Benvenuto v. Brookman

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  VINCENT G. BENVENUTO v. KEVIN BROOKMAN
                 (SC 20699)
             Robinson, C. J., and McDonald, D’Auria, Mullins,
                   Ecker, Alexander and Dannehy, Js.

                                   Syllabus

The plaintiff, a lieutenant with the Hartford Police Department, filed a bill
   of discovery against the defendant, who publishes an Internet blog on
   issues relating to Hartford municipal governance, seeking the production
   of certain materials that would enable the plaintiff to ascertain the
   identities of persons who had posted anonymous blog comments containing allegedly defamatory statements about him. Specifically, the
   plaintiff sought to compel the defendant to release the Internet protocol
   addresses and any other information identifying the anonymous commenters and to submit for forensic analysis the hard drive of the laptop
   and the cell phone the defendant used in connection with the blog. The
   trial court granted the plaintiff’s bill of discovery, concluding that the
   plaintiff had demonstrated probable cause with respect to his defamation
   claim against the authors of certain anonymous comments. To safeguard
   the defendant’s privacy interests, the court ordered that the parties
   initially attempt to come to an agreement on the terms of a protective
   order and search protocols that would govern the scope and procedures
   to be used in the forensic analysis of his electronic devices. The court
   further ordered that, if the parties could not agree on those matters,
   then they must submit to the court proposed orders so the court could
   resolve any dispute. The court explicitly retained jurisdiction until such
   time as the parties filed their agreements or the court resolved any
   related disputes. Before the parties attempted to negotiate the terms,
   however, the defendant appealed, challenging the trial court’s granting
   of the plaintiff’s bill of discovery on various constitutional, statutory,
   and evidentiary grounds.

Held that the trial court’s decision granting the plaintiff’s bill of discovery
   was not an appealable final judgment, and, accordingly, this court dismissed the defendant’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction:

   The final judgment rule applies to a pure bill of discovery, the trial court’s
   decision in the present case would not become a final judgment until
   the scope of discovery was clearly defined by agreement of the parties
   or, in the absence of an agreement, by court order, and, because the
   parties had not yet complied with the aspect of the trial court’s order
   requiring them, prior to any discovery, to either file an agreement regarding the terms of the protective order and search protocols or to return
   to the trial court for resolution of those issues, the trial court’s decision
   was not a final judgment in the usual sense.

   Moreover, contrary to the defendant’s claim, the trial court’s interlocutory decision did not constitute an appealable final judgment under the
   second prong of State v. Curcio (

), insofar as it did not so
   conclude the rights of the parties that further proceedings could not
   affect them.

   Specifically, the trial court’s order that the parties ‘‘attempt’’ to agree
   meant only that counsel was required to engage in good faith efforts to
   reach an agreement regarding the terms of the protective order and
   search protocols and in no way required, contrary to the defendant’s
   argument, the defendant’s counsel to reveal information that would put
   at risk the statutory and constitutional rights to anonymity that the
   defendant sought to protect, as counsel could decline to reveal any such
   information if he acted in good faith and could ask the court to decide
   the open issues if the negotiations were to fail, and the very purpose of the
   further proceedings contemplated by the court’s order was to safeguard
   those rights to the extent possible.

   Furthermore, the defendant’s argument that, regardless of the terms of
   the protective order and search protocols, his asserted rights to privacy
  would be violated once the forensic analysis of his devices was undertaken also failed to satisfy the second prong of Curcio because, although
  proceedings in the trial court relating to the protective order and search
  protocols might not have extinguished the defendant’s aggrievement or
  eliminated his grounds for appeal, the terms of the order and protocols
  might have affected the nature or scope of the issues requiring resolution
  in a future appeal.

  In addition, the exception to the final judgment rule recognized in Curcio
  is applicable only when this court finds that a cognizable legal right to
  which the appellant was plausibly entitled would be lost if appellate
  review were delayed, there could be no search of the defendant’s devices
  until after the terms of the protective order and search protocols were
  finalized by agreement or by the court, until then, there was no threat
  of disclosure of the information that the defendant claimed he was legally
  entitled to withhold, and, accordingly, it was clear that the defendant
  would suffer no risk of irreparable harm to the rights he sought to
  preserve if he had been required to defer his appeal until the parties
  complied with the court’s order.

