Volume 348 — Connecticut Reports

The plaintiff sought to recover damages from the defendant for its allegedly tortious interference with contractual relations and its alleged violation of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA) (§ 42-110a et seq.). The parties are home care service providers that participate in the Connecticut Home Care Program for Elders, which is operated by the Department of Social Services. In connection with that program, the parties each entered into a provider enrollment agreement with the department, pursuant to which the department matched each party with elderly individuals who were at risk of being placed in nursing homes, to whom the parties' employees provided nonmedical personal, home- making and companion care. In 2016, the department notified program participants that they would be required to use a new electronic billing system effective January 1, 2017. The plaintiff invited other program participants to join in a lawsuit challenging the implementation of the new billing system, which the defendant and three other program partici- pants accepted. The defendant's chief executive officer, G, represented to the plaintiff that the defendant had operational concerns about the new system and had not been given enough time to train its employees, and he personally approved the filing of a legal action against the depart- ment. In that action, the program participants alleged that they were unable to implement the new system and sought injunctive relief. The plaintiff subsequently learned that the defendant had been using the new system to bill the department, but G assured the plaintiff that the defendant had only been testing the system and was convinced that it was unworkable. In December, 2016, the program participants were denied prejudgment relief against the department, and, after G confirmed that the defendant would like to continue participating in the lawsuit, the plaintiff filed an appeal that included the defendant as an appellant. The day after the decision denying prejudgment relief was issued, G communicated with B, a director at the department, about the defen- dant's successful efforts to implement the new billing system and its commitment to bill using the system. G nonetheless assured the plain- tiff's general counsel that the defendant would not take any of the plaintiff's clients or recruit any of its employees, who were bound by noncompete agreements with the plaintiff. On December 29, 2016, the plaintiff informed the department via letter that it would not meet the deadline for implementation of the billing system. Days later, the depart- ment terminated the plaintiff's provider enrollment agreement due to the plaintiff's refusal to comply with the billing system requirement. Thereafter, the department immediately began to refer the plaintiff's clients to the defendant, and between eighty and eighty-five of the plaintiff's clients ultimately were transferred to the defendant. Subse- quently, the plaintiff filed the present action against the defendant, specifically alleging that the defendant had tortiously interfered with the plaintiff's provider enrollment agreement with the department, and with the plaintiff's noncompete agreements with its employees, and that the allegedly tortious interference constituted a violation of CUTPA. Following a bench trial, the trial court rendered judgment for the plaintiff on all counts. The court's conclusion that the defendant had tortiously interfered with the provider enrollment agreement was based on its finding that the defendant's conduct during the billing system litigation against the department, and, specifically, G's numerous statements and assurances to the plaintiff, constituted fraudulent misrepresentation. The court reasoned that the defendant's misrepresentations throughout that litigation had been meant to interfere with the provider enrollment agreement between the plaintiff and the department, and had harmed the plaintiff, insofar as the defendant's scheme undermined the plaintiff's position in the billing system litigation against the department and dem- onstrated to the department that the defendant was prepared to use the new billing system and willing to take the plaintiff's clients. The court also found that the defendant had tortiously interfered with the plaintiff's noncompete agreements with its employees and that the defendant's interference with the plaintiff's contractual relations violated CUTPA. The court awarded the plaintiff compensatory damages in the amount of $118,008 for the lost profits relating to the transfer of its clients to the defendant, as well as punitive damages and attorney's fees pursuant to CUTPA. On the defendant's appeal from the trial court's judgment, held: 1. There was no merit to the defendant's claim that the trial court improperly found that the defendant had tortiously interfered with the plaintiff's provider enrollment agreement with the department on the ground that the defendant did not owe the plaintiff a duty to disclose: The trial court did not base its finding of fraudulent misrepresentation on the defendant's failure to disclose but, rather, on express misrepresen- tations, as the trial court made clear that it found that the defendant, through G, had made multiple false, express representations to the plain- tiff, which the plaintiff relied on to its detriment. Specifically, the trial court found that G had approved the filing of the complaint in the billing system litigation, in which it was alleged that the defendant was unable to implement the new billing system, and that G made other statements about the defendant's concerns with the new billing system, even as the defendant continued to implement that system. The trial court also found that the extent of the defendant's use of the new system undermined the representations made in the complaint in the billing system litigation and belied G's representation that the defen- dant had tested the system only on a limited basis, and that the plaintiff acted on G's assurances that the defendant would not take the plain- tiff's clients. Moreover, the trial court found that G's statements were deceptive both because G had repeatedly assured the plaintiff that the defendant could not implement the new system even though it did so and because G assured the plaintiff that the defendant would not take the plaintiff's clients even though it made a concerted effort to do so, and that this deception was actuated, at least in part, by an improper purpose, namely, to interfere with the plaintiff's provider enrollment agreement with the department. 2. The evidence was sufficient to support the trial court's finding that the defendant's tortious conduct caused the plaintiff to sustain damages: Contrary to the defendant's argument that there was no evidence that it caused or played a role in the department's decision to terminate the plaintiff's provider enrollment agreement, the evidence was sufficient to support the trial court's finding that the department had relied on G's assurances that the defendant could take over the plaintiff's clients if the plaintiff's provider enrollment agreement was terminated because, although certain department officials testified that the department had not relied on any communications with G in deciding to terminate the plaintiff's provider enrollment agreement, the trial court apparently did not credit that testimony and reached a contrary conclusion on the basis of other evidence. Specifically, in concluding that the department knew that the defendant was available to take over the plaintiff's clients and relied on that fact in deciding to terminate the plaintiff's provider enrollment agreement, the trial court reasonably could have relied on the ample, circumstantial evidence presented at trial, including B's testimony that she was aware of the defendant's use of the new billing system, that she had communicated directly with G about the defendant's taking over the plaintiff's clients, and that she was involved in the decision to terminate the plaintiff's provider enrollment agreement. Moreover, the trial court found that the plaintiff's decision to inform the department that it would not meet the billing system implementation deadline was made in reliance on G's assurances that the defendant would not take the plaintiff's clients or recruit the plaintiff's employees, and the defendant did not dispute that the decision to so inform the department led directly to the department's decision to terminate the plaintiff's provider enrollment agreement. Furthermore, the record supported the trial court's finding regarding the amount of damages that the plaintiff had sustained as a result of the defendant's conduct, insofar as the court relied on the testimony of the plaintiff's expert, who determined that the plaintiff had incurred $118,008 in lost profits as a result of the department's transfer of the plaintiff's clients to the defendant after the department terminated the plaintiff's provider enrollment agreement. 3. In light of this court's conclusion that the evidence was sufficient to support the trial court's finding that the defendant had tortiously inter- fered with the plaintiff's provider enrollment agreement, the defendant could not prevail on its claim that the trial court improperly found that the defendant had violated CUTPA on the ground that it did not engage in such tortious conduct. 4. This court declined to address the defendant's claim that the trial court improperly found that the defendant had tortiously interfered with the noncompete agreements between the plaintiff and its employees, as any error in this regard was harmless because the court's award of damages was independently supported by its finding that the defendant had tor- tiously interfered with the plaintiff's provider enrollment agreement with the department. Argued December 14, 2022—officially released October 10, 2023

The plaintiff town appealed to the trial court from the decision of the defendant State Board of Labor Relations, which concluded that the town had violated the Municipal Employee Relations Act (§ 7-467 et seq.) by unilaterally changing its past practice of including extra duty pay in calculating pension benefits for members of the named defendant union. The labor board's decision was based on its conclusions that the town had violated the statute (§ 7-470 (a) (4)) requiring municipal employers to bargain in good faith, that there had been a consistent past practice of including extra duty pay in the calculation of pension benefits, and that the union had not waived its right to bargain with respect to changes to the calculation of future retirement benefits. In reaching its decision, the labor board applied its well established stan- dard that a union's waiver of its right to bargain with respect to an otherwise mandatory subject of bargaining must be clear and unmistak- able. During the pendency of the town's administrative appeal to the trial court, however, the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) issued a decision in MV Transportation, Inc. (368 N.L.R.B. No. 66), in which the NLRB abandoned the clear and unmistakable waiver standard in favor of the contract coverage standard, under which the NLRB initially reviews the plain language of the parties' collective bargaining agreement to determine whether the change made by the employer was within the compass or scope of the contractual language granting the employer the right to act unilaterally. Because the NLRB had held that the contract coverage standard applied retroactively to all pending cases, the trial court remanded the case to the labor board to consider whether to adopt that new federal standard. Subsequently, the labor board declined to adopt the contract coverage standard, and the trial court rendered judgment dismissing the town's administrative appeal, concluding, inter alia, that the town had failed to demonstrate any illegality, abuse of discretion, or prejudice to the town's rights in the labor board's decision. On appeal to the Appellate Court, that court concluded that, because NLRB decisions are not binding on the labor board, the labor board did not act unreasonably, illegally, arbitrarily, or in abuse of its discretion in declining to adopt the contract coverage standard. The Appellate Court also concluded that, because the labor board is the administrative agency tasked with enforcing the Municipal Employee Relations Act, its policy decision to continue to apply the clear and unmistakable waiver standard was entitled to deference. On the granting of certification, the town appealed to this court. Held that the Appellate Court correctly concluded that the labor board did not act unreasonably, illegally, arbitrarily, or in abuse of its discretion when it declined to follow MV Transportation, Inc., and to apply the contract coverage standard in determining whether the town's unilateral change to the way it calculated pension benefits for union members violated the Municipal Employee Relations Act: Although the Municipal Employee Relations Act was predicated on, and its phraseology was patterned after, the National Labor Relations Act (29 U.S.C. § 151 et seq.), and although this court frequently has relied on federal labor law precedent in interpreting parallel state legislation, including the Municipal Employee Relations Act, the federal act does not apply to Connecticut municipalities, the labor board was neither bound by NLRB precedent nor required to follow the NLRB's decision in MV Transportation, Inc., and, accordingly, the labor board did not act unreasonably, illegally, arbitrarily, or in abuse of its discretion in declining to follow that case. Moreover, even if the labor board had followed MV Transportation, Inc., and had adopted the contract coverage standard, the outcome of the present case would not have changed, as the NLRB has clarified that application of the contract coverage standard is limited to cases involving unexpired collective bargaining agreements, and it was undisputed that the agreement between the town and the union expired before the town unilaterally changed its past practice of including extra duty pay in the calculation of pension benefits. Furthermore, contrary to the town's claim, the Appellate Court did not improperly defer to the labor board's decision to apply the clear and unmistakable waiver standard, as the labor board has applied that stan- dard for approximately fifty years, this court long has approved of the labor board's application of that standard to claims that an employer's unilateral change violated the Municipal Employee Relations Act, prior to MV Transportation, Inc., the United States Supreme Court had endorsed the NLRB's application of the clear and unmistakable waiver standard to claims that an employer's unilateral change to employment conditions constituted a refusal to bargain collectively, and the labor board was the administrative agency authorized and vested with broad powers to enforce collective bargaining rights in this state, such that its policy decision to retain the long-standing and judicially approved clear and unmistakable waiver standard was entitled to deference. Argued March 30—officially released October 24, 2023

