice to make § 13a-149 the exclusive remedy by which a plaintiff may recover for damages resulting from injury to person or property by means of a highway defect. Argued December 21, 2022—officially released April 18, 2023

The plaintiffs M and C, state police officers who suffered injuries when a motor vehicle driven by a nonparty tortfeasor struck a police cruiser, sought to recover underinsured motorist benefits in connection with certain insurance coverage provided by the self-insured defendant, the state of Connecticut. The plaintiffs' cases were consolidated for a trial to the court, which found for the plaintiffs on the issue of liability but awarded only a fraction of the damages they had sought. The trial court concluded that the plaintiffs were not entitled to damages for their alleged post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) on the ground that such damages are not available under the statute (§ 38a-336 (a) (1) (A)) governing uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage and prescrib- ing coverage for damages ''because of bodily injury,'' insofar as the plaintiffs' alleged PTSD was not a result of physical injuries. The trial court also did not credit the expert opinion and testimony of H, the plaintiffs' therapist, that the plaintiffs had suffered from PTSD. Subse- quently, the court held a collateral source hearing, after which it con- cluded that certain workers' compensation benefits that the plaintiffs had received were deductible from the plaintiffs' damages but that cer- tain amounts the plaintiffs had received from a pretrial settlement under the Dram Shop Act (§ 30-102) were not. Accordingly, the court adjusted the plaintiffs' damages and rendered judgments for the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs appealed and the defendant filed a cross appeal. On appeal, the Appellate Court rejected the plaintiffs' claim that the trial court had misconstrued § 38a-336 (a) (1) (A) as limiting underinsured motorist coverage to damages for physical injury and agreed with the defendant that the trial court improperly had failed to reduce the plaintiffs' damages by the amounts of their dram shop recoveries. In light of the Appellate Court's holdings and the fact that the plaintiffs' damages were reduced to zero dollars, the Appellate Court reversed the trial court's judgments and remanded the cases with direction to render judgments for the defendant. On the granting of certification, the plaintiffs appealed to this court. Held: 1. The Appellate Court correctly concluded that the plaintiffs were not entitled to recover underinsured motorist benefits for their alleged PTSD: Even if this court were to conclude that coverage for PTSD was permitted under § 38a-336, expert testimony was required to establish that the plaintiffs suffered from PTSD, and the trial court did not arbitrarily reject the opinion of H, the plaintiffs' only expert witness, regarding the plaintiffs' alleged PTSD in light of H's failure to independently assess the credibility of the plaintiffs' statements to her concerning their claims of emotional distress. Although it may be standard practice for therapists to presume the truthfulness of their patients' reporting of PTSD symptoms for treatment purposes, the trial court reasonably determined that such an assumption was not sufficient for purposes of a forensic assessment, which is a view shared by some experts in the field, and the cross-examination of H by the defendant's counsel provided further grounds for questioning her assumption that the plaintiffs had honestly and accurately reported their symptoms to her. Moreover, notwithstanding the plaintiffs' claim that H did not rely exclu- sively on the plaintiffs' reporting of their symptoms but also on her observations of them during treatment, the trial court reasonably could have rejected H's testimony that she was able to observe the plaintiffs' reactions while she was treating them and instead have relied on H's session notes, which almost exclusively recounted symptoms as reported by the plaintiffs and in which H recorded few personal observations. 2. The Appellate Court incorrectly concluded that the trial court should have reduced any award by the plaintiffs' dram shop recoveries: Pretrial settlement payments, such as the sums the plaintiffs received in settlement of their dram shop claims, are deductible from a jury award only if the trial court finds that the award would otherwise be excessive as a matter of law in the absence of such a reduction, and the amounts the trial court awarded the plaintiffs could not be deemed excessive as a matter of law, as the pretrial settlement amounts may have contemplated payment for damages that were not included, or available, in the present action, such as damages for the plaintiffs' alleged PTSD. Moreover, the defendant could not prevail on its claim that the dram shop payments were collateral sources for which a reduction was appro- priate, as settlements expressly have been excluded from the statutory (§ 52-225b) definition of ''collateral sources'' for purposes of civil actions, either in tort or in contract, in which a plaintiff seeks to recover damages for personal injuries. Furthermore, although a statute or regulation may provide for a reduction from specific sources in an action seeking to recover uninsured or under- insured motorist benefits, including settlement payments, this court pre- viously has concluded that Dram Shop Act payments do not fall within the exception, set forth in the state regulations (§ 38a-334-6 (d) (1) (A)), for sums ''paid by or on behalf of any person responsible for the injury,'' insofar as a claim under the Dram Shop Act does not require proof that the dram shop was responsible for the injury, and no other statutory or regulatory exception applied under the facts of the present case. Argued January 12—officially released April 25, 2023