  Strict adherence to the requirements of the final judgment rule was
  appropriate under the present circumstances insofar as that rule implicates the court’s jurisdiction and is intended to promote efficient judicial
  administration by discouraging piecemeal appeals, and, although an
  appeal by the defendant may be inevitable, he could not jump the gun
  by obtaining appellate review before the court’s decision in the present
  case becomes a final judgment.
      Argued October 19, 2023—officially released March 5, 2024

                           Procedural History

   Petition for a bill of discovery seeking certain information and materials that would aid in the discovery
of the identities of anonymous commenters to the
defendant’s blog, brought to the Superior Court in the
judicial district of Hartford, where the court, Noble, J.,
granted the plaintiff’s motion to strike the defendant’s
special defenses; thereafter, the case was tried to the
court, Noble, J.; judgment granting the plaintiff’s petition, and the defendant appealed. Appeal dismissed.
  Mario Cerame, with whom were Robert Killian and
Ikechukwu Ubaike, law student intern, for the appellant (defendant).
  Gregory A. Jones, with whom was Patrick Tomasiewicz, for the appellee (plaintiff).
  Jay M. Wolman filed a brief for Public Citizen as
amicus curiae.
                          Opinion

   ECKER, J. This is an appeal from an order granting
a bill of discovery and requiring the defendant, Kevin
Brookman, who publishes an Internet blog known as
‘‘We The People–Hartford,’’ to submit his laptop and
cell phone for a forensic analysis that will enable the
plaintiff, Vincent G. Benvenuto, to ascertain the identities of persons who posted blog comments containing
allegedly defamatory statements about him. ‘‘[T]o safeguard the defendant’s privacy interest,’’ the trial court’s
discovery order mandates that the parties attempt to
reach an agreement on the terms of a protective order
and search protocols that together will govern the scope
and procedures to be used in the forensic analysis, or,
in the absence of an agreement, submit proposed orders
so that the trial court can resolve any disputes regarding
the terms of the protective order and search protocols.
The court expressly retained jurisdiction until such time
as the parties have filed an agreement or the court
has resolved any impasse. Following oral argument, we
ordered the parties to file supplemental briefs addressing
whether the trial court’s order is a final judgment for
purposes of appellate review. We conclude that the
order is not final and dismiss the appeal.
   The following facts and procedural history are relevant to our disposition. The defendant’s blog ‘‘concentrates on police, fire, public works, the board of
education, and city hall as they relate to Hartford residents.’’ The blog contains two sections, the first of
which includes the defendant’s investigative reports
regarding matters of municipal governance. The second
section consists of comments posted by readers, who
can elect to reveal their identity or to remain anonymous. The present case arises from comments posted
anonymously in the second section of the blog between
August 5 and October 21, 2019, containing allegedly
defamatory comments about the plaintiff, a lieutenant
with the Hartford Police Department. There is no claim
that the defendant was the author of these comments,
conspired with the commenters, or has actual knowledge of the identities of the commenters.
   The plaintiff filed the present action, seeking a pure
bill of discovery1 requiring the defendant to release the
Internet protocol addresses and any other information
identifying the anonymous commenters, and requiring
the defendant to submit for forensic analysis the hard
drive of the laptop and the media storage of the cell
phone used to access, monitor, and maintain the blog.
The plaintiff alleged that he sought this information so
that he could file defamation claims against the anonymous commenters. The defendant raised a special
defense, alleging that the information was shielded from
disclosure under General Statutes § 52-146t because his
blog fell within the definition of ‘‘[n]ews media’’ protected by that statute.2 The trial court granted the plain-
tiff’s motion to strike the special defense on the ground
that ‘‘the facts alleged in the [defendant’s] first special
defense fail to support any of the criteria outlined by
the legislature [in § 52-146t] that would allow [the trial]
court to consider including [his] blog under ‘news media.’ ’’
   After a bench trial on the bill of discovery, the court
found that four anonymous comments were defamatory
per se because they referred to the plaintiff in his professional capacity as a police officer and were false.3 The
court concluded that the plaintiff had demonstrated
probable cause to bring an action for defamation against
the authors of those four comments.4
   In fashioning the appropriate relief, the court determined that ‘‘[t]he only source . . . of any potential
information relative to the identity of the commentors
is . . . meta- and other data contained in the defendant’s laptop and cell phone.’’ The court credited the
testimony of the plaintiff’s expert witness, who
explained that ‘‘a forensic analysis of the defendant’s
data . . . might contain identifiers in emails and texts
that may be used to identify identical key words relative
to the comments’’ and might reveal ‘‘potential information relative to the identity of the commentors . . . .’’
The court therefore ordered the defendant to submit
his laptop’s hard drive and his cell phone for forensic
analysis. ‘‘[T]o safeguard the defendant’s privacy interest, the court order[ed] the parties to attempt to reach
an agreement on the terms of a protective order that
adequately preserves the defendant’s interests, and to
attempt to agree on a search protocol covering procedures, search terms, and dates.’’ If the parties could not
‘‘reach agreement on these subjects,’’ the court would
require them ‘‘to submit proposed orders regarding the
protective order and search protocols.’’ The trial court
noted that it would ‘‘retain jurisdiction of this action
until such time as the parties have filed agreements as
to the [terms of the protective order and the search
protocols] or the court resolves any related disputes.’’
The parties have not yet attempted to negotiate the
terms of the protective order or to agree on the search
protocols that will be used in conducting the forensic
analysis. Instead, the defendant filed the present appeal
without complying with the court’s order regarding
these issues.5
  On appeal, the defendant claims that the trial court
improperly granted the bill of discovery because (1)
the blog is protected from disclosure as ‘‘news media,’’
as defined by § 52-146t, (2) the court applied the wrong
legal standard in its decision to ‘‘ ‘unmask’ ’’ the anonymous commenters, in violation of article first, §§ 4, 5,
and 14, of the Connecticut constitution, (3) the evidence
was insufficient to establish that the anonymous comments were defamatory, and (4) the court’s discovery
order was overly broad and unreasonably invasive.
  Following the submission of appellate briefs and oral
argument before this court, we ordered the parties to
file supplemental briefs addressing whether the trial
court’s decision constitutes an appealable final judgment in light of the fact that the parties have not yet
complied with the aspect of the court’s order requiring
them, prior to any discovery, either to file an agreed
on protective order and search protocols or, in the event
of an impasse, to return to the trial court for resolution
of those threshold issues. In their supplemental briefs,
both parties agree that the circumstances render the
judgment nonfinal for purposes of appeal unless it
comes within the exception set forth in State v. Curcio,