The plaintiffs, three siblings who were beneficiaries of an inter vivos trust established by their father, R, and S, who was one of three cotrustees of the trust, sought to recover damages from the defendant, another one of the cotrustees, for the defendant's alleged breach of her fiduciary duty. S is the ex-wife of R and the mother of the trust beneficiaries, whereas the defendant was married to R at the time of his death in 2007. In 2006, R executed a will leaving the residue of his estate to the trust. At the time of R's death, R owned a 49 percent interest in certain commercial real estate development projects, including properties owned by E Co., M Co., and N Co., which became a part of his estate upon his death. R's business partner, F, also held a 49 percent interest in each of the three companies, and, after R's death, F served as the sole manager of each of the companies pursuant to their respective operating agree- ments. L had served as the sole executor of the estate since 2009. In 2016, S was appointed as the third cotrustee of the trust, joining the defendant and L, the other two cotrustees. After S was appointed as a cotrustee, the plaintiffs raised various challenges in the Probate Court to L's management of the estate and to certain accountings, and sought to remove L as executor. Those challenges were predicated on allega- tions that L had breached his duty of loyalty on the grounds that he engaged in self-dealing and had a conflict of interest stemming from his personal and professional relationship with F. The Probate Court, however, rejected the plaintiffs' claims and issued various decrees deny- ing the petition to remove L as executor and approving in part the challenged accountings. The plaintiffs and L filed separate appeals from the Probate Court's decrees, which were consolidated and scheduled for a trial de novo in the Superior Court. Meanwhile, in their complaint against the defendant in the present case, the plaintiffs alleged that she had breached her fiduciary duty as trustee by failing to protect and collect trust property, to investigate or ask questions about L's alleged mismanagement of the estate, and to seek recovery from and hold L accountable for any damages sustained by the trust as a result of his misconduct. The plaintiffs relied on three sets of factual circumstances relating to L's administration of the estate and F's management of the three companies. Specifically, the plaintiffs referred to a 2011 amend- ment to the operating agreement of E Co., which provided F with an annual salary for his services as manager retroactive to 2007, a $3 million loan to E Co. from the proceeds of the sale of assets owned by M Co. and N Co., and the sale of real property owned by E Co. The plaintiffs alleged that these transactions were detrimental to the interests of the trust and that L had ongoing conflicts of interest stemming both from his personal relationship with F and the legal representation provided to F by the law firms with which L was associated while administering the estate. The parties filed separate motions for summary judgment. The plaintiffs adduced certain evidence, in support of their summary judgment motion, that L's actions had benefited F to the detriment of the trust beneficiaries and relied on the defendant's own deposition testimony that she, among other things, had failed to attend any of the Probate Court hearings pertaining to the estate, did not inquire about the assets that the trust should have been receiving from the estate, maintained no records of distributions made to the trust or to the trust beneficiaries, and took no steps to determine whether L had properly performed his duties as executor. The trial court, however, granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment and rendered judgment for the defendant, agreeing with her arguments that her duties as a trustee with respect to the residuary assets of R's estate had not commenced because those assets had not yet been conveyed to the trust, and that she owed no fiduciary duty to the trust beneficiaries until the estate settled. On the plaintiffs' appeal from the trial court's judgment, held: 1. The Probate Court's denial of the plaintiffs' petition to remove L as executor of R's estate on the grounds of self-dealing and conflict of interest did not collaterally estop the plaintiffs from litigating in the present case the issue of whether the defendant had breached her fidu- ciary duty to investigate, object to, or otherwise hold L accountable for his mismanagement of the estate: Probate Court orders, judgments, and decrees are final judgments for purposes of collateral estoppel and res judicata, the general rule in Connecticut is that a pending appeal does not deprive a Probate Court order, judgment, or decree of finality for purposes of the preclusion doctrines, and, thus, the Superior Court in the present case ordinarily would be required to apply the principles of collateral estoppel and res judicata to the Probate Court's decrees, even when there is a pending appeal from those decrees. In the present case, however, the consolidated appeal from the Probate Court's decrees was to take the form of a trial de novo in the Superior Court pursuant to statute (§ 45a-186), and, although this court had not previously considered whether a trial de novo in a pending appeal renders the preclusion doctrines inapplicable, it adopted the rule applied by the federal courts and endorsed by the Restatement (Second) of Judgments, pursuant to which the pendency of an appeal ordinarily does not suspend the preclusive effect of an otherwise final judgment, unless the appeal is to be conducted as a trial de novo. Application of the federal rule in the context of prior litigation resulting in a probate decree that is the subject of a pending de novo appeal struck the appropriate balance because, when an appeal is conducted as a trial de novo, the appellant is entitled to relitigate the issues that were addressed by the Probate Court without regard to the Probate Court's factual findings or legal conclusions, and the Superior Court, sitting as a Probate Court, may admit or preclude evidence, make factual findings and credibility determinations, and arrive at an ultimate conclu- sion without according any preclusive effect to the Probate Court's prior findings or rulings. Accordingly, a probate decree that is the subject of a pending de novo appeal does not contain the necessary attributes of finality to warrant application of the doctrine of collateral estoppel. Nonetheless, this court emphasized that trial courts possess significant and effective means to manage their dockets to minimize the risk of inconsistent outcomes or other undesirable consequences of potentially duplicative litigation, and it suggested that, on remand, the trial court may wish to consider deferring trial pending the outcome of the trial de novo in the appeal from the decree denying the petition to remove L as executor, which might ultimately have preclusive effect in the present case. 2. The trial court incorrectly concluded that there was no genuine issue of material fact as to whether the defendant had breached her fiduciary duty to collect and protect trust assets on the ground that she did not owe the trust beneficiaries such a duty with respect to the residuary assets that were not yet part of the trust res, and, accordingly, this court reversed the trial court's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings: Beginning when the trustee accepts the trusteeship, the trustee owes a fiduciary duty to administer the trust in the interest of the beneficiaries, the duty to administer the trust includes a duty to collect and protect trust property, as well as the associated responsibility of taking reason- able steps to uncover and redress any breach of duty committed by a predecessor fiduciary, and, when trust property is held or controlled by another, the duty to collect and protect trust property may require the trustee to take reasonable steps to enforce claims held by the trust. Moreover, the trustee of a testamentary trust has a duty to compel the executor of an estate to transfer trust property that the executor has a duty to transfer, or to redress any breach of duty committed by the executor, these principles apply with equal force when a will contains a testamentary disposition for the purpose of adding property to an inter vivos trust, such as in the present case, and, when an inter vivos trust is the beneficiary of a will, the trustee has a duty to pursue reasonable claims on behalf of the trust against the executor. In the present case, R's trust, which was amended and restated on the same day that R executed his will, operated in association with R's will, insofar as R's will expressly granted to L the authority to retain the estate assets and significant discretion in controlling their operation and management, the trust, as the residuary beneficiary, was entitled to whatever remained of the assets under L's control upon the closing of the estate, and the defendant had a duty, as trustee, to take reasonable steps to safeguard and protect the trust's interest in those assets. Furthermore, it was of no consequence that the defendant lacked legal title or any power to take action with respect to the residuary assets that were in L's control because, when an executor, such as L, controls the estate assets while the estate remains open, a trustee has a duty to take reasonable steps to protect and collect the trust's interests in the residuary assets, after appropriate inquiry and investigation, and to pur- sue a claim against the executor if required by the standard of care applicable to trustees. In addition, this court's review of the record revealed that genuine issues of material fact existed with respect to the allegations that the defendant had breached her fiduciary duty to protect and collect the residuary assets in R's estate. Specifically, the allegations in the plaintiffs' motion for summary judg- ment, and the evidence that the plaintiffs adduced, established that R's estate had been in probate for nearly seventeen years, raised disputed questions of fact concerning both L's involvement in the loan to E Co. and the amendment to E Co.'s operating agreement authorizing a retroactive salary for F, and demonstrated that L had significant personal and profes- sional ties to F and that the law firms with which L was associated received substantial income from their representation of entities in which F had an interest. Likewise, a reasonable fact finder could reach different conclusions about whether L had made prudent business decisions in managing the estate, consistent with his fiduciary duty as executor, or had made decisions that benefitted L and F to the detriment of the estate and the trust. The plaintiffs also submitted sufficient evidence to establish that material questions of fact remained as to whether the defendant knew or should have known of L's alleged breach of trust, including the deposition transcripts of the defendant, in which she admitted that she, among other things, had failed to discuss at any point with her cotrustees what her duties as trustee included, had failed to attend any Probate Court proceedings, had not inquired about what assets the trust should be receiving from the estate, and had signed the amendment to the operating agreement of E Co. without inquiring about whether the amendment was in the best interest of the trust. 3. The trial court's judgment in favor of the defendant could not be affirmed on the alternative ground that the plaintiffs' complaint had failed, as a matter of law, to state a claim for breach of fiduciary duty: The defendant's alternative ground for affirmance was premised on her claim that an allegation of self-dealing is a necessary element of a claim for breach of a trustee's fiduciary duty of prudence and that the plaintiffs did not allege or submit evidence to establish that she had engaged in self-dealing, but this court disagreed that a claim for breach of a trustee's fiduciary duty must include an allegation that the trustee engaged in self-dealing. Specifically, this court clarified that, to state a claim of breach of fiduciary duty against a trustee, a plaintiff must allege the existence of a fiduciary relationship, giving rise to a duty, breach of that duty, causation, and damages, and it overruled an Appellate Court case on which the defen- dant relied, Rendahl v. Peluso (173 Conn. App. 66), to the extent that that case required an allegation of self-dealing as an element of a claim of breach of fiduciary duty against a trustee. In the present case, the plaintiffs' complaint sufficiently alleged a claim of breach of fiduciary duty against the defendant, as trustee, insofar as the complaint alleged that the defendant owed the plaintiffs a duty of undivided loyalty and a duty to administer the trust prudently and with due diligence, that the defendant breached those duties by failing to protect and collect trust property, to investigate or ask questions about L's alleged misconduct, and to seek to hold L accountable for that miscon- duct, and that, as a result of the defendant's various alleged breaches of fiduciary duty, the plaintiffs incurred damages. Argued February 15—officially released November 7, 2023

Pursuant to statute (§ 52-470 (c) and (e)), there is a rebuttable presumption that the filing of a habeas petition has been delayed without good cause if it was filed more than five years after the date on which the judgment of conviction is deemed to be a final judgment, or October 1, 2017, whichever is later, and, when this rebuttable presumption applies, the habeas court, upon the request of the Commissioner of Correction, shall issue an order to show cause why the untimely petition should be permitted to proceed. The petitioner, who had been convicted of felony murder, among other crimes, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in February, 2018, more than five years after the date on which his judgment of conviction was deemed to be final. The petitioner had originally filed a timely habeas petition in 2012, but, on the date that his habeas trial was scheduled to commence, he notified the habeas court that he did not want to proceed because of his ongoing dissatisfaction with the representation provided by his assigned counsel, W. The habeas court initially indicated that it was unwilling to dismiss the petition without prejudice to refiling because the Office of the Chief Public Defender would appoint the same attorney to represent the petitioner. W, however, informed the habeas court that the petitioner would be appointed a different attorney in a future proceeding and that he previously had sent a letter to the peti- tioner advising him that ''he could withdraw [his 2012 petition] but do it now, and they'll assign you another lawyer.'' The petitioner then signed a withdrawal form, and the habeas court dismissed the 2012 petition without prejudice to refiling. When the petitioner filed the present habeas petition in 2018, the respondent, the Commissioner of Correction, moved for an order to show cause why the petition should not be dismissed as untimely pursuant to § 52-470 (c) and (e). At a hearing on the respon- dent's motion, the petitioner's counsel argued that good cause existed to excuse the untimely filing because, inter alia, W had failed to inform the petitioner of the deadline to refile his petition under § 52-470 (c). The habeas court admitted into evidence the transcript of the proceeding at which the petitioner withdrew his 2012 petition, and both W and the petitioner testified that W had never advised the petitioner that a new petition needed to be refiled by a certain date. The habeas court ulti- mately dismissed the 2018 petition as untimely, concluding that W's failure to advise the petitioner of the filing deadline in § 52-470 (c) did not constitute good cause because the transcript demonstrated that W had sent a letter advising the petitioner to refile his petition ''now . . . .'' On the granting of certification, the petitioner appealed to the Appellate Court, which affirmed the habeas court's judgment, and the petitioner, on the granting of certification, appealed to this court. Held that the Appellate Court improperly affirmed the habeas court's judg- ment, as the habeas court's determination that no good cause existed was predicated on a clearly erroneous factual finding, and, accordingly, this court reversed the judgment of the Appellate Court: In its decision in Kelsey v. Commissioner of Correction (343 Conn. 424), this court explained that a good cause determination under § 52-470 requires the habeas court to balance numerous nondispositive factors, including whether external forces outside of the petitioner's control had any bearing on the delay in filing the habeas petition and whether and to what extent the petitioner or counsel bore personal responsibility for any excuse proffered for the untimely filing, in light of the totality of the facts and circumstances presented. In the present case, the habeas court's determination that no good caused existed for the delay in filing was based on that court's clearly erroneous finding that W had advised the petitioner to refile his habeas petition ''now,'' or immediately, when the uncontradicted evidence adduced at the good cause hearing established that W never advised the petitioner of the need to refile his habeas petition prior to the date after which the petition would no longer be deemed to be timely. Specifically, neither party presented any evidence at the good cause hearing to support a reasonable inference that W had advised the peti- tioner to refile his habeas petition ''now,'' as W and the petitioner both testified that W never informed the petitioner of any time limit or specific date by which he had to refile the petition in order for it not to be deem- ed untimely. Moreover, although the transcript from the proceeding during which the petitioner withdrew his 2012 petition, and on which the habeas court relied in making its good cause determination, demonstrated that W had advised the petitioner to withdraw the 2012 petition ''now,'' there was no indication that W also advised the petitioner to refile a new habeas petition ''now,'' or immediately, and, given that the parties and the court at the prior proceeding were concerned with the timing of the withdrawal of the 2012 petition, and not the refiling of a subsequent habeas petition, there was no evidence that anyone at that proceeding advised the peti- tioner of the time constraints imposed by § 52-470 (c) or the need to refile a habeas petition within a specified period of time. Furthermore, there was no merit to the respondent's claim that the Appellate Court's judgment could be affirmed on the alternative ground that the petitioner had failed to establish good cause as a matter of law insofar as ignorance of the time constraints imposed by § 52-470 (c) and (e), whether attributable to the petitioner or the deficient performance of habeas counsel, is insufficient to establish good cause, as this court determined that ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of the sixth amendment to the United States constitution cannot be imputed to the petitioner and, therefore, can constitute an external, objective factor under Kelsey that is sufficient to establish good cause to excuse a late filing. Insofar as the habeas court made no factual findings regarding W's alleged ineffective assistance, this court declined to address that issue for the first time on appeal, and, accordingly, the case was remanded so that the habeas court could conduct a new hearing and make a good cause determination under § 52-470 (c) and (e) in light of its factual findings with respect to the performance of prior habeas counsel. Argued September 7—officially released December 12, 2023