The defendant, who had been convicted of sexual assault in the fourth degree and risk of injury to a child, appealed to the Appellate Court. The Appellate Court reversed the judgment of conviction, concluding that the state had failed to establish that the trial court's improper withholding of certain sealed medical records of one of the victims, A, was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt and that the trial court had abused its discretion in allowing the state to introduce evidence of uncharged sexual misconduct that was not sufficiently similar to the conduct at issue in the present case. On the granting of certification, the state appealed to this court. Held that, after an examination of the record and briefs on appeal and consideration of the parties' arguments, the Appellate Court's judgment was affirmed, and this court adopted the Appellate Court's thorough and well reasoned opinion as the proper statement of the issues and the applicable law concerning those issues: This court undertook a thorough and independent review of the sealed records at issue and identified multiple references to A's history of untruthfulness and of having made false allegations, those records con- tained information relating to behavioral, cognitive and emotional issues that could have affected A's ability to observe, understand and accurately narrate the events in question, and, because that information was not available elsewhere in the trial court record, defense counsel's cross- examination of A was limited. Moreover, the record supported the Appellate Court's determination that the uncharged sexual misconduct evidence at issue was not sufficiently similar to the conduct at issue in the present case. Argued March 22—officially released May 2, 2023

The defendant appealed from the trial court's denial of his motion to correct an illegal sentence. The defendant had been convicted of the crimes of criminal possession of a firearm and robbery in the first degree, but acquitted of assault in the first degree, in connection with an armed robbery and a shooting. During the sentencing hearing, the prosecutor, relying on United States v. Watts (519 U.S. 148), requested that the sentencing court find, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the defendant had committed the assault, notwithstanding his acquittal of that charge, and consider that finding for purposes of sentencing. The sentencing court reviewed the underlying facts of the defendant's convic- tion, as well as the assault charge of which the defendant was acquitted, noted that it found the evidence to be telling and the witnesses to be credible, and commented on the nature of the alleged assault and its impact on the victim. The court specifically stated that the victim ''was shot in the back of both legs by the defendant.'' The defendant received a lengthy total effective sentence, but the sentence for each count on which he was convicted fell within the statutorily prescribed range. In his motion to correct, the defendant argued that the sentencing court violated his rights under the federal and state constitutions when it considered the conduct underlying the assault charge, but the court rejected the defendant's claim and denied the motion. On appeal, the defendant claimed, inter alia, that the sentencing court's consideration of the conduct underlying the assault charge of which he was acquitted violated his federal and state constitutional rights to due process and to a trial by jury. Held: 1. The sentencing court's consideration of the conduct underlying the assault charge of which the defendant was acquitted did not violate his rights to a trial by jury or due process under the sixth and fourteenth amend- ments to the United States constitution, respectively: Contrary to the defendant's argument that there was no binding prece- dent on whether the consideration of acquitted conduct for purposes of sentencing violates a criminal defendant's federal constitutional rights to a trial by jury or to due process, in Watts, the United States Supreme Court emphasized that a long line of cases had established the broad range of information a sentencing court can consider in imposing a sentence and held that a sentencing court is not prevented from consider- ing conduct underlying a crime or crimes of which the defendant has been acquitted, provided that such conduct is proven by a preponderance of the evidence. Moreover, since Watts, the United States Supreme Court has clarified that a sentencing court has discretion to consider a broad range of conduct, so long as the sentence imposed falls within the statutory range and the conduct does not serve as a basis to enhance that sentence, nearly every federal court of appeals has held that the consideration of acquitted conduct for purposes of sentencing does not violate a criminal defendant's constitutional rights, including the right to a trial by jury or to due process, provided that the sentence imposed does not exceed the statutory maximum for the conviction, and, in State v. Huey (199 Conn. 121), which predated Watts, this court emphasized the broad discretion a