, 

 (1983). The plaintiff
contends that the judgment is not immediately appealable because it satisfies neither prong of the Curcio
exception. The defendant argues that the judgment is
immediately appealable under the second prong of Curcio, which treats an otherwise interlocutory order as
an appealable final judgment when it ‘‘so concludes the
rights of the parties that further proceedings cannot
affect them.’’ 

 We agree with the plaintiff and, accordingly, dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
   Except as otherwise provided in the state constitution, the jurisdiction of our appellate courts is determined purely by statute. See, e.g., Redding Life Care,
LLC v. Redding, 

, 

 (2019).
General Statutes §§ 51-197a and 52-263, in turn, limit
the ‘‘statutory right to appeal . . . to appeals by
aggrieved parties from final judgments.’’ State v. 

; accord Halladay v. Commissioner
of Correction, 

, 57, 

 (2021).
Because the requirement of a final judgment implicates
our jurisdiction, we must determine whether the judgment is final before reaching the merits of the appeal.
See, e.g., Smith v. Supple, 

, 937, 

 (2023).
   ‘‘Adherence to the final judgment rule is not dictated
by legislative fiat alone.’’ State v. 

. The rule also serves important functional
purposes relating to efficient judicial administration in
both the appellate and trial courts, namely, ‘‘to discourage piecemeal appeals and to facilitate the speedy and
orderly disposition of cases at the trial court level.’’
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Wolfork v. Yale
Medical Group, 

, 459, 

 (2020);
accord Mazurek v. Great American Ins. Co., 

, 

 (2007); see also Burger & Burger,
Inc. v. Murren, 

, 

(1987). Our ‘‘decisions recognize that the allowance of
interlocutory appeals must be very narrowly prescribed’’ because ‘‘ ‘[i]mmediate review of every trial
court ruling, while permitting more prompt correction
of erroneous decisions, would impose unreasonable
disruption, delay, and expense. It would also undermine
the ability of [trial court] judges to supervise litigation.’ ’’ Burger & Burger, Inc. v. 

,
quoting Richardson-Merrell, Inc., v. Koller, 

, 

, 

 (1985). Our
usual policy of strict enforcement of the final judgment
rule at times may come at the cost of providing immediate appellate relief to an aggrieved party, but ‘‘this court
has expressed the preference that some erroneous trial
court decisions go uncorrected until appeal after judgment rather than have litigation disrupted by piecemeal
appeals.’’ Burger & Burger, Inc. v. 