The plaintiffs, A Co. and its sole member, N, appealed to the trial court from the decision of the board of assessment appeals of the defendant town of Somers, Connecticut, which upheld property tax assessments on two motor vehicles owned by A Co. A Co. is a Massachusetts company with offices in Ludlow, Massachusetts, and in Somers. N and his wife, who works for A Co., drive the vehicles every day and garage the vehicles at their home in Somers. Until 2021, both vehicles were registered in Massachusetts, and A Co. paid taxes on them in that state. In 2018, the defendant town's tax assessor became aware of the presence of the vehicles in the town, and he retroactively placed them on the town's 2017 and 2018 grand lists and assessed motor vehicle property taxes on N individually pursuant to the statute (§ 12-71 (f)) that, inter alia, authorizes a Connecticut municipality to assess property taxes on any motor vehicle that, in the normal course of operation, most frequently leaves from and returns to that municipality. N appealed the assessments to the board of assessment appeals, which altered the 2017 and 2018 grand lists to reflect that A Co. was the owner of the vehicles but otherwise upheld the assessments. A Co. then appealed the assessments to the board, which again upheld the assessments. Thereafter, the plain- tiffs appealed to the trial court, seeking, inter alia, a judgment declaring that the assessments were unconstitutional in light of federal jurispru- dence pertaining to the dormant commerce clause under the United States constitution. The plaintiffs argued that, because the vehicles were used in interstate commerce and subject to taxation in Massachusetts, the vehicles impermissibly were subjected to double taxation under § 12-71 (f). The trial court denied the plaintiffs' request for a declaratory judgment, concluding that § 12-71 (f) did not discriminate against inter- state commerce and that any double taxation on the vehicles was not the result of a discriminatory tax scheme but, rather, was caused by the plaintiffs' own business decisions. On appeal, the plaintiffs renewed their claim that the taxation of A Co.'s vehicles pursuant to § 12-71 (f) violated the dormant commerce clause. Held that the motor vehicle property tax authorized by § 12-71 (f) is a valid, nondiscriminatory tax that does not violate the dormant commerce clause, and, accordingly, this court affirmed the trial court's judgment: Because § 12-71 (f) is facially neutral, this court applied the test set forth in Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady (430 U.S. 274) for determining the constitutionality of a state tax that is facially neutral but has the practical effect of imposing a burden on interstate commerce that is disproportionate to its legitimate benefits, under which the tax will be sustained if it (1) is applied to an activity that has a substantial nexus with the taxing state, (2) is fairly apportioned, (3) does not discriminate against interstate commerce, and (4) is fairly related to the services provided by the state. Insofar as the plaintiffs conceded that § 12-71 (f) satisfied the first and fourth prongs of the Complete Auto Transit, Inc. test, and because they advanced the same claim with respect to both the second and third prongs, this court limited its analysis to the second prong and applied the internal consistency test for determining whether a tax has been fairly apportioned, pursuant to which a court determines whether interstate commerce would be placed at a disadvantage if every state imposed the same tax law as the law under review. In the present case, it was clear from the statutory scheme that, if every state adopted a tax scheme identical to that of § 12-71 (f), a vehicle would be taxed by only one state because a vehicle cannot, in the normal course of operation, most frequently leave from and return to more than one state, and, thus, if Massachusetts had a tax scheme identical to that of § 12-71 (f), A Co. would owe no taxes to Massachusetts, despite being incorporated in that state and registering its vehicles there, as it was undisputed that A Co.'s vehicles most frequently left from and returned to Connecticut. Moreover, contrary to the plaintiffs' claim that § 12-71 (f) is internally inconsistent insofar as it does not provide for a credit for the taxes that A Co. pays to Massachusetts, the provision of tax credits saves a tax scheme from a commerce clause challenge only if the tax scheme is internally inconsistent, and this court determined that § 12-71 (f) presents no risk of multiple taxation and, thus, passes the internal inconsis- tency test. Furthermore, there is a distinction between discriminatory tax schemes that violate the commerce clause and double taxation that results only from the interaction of two different but nondiscriminatory tax schemes, and, to the extent that A Co. pays multiple taxes on its vehicles as a result of its decision to register its vehicles in Massachusetts and to garage them in Connecticut, that double taxation is the result of the combined effect of Connecticut's and Massachusetts' different and non- discriminatory tax schemes, one of which taxes vehicles on the basis of their physical location and the amount of time that they are in the state, and the other that taxes vehicles on the basis of their registration in the state. Argued September 11—officially released December 19, 2023

Pursuant to statute (§ 52-470 (d)), when a petitioner files a petition for a writ of habeas corpus ''subsequent to a judgment on a prior petition challenging the same conviction, there shall be a rebuttable presumption that the filing of the subsequent petition has been delayed without good cause if such petition is filed after the later of . . . [t]wo years after the date on which the judgment in the prior petition is deemed to be a final judgment . . . [or] October 1, 2014 . . . .'' Pursuant further to statute (§ 52-470 (e)), if the petitioner fails to demon- strate good cause for the delay, the habeas court shall dismiss the petition. The petitioner, who had been convicted of various larceny offenses, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus after he had exhausted his direct appeals. The habeas court denied the petition, the Appellate Court dis- missed the petitioner's appeal, and the habeas court's judgment became final on May 9, 2012. Approximately nine days before the judgment in that habeas action became final, the petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in federal court. The federal habeas matter became final in June, 2015, when the federal court denied the petition and declined to issue a certificate of appealability. On May 18, 2017, the petitioner filed a second habeas petition in the Superior Court challeng- ing the conviction that was the subject of his first state habeas petition. The respondent, the Commissioner of Correction, requested that the habeas court issue an order directing the petitioner to show good cause why his second state habeas petition should not be dismissed pursuant to § 52-470 (e), claiming that it was filed after the applicable deadline in § 52-470 (d) of October 1, 2014. The habeas court issued an order to show cause for the delay. At an evidentiary hearing on the order to show cause, the petitioner's counsel argued that the term ''prior petition'' in § 52-470 (d) was not limited to habeas petitions filed in state court and, therefore, that the second state habeas petition was timely because it was filed within two years of the final judgment rendered in connection with the petitioner's federal habeas petition. Alternatively, the petition- er's counsel argued that, even if the second state habeas petition had been untimely, the petitioner had established good cause for the delay, insofar as the petitioner was not aware of § 52-470 (d) or its deadlines, and insofar as the petitioner's former counsel could not have informed the petitioner of those deadlines because counsel had terminated their representation of the petitioner before the enactment of § 52-470 (d). The habeas court rendered judgment dismissing the petition, concluding that it was untimely filed and that the petitioner had not established good cause to excuse the delay. On the granting of certification, the petitioner appealed to the Appellate Court, which affirmed the habeas court's judgment, concluding that the phrase ''prior petition'' does not include federal habeas petitions and that the petitioner's alleged lack of knowledge of the deadlines prescribed by § 52-470 (d), without more, was insufficient to establish good cause for the delay in filing his second state habeas petition. On the granting of certification, the petitioner appealed to this court. Held: 1. The Appellate Court correctly concluded that the phrase ''prior petition'' in § 52-470 (d) unambiguously refers solely to prior state habeas petitions and does not also include prior federal habeas petitions, and, accord- ingly, the petitioner's second state habeas petition was untimely: Although § 52-470 does not explicitly indicate that the term ''prior peti- tion'' refers solely to state habeas petitions, and although the other provisions in chapter 915 of the General Statutes do not make it explicit that they are referring solely to state habeas applications, proceedings, or petitions, the provision (§ 52-466 (a)) in chapter 915 that contains the requirements for where a habeas petition must be filed specifies that the application must be made to the Connecticut Superior Court, and the Superior Court has jurisdiction over only state habeas petitions. Moreover, the entire statutory scheme in which § 52-470 is situated deals exclusively with state habeas petitions, if the legislature had intended any portion of that statute to address federal habeas petitions, it would have explicitly stated so, or the context would necessarily imply it, and, accordingly, the statute's silence as to whether a ''prior petition'' includes a federal petition indicates that it does not include a federal petition within its scope. Furthermore, subsections (b) and (c) of § 52-470 dictate the procedures for, and treatment of, a ''petition,'' and, insofar as the legislature is empowered to dictate neither the procedures for federal habeas petitions nor when a federal court must dismiss a petition, it could not credibly be maintained that these other references to ''petition'' encompass federal habeas petitions. In addition, the petitioner's claim that interpreting ''prior petition'' as limited to state habeas petitions would lead to absurd and unworkable results because it would require a petitioner to file simultaneous state and federal habeas petitions, resulting in an unnecessary state petition should he succeed on his federal habeas petition, was unavailing, as it is not uncommon for a petitioner to pursue simultaneous federal and state habeas petitions, and this court's construction of § 52-470, which encourages petitioners to consolidate all their claims in their first state habeas petition or to bring any additional claims forward promptly once they become apparent, rather than waiting to complete litigation on a federal habeas claim, was consistent with the legislative intent of ensur- ing the expedient resolution of state habeas cases. 2. The habeas court properly exercised its discretion in determining that the petitioner had failed to establish good cause for the untimely filing of his second state habeas petition and properly dismissed that petition pursuant to § 52-470 (d) and (e): The petitioner's claim that good cause existed because he was unaware of § 52-470 and its statutory deadlines when he filed the second state habeas petition was unavailing, as the petitioner's lack of knowledge of the law, standing alone, was insufficient to excuse his late filing, and the petitioner did not present any testimony or argument to establish that his lack of knowledge was beyond his control. Moreover, the petitioner could not prevail on his claim, raised for the first time on appeal, that good cause existed because, even if he had known about § 52-470 and its deadlines, he could not have understood that the term ''prior petition'' in that statute encompassed only prior state habeas petitions, as this court could not conclude that the habeas court abused its discretion on the basis of evidence and arguments that were not presented to it. Furthermore, any interpretation contrary to this court's interpretation that § 52-470 unambiguously refers solely to state habeas petitions would have been unreasonable, and, even if the statutory language was pre- viously unclear, the petitioner could not establish that any ambiguity in the statutory language established good cause for his late filing, as the petitioner testified at the evidentiary hearing that he was unaware of the statute prior to filing his second state habeas petition, which necessarily meant that he could not establish the necessary nexus between the purportedly unclear statutory language and his failure to timely file his second state habeas petition. Argued September 7, 2023—officially released January 23, 2024