sentencing court has within the federal constitutional rubric to consider matters that would not be admissible at trial and held that, as a matter of federal due process, a sentencing court can consider information that merely has some minimal indicium of reliability. In the present case, the sentencing court considered testimony and evi- dence adduced at a jury trial over which it presided, it had sufficient opportunity to observe and judge the credibility of the witnesses, although it did not explicitly state that the evidence on which it was relying had some minimal indicium of reliability, such sworn testimony is exactly the kind of minimally credible evidence on which sentencing courts rely, and the sentencing court's findings as to the sufficiency of the evidence of the acquitted conduct were implicit in its explanation that it found the evidence to be telling and the witnesses to be credible. Furthermore, the defendant could not prevail on his claim that neither Watts nor Huey was binding on this court, insofar as he argued that Huey did not explicitly address whether a sentencing court could consider acquitted conduct and that the holding of Watts was limited to the context of double jeopardy violations, as Watts explicitly stated that due process is generally satisfied when the acquitted conduct under consideration has been established by a preponderance of the evidence, and the rationale supporting Watts and Huey extended to a sentencing court's consider- ation of acquitted conduct, provided the requisite standards are met. 2. The sentencing court's consideration of the conduct underlying the assault charge of which the defendant was acquitted did not violate his rights to due process or to a trial by jury under article first, §§ 8 and 19, of the Connecticut constitution: Notwithstanding the defendant's claim that the state constitution affords greater protection than the federal constitution with respect to a defen- dant's rights to due process and to a trial by jury in the context of a sentencing court's consideration of acquitted conduct, an analysis under the multifactor approach articulated in State v. Geisler (222 Conn. 672) for construing state constitutional provisions led this court to conclude that the state constitution does not prohibit the consideration of acquitted conduct for purposes of sentencing when the sentence is within the statutory range for the offenses of which the defendant has been con- victed and the information relied on has a minimal indicium of reliability. Specifically, the text of the relevant state constitutional provisions, related Connecticut precedent, and persuasive federal precedent all weighed heavily in favor of this court's determination that consideration of acquitted conduct for purposes of sentencing is not unconstitutional, as §§ 8 and 19 of article first of the Connecticut constitution are almost identical in substance to the corresponding provisions in the federal constitution, this court previously has emphasized that a sentencing court has broad discretion in imposing a sentence within the statutory limits and has held that the practice of commenting on conduct for which a defendant is acquitted does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation, the defendant cited no Connecticut authority supporting the opposite proposition, and every federal court of appeals that has addressed the issue has afforded sentencing courts the same wide lati- tude discussed by the United States Supreme Court in Watts in concluding that the consideration of acquitted conduct for sentencing purposes does not raise double jeopardy concerns. Moreover, the factor regarding the persuasive precedents of other state courts, which follow diverse approaches with respect to the consider- ation of acquitted conduct for purposes of sentencing, did not strongly favor either the state's or the defendant's position, the factor regarding the historical insights into the intent of the framers of the state constitu- tion favored the state's argument that the state constitution grants the same rights as the federal constitution, insofar as the state right to trial by jury developed in a similar manner to the right to a trial by jury under the federal constitution, and, although contemporary norms and public policy weighed in favor of the defendant's position, on balance, the factors favoring the state's position outweighed the concerns embodied in the contemporary norms and public policy factor. 3. This court declined the defendant's invitation to exercise its supervisory authority over the administration of justice to impose a rule prohibiting a sentencing court's consideration of conduct underlying a charge of which a defendant has been acquitted, but it emphasized that sentencing courts should exercise caution if they do rely on such conduct: Under Connecticut's sentencing system, a sentencing court has wide latitude to sentence a defendant within the established statutory range for each offense of which a defendant is convicted, it may consider any evidence that has a minimal indicium of reliability in imposing a sentence within that range, and it is not permitted to make findings of fact relating to aggravating factors or other factors that may place a sentence outside the statutory range. Accordingly, limiting the information on which a sentencing court can rely would not provide any benefit and, instead, would discourage that court from articulating on the record a full and transparent basis for the sentence, which would prevent