.
   The plaintiff in this case seeks a pure bill of discovery.
The bill of discovery is an equitable action ‘‘designed
to obtain evidence for use in an action other than the
one in which discovery is sought.’’ Berger v. Cuomo,

, 5–6, 

 (1994). In a pure bill of
discovery, the plaintiff ‘‘seeks no remedy other than
[the] disclosure of certain information or documentation . . . .’’ Journal Publishing Co. v. Hartford
Courant Co., 

, 

 (2002)
(Borden, J., dissenting); see footnote 1 of this opinion.
‘‘Because the bill of discovery [is] an independent
action, its merits [can] . . . be reviewed [only] in an
independent appeal.’’ State v. Ebenstein, 

, 

 (1991).6 That said, the final judgment
rule applies to a pure bill of discovery as it does to any
other civil action, and the judgment in such a case does
not come within our appellate jurisdiction unless and
until it satisfies the statutory requirement of finality or
falls within a Curcio exception.
   The parties agree that the judgment in the present
case is not yet final unless Curcio applies. Although
the trial court ordered the defendant to submit two of
his devices for forensic analysis, the parties have yet
to comply with that part of the judgment requiring them,
at the outset, to take certain designated steps to establish ‘‘the terms of a protective order that adequately
preserves the defendant’s [privacy] interests’’ and ‘‘a
search protocol covering procedures, search terms, and
dates’’ in connection with the forensic analysis. The
trial court ordered that counsel first ‘‘attempt to reach
an agreement’’ as to the terms of the protective order,
and ‘‘attempt to agree’’ on the search protocols. Recognizing that such an agreement may not occur, the court’s
order requires the parties to return to court in the event
of an impasse so that the court can resolve any
remaining disputes concerning the protective order and
search terms.7 The court explicitly retained jurisdiction
over the case ‘‘until such time as the parties have filed
agreements as to the [terms of the protective order and
the search protocols] or the court resolves any related
disputes.’’ The trial court’s judgment is not final until
the scope of discovery has been clearly defined by
agreement or, in the absence of agreement, by court
order. As of now, no such agreement has been filed,
and no such court order has been sought or obtained.
The judgment is therefore not final in the usual sense.
   Nor can we conclude under these circumstances that
the judgment is final under Curcio. An otherwise nonfinal judgment may be deemed final and appealable under
Curcio ‘‘ ‘(1) [when] the order or action terminates a
separate and distinct proceeding, or (2) [when] the
order or action so concludes the rights of the parties
that further proceedings cannot affect them.’ ’’ Barbato
v. J. & M. Corp., 

, 

(1984), quoting State v. 