Pursuant to the Uniform Commercial Code (§ 42a-2-711 (1)), a buyer who ''justifiably revokes acceptance'' of goods purchased from a seller may recover ''so much of the price as has been paid . . . .'' The plaintiff sought to recover damages from the defendant automobile dealership, S Co., in connection with S Co.'s sale of an allegedly defective, used motor vehicle. The plaintiff financed the majority of the purchase price through a loan with S Co., which agreed to provide a limited warranty on the vehicle. Shortly after the purchase, the plaintiff began to experience mechanical problems with the vehicle, and, when S Co. refused to make the costly, recommended repairs, the plaintiff sent a letter to S Co., in which she revoked her acceptance of the vehicle. The plaintiff thereafter brought the present action, alleging breach of warranty and revocation of acceptance pursuant to statute (§ 42a-2- 608). Specifically, the plaintiff alleged that she had notified S Co. of her intent to revoke acceptance of the vehicle and that S Co. had refused to accept its return or to refund to her so much of the purchase price as had been paid pursuant to § 42a-2-711 (1). After the presentation of evidence and closing argument, the parties' counsel agreed to the special verdict form the trial court would provide to the jury, as well as to the court's jury instructions, which set forth two divergent sets of directions as to how to calculate damages, depending on whether the plaintiff had proven her revocation of acceptance claim. The jury ultimately returned a verdict for the plaintiff, including on her revocation of acceptance claim, and awarded her $11,000 in damages, which was roughly equal to the amount the plaintiff had made in monthly payments to S Co. at the time of trial. The plaintiff subsequently moved for additur, requesting that the court order S Co. to remit to her the full purchase price of the vehicle, in addition to the $11,000 the jury had awarded. The trial court denied the motion for additur, concluding that the jury's verdict clearly set forth the amount of damages due to the plaintiff, and rendered judgment in accordance with the verdict. The Appellate Court upheld the trial court's denial of the motion for additur and affirmed the trial court's judgment. On the granting of certification, the plaintiff appealed to this court, claiming that she was entitled to the jury's award of $11,000, in addition to a refund of the full purchase price of the vehicle, because the jury found in her favor on her revocation of acceptance claim. Held that the Appellate Court correctly concluded that the trial court had not abused its discretion in denying the plaintiff's motion for additur, this court having disagreed with the plaintiff's argument that the jury's verdict did not include an award of revocation of acceptance damages and that, pursuant to § 42a-2-711, those damages were to be decided by the trial court, as a matter of law, after the jury returned its verdict: The issue of revocation of acceptance damages was submitted to the jury as a matter of disputed fact, the court instructed the jury to award the plaintiff damages that were due to her on her revocation of accep- tance claim, and the parties' agreement with the jury instructions and the verdict form manifested their decision to have the jury decide whether the plaintiff had proven her revocation of acceptance claim and, if so, the amount of damages to which she was entitled on that claim. Moreover, the verdict form indicated that the jury had found in the plaintiff's favor on her revocation of acceptance claim and awarded $11,000 as the amount of damages, and, applying the presumptions that the jury did not make a mistake, did exactly as it intended, and properly followed the court's instructions, this court concluded that the jury intended that its $11,000 award as revocation of acceptance damages equal its determination of so much of the purchase price of the vehicle as the plaintiff had paid, in accordance with § 42a-2-711 (1). Contrary to the plaintiff's claim that the trial court reserved the issue of revocation of acceptance damages as a legal question it would determine postverdict because the pleadings demonstrated that S Co. had admitted the purchase price of the vehicle, the parties' pleadings did not defini- tively resolve the amount of such damages, insofar as the complaint alleged only that the vehicle's ''purchase price'' was a certain amount, which fell short of conclusively establishing the amount of the ''price as has been paid'' pursuant to § 42a-2-711 (1), and S Co.'s failure to contest the vehicle's purchase price did not relieve the plaintiff of her burden of proving at trial the amount of the purchase price she had paid in addition to any incidental and consequential damages. Furthermore, nothing in the record suggested that the trial court reserved, as a legal question, a determination of the amount of revocation of acceptance damages pursuant to § 42a-2-711 (1) until after the jury returned its verdict, the plaintiff's reliance on a certain statement by the trial court in support of that argument was misplaced, insofar as the court was indicating that it was reserving a different question of law concerning revocation of acceptance, and the fact that S Co. requested a hearing on the value of the vehicle before the court ruled on the motion for additur did not amount to a retroactive admission that the plaintiff's revocation of acceptance damages were not at issue during the trial. In addition, there was no merit to the plaintiff's argument that it was inequitable for the trial court to decline to award her the vehicle's full purchase price because that decision violated the general principle in breach of contract cases that she be returned to the same position she would have been in had the contract been performed, as it was within the province of the jury to determine the amount of damages that would return the plaintiff to the financial position she would have been in had the contract been performed, that was what the jury was instructed to do, and the plaintiff, having asked the jury to award revocation of acceptance damages, could not now request this court to conclude, as a matter of statutory interpretation, that the trial court should have determined the proper measure of those damages after the jury returned its verdict. To the extent that the plaintiff did not receive the full amount of her claim for damages, the jury might have discredited aspects of her evidence or determined that she failed to establish that the full purchase price of the vehicle had been paid. Argued November 13, 2023—officially released January 30, 2024

Convicted, after a jury trial, of burglary in the first degree, criminal mischief in the first degree, and threatening in the second degree, among other crimes, the defendant appealed. The defendant had contacted his brother, A, and told A that he was coming to A's residence despite A's contrary wishes. The defendant thereafter unlawfully entered A's residence. A fled the residence and sought aid from certain neighbors. Subsequently, the defendant damaged certain property within the resi- dence and, while outside, repeatedly struck A's car with a baseball bat. At trial, defense counsel neither requested an instruction on the burglary charge nor objected to the proposed instruction that the court had distributed to the state and defense for review. The jury returned a guilty verdict on all of the charges pertaining to the incident, including burglary. The Appellate Court affirmed the defendant's convictions, and the defendant, on the granting of certification, appealed to this court. Held: The Appellate Court correctly concluded that the trial court had not committed plain error when it gave a jury instruction on first degree burglary that did not identify the crime or crimes the defendant allegedly was intending to commit when he unlawfully entered or remained in A's residence, this court having concluded that such an omission was not an obvious and indisputable error so egregious that it affected the fairness and integrity of and public confidence in the judicial proceedings: When instructing a jury on the elements of burglary in the first degree pursuant to the applicable statute (§ 53a-101 (a) (1)), a trial court should name and define the elements of the crime or crimes for which there is evidence to support a finding of the defendant's intent to commit in connection with the unlawful entry or remaining, and, although it is the better practice for trial courts to name the crime or crimes and define such elements in its instructions, this court has never clearly held that such an instruction is mandatory. Although the trial court in the present case did not name the relevant crimes and describe the elements thereof in its instruction on first degree burglary, the court's instruction accurately recited the elements of the burglary charge and offered guidance on how to interpret them, making it clear that the intent to commit a crime within the building is a distinct element, which lessened the chance that the jury would have improperly found that the defendant's unlawful entry itself was the crime he intended to commit. Moreover, defense counsel did not object to the part of the charge describing the elements of burglary in the first degree or propose an instruction that would have included the language of the intended offense. Furthermore, the trial court's statement of the applicable statute did not mislead the jury as to what evidence it could consider, and, although the court's instruction included an incomplete explanation of the elements of burglary in the first degree, this court concluded that it would be a significant departure from its precedent to hold that the trial court's oversight in this regard was the kind of truly extraordinary situation contemplated by the plain error doctrine. In addition, even if there had been a patent error in the court's instruction, reversal on plain error grounds would not be warranted because the omission did not result in a manifest injustice, the evidence having established that the defendant violently forced his way into A's residence and caused extensive damage therein, the court having properly instructed the jury on the elements of first degree criminal mischief, and the jury having necessarily concluded that the defendant had intended to damage the tangible property of another by finding the defendant guilty of criminal mischief. Notwithstanding the defendant's argument that his criminal mischief conviction may have been based solely on the damage he caused to A's car outside of A's residence, this court saw no reason why the jury would have focused exclusively on the damage to the car and ignored the significant destruction the defendant caused inside A's residence, and the fact that the prosecutor, during closing argument, directed the jury's attention to the criminal mischief charge and other possible intended crimes made it less likely that the jury based its verdict on noncrimi- nal conduct. Argued October 25, 2023—officially released January 30, 2024

The plaintiffs, former Meriden firefighters who retired in January, 2015, sought to recover damages from the defendants, the city of Meriden and the Meriden Municipal Pension Board, for, inter alia, their alleged breach of a collective bargaining agreement between the city and the plaintiffs' union. The collective bargaining agreement contained a wage reopener provision and incorporated by reference the pension plan for fire employees that the city had adopted. Under the terms of the pension plan, a firefighter can become eligible for retirement after he or she has completed twenty-five years of service, or after the firefighter has attained the age sixty-five, in which case he or she is retired automati- cally, effective the first day of the month following the sixty-fifth birth- day. Additionally, under the plan, the amount of any retiree's normal retirement benefit is calculated in part by using his or her base rate of pay, which is defined as the ''annual pay as fixed from time to time by the collective bargaining agreement.'' The plaintiffs, all of whom were younger than sixty-five at the time of retirement, had retired voluntarily following twenty-five years of service with the city. At the time of their retirements, the city and the union were negotiating a wage reopener for the 2014–2015 contract year. When those negotiations reached an impasse, the matter proceeded to interest arbitration pursuant to the relevant provision (§ 7-473c) of the Municipal Employee Relations Act. The arbitration panel issued an award granting all Meriden firefighters a 2 percent wage increase retroactive to January 1, 2015, which was before the plaintiffs' retirements took effect. The parties, having agreed that the facts were not in dispute and that the case presented purely legal questions, agreed to have the case tried to the court, which con- cluded, inter alia, that the defendants had breached the collective bar- gaining agreement by failing to recalculate the plaintiffs' pension benefits based on the retroactive wage increase awarded in arbitration. The court reasoned that the interest arbitration award was ''final and binding'' pursuant to § 7-473c (d) (10) and that that award was explicit that the effective date of the wage increase was January 1, 2015, at which time the plaintiffs were employees of the city and members of the union. Accordingly, the court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs with respect to liability on the breach of contract claims, the parties stipulated to the amount of damages, and the court rendered judgment for the plaintiffs, from which the defendants appealed. Held: 1. The defendants could not prevail on their unpreserved claim that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the plaintiffs did not exhaust their administrative remedies by requesting relief directly from the pension board prior to filing the present action: This court has held that the exhaustion of administrative remedies is required when a statute, regulation, or contractual provision explicitly requires it or, if the exhaustion requirement is not explicit, when the statutory, regulatory, or contractual scheme has an established proce- dure to redress a particular wrong, in which case the party must follow the specified remedy and may not institute a proceeding that might have been permissible in the absence of such a procedure. In the present case, the exhaustion doctrine was inapplicable insofar as the pension plan provisions that the defendants relied on to support their exhaustion argument, which vested the pension board with the power and duty to determine an employee's eligibility and rights, and to do all things necessary and proper toward carrying out the pension plan's purposes, contained no explicit exhaustion requirement and also failed to establish an exhaustion requirement by implication, there having been no established administrative process pursuant to which retirees could seek the recalculation of their pension benefits. 2. The trial court incorrectly determined that the defendants had breached the collective bargaining agreement by failing to recalculate the plain- tiffs' pension benefits to reflect the 2 percent wage increase awarded in arbitration, and, accordingly this court reversed the trial court's judg- ment as to the plaintiffs' breach of contract claims and remanded the case with direction to render judgment for the defendants on those claims: Although the parties agreed that the interest arbitration award was final and binding, they disagreed as to whether the plain language of the collective bargaining agreement, the pension plan, and the interest arbi- tration award required the defendants to recalculate the amount of the plaintiffs' pension benefits to account for the 2 percent retroactive wage increase, and this court, upon reviewing the relevant provisions of those documents, concluded that, although those documents were clear that the 2 percent wage increase retroactively applied to employees' wages, they were ambiguous with respect to whether the 2 percent wage increase retroactively applied to voluntary retirees earning pension benefits. In the present case, the parties had agreed that the relevant contract provisions could be construed as a matter of law, the parties did not introduce extrinsic evidence of the contracting parties' intent, and, there- fore, in light of the way the case was tried by the parties and decided by the trial court, the issue on appeal presented a question of law for this court to determine independently, without reference to extrinsic evidence of intent, and in accordance with general principles of con- tract construction. This court concluded that the defendants' construction of the operative documents, pursuant to which the 2 percent wage increase applied only to active employees and not to former employees who voluntarily retired before the issuance of the arbitration award, was the more reasonable construction insofar as it avoided rendering a certain provision of the pension plan superfluous and resulted in a more harmonious construc- tion of the other relevant contractual provisions. Specifically, the pension plan includes a provision stating that mandatory retirees who are forced to retire under the age sixty-five retirement rule while contract negotiations between the city and the union are ongoing may have their retirement and any payout retroactively increased by any raises for the time they would have been working prior to retirement, that provision would be unnecessary if both mandatory and voluntary retirees were entitled to a retroactive increase in pension benefits to reflect a retroactive wage increase for hours worked prior to retirement, and, by specifying that only mandatory retirees are entitled to a retroac- tive adjustment of pension benefits following a negotiated wage increase, the pension plan implicitly excluded voluntary retirees from receiving the same benefit. Moreover, the pension plan included certain language providing that a retroactive benefit payment would in no event be made and that a retiree's base rate of pay is limited to the amount the retiree was receiving at the time of retirement, and, when read together, those provisions further bolstered the conclusion that the pension plan did not permit the recalcu- lation of pension benefits for voluntary retirees following a negotiated wage increase with retroactive effect. Furthermore, there was no merit to the plaintiffs' argument that the provision allowing for retroactive increases for mandatory retirees was not meant to exclude by implication voluntary retirees from receiving the same benefit or their argument that construing the operative docu- ments as allowing the 2 percent wage increase to apply only to active employees would render certain provisions of the pension plan super- fluous. In addition, the plaintiffs' claim that fixing a retiree's base rate of pay as of the date of retirement would yield an absurd result was unavailing, as it was not irrational for the contracting parties to negotiate an agree- ment that treats the wages of employees differently from the pension benefits of retirees or a particular class of retirees, such as voluntary retirees, and it would not be absurd for the contracting parties to provide employees with the ability to seek a wage increase through the wage reopener process, while at the same time limiting the effect of any retroactive increase obtained in that process to retirees who are forced to retire during ongoing contract negotiations due to the age sixty-five retirement rule. This court's conclusion was not inconsistent with the interest arbitration award, insofar as the 2 percent increase, as well as the arbitration panel's consideration of the statutory factors enumerated in § 7-473c (d) (9), was limited to the wages payable to employees, no mention was made of retirees, voluntary or otherwise, or the method used to calculate pension benefits, and, in the absence of extrinsic evidence of intent, this court could not conclude that the interest arbitration award modified the collective bargaining agreement to require the recalculation of pension benefits for retirees, like the plaintiffs, who voluntarily retired during ongoing contract negotiations. Argued October 25, 2023—officially released February 6, 2024