appellate courts from remedying those instances in which a sentencing court does rely on unreliable, inaccurate, or patently wrong information that falls short of a minimal indicium of reliability, and, as long as the evidence considered in this context satisfies the requisite standard of having a minimal indicium of reliability, it would not be appropriate for this court to interfere with a trial court's discretion in crafting proper sentences. Nevertheless, this court emphasized that sentencing courts should under- take every effort to refrain from basing a sentence on facts that cast doubt, either directly or indirectly, on any aspect of a jury's verdict, and that it is neither necessary nor appropriate for a sentencing court to express or imply its disagreement with the jury's verdict, as such a practice may harm public confidence in the fairness of the judicial system and undermine the importance of the jury's role in fair adjudications, and, in the present case, although the sentencing court's declarative statement that the victim ''was shot in the back of both legs by the defendant'' was not unconstitutional or illegal, it was imprudent. Argued November 17, 2022—officially released June 6, 2023

Pursuant to statute (§ 7-433c (a)), ''a uniformed member of a paid municipal fire department,'' who successfully passed a physical examination that failed to reveal any evidence of hypertension or heart disease before beginning such employment and then subsequently suffered any condi- tion or impairment of health caused by hypertension or heart disease resulting in his disability, is entitled to ''receive from his municipal employer compensation and medical care in the same amount and the same manner as that provided under [the Workers' Compensation Act] . . . from the municipal or state retirement system under which he is covered . . . . [These] benefits . . . shall be in lieu of any other bene- fits which such . . . fireman . . . may be entitled to receive from his municipal employer under the provisions of [the Workers' Compensation Act] or the municipal or state retirement system under which he is covered . . . .'' Pursuant further to statute (§ 7-433c (b)), ''those persons who began employ- ment on or after July 1, 1996, shall not be eligible for [heart and hyperten- sion] benefits'' under § 7-433c (a). Pursuant further to statute (§ 7-425 (5)), ''except as otherwise provided,'' the word ''member,'' as used in part II of chapter 113 (title 7) of the General Statutes, ''means any regular employee . . . receiving pay from a participating municipality . . . who has been included by such munici- pality in the pension plan as provided in section 7-427, but shall not include any person who customarily works less than twenty hours a week . . . .'' The named defendant, the town of Waterford, Cohanzie Fire Department, appealed from the decision of the Compensation Review Board, which upheld the workers' compensation commissioner's decision that the plaintiff's claim for heart and hypertension benefits was compensable under § 7-433c (a). The town originally hired the plaintiff as a part-time firefighter in 1992, prior to which he passed a physical examination that revealed no evidence of heart disease or hypertension. In 1997, the town hired the plaintiff as a full-time firefighter, and, in 2017, he suffered a myocardial infarction and underwent quadruple bypass surgery. The plaintiff then filed a claim under § 7-433c seeking compensation for his heart disease, which the town contested as noncompensable on the ground that the plaintiff had not been employed as a full-time firefighter until 1997 and, therefore, did not qualify for benefits in light of § 7-433c (b). At a hearing before the commissioner, the plaintiff testified that, while employed as a part-time firefighter, he worked assigned shifts, and the number of shifts he was assigned to work was irregular, but he did not indicate the number of hours he customarily worked. The town reasoned that benefits under § 7-433c are available only to a ''uniformed member of a paid municipal fire department'' hired prior to July 1, 1996, the term ''member'' in § 7-433c is controlled by the definition of that term in § 7-425 (5), which excludes persons who customarily work less than twenty hours per week, and, because the plaintiff failed to establish that he customarily worked twenty hours or more per week when he was employed as a part-time firefighter, he was not eligible for benefits. The commissioner rejected the town's claim and ordered it to accept the plaintiff's myocardial infarction as compensable. In doing so, the commissioner made no finding as to the number of hours the plaintiff worked per week as a part-time firefighter. Instead, the commissioner noted that § 7-433c does not define the phrase ''uniformed member of a paid municipal fire department'' or distinguish between part-time and full-time employment and applied the common definition of the word ''member'' to conclude that the plaintiff's date of employment was in 1992 and that he therefore was entitled to benefits. The board upheld the commissioner's award of benefits, and the town appealed to the Appellate Court, which affirmed the board's decision. The Appellate Court observed that, although §§ 7-425 (5) and 7-433c are both contained within part II of chapter 113 of the General Statutes, they do not concern the same subject matter and could not be read together without reaching an absurd result, insofar as § 7-425 (5) defines terms related to the