.
Although he raises no claim under the first prong of
Curcio,8 the defendant argues that the judgment is
immediately appealable under Curcio’s second prong
for two primary reasons.
   First, the defendant argues that ‘‘interlocutory review
is necessary to preserve the substantive rights to anonymity at stake, statutory and constitutional.’’ More
specifically, he contends that ‘‘[t]he order ‘to attempt
to agree’ [requires him] to engage in a back and forth
conversation concerning search terms and dates’’ and
that ‘‘this compelled conversation puts [substantive
rights to anonymity] at risk.’’ He asserts that ‘‘[n]egotiations refusing one term and allowing another can reveal
information about anonymous identities.’’ We reject
this claim.
   The trial court ordered the parties to attempt to reach
an agreement, nothing more. This means that the defendant’s counsel must engage in good faith efforts to reach
an agreement, in whole or in part, regarding the terms
of the protective order and search protocols. The order
in no way requires counsel to reveal information during
these negotiations that will put at risk the ‘‘substantive
rights to anonymity’’ that he claims a right to preserve
and protect. So long as counsel acts in good faith, he
may decline to reveal any such information in connection with the negotiation process, and he may request
the trial court to decide the open issues if the negotiations fail.9 We do not accept the argument that, by
requiring the parties to make efforts to reach agreement
on the terms of a protective order, the judgment concludes the rights of the defendant such that further
proceedings relating to the terms of the protective order
and search protocols cannot affect those rights. Indeed,
the very purpose of the further proceedings contemplated by the trial court’s order is to safeguard the
defendant’s rights to the extent possible.
   The defendant’s second argument is that he will be
‘‘compelled to give his laptop and cell phone for forensic
review’’ and that there can be ‘‘nothing in subsequent
orders that [will] change the . . . granting [of] the bill
of discovery [or that] will alter [this] order to relinquish
the property . . . putting critical rights at risk.’’10 In
other words, regardless of the terms of the protective
order and search protocols, the defendant contends
that his asserted rights are certain to be violated once
the forensic analysis is undertaken. This argument also
fails to satisfy the second prong of Curcio.
   First of all, although proceedings in the trial court
relating to the protective order and search protocols
may not extinguish the defendant’s aggrievement or
eliminate his grounds for appeal, the terms of the order
and protocols might very well affect the nature or scope
of the precise issues requiring resolution in a future
appeal. The trial court, for its part, plainly contemplated
that a protective order could function to help ‘‘safeguard’’ at least some of the defendant’s interests, and
we have no reason to doubt that such an order, properly
drafted, may have such an effect. For example, on the
merits of the present appeal, one of the defendant’s
arguments is that the trial court’s discovery order is
‘‘overbroad and entirely far too invasive . . . .’’ This is
the type of concern that can readily be eliminated by
a properly drafted protective order.
   Second, and more fundamental, even if the defendant
were correct that further proceedings in the trial court
will do nothing to affect the claims of error arising from
the portion of the case that already has been adjudicated, that fact would not change our conclusion that
the second prong of Curcio is not satisfied under the
present circumstances. Although the shorthand version
of the second prong of Curcio asks whether ‘‘the order
on appeal so concludes the rights of the parties that
further proceedings cannot affect them,’’ our cases
make it abundantly clear that this truncated formulation
does not capture the full scope of the analysis. State
v. 

. As the court in Curcio
itself explained, the inquiry ‘‘focuses not on the proceeding involved, but on the potential harm to the appellant’s rights’’ if appellate review is delayed. 

 The
exception to the final judgment rule ‘‘is applicable only
[when] we find that a cognizable legal right to which
the appellant was plausibly entitled would be lost if
appellate review were delayed.’’ (Emphasis added.) 

; see also Halladay v. Commissioner of Correction,
supra, 340 Conn. 62–63 (‘‘the second prong of Curcio
boils down to whether, as a practical and policy matter,
not allowing an immediate appeal will create irreparable harm insofar as allowing the litigation to proceed
before the trial court will—in and of itself—function
to deprive a party of that right’’); Ruggiero v. Fuessenich, 

, 

 (1996) (‘‘[t]he
second prong of Curcio requires . . . the plaintiffs to
prove that the trial court’s order threatens the preservation of a right already secured to them and that that right
will be irretrievably lost and the plaintiffs irreparably
harmed unless they may immediately appeal’’). It is
clear that the defendant will suffer no risk of irreparable
harm to his rights if he is required to defer his appeal
until the parties comply with the court order with
respect to the protective order and search protocols.
There can be no search of the electronic devices until
after the protective order and search protocols are final-
ized (whether by agreement or judicially) and entered
as an order of the court. It follows that, until then, there
is no threat of disclosure of the information that the
defendant claims he is legally entitled to withhold. At
that point in time, the defendant can exercise his appellate rights if he still wishes to do so, and he will be in
no worse of a position than he is today with respect to
his ability to vindicate his rights on appeal.
   Strict adherence to the requirements of the final judgment rule under the present circumstances serves two
important purposes. First, the rule is jurisdictional, and
we are not at liberty to expand our jurisdiction merely
because it seems expedient to do so. See, e.g., Sena v.
American Medical Response of Connecticut, Inc., 

, 40, 

 (2019) (‘‘Neither the parties
nor the trial court . . . can confer jurisdiction [on an
appellate] court. . . . [E]xcept insofar as the legislature has specifically provided for an interlocutory
appeal or other form of interlocutory appellate review
. . . appellate jurisdiction is limited to final judgments
of the trial court.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)).
An appeal by the defendant may be inevitable, as he
predicts. That circumstance does not allow the defendant to jump the gun by obtaining appellate review
before the judgment is final. Second, even apart from
jurisdictional considerations, we noted previously in
this opinion that one of the principal purposes served by
the final judgment rule is to prevent piecemeal appeals.
Permitting a party to appeal a nonfinal judgment creates
the risk of fragmented trial and appellate proceedings.
In the present case, for example, either the plaintiff or
the defendant may be disappointed by the terms of the
protective order and search protocols yet to issue if no
agreement can be reached, and an appeal may follow.
We consider it far preferable to entertain a single appeal
raising all appellate claims emanating from a single
case, unless the circumstances require interlocutory
review under an established exception to the final judgment rule.
  We have considered the defendant’s other arguments
and consider them to be without merit.
  For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the defendant has appealed from a nonfinal judgment. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
      The appeal is dismissed.
      In this opinion the other justices concurred.
  1
     The bill of discovery ‘‘is designed to obtain evidence for use in an action
other than the one in which discovery is sought.’’ Berger v. Cuomo, 