The plaintiffs, L and M, individually and in their representative capacities as parents of their minor son, J, and as the administrators of the estate of their daughter, S, sought to recover damages for the alleged medical malpractice of the named defendant, the state of Connecticut, in connec- tion with certain therapeutic donor insemination (TDI) services and prenatal care provided to them at a state hospital. Prior to the plaintiffs' initial visit, hospital staff sent them a patient information packet that included general information about TDI risks, approved sperm banks, and testing that TDI patients are required to undergo, including testing for cytomegalovirus (CMV). Because of the risks to fetal health associ- ated with a mother's initial exposure to CMV in early pregnancy, it was necessary for the hospital to determine both M's and the sperm donor's CMV status. The patient information packet also stated, in accordance with accepted professional guidelines, that, if a patient tests negative for CMV, only CMV negative donor sperm should be used. Thereafter, M, who had tested negative for CMV, underwent a successful intrauterine insemination procedure using sperm from a CMV positive donor and became pregnant with J and S. The physician who performed the proce- dure did not check the donor's CMV status and allegedly did not seek or obtain M's informed consent for the procedure. Throughout her preg- nancy, M received care from the hospital's prenatal care staff. When M was twenty-two weeks pregnant, she underwent an ultrasound that revealed that J and S displayed conditions associated with an in utero CMV infection. M's prenatal care physician did not perform any follow- up tests to rule out a CMV infection, inform M of the ultrasound results, or include a copy of those results in M's medical records. Subsequently, it was discovered that S had died in utero from a severe CMV infection, and J was born with debilitating, lifelong medical conditions as a result of congenital CMV. Thereafter, pursuant to statute ((Rev. to 2015) § 4-160 (b)), the plaintiffs filed a notice of claim with the Claims Commissioner, seeking permission to bring an action against the state for medical malpractice arising out of the fertility treatment and prenatal care M had received at the state hospital. Although the notice of claim stated that a good faith certificate, as required by statute (§ 52-190a), was attached thereto, the plaintiffs inadvertently failed to attach it. The plaintiffs did, however, attach a physician's statement that set forth the physician's reasons for concluding that the standard of care relating to the fertility treatment claims had been breached and stated that it was offered in support of the plaintiffs' good faith certificate, as required by § 52-190a. The Claims Commissioner found that the requirements of § 4-160 (b) had been met and granted the plaintiffs permission to bring an action against the state, limited to the portion of the claim alleging medical malpractice. In the counts of their complaint setting forth claims related to M's fertility treatment, the plaintiffs alleged, inter alia, that the hospital staff had committed medical malpractice by inseminating M, a CMV negative patient, with sperm from a CMV positive donor, causing S's death and J's severe injuries. In the counts setting forth claims related to M's prenatal care, the plaintiffs alleged, inter alia, that the hospital's prenatal care staff had been negligent in failing to properly interpret and respond to the ultrasound images indicating that M, J, and S were infected with CMV. The plaintiffs attached to their complaint a certificate of good faith and two opinion letters from similar health care providers, including a copy of the physician's statement that the plaintiffs had attached to their notice of claim. The state moved to strike the fertility treatment claims brought on behalf of S and J, and the prenatal care claim brought on behalf of J, on the ground that they were wrongful life claims, which the state claimed were not legally cognizable in Con- necticut. The trial court struck the prenatal care claim but denied the motion to strike as to the fertility treatment claims, concluding that they were ordinary medical malpractice claims. Prior to trial, the plaintiffs disclosed that their causation expert, E, would testify that, to a reason- able degree of medical probability, the use of sperm from a CMV positive donor to inseminate M caused the CMV infection that resulted in S's death and J's severe injuries. The state moved, pursuant to State v. Porter (241 Conn. 57), to preclude E's testimony on the ground that it lacked a valid scientific basis, but the trial court ultimately ruled that E's testimony satisfied the admissibility requirements of Porter and credited that testimony in concluding that the donor sperm more likely than not caused the CMV infection in M, J, and S. Following the plaintiffs' case-in-chief, the state moved to dismiss the plaintiffs' fertility treatment claims, contending that they sounded in informed consent rather than in medical malpractice and, therefore, did not fall within the scope of the waiver of sovereign immunity insofar as § 4-160 (b) applies only to medical malpractice claims. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss, concluding that the plaintiffs' fertility treatment claims were hybrid claims because, in the field of reproductive endocrinology, it is medical malpractice to inseminate a CMV negative patient with CMV positive donor sperm except when the patient is appropriately counseled as to the risks and gives her informed consent. The trial court ultimately found in favor of the plaintiffs on thirteen counts and awarded them economic and noneconomic damages. On the state's appeal from the trial court's judgment, held: 1. The state could not prevail on its claim that the judgment should be set aside on the ground that the claims on which the plaintiffs prevailed at trial were barred by sovereign immunity: a. There was no merit to the state's contention that the plaintiffs' fertility treatment claims were outside the scope of the action authorized by the Claims Commissioner's waiver of sovereign immunity because they were informed consent claims, not medical malpractice claims based on the failure of a physician to comply with the standard of care established through expert testimony at trial: When permission to sue the state is granted pursuant to § 4-160 (b), it applies to medical malpractice claims only, and, although medical malpractice and lack of informed consent are distinct causes of action, they are not mutually exclusive, and the same set of facts can give rise to both types of claims. Upon reviewing the allegations in the complaint related to the plaintiffs' fertility treatment claims, this court concluded that they were clearly allegations of medical malpractice. Moreover, it was of no consequence that both parties' experts testified that a CMV negative patient could elect to be inseminated with sperm from a CMV positive donor, as the trial court repeatedly observed that insemination of a CMV negative patient with CMV positive donor sperm is only within the standard of care if the patient consents after she is appropriately informed of the risk of congenital CMV, and it was testi- mony regarding the standard of care in the absence of informed consent that led the trial court to conclude that the fertility treatment claims were medical malpractice claims within the scope of the Claims Commis- sioner's waiver of sovereign immunity. b. There was no merit to the state's arguments that the waiver of sovereign immunity was invalid due to the plaintiffs' failure to submit to the Claims Commissioner a physician's opinion letter specifically addressing the prenatal care claims and a certificate of good faith in accordance with § 52-190a, as required by § 4-160 (b): It was clear from the record that the Claims Commissioner reviewed the plaintiffs' notice of claim and the physician's statement, and con- cluded that, together, they satisfied the good faith certificate requirement of § 52-190a. To the extent that the state disputed the applicability of § 4-160 (b) because of alleged defects or shortcomings in the plaintiffs' good faith certificate, it was incumbent on the state to raise that issue with the Claims Commissioner while the matter was still under his review, as the state was precluded from doing so once the Claims Commissioner had authorized the plaintiffs' action by virtue of § 4-160 (c), which provides that the state waives all defenses related to the governmental nature of the complained of activity once the Claim Commissioner authorizes suit pursuant to § 4-160 (b). Moreover, the state did not claim that the plaintiffs failed to submit to the trial court a certificate of good faith and an opinion letter from a similar health care provider addressing both their fertility treatment claims and their prenatal care claims or that the opinion letters and good faith certificate that they had filed with the court were in any way deficient. 2. The state could not prevail on its claim that J was not entitled to recover any damages based on the fertility treatment claims brought by the plaintiffs on his behalf because he did not suffer any legally cognizable injuries, this court having concluded that common-law negligence princi- ples were sufficiently adaptable to provide a remedy for injuries such as those sustained by J, without disturbing the fundamental rules govern- ing tort liability and compensation: a. The fertility treatment claims brought by the plaintiffs on J's behalf were properly construed and adjudicated as conventional medical mal- practice claims and not, as the state contended, as wrongful life claims: The term ''wrongful life'' refers to a claim, brought by a child, based on the theory that that child would not have been born but for the defendant's negligence, and those cases generally involve plaintiffs seeking to hold medical professionals responsible for failing to prevent a birth that would have occurred regardless of medical intervention, such as when a child with a congenital abnormality is born to a mother who would not have proceeded with the pregnancy if she had received timely notice of the condition, or when a medical professional fails to prevent an unwanted pregnancy by negligently performing a birth control or abortion pro- cedure. The present case differed in fundamental ways from those paradigmatic wrongful life cases because the state was directly responsible both for J's birth and for his condition, insofar as the hospital staff created the pregnancy, and it was their negligence in doing so that was the proximate cause of J's injuries. Moreover, in most wrongful life cases, but for the defendant's negligence, there never could have been a healthy child, whereas, in the present case, the plaintiffs presented undisputed testimony that antiviral medications were available that had been used to prevent CMV or to treat the disease in utero after infection. Furthermore, because the plaintiffs consistently represented that the fertility treatment claims were medical malpractice claims and not wrong- ful life claims, and the trial court understood and evaluated them as medical malpractice claims, the most prudent course was to evaluate the claims as articulated by the plaintiffs and to let them rise or fall on the plaintiffs' ability to establish a valid medical malpractice cause of action. b. There was no merit to the state's contention that the plaintiffs had failed to establish a valid, conventional medical malpractice claim with respect to J's injuries: The state's arguments that any damages awarded to J would be unavoid- ably speculative and predicated on the impermissible concept that nonexistence can be preferable to impaired existence were unavailing, as this court previously had rejected versions of those arguments when it recognized a cause of action for wrongful birth in Och v. Borrelli (187 Conn. 253). Moreover, this court rejected the state's argument that the standard formula for calculating damages in tort, namely, making the plaintiff whole by returning him to the position he would have been in but for the defendant's negligence, precluded any recovery in this case insofar as J arguably would not have existed but for the state's conduct, as such a rigid conception of tort damages left no room for the substantial technological advancements that have occurred in the field of assisted reproductive technologies. This court reviewed the state's challenge to the trial court's damages award in the light of the underlying purposes and principles that inform tort law, namely, compensation for innocent parties, shifting the loss to responsible parties or distributing it among appropriate entities, and deterrence of wrongful conduct. In the present case, all of those considerations weighed in favor of holding the state liable for the full amount of J's economic and noneco- nomic damages proximately caused by the state's negligence, as J was an innocent victim whose serious injuries were caused by the state's failure to adhere to the applicable standard of care, the state was the party best equipped to avoid such mishaps and best positioned to absorb and spread the costs of J's lifelong care, and, if this court were to deny recover to children who, like J, were injured by the negligent provision of assisted reproductive technologies, there would be little to deter the state or other providers of artificial insemination services from such negligence and its consequences. Accordingly, because the trial court found, on the basis of abundant evidence, that J suffered economic and noneconomic harms, losses, and injuries as a result of the state's negligence, he was no less entitled to be compensated financially for those damages than are other victims of medical malpractice, the trial court's award of damages was fully commensurate with the injuries that J suffered, and it restored J as nearly as possible to the position that he had occupied before the state's negligence, which was consistent with the underlying goals and purposes of tort law. 3. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting E's expert testimony regarding causation under Porter: The methodologies underlying E's causation testimony, namely, differen- tial diagnosis and polymerase chain reaction testing, are two of the most common and accepted methods for diagnosing disease, and, as such, are among the well established principles of the scientific community to which Porter does not apply. Moreover, contrary to the state's argument that E's testimony should have been excluded because it was based on a series of factual assump- tions that lacked a reliable scientific and factual basis, namely, that the CMV positive sperm donor was shedding the infectious virus into his sperm when he donated it, the state's argument went to the weight of E's testimony, not to its admissibility. Argued February 22, 2023—officially released February 6, 2024

