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STATE OF CONNECTICUT v.
ULYSES R. ALVAREZ
(SC 20697)
Robinson, C. J., and McDonald, D’Auria,
Mullins, Ecker and Alexander, Js.
Syllabus
The defendant, who had been convicted of sexual assault in the fourth
degree and risk of injury to a child, appealed to the Appellate Court.
The Appellate Court reversed the judgment of conviction, concluding
that the state had failed to establish that the trial court’s improper
withholding of certain sealed medical records of one of the victims, A,
was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt and that the trial court had
abused its discretion in allowing the state to introduce evidence of
uncharged sexual misconduct that was not sufficiently similar to the
conduct at issue in the present case. On the granting of certification,
the state appealed to this court.
Held that, after an examination of the record and briefs on appeal and
consideration of the parties’ arguments, the Appellate Court’s judgment
was affirmed, and this court adopted the Appellate Court’s thorough
and well reasoned opinion as the proper statement of the issues and
the applicable law concerning those issues:
This court undertook a thorough and independent review of the sealed
records at issue and identified multiple references to A’s history of
untruthfulness and of having made false allegations, those records contained information relating to behavioral, cognitive and emotional issues
that could have affected A’s ability to observe, understand and accurately
narrate the events in question, and, because that information was not
available elsewhere in the trial court record, defense counsel’s cross-examination of A was limited.
Moreover, the record supported the Appellate Court’s determination that
the uncharged sexual misconduct evidence at issue was not sufficiently
similar to the conduct at issue in the present case.
Argued March 22—officially released May 2, 2023
Procedural History
Substitute information charging the defendant with
two counts each of the crimes of sexual assault in the
fourth degree and risk of injury to a child, brought to
the Superior Court in the judicial district of Litchfield,
where the court, Wu, J., granted the state’s motion
to introduce certain uncharged misconduct evidence;
thereafter, the case was tried to the jury before Wu, J.;
verdict and judgment of guilty, from which the defendant appealed to the Appellate Court, Bright, C. J., and
Suarez and Sullivan, Js., which reversed the judgment
of the trial court and remanded the case for a new trial,
and the state, on the granting of certification, appealed
to this court. Affirmed.
Denise B. Smoker, senior assistant state’s attorney,
with whom, on the brief, were David R. Shannon, state’s
attorney, and Dawn Gallo, former state’s attorney, for
the appellant (state).
Kevin M. Smith, with whom, on the brief, was Norman A. Pattis, for the appellee (defendant).
Opinion
PER CURIAM. In this certified appeal, the state appeals
from the Appellate Court’s judgment reversing the trial
court’s judgment of conviction against the defendant,
Ulyses R. Alvarez, rendered after a jury trial, of sexual
assault in the fourth degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-73a (a) (1) (E) and (8), and risk of injury to
a child in violation of General Statutes § 53-21 (a) (1)
and (2).1 See State v. Alvarez, 209 Conn. App. 250, 252,
271,
267 A.3d 303 (2021). On appeal, the state claims
that the Appellate Court incorrectly held that (1) the
state had failed to establish that it was harmless beyond
a reasonable doubt that the trial court improperly withheld relevant sealed medical records of A,2 who testified
on behalf of the state both to corroborate the testimony
of the victim, K, and to provide uncharged sexual misconduct evidence, and (2) the trial court abused its
discretion by allowing the state to introduce evidence
of uncharged sexual misconduct, specifically, the testimony of P, on the ground that the conduct was not
sufficiently similar to the conduct at issue in the present case.
After examining the record and briefs on appeal and
considering the arguments of the parties, we conclude
that the judgment of the Appellate Court should be
affirmed on the grounds stated by the Appellate Court.
More specifically, as to the state’s first claim, this court,
like the Appellate Court, has undertaken a thorough
and independent review of the sealed records. Based on
that review, we identified multiple records containing
references both to A’s history of untruthfulness in general and A’s history of making false misconduct allegations in particular. The records also contain information
relating to behavioral, cognitive, and emotional issues
that could affect A’s ability to observe, understand, and
accurately narrate the events in question. See State v.
Juan A. G.-P.,
346 Conn. 132, 155,
287 A.3d 1060 (2023)
(trial court improperly withheld from defendant relevant impeachment material contained in complainants’
psychiatric records and generally describing relevant
portions of those records). This information was not
available elsewhere in the trial court record, and thus
defense counsel’s cross-examination of A was limited
to the fact that A had a criminal history, A had a history
of drug use, and A originally denied that the misconduct
at issue had occurred. As to the state’s second claim,
our review of the trial court record also confirms the
Appellate Court’s determination that the uncharged sexual misconduct about which P testified was not sufficiently similar to the conduct at issue in the present
case. The Appellate Court’s thorough and well reasoned
opinion fully addresses the certified questions, and,
accordingly, we adopt the Appellate Court’s opinion as
the proper statement of the issues and the applicable
law concerning those issues. See, e.g., State v. Hender-
son,
330 Conn. 793, 799,
201 A.3d 389 (2019).
The judgment of the Appellate Court is affirmed.
1
We granted the state’s petition for certification to appeal, limited to
the following issues: (1) ‘‘Did the Appellate Court improperly apply the
constitutional harmless error standard to the trial court’s failure to disclose
certain sealed records under State v. Esposito, 192 Conn. 166,
471 A.2d 949
(1984), instead of the standard typically used for purely evidentiary claims?’’
And (2) ‘‘[d]id the Appellate Court incorrectly determine that the trial court
had abused its discretion in finding that evidence of the defendant’s
uncharged misconduct against P was not sufficiently similar to his charged
conduct against the complainant, K, in this case?’’ State v. Alvarez,
342
Conn. 905,
270 A.3d 692 (2022).
2
In accordance with our policy of protecting the privacy interests of the
victims of sexual assault and the crime of risk of injury to a child, we decline
to identify the victim or others through whom the victim’s identity may be
ascertained. See General Statutes § 54-86e.
Furthermore, in accordance with federal law; see 18 U.S.C. § 2265 (d) (3)
(2018), as amended by the Violence Against Women Act Reauthorization
Act of 2022,
Pub. L. No. 117-103, § 106,
136 Stat. 49, 851; we decline to
identify any person protected or sought to be protected under a protection
order, protective order, or a restraining order that was issued or applied
for, or others through whom that person’s identity may be ascertained.