, 5–6, 

 (1994). A pure bill of discovery seeks no relief
other than the disclosure of information in some form. See, e.g., Journal
Publishing Co. v. Hartford Courant Co., 

, 

(2002) (Borden, J., dissenting). It is distinguishable from a second type of
bill of discovery, the ‘‘bill of discovery and relief,’’ ‘‘in which a plaintiff not
only seeks some information or document in the possession of the adverse
party, but also requests that the court take some affirmative action on the
asserted cause of action.’’ 

   2
     The defendant also raised a special defense claiming statutory protection
under the Communications Decency Act of 1996 (CDA), 

, ‘‘for
the publication of his personal opinions or as the publisher of anonymous
opinions of others . . . .’’ The trial court granted the plaintiff’s motion to
strike this special defense because the defendant had failed to plead any
facts establishing that ‘‘the CDA shields him from disclosing the identifying
information regarding commenters on the blog or [explaining] how he is a
publisher pursuant to the CDA . . . .’’ The trial court’s ruling on the CDA
special defense is not before us on appeal.
    3
      The court found the following four comments to be defamatory for
purposes of the present action: (1) ‘‘Go back to sleep Vinnie. You have to
start the van for the early commute in a few hours. Oh just kidding, you
can sleep during your shift in 608 so you are well rested for your morning
cup of [j]oe with [the assistant police chief].’’ (2) ‘‘Vinny is the leak, fact.’’
(3) ‘‘ ‘[The plaintiff] was racist so they kept him out of [Q]ueens and [the]
Bronx.’ ’’ And (4) ‘‘[now that] Vinnie has threatened to cut [the defendant’s]
throat and made racially insensitive comments towards . . . an African
American officer, do you think it’s possible that ‘Anonymous said: What
makes you think [another officer] aligns himself with [the plaintiff]?’ ’’ In
that fourth post, the commenter also ‘‘characteriz[ed] the plaintiff as ‘a
complete disgrace to the badge’ . . . .’’
    4
      The plaintiff conceded that he is a public figure. Typically, public figures
who allege defamation ‘‘also must prove that the defamatory statement was
made with actual malice, such that the statement, when made, [was] made
with actual knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether
it was false.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Gleason v. Smolinski, 

, 431, 

 (2015). However, the trial court in the present
case did not require the plaintiff to show actual malice ‘‘[b]ecause a pure
bill of discovery ‘is favored in equity [and] should be granted unless there
is some well-founded objection against the exercise of the court’s discretion’
. . . and because of the near impossibility that a public figure would be
able to establish actual malice on the part of an anonymous declarant under
the present circumstances such that the identity of the declarant is unknown
. . . .’’ (Citation omitted.)
    5
      The defendant appealed from the judgment of the trial court to the
Appellate Court, and we transferred the appeal to this court pursuant to
General Statutes § 51-199 (c) and Practice Book § 65-1.
    6
      Civil actions typically seek ultimate relief other than (or in addition to)
discovery, and interlocutory discovery orders in such cases are always
nonfinal and nonappealable unless they qualify for immediate appeal under
Curcio. See Redding Life Care, LLC v. 

(‘‘[g]enerally, an order issued [in connection with] a motion for discovery
ordinarily is not appealable because it does not constitute a final judgment,
at least in civil actions’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)). A pure bill of
discovery is different because no other relief is sought. Cf. Lougee v. Grinnell, 

, 485–87, 

 (1990) (concluding that trial court’s
denial of motion to quash deposition subpoena in connection with out-ofstate lawsuit constituted appealable final judgment under first prong of
Curcio because Connecticut proceeding would ‘‘not result in a later judgment from which [the deponent could] then appeal,’’ and order thus terminated separate and distinct proceeding (internal quotation marks omitted)),
overruled in part on other grounds by State v. Salmon, 