Pursuant to statute (§ 16-243u), ''in an annual retail generation rate contested case,'' a peaking generation facility ''shall be entitled to recover its prudently incurred costs,'' and the Public Utilities Regulatory Authority (PURA) ''shall review such recovery of costs consistent with the princi- ples set forth in sections 16-19, 16-19b and 16-19e . . . .'' Pursuant further to statute (§ 16-19e (a) (4)), PURA shall examine and review a peaking generation facility's recoverable costs to ensure ''that the level and structure of rates be sufficient, but no more than sufficient,'' to cover the facility's operating costs. The plaintiff electric supplier, G Co., appealed to the trial court from the final decision of the defendant, PURA, which reduced G Co.'s proposed return on capital with respect to two of G Co.'s peaking generation facilities that were designed to provide additional electric supply to Connecticut consumers at times of increased demand. G Co., as a peak- ing generation provider, is required to submit its Annual Fixed Revenue Requirements application (application) to PURA every year to set out the recoverable capital it seeks for the upcoming year. In determining the allowable recoverable capital, PURA first determines the peaking generation facility's rate base, which represents the value of the property on which the facility is permitted to earn a rate of return. The rate base is then divided based on the debt-to-equity ratio to find the portion of the rate base that is attributable to each. Finally, the portion of the rate base that is attributable to debt and the portion that is attributable to equity are multiplied by the applicable rate to find the total amount the facility should be allowed to recover. For each of G Co.'s applications for 2010 through 2020, it sought and was allowed to recover, as part of the recoverable capital, its actual annual financing costs. When G Co. submitted its 2021 application, PURA concluded that G Co. was not entitled to recover the entire $8.573 million actual interest expense and determined that a reduction was warranted. PURA found that there were certain inaccuracies in both the debt-to-equity ratio and the debt rate proposed by G Co., and that G Co.'s miscalculations would lead to an overrecovery of costs. PURA's solution was to maintain G Co.'s proposed debt-to-equity ratio but to reduce the debt rate, ultimately reducing G Co.'s recoverable capital by approximately $2.861 million. According to PURA, this result would be more in line with the recovery contemplated by § 16-19e (a) (4), in that the rates paid by consumers would be ''sufficient, but no more than sufficient,'' to cover G Co.'s capital costs. PURA therefore approved G Co.'s 2021 application but only authorized a return on interest of approximately $5.712 million rather than the $8.573 million that G Co. sought. The trial court rendered judgment dismissing G Co.'s administrative appeal, concluding that PURA was authorized to adjust G Co.'s overall recovery as it did. On appeal from the trial court's judgment, G Co. claimed, inter alia, that § 16-243u required PURA to use the statute's specific rate-making meth- odology applicable to peaking generation and not the general rate-mak- ing principles found in § 16-19e, and that the plain language of § 16-243u did not give PURA the authority to lower the recovery of G Co.'s actual annual financing costs. Held: 1. The trial court correctly determined that PURA had acted within its statutory authority to lower G Co.'s debt rate in its decision on G Co.'s 2021 application, PURA having acted pursuant to its authority under § 16-243u when it reviewed G Co.'s recovery of costs consistent with the general rate-making principles of § 16-19e: Because § 16-243u incorporates § 16-19e by reference, the plain meaning of § 16-243u must be determined by considering § 16-19e alongside of it, and, when the two statutes are considered together, it is clear that § 16-243u directs PURA to review a peaking generation facility's recover- able costs pursuant to § 16-19e (a) (4) to ensure that the rates are ''suffi- cient, but no more than sufficient,'' to allow a peaking generation facility to cover its operating costs. Moreover, there was no merit to G Co.'s claim that § 16-243u's reference to § 16-19e authorizes PURA only to consider the principles in § 16-19e for the recovery of costs but not for the setting of rates, as cost recovery and rate setting are interrelated in that a peaking generation facility recovers its costs only through the setting of rates. Furthermore, G Co.'s contention that PURA must allow a full recovery of costs for any costs that were previously deemed ''prudent,'' without any additional evaluation, would render the language in § 16-243u requiring an ''annual retail generation rate contested case'' and a review by PURA of ''recovery of costs consistent with the principles set forth in [§] . . . 16-19e'' meaningless. In addition, although it was undisputed that PURA previously determined that the interest costs that G Co. had incurred from a 2012 refinancing of its debt were prudent, PURA had the authority, under § 16-243u, to reevaluate and recharacterize costs that were previously deemed pru- dently incurred in a prior year and to determine that they nevertheless may not properly be recovered from consumers in a subsequent year. There also was no merit to G Co.'s claim that PURA had violated the plain language of § 16-243u by preventing G Co. from recovering a reason- able rate of return on equity when it disallowed some of G Co.'s recovery of costs and thus effectively reduced the rate of return on equity to less than the amount on which the parties had previously agreed, as the reduction in G Co.'s recoverable capital resulted from a reduction in the debt rate rather than a reduction of the rate of return on equity, and, accordingly, PURA allowed a reasonable rate of return on equity pursuant to the same rate of return on equity that had previously been agreed on by the parties. This court concluded that G Co.'s interpretation of the statutory scheme, if applied, would leave PURA powerless to fix excess recoveries, which would conflict with the plain meaning of § 16-243u and with the broad authority granted to PURA in § 16-19e to set rates. 2. PURA's action in lowering the debt rate in its decision on G Co.'s 2021 application after not doing so for more than one decade was not arbitrary and capricious, as the administrative record contained substantial evi- dence to support PURA's conclusion that a reduction in G Co.'s debt rate was necessary: The evidence presented and examined by PURA provided a substantial basis from which PURA reasonably could infer that G Co. had sought an overrecovery of costs, that finding supported PURA's conclusion that an adjustment was necessary to ensure that the rates set by G Co. were, pursuant to § 16-19e (a) (4), ''no more than sufficient'' to allow G Co. to recover its costs, and PURA provided an adequate and full explanation in both its final decision and subsequent briefs for the reasons behind the change. (One justice dissenting) Argued September 8, 2023—officially released February 27, 2024

Pursuant to a provision of the Freedom of Information Act (§ 1-210 (b) (3) (D)), records of law enforcement agencies not otherwise available to the public that were compiled in connection with the detection or investi- gation of a crime are exempt from disclosure if the disclosure of such records would result in the disclosure of ''information to be used in a prospective law enforcement action if prejudicial to such action . . . .'' The plaintiffs, the town of Madison, its police department, and its chief of police, D, appealed to the trial court from the decision of the defendant, the Freedom of Information Commission, ordering the disclosure, pursu- ant to the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), of certain documents contained in the police department's homicide investigation files to the intervening defendant, N, a filmmaker who was the complainant before the commission. The requested documents related to the 2010 homicide of B. Immediately after the homicide, DNA evidence was recovered, but the case went unsolved. In 2013, N and B's son, H, began working on a documentary about B's unsolved homicide. Between 2013 and 2019, H met with members of the police department, including S, three times in an attempt to obtain information about the investigation. During those meetings, H was left with the impression that the police department had classified B's homicide as a cold case. S indicated to H that, although the DNA evidence was sufficient to identify potential suspects, it was inadequate to prosecute any particular individual, and that the police department had had the same prime suspect since one week after the homicide. Nevertheless, D, citing the ongoing investigation, would not permit the police department to cooperate with the documentary project. As a result, N filed an FOIA request with the police department, which denied the request and declined to produce any of the requested docu- ments on the ground that they were not subject to public disclosure pursuant to § 1-210 (b) (3) (D). N then filed a complaint with the commis- sion. The only evidence the plaintiffs offered at the hearing before the commission was S's testimony. S acknowledged that the case had gone cold by 2016 and that, with the technology available at that time, the DNA evidence could not lead to an arrest. S also testified, however, that the investigation remained open and active, that he was working on the case periodically throughout the year, and that the police periodically received new leads, which he then would investigate. S further testified that he monitored changes in forensic technology and suggested that new DNA technologies might help the police make an identification in the future. The commission ruled in favor of N with respect to most of the requested documents, ordering that the plaintiffs provide N with copies of those documents. The commission found that, although B's death continued to be investigated, the requested documents did not fall within the exception from disclosure of law enforcement records because the plaintiffs had failed to establish either prong of § 1-210 (b) (3) (D), namely, that the requested records would ''be used in a prospec- tive law enforcement action'' and that their release would be prejudicial. The trial court upheld the commission's decision and dismissed the plaintiffs' appeal. In so doing, the trial court concluded that the law enforcement exception to the FOIA is governed by a reasonable possibil- ity standard, articulated a list of seven, nonexclusive factors that the commission should use to determine whether a prospective law enforce- ment action is a reasonable possibility, and determined that the plaintiffs were unable to satisfy that standard. On the plaintiffs' appeal from the trial court's judgment, held: 1. The plaintiffs could not prevail on their claim that the commission arbi- trarily and capriciously had failed to articulate and apply the correct legal standard that governs claims of exemption under § 1-210 (b) (3) (D): a. The trial court correctly concluded that, under the first prong of § 1-210 (b) (3) (D), a ''prospective law enforcement action'' is a law enforcement action that is at least a reasonable possibility: Insofar as the FOIA does not define the term ''prospective,'' this court consulted dictionary definitions of the term and concluded that the statute was facially ambiguous, as plausible arguments could be made that the legislature, in enacting § 1-210 (b) (3) (D), may have intended ''prospective'' to have a probabilistic meaning, such as potential, antici- pated, expected, likely or possible, or to mean in prospect or pertaining to a prospect, as in prospective buyers. In resolving that ambiguity, this court adopted the probabilistic definition of ''prospective'' and agreed with the trial court's conclusion that a ''prospective law enforcement action'' refers to a future law enforcement action that has at least a reasonable possibility of occurring, meaning that the occurrence is more than theoretically possible but not necessar- ily likely or probable. Moreover, although the law enforcement exception plausibly could be read to impose either a more exacting standard, such as by requiring that the police show that an arrest or prosecution is pending or likely, or a less demanding standard, such as by requiring that the police demon- strate only a speculative or theoretical possibility of some future law enforcement action, the reasonable possibility standard was the most reasonable reading of the law enforcement exception insofar as it struck a proper balance between the competing public interests underlying the FOIA, namely, fostering openness and transparency while protecting important governmental functions that demand a degree of confiden- tiality. Furthermore, application of the rules of statutory interpretation to a related FOIA provision (§ 1-215 (b) (3)), which exempts from disclosure information relating to records of arrest that may ''prejudice a pending prosecution or a prospective law enforcement action,'' and the legislative history of § 1-210 (b) (3) (D) provided further support for the reasonable possibility standard and ruled out the most extreme readings of the term ''prospective.'' b. This court clarified that, under the first prong of § 1-210 (b) (3) (D), a respondent before the commission must establish only that it is at least reasonably possible that the information contained in a requested document will ''be used in'' support of an arrest or prosecution: In Dept. of Public Safety v. Freedom of Information Commission (51 Conn. App. 100), the Appellate Court stated in dictum that the law enforcement exception is satisfied when there is an evidentiary showing that the requested records are going to be used in a law enforcement action, and Superior Court judges and the commission have relied on that language to require a showing that it is at least probable, if not certain, that the subject records would be used for an arrest or prose- cution. Construing the statute to create a coherent and cohesive scheme, this court presumed that the same standard must govern both the ''to be used'' and the ''prospective law enforcement action'' elements of the first prong of the statutory law enforcement exception, and, accordingly, it overruled the Appellate Court's dictum in Dept. of Public Safety to the extent that it imposed a standard in connection with the ''to be used'' element that was different from the reasonable possibility standard that applied to the ''prospective law enforcement action'' element. c. This court rejected the policy arguments advanced by the plaintiffs and the amicus curiae, the Division of Criminal Justice: The division's claim that the reasonable possibility standard should be deemed satisfied when a law enforcement investigation is open, a suspect has been identified, and no insurmountable obstacles exist to a future arrest or prosecution was not supported by the language or legislative history of the statute, and that proposed rule followed a categorical approach that failed to account for the specific facts and context of each individual case, placed too much weight on the law enforcement side of the scale, precluded the public from exercising any effective oversight in all cases in which any applicable statute of limitations has not run, and did not account for the fact that, with the passage of time, it becomes increasingly likely that openness, rather than secrecy, is what will unearth the elusive lead that will help the police solve the case. Moreover, the claim that, as a matter of public policy, courts and the commission should defer to the expertise of law enforcement agencies or officials when construing or applying the law enforcement exception was not supported by the statutory scheme or the legislative history, especially in view of the fact that the legislature, which has been clear in the context of exceptions to the disclosure of records when it intends to give the agency possessing the subject records increased deference, did not do so when it drafted § 1-210 (b) (3). d. This court articulated various factors for determining, in the context of the crime of murder and other crimes that involve lengthy or no statutes of limitations, whether a future law enforcement action is reason- ably possible: This court agreed that the following seven, nonexclusive factors identi- fied by the trial court were relevant to a determination of whether a future law enforcement action is reasonably possible: the length of time that has passed since the crime; the length of time that has elapsed since the law enforcement agency last obtained significant new evidence or leads; whether the investigation, even if officially open, is classified as a cold case; the number of investigators presently assigned to the investigation; the amount of time investigators are committing to the case; whether the agency has a suspect and, if so, whether the agency's suspicion is supported by more than speculation; and whether advances in science or technology, such as improvements in DNA analysis, may help solve the crime. This court also noted that those individual factors may vary in importance from case to case and are not intended to serve as a complete or mecha- nistic checklist, and sight should not be lost of the two fundamental issues that underlie the factors, namely, whether the law enforcement agency continues to investigate the crime actively and earnestly, and, if the investigation has gone cold, whether there remains a reasonable possibility that the investigation ultimately will culminate in some law enforcement action. 2. The existing administrative record was not sufficient to permit this court to apply the newly adopted reasonable possibility standard as a matter of law, and, accordingly, this court remanded the case for further pro- ceedings before the commission: The commission's finding that the police had not identified a suspect was without support in the record and was contradicted by S's and H's testimony that the police department had enough DNA to develop suspects and that it had a prime suspect, the erroneous finding was apparently important to the commission's law enforcement exception analysis insofar as the commission had relied on that finding to distin- guish the present case from previous cases in which it had found that release of requested records would be prejudicial to a prospective law enforcement action, and, accordingly, this court concluded that the com- mission must be afforded an opportunity on remand to consider what weight and importance, if any, to give to the testimony that the police department identified a prime suspect early in the investigation. Moreover, the commission's final decision could be understood to require a probability, even a certainty, that the requested records will be used for an arrest or prosecution, a stringent standard that is not consistent with the plain language of the statute, and, because the commission's factual findings, such as that the plaintiffs' claims were wholly specula- tive, were conclusory and may be tied up with the legal standard that it applied, this court could not apply the new reasonable possibility standard to the existing record without running the risk of substituting its judgment for that of the commission as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact, and, accordingly, the commission must be provided with the opportunity on remand to assess whether some law enforcement action still remains a reasonable possibility. Furthermore, in concluding that a law enforcement action was not rea- sonably possible, the trial court relied on certain statistical evidence regarding the probability of a prosecution in cold murder investigations and the extent to which public disclosure of information in such cases would improve the likelihood of an arrest and prosecution rather than prejudice that outcome, but the commission was the fact finder, and it should have the opportunity on remand to review any available statistical data in the first instance, with the input from the parties and any expert testimony they wish to offer, before making relevant findings. 3. Although the trial court did not address the commission's determination that the plaintiffs had failed to establish that disclosure of the requested records would be prejudicial to a prospective law enforcement action, this court declined to give the trial court the opportunity on remand to consider the prejudice prong of § 1-210 (b) (3) (D) because, under the circumstances of the present case, further review by the trial court was unnecessary: The two prongs of the law enforcement exception, although distinct, are not wholly unrelated, several of the factors that the trial court identified as relevant to the prospective law enforcement action prong of § 1-210 (b) (3) (D), such as the existence of a suspect and the availability of DNA evidence for future testing, also are relevant to the issue of prejudice, and the commission's reconsideration of these matters will necessarily bear on prejudice, as well. Moreover, it seemed likely that the commission also applied the wrong legal standard to the prejudice prong insofar as it improperly conflated the two prongs of the statutory exception and improperly relied on S's offhand statement that he could ''go on with speculating'' as to how the requested information might be used, and, on remand, any documents that the plaintiffs submit for in camera review as containing potentially prejudicial information should be reviewed by the commission under its established standards. Argued October 19, 2022—officially released February 27, 2024