governance of the voluntary public pension plan provided by the state for participating municipalities and their employees and elected officials, including the term ''member,'' which is defined therein as a regular employee who receives pay from a municipality that participates in that state retirement fund, whereas § 7-433c (a) mandates that municipal employers pay heart disease and hypertension benefits to qualified uni- formed members of paid municipal fire departments, regardless of whether the municipality participates in the state retirement fund. The Appellate Court also concluded that the town's interpretation would lead to the absurd result that benefits under § 7-433c are available only to uniformed firefighters employed and paid by municipalities that par- ticipate in the state retirement fund. On the granting of certification, the town appealed to this court. Held that the Appellate Court incorrectly determined that the definition of ''member'' in § 7-425 (5) does not affect eligibility for heart and hypertension benefits under § 7-433c, and, accordingly, this court reversed the judgment of the Appellate Court: When considered in context, the language of §§ 7-425 (5) and 7-433c compelled the conclusion that the meaning of the word ''member'' in § 7-433c was controlled by the definition set forth in § 7-425 (5), especially in view of the relationship between § 7-433c and other statutes, the principle of statutory interpretation that the legislature, in amending or enacting statutes, is presumed to have created a harmonious and consis- tent body of law, and the absence of legislative history squarely support- ing the proposition that the legislature did not intend the definition of ''member'' in § 7-425 (5) to apply to § 7-433c. Section 7-425 clearly and unambiguously provides that, ''except as other- wise provided,'' it governs the meanings of the statutes in part II of chapter 113 (title 7) of the General Statutes, that is the part of the General Statutes that provides for the establishment of the state retirement fund, tenets of statutory interpretation required this court to presume that the legislature acted consciously when it codified § 7-433c with the governing definitions in that part of the General Statutes, and, in view of the logical and factual relationship between heart and hypertension benefits and retirement benefits, as expressly and repeatedly recognized by the text of § 7-433c (a), this court assumed that the placement of § 7-433c was intentional, particularly when there were other logically suitable places in the General Statutes where that statute could have been codified, such as within the related provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act. Moreover, because the legislature specifically defined the operative term ''member'' in § 7-425 (5), this court was bound to accept that definition unless it would create an irrational result that the legislature could not have intended. Furthermore, insofar as the legislature expressly provided in § 7-433c for an independent definition of a different term, specifically that ''municipal employer,'' as used in § 7-433c, would be defined by another statute (§ 7- 467), it was evident that, if the legislature had desired to incorporate a different definition of ''member'' for purposes of heart and hypertension benefits eligibility, it could have done so, and, similarly, if the legislature had desired to provide more flexibility with respect to the eligibility for such benefits under § 7-433c, it could have done so by using broader terminology, such as ''firefighter'' instead of ''a uniformed member of a paid municipal fire department,'' or, alternatively, more flexible phrasing in the definitions, as it did when it added the qualifier, ''unless the context otherwise provides,'' in the context of the definitions applicable to the workers' compensation statutes. Although the plaintiff, as a part-time firefighter, performed the same tasks as full-time firefighters, similarity in job function did not require the town to pay its part-time firefighters benefits under § 7-433c, as the terminology that the legislature used to describe the officials who are eligible for benefits under § 7-433c was controlling, notwithstanding the similarity in the officers' respective job functions, this court disagreed with the plaintiff's claim and the Appellate Court's conclusion that applying the definition of ''member'' in § 7-425 (5) to § 7-433c necessarily would lead to an absurd result insofar as only those firefighters whose municipal employers have elected to participate in the state retirement fund can qualify for benefits under § 7-433c, and, to the extent that this court's construction of the plain and unambiguous statutory text of §§ 7- 425 (5) and 7-433c could lead to results unintended by the legislature, that was not a reason to depart from the plain and unambiguous statutory text, as the legislature was free to clarify the meaning of § 7-433c if it desired to make it plain that any paid firefighter is eligible for benefits under that statute. Because the commissioner did not apply the correct legal standard in failing to make a finding as to whether the plaintiff had customarily worked twenty hours or more per week before being hired as a full- time firefighter, the plaintiff was entitled to have the commissioner decide that factual issue, and, accordingly, the case was remanded for fur- ther proceedings. (One justice dissenting) Argued November 17, 2022—officially released June 20, 2023