, 

 (1999).
    7
      This aspect of the order adopts a procedure similar to the one used in
our rules of practice governing discovery disputes in general, which require
the parties to exercise good faith efforts to resolve any such dispute before
seeking judicial resolution. See, e.g., Practice Book § 13-10 (i) (‘‘[n]o objection to any request for production shall be placed on the short calendar list
until an affidavit by counsel or self-represented parties is filed certifying
that they have made good faith attempts to resolve the objection and that
counsel and/or self-represented parties have been unable to reach an agreement’’). The requirement of good faith efforts serves a very important purpose because, by requiring the lawyers to meet and discuss in detail the
specific needs and concerns of each respective side, they frequently are
able to substantially narrow or even eliminate altogether the disputed issues,
a result that not only preserves scarce judicial resources but often produces
an agreed on compromise that is preferable to whatever order may be
imposed by the court in the absence of agreement. Although there is no
way to know whether counsel in the present case will reach an agreement
that narrows or eliminates the dispute between the parties, they are required
to make the effort. If that effort fails, the trial court will adjudicate the
open issues.
   8
     The first prong of Curcio requires the order to ‘‘[terminate] a separate
and distinct proceeding . . . .’’ State v. 

. ‘‘The
question to be asked is whether the main action could proceed independent
of the ancillary proceeding.’’ State v. Parker, 

, 

 (1984). Here, although the bill of discovery was granted, no separate
or distinct proceeding has terminated. Instead, the trial court ordered the
parties to file an agreement that would eventually lead to the termination
of the present proceeding. This order is not an ancillary proceeding, and
the main action cannot proceed independently therefrom. ‘‘[T]he order granting’’ the bill of discovery certainly is not ‘‘the final step,’’ and ‘‘there are
further proceedings to be undertaken.’’ Barbato v. J. & M. 

.
   9
     To be clear, we do not intend to suggest that the defendant’s attorney
is at liberty to refuse altogether to participate in the negotiation process
ordered by the trial court, and we trust that he will reconsider the statement
in his supplemental brief that, because ‘‘[t]he compelled conversation threatens anonymity,’’ the defendant ‘‘will refuse’’ even ‘‘to ‘attempt to agree’ ’’
regarding the terms of the protective order and search protocols. Counsel
is not required to reach an agreement regarding the protective order, and,
during the course of the required negotiations, he is not required to reveal
the information that the defendant claims a legal right to withhold in this
lawsuit. But he is required to engage in good faith negotiations.
   10
      The defendant does not contend that he has standing in this lawsuit to
assert the rights of the nonparty commenters. The defendant’s claim, rather,
is that compelled disclosure of the information at issue violates his own
statutory and constitutional rights. In making his arguments to this court
with respect to the jurisdictional issue at hand, the defendant occasionally
loses sight of the fact that he is not defending the rights of others. In
adjudicating this appeal, we cannot credit any argument that is based on
the defendant’s assertion of the rights of third parties because he has not
argued, either at trial or in this court, that he has third-party standing to
assert the rights of the anonymous nonparty commenters, and the record
before us does not allow such a determination to be made.
   Thus, for example, the defendant cannot establish a right to appeal on
the basis of Doe v. Rackliffe, 

, 

 (2017). The
Appellate Court in Rackliffe ‘‘determin[ed] that [t]he trial court order denying
a motion for continued use of pseudonyms . . . [was] an appealable final
judgment pursuant to the second prong of’’ Curcio. (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) 

 395 n.3. Rackliffe is manifestly distinguishable, however,
because the plaintiffs in that case were asserting their own rights to proceed
pseudonymously, rather than the rights of others to do so. See 

.
   The same can be said of Sabanovic v. Sabanovic, 

, 

 (2008), which the defendant cites as illustrating ‘‘that orders
implicating anonymity are appealable final judgments.’’ The anonymity rights
in Sabanovic, however, involved the parties’ minor children. See 

 90–91.
Further, the Appellate Court in that case concluded that, ‘‘[r]egardless of the
outcome of the underlying proceedings, the court would have no occasion
to revisit the issues addressed by the court’s revocation orders, namely,
whether the privacy interests of the parties’ children override the public’s
interest in viewing the unsealed materials.’’ 

 90 n.1. Here, the defendant
has not asserted that he has third-party standing to vindicate the rights of
the anonymous nonparty commenters, and the as yet unresolved issues
relating to the protective order and search protocols directly involve the
issues sought to be raised on appeal.