The plaintiff, a lieutenant with the Hartford Police Department, filed a bill of discovery against the defendant, who publishes an Internet blog on issues relating to Hartford municipal governance, seeking the production of certain materials that would enable the plaintiff to ascertain the identities of persons who had posted anonymous blog comments con- taining allegedly defamatory statements about him. Specifically, the plaintiff sought to compel the defendant to release the Internet protocol addresses and any other information identifying the anonymous com- menters and to submit for forensic analysis the hard drive of the laptop and the cell phone the defendant used in connection with the blog. The trial court granted the plaintiff's bill of discovery, concluding that the plaintiff had demonstrated probable cause with respect to his defamation claim against the authors of certain anonymous comments. To safeguard the defendant's privacy interests, the court ordered that the parties initially attempt to come to an agreement on the terms of a protective order and search protocols that would govern the scope and procedures to be used in the forensic analysis of his electronic devices. The court further ordered that, if the parties could not agree on those matters, then they must submit to the court proposed orders so the court could resolve any dispute. The court explicitly retained jurisdiction until such time as the parties filed their agreements or the court resolved any related disputes. Before the parties attempted to negotiate the terms, however, the defendant appealed, challenging the trial court's granting of the plaintiff's bill of discovery on various constitutional, statutory, and evidentiary grounds. Held that the trial court's decision granting the plaintiff's bill of discovery was not an appealable final judgment, and, accordingly, this court dis- missed the defendant's appeal for lack of jurisdiction: The final judgment rule applies to a pure bill of discovery, the trial court's decision in the present case would not become a final judgment until the scope of discovery was clearly defined by agreement of the parties or, in the absence of an agreement, by court order, and, because the parties had not yet complied with the aspect of the trial court's order requiring them, prior to any discovery, to either file an agreement regard- ing the terms of the protective order and search protocols or to return to the trial court for resolution of those issues, the trial court's decision was not a final judgment in the usual sense. Moreover, contrary to the defendant's claim, the trial court's interlocu- tory decision did not constitute an appealable final judgment under the second prong of State v. Curcio (191 Conn. 27), insofar as it did not so conclude the rights of the parties that further proceedings could not affect them. Specifically, the trial court's order that the parties ''attempt'' to agree meant only that counsel was required to engage in good faith efforts to reach an agreement regarding the terms of the protective order and search protocols and in no way required, contrary to the defendant's argument, the defendant's counsel to reveal information that would put at risk the statutory and constitutional rights to anonymity that the defendant sought to protect, as counsel could decline to reveal any such information if he acted in good faith and could ask the court to decide the open issues if the negotiations were to fail, and the very purpose of the further proceedings contemplated by the court's order was to safeguard those rights to the extent possible. Furthermore, the defendant's argument that, regardless of the terms of the protective order and search protocols, his asserted rights to privacy would be violated once the forensic analysis of his devices was under- taken also failed to satisfy the second prong of Curcio because, although proceedings in the trial court relating to the protective order and search protocols might not have extinguished the defendant's aggrievement or eliminated his grounds for appeal, the terms of the order and protocols might have affected the nature or scope of the issues requiring resolution in a future appeal. In addition, the exception to the final judgment rule recognized in Curcio is applicable only when this court finds that a cognizable legal right to which the appellant was plausibly entitled would be lost if appellate review were delayed, there could be no search of the defendant's devices until after the terms of the protective order and search protocols were finalized by agreement or by the court, until then, there was no threat of disclosure of the information that the defendant claimed he was legally entitled to withhold, and, accordingly, it was clear that the defendant would suffer no risk of irreparable harm to the rights he sought to preserve if he had been required to defer his appeal until the parties complied with the court's order. Strict adherence to the requirements of the final judgment rule was appropriate under the present circumstances insofar as that rule impli- cates the court's jurisdiction and is intended to promote efficient judicial administration by discouraging piecemeal appeals, and, although an appeal by the defendant may be inevitable, he could not jump the gun by obtaining appellate review before the court's decision in the present case becomes a final judgment. Argued October 19, 2023—officially released March 5, 2024

Convicted, after a jury trial, of the crime of home invasion in connection with an incident in which the defendant and another man kicked down the door to the victim's apartment, physically assaulted the victim, and stole some of his belongings, the defendant appealed to this court. After closing arguments, the trial court instructed the jury on home invasion, the other offenses with which the defendant had been charged, including burglary in the first degree, and certain lesser included offenses, includ- ing burglary in the third degree as a lesser included offense of burglary in the first degree. The jury did not reach a verdict after the first day of deliberations. Before the second day of deliberations began, however, the defendant was exposed to COVID-19, which he eventually con- tracted. As a result, jury deliberations were delayed for twenty-five days. During that time, two jurors became unavailable for the rescheduled proceedings and were replaced by alternate jurors. When the proceed- ings resumed, the court instructed that the remaining members of the original jury were to disregard their earlier deliberations and that the jury was to begin deliberations anew. Thereafter, the jury returned a verdict finding the defendant guilty of home invasion but not guilty of the other charges and the lesser included offenses. Defense counsel indicated that he had no objections to the verdict, which the court accepted. Defense counsel then moved for a mistrial, claiming that the defendant was prejudiced by the twenty-five day interruption in the jury deliberations. The court denied the motion and rendered judgment in accordance with the jury's verdict. On the defendant's appeal from the judgment of conviction, held: 1. The defendant could not prevail on his claim that this court should reverse his conviction of home invasion or grant him a new trial on that charge because the jury's verdicts of guilty of home invasion and not guilty of the lesser included offense of burglary in the third degree were legally inconsistent: The defendant conceded that his challenge to the jury's legally inconsis- tent verdicts was barred by this court's decision in State v. Arroyo (292 Conn. 558), in which this court held that legal inconsistency claims are unreviewable on appeal, this court declined the defendant's invitation to overrule or modify Arroyo, insofar as that decision was consistent with United States Supreme Court precedent and that of the majority of other jurisdictions, and this court emphasized that any inconsistency in the jury's verdicts must be addressed by the trial court and the parties before the jury has been discharged if anything is to be done about it. Moreover, this court rejected the defendant's assertion that a trial court is obligated to seek consistency in jury verdicts sua sponte, as a court's direction to the jury to resolve any inconsistency through further delibera- tions could result in another guilty finding that exposes a defendant to a lengthier sentence. In the present case, the legally inconsistent verdicts did not implicate the defendant's constitutional rights, as nothing in the United States constitution prohibits a court from accepting inconsistencies between guilty and not guilty verdicts, and, because there was no constitutional issue at stake or any nonspeculative reason to conclude that the defen- dant was prejudiced by the jury's legally inconsistent verdicts, this court would not upset those verdicts on appeal. Insofar as this court declined to overturn or modify its conclusion in Arroyo that there is no appellate remedy for inconsistent verdicts, the defendant's alternative claim that the trial court committed plain error by accepting the jury's inconsistent verdicts necessarily failed. 2. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defense counsel's motion for a mistrial: Although this court acknowledged the risk that pausing jury deliberations may increase the likelihood that jurors will forget the arguments of counsel and the trial court's instructions, and that jurors will rush to a consensus in order to conclude deliberations, it also recognized the unprecedented circumstances presented by the COVID-19 pandemic and the efforts that the trial court made in obtaining input from the parties on how to proceed once the pandemic impacted the trial while seeking to protect the parties' rights, which, taken together, led this court to conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defense counsel's motion for a mistrial. Moreover, notwithstanding the defendant's claim that the trial court jeopardized the integrity of the proceedings by failing to canvass the jurors to confirm that they had not investigated or discussed the case during the delay, the record demonstrated that the trial court was mindful of and responsive to the parties' concerns during the delay, as the court considered, among other things, ways to conceal from the jury that it was the defendant who had tested positive for COVID-19 and the fact that he was incarcerated in the event that he were to appear remotely during the proceedings, how to notify the jury about scheduling changes, and having counsel review the language to be used when notifying the jurors of the delay. Furthermore, this court's decision was in line with those of other jurisdic- tions, consistent with Connecticut case law concerning the management of trial delays, and, more specifically, in accord with the decisions of other jurisdictions addressing the legal impact of delays attributable to COVID-19, and, although a pause in jury deliberations can increase the likelihood that jurors may forget counsel's arguments or rush to be done with their responsibilities, under the unprecedented circumstances presented by the COVID-19 pandemic, there always was the risk of delays from the outset of the trial due to the pandemic. Argued October 19, 2023—officially released March 19, 2024

Convicted of felony murder and conspiracy to commit robbery in the first degree, among other crimes, in connection with his role in the robbery of a convenience store and the shooting death of the store clerk, the defendant appealed to the Appellate Court, claiming, inter alia, that the trial court had improperly denied his motions to suppress evidence of his cell phone and the data contained therein. The defendant and two other men, V and S, had driven to the convenience store in V's car. While V waited in the car, the defendant and S entered the store, robbed it of cash and cigars, and fatally shot the store clerk. V then drove S and the defendant to the defendant's apartment. V later contacted the police and identified the defendant and S in photographs taken from the store's surveillance footage, which showed that they were wearing masks and gloves. Subsequently, the police obtained and executed a search warrant for the defendant's residence, where they found a ski mask and a pair of gloves. The defendant was not present during the search but thereafter met with the police for an interview. Before the interview, the defendant gave his cell phone to his mother, who was sitting outside of the interview room. After the defendant invoked his right to counsel, a detective approached the defendant's mother and asked her for the defendant's cell phone, which she gave to the detective. The police subsequently obtained a warrant to search the contents of the cell phone. The evidence retrieved from the cell phone included a draft, unsent text message to an unknown recipient, in which the defen- dant stated, ''[i]f I get locked up tell sheema put them shits in the river some where . . . .'' At trial, there was testimony that ''sheema'' referred to the defendant's girlfriend, and the prosecutor argued during closing argument that ''shits'' referred to the gun used during the robbery. The state also elicited testimony from H, who had been incarcerated with the defendant during the defendant's pretrial custody. H testified that the defendant admitted that he and S both had shot the clerk during the robbery. The state further introduced into evidence a statement made to the police by J, a friend of the defendant who had been arrested for an unrelated crime. In that statement, J indicated that he had spoken to the defendant and S on the day of the robbery and that they had admitted to having shot the clerk. The Appellate Court upheld the judg- ment of conviction. In doing so, the Appellate Court rejected the defen- dant's claims that the police had violated his rights under Miranda v. Arizona (384 U.S. 436) and article first, § 8, of the Connecticut constitu- tion when they continued to interrogate him after he had invoked his right to counsel, that the seizure of his cell phone violated the fourth amendment to the United States constitution and article first, § 7, of the Connecticut constitution, and that the affidavit the police submitted in support of their application for a warrant to search the contents of his cell phone contained materially false information. On the granting of certification, the defendant appealed to this court, claiming, inter alia, that the Appellate Court had improperly upheld the defendant's conviction and that article first, § 8, of the Connecticut constitution mandates protection of a suspect's rights under Miranda via the adop- tion of a rule that evidence obtained through the questioning of a suspect after the suspect has invoked the right to counsel must be suppressed and cannot be used in the state's case-in-chief at a subsequent trial. Held that any error in the admission of the contents of the defendant's cell phone was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, and, accordingly, this court declined to address the defendant's constitutional challenges and affirmed the Appellate Court's judgment: A review of the trial record demonstrated that the state offered an overwhelming wealth of evidence beyond the contents of the cell phone to prove that the defendant had committed the crimes with which he was charged, including surveillance footage from inside of the conve- nience store, which depicted two perpetrators wearing hoodies, ski masks, and gloves, and the detailed testimony from V about his and the defendant's involvement in the events that occurred on the night of the robbery, and the consistency and independent corroboration of the various witnesses' testimony and statements rendered any error with respect to the admission of the contents of the cell phone harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Specifically, V's detailed testimony was corroborated by H's testimony that the defendant had admitted to the robbery and had provided him with numerous details about it, including that the defendant and another man both had guns and both had shot the clerk, that he wanted to get his cell phone excluded from evidence because it contained a photograph of the gun used in the robbery, that he was worried that the ski mask and gloves discovered by the police might have his DNA on them, and that he hid the gun at his girlfriend's house after the shooting but moved it once the police searched his residence, and V's testimony was also corroborated by J's statement to the police, which included details about the robbery that were not publicly available, such as the type of gun S used and the brand of cigars they stole. Moreover, the state presented significant evidence of the defendant's consciousness of guilt, insofar as there was testimony from H that, after J gave his statement to the police, the defendant directed his cousin to assault J to force J to recant his testimony, and testimony from J himself that, after speaking to the police, he had a physical altercation with someone who had the same name as the defendant's cousin. Furthermore, there was physical evidence corroborating the testimony and statements of V, H, and J, including the ski mask and gloves found during the search of the defendant's residence, testimony that an analysis of the DNA discovered on that ski mask indicated that the defendant was a potential contributor to that DNA, and testimony about the histori- cal cell site location data associated with the defendant's cell phone, which established that that phone was in the areas of the convenience store and the defendant's residence at around the same times that, according to V's testimony, V, the defendant, and S were at those locations. Although this court acknowledged that the testimony of V and H was properly viewed with some skepticism in light of their self-interest in testifying for the state as an accomplice and a jailhouse informant, respec- tively, the quality of their testimony grew in strength with the degree of independent corroboration. In addition, even though the prosecutor mentioned the unsent text mes- sage several times during closing and rebuttal arguments, when viewed in context, the prosecutor's focus on the unsent text message was minimal relative to the other evidence admitted at trial, insofar as the prosecutor addressed the testimony of the various witnesses and the cell site location data before mentioning the contents of the cell phone and emphasized that other evidence far more strongly, and the contents of the cell phone played no role in establishing an element of an offense or in bolstering or destroying the credibility of any particular witness, which lessened the impact of any improper admission of the cell phone's contents. (One justice dissenting) Argued October 11, 2022—officially released March 26, 2024

Convicted of the crimes of felony murder, burglary in the first degree, conspiracy to commit burglary in the first degree, attempt to commit robbery in the first degree, and criminal possession of a firearm in connection with the shooting death of the victim, the defendant appealed to this court. At trial, one of the defendant's accomplices, D, testified pursuant to a cooperation agreement with the state. D testified that, on the night of the murder, she had driven her boyfriend, J, and J's friend, who allegedly was the defendant and went by the name ''E,'' to the victim's house to buy drugs. Once they arrived, J informed D that they were going to rob the victim. D and E approached the house while J waited across the street. When the victim opened the door, E drew a gun and barged into the victim's house. D was scared and ran back to the car, where she met J. According to D, she heard a gunshot as she fled. The defendant testified in his own defense. Although he admitted that he went to the victim's house with J and D to buy drugs, he testified that he stayed near the car while J and D approached the house and that, after ten to fifteen minutes, he heard a gunshot. According to the defendant, J handed D a gun when J reentered the car. While cross- examining the defendant, the prosecutor indicated that a video recording of the defendant's interviews with the police, in which the defendant made certain statements that were inconsistent with his trial testimony, would be played at a later point in the trial. The video recordings, however, ultimately were not offered into evidence. During rebuttal argument, the prosecutor remarked on D's credibility, stating that either D or the defendant was ''completely wrong'' because their testimony was not consistent. The prosecutor also made remarks regarding the fact that the defendant, during his testimony, did not express outrage toward others who had implicated him or who had testified against him, and then proceeded to ask the jurors how they would feel if they were being accused of the crimes for which the defendant was being tried. The trial court issued a general credibility instruction that was applicable to all of the witnesses, an instruction applicable to accomplices that named D by name, and an instruction concerning the defendant's testi- mony in particular. The court specifically instructed the jurors to assess the defendant's credibility in the same manner as that of other witnesses and that they could consider ''his interest in the verdict'' in assessing his credibility. On appeal, the defendant claimed, for the first time, that the trial court had committed plain error by instructing the jury that it could consider the defendant's interest in the outcome of the trial and that the prosecutor had made certain improper remarks during his cross- examination of the defendant and during rebuttal argument. Held: 1. The defendant could not prevail on his claim that the trial court had committed plain error by instructing the jury that it could consider his interest in the outcome of the trial in assessing the credibility of his trial testimony: In State v. Medrano (308 Conn. 604), this court exercised its supervisory authority over the administration of justice and directed trial courts to refrain from instructing the jury that, when a defendant testifies, it may specifically consider the defendant's interest in the outcome of the case and the importance to him of the outcome of the trial, and, although this court agreed, and the state conceded, that the trial court's instruction in the present case violated the directive in Medrano in an obvious and readily discernible manner, the defendant failed to demonstrate that the erroneous instruction resulted in manifest injustice. The fact that a trial court's jury instruction, by commission or omission, fails to comply with a supervisory rule does not, in and of itself, establish the existence of manifest injustice necessary for plain error, and, instead, the defendant must establish that the evidence adduced at trial, the disputed factual issues before the jury, and the instructions as a whole gave rise to the danger of juror misunderstanding or confusion that prompted the court to adopt the rule that the trial court failed to implement. In the present case, although the trial court included a sentence that improperly made a specific reference to the defendant's interest in the outcome of the trial, the erroneous instruction was brief and immediately preceded and followed by qualifying language, which the defendant did not challenge on appeal and which required the jury to evaluate the defendant's testimony as it would the testimony of any other witness, and, viewing the jury charge in its entirety, this court concluded that the erroneous instruction did not mislead the jury. Moreover, this court could not conclude that the erroneous jury instruc- tion so affected the fairness and integrity of, and public confidence in, the judicial proceedings so as to require reversal of the judgment, as the jury was free to infer from the evidence presented at trial, including the defendant's admission that he traveled with J and D to the victim's home to purchase drugs from a known drug house and evidence that he was in that area at the time the victim was killed, that the defendant was a ready and willing participant in the criminal activity that resulted in the victim's death, and also to infer that the defendant's behavior following the crimes, particularly changing his cell phone number and lying to the police, was inconsistent with innocence and indicative of consciousness of guilt. There was no merit to the defendant's contention that the erroneous instruction likely misled the jury by placing the defendant on equal footing with D for purposes of the jury's credibility determination, the trial court's instructions having carefully distinguished between the spe- cial credibility rules governing the testimony of an accomplice and the general credibility rules governing the testimony of all other witnesses who might have an interest in the outcome of the case, including the defendant, and the trial court explicitly informed the jury that the defen- dant's testimony should be assessed in accordance with its general credi- bility instruction governing the testimony of all other witnesses, whereas D's testimony was governed by the special credibility instruction unique to the testimony of accomplices. 2. There was no merit to the defendant's claim that the prosecutor had engaged in certain improprieties during his cross-examination of the defendant and during rebuttal argument because none of the prosecu- tor's remarks was improper: a. The prosecutor did not improperly comment on D's credibility, during rebuttal argument, when he stated that either D or the defendant must be ''wrong'': Contrary to the defendant's argument that the prosecutor's comment improperly implied that the jury could not find the defendant not guilty unless it found that D had lied, the prosecutor's isolated remark did not make a direct connection between the defendant's guilt and D's credibil- ity or misrepresent the state's burden of proof. Moreover, because D only identified her accomplices as J and E, and never identified the defendant as E, the jury was not required to find that D had lied in order to find the defendant not guilty of the charged crimes. b. The prosecutor did not make an improper golden rule argument when, during rebuttal argument, he commented on the defendant's lack of outrage toward his accusers and asked the jurors how they would feel if they had been accused of the crimes for which the defendant was on trial: The prosecutor's observation about the defendant's lack of outrage and his question to the jurors did not appeal to the jurors' passions or emo- tions but, instead, asked the jurors to use their common sense and experience to infer that an innocent person accused of the crimes charged would have exhibited some outrage or anger on the witness stand, and such an argument fell within the permissible bounds of fair comment on witness credibility. c. The prosecutor did not argue facts not in evidence during his cross- examination of the defendant: Certain questions the prosecutor asked the defendant about threats he allegedly made to D's son were not improper because those questions were designed to test the defendant's credibility and to rebut, impeach, modify, or explain the defendant's direct testimony, and the defendant did not claim that the prosecutor lacked a good faith basis to ask those questions or that the questions themselves or the information sought was inflammatory, inadmissible, unduly prejudicial, or in violation of a court order. Moreover, the prosecutor's comments that allegedly inconsistent state- ments the defendant made during his video-recorded police interroga- tions would be played at a later point during the trial did not constitute improprieties, insofar as the jury was aware of the existence of the recordings and of the fact that many of the defendant's statements therein were inconsistent with his trial testimony, the defendant did not claim that the inconsistent statements were inadmissible for impeachment purposes or that the prosecutor lacked a good faith intent to play them at the time he made the challenged remarks, and the record did not reflect that the prosecutor's comments were delivered in a sarcastic, provocative, or aggressive manner. Argued November 14, 2023—officially released April 9, 2024

Pursuant to statute (§ 14-227b (c)), when a person has been arrested for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or any drug, the arresting officer ''shall prepare a report of the incident and shall mail or otherwise transmit . . . the report and a copy of the results of any chemical test [of such person's blood, breath or urine] to the Department of Motor Vehicles within three business days.'' Pursuant further to Volck v. Muzio (204 Conn. 507), an incident report prepared in accordance with § 14-227b (c) is admissible at a motor vehicle operator's license suspension hearing, as an exception to the hearsay rule, without the need for testimony from the arresting officer. The plaintiff, who had been arrested for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, appealed to the trial court from the decision of the defendant, the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, who temporarily suspended the plaintiff's license to operate a motor vehicle. At the plaintiff's license suspension hearing, the plaintiff's attor- ney objected to the admission of an incident report that was prepared by the arresting officer on the ground that it was not prepared and mailed to the Department of Motor Vehicles within three business days, as required by § 14-227b (c). The arresting officer had not completed the report until five business days after the plaintiff's arrest. The department hearing officer overruled the objection and admitted the report, which was the only evidence submitted at the hearing. On appeal to the trial court from the hearing officer's decision, that court dismissed the appeal, concluding that strict adherence with the preparation and mailing requirement of § 14-227b (c) was not necessary for the report to be admissible because the report bore indicia of trustworthiness and relia- bility. The Appellate Court affirmed the trial court's judgment, conclud- ing that, because § 14-227b (c) is not accompanied by any negative or prohibitory language, the preparation and mailing requirement is directory, and, therefore, strict compliance with that requirement is not necessary for a report to be admissible at a license suspension hearing. The Appellate Court further determined that there were sufficient indicia of reliability of the report at issue. Accordingly, the Appellate Court held that the hearing officer did not abuse her discretion in admitting the report. On the granting of certification, the plaintiff appealed to this court. Held that the hearing officer abused her discretion in admitting an incident report that did not strictly comply with the preparation and mailing provision of § 14-227b (c) in the absence of testimony from the arresting officer, and, accordingly, this court reversed the Appellate Court's judg- ment and remanded with direction to reverse the trial court's judgment and to direct the trial court to sustain the plaintiff's appeal: Contrary to the Appellate Court's conclusion that the preparation and mailing requirement in § 14-227b (c) is directory, this court concluded that that requirement was mandatory because, even though the statute contained no negative or prohibitory language, the substantive nature of the statutory provision was clear, insofar as it plainly promoted the accuracy and reliability of the information that ultimately will be used at a license suspension hearing. The legislature enacted § 14-277b to protect the public from drivers who are under the influence by authorizing the temporary revocation of their operating privileges prior to conviction while also affording them due process, to achieve that purpose, the legislature authorized the admission of incident reports at license suspension hearings without the need to produce the arresting officer, provided that the procedures set forth in the hearsay exception created by § 14-277b (c) are followed to ensure the reliability of the information contained in the report, and the legislature determined that requiring the arresting officer to prepare the report within three business days, while the officer's recollection of the incident remains fresh, is an appropriate time frame to imbue the report with sufficient reliability. Having concluded that the preparation and mailing requirement of § 14- 227b (c) is mandatory, this court clarified that § 14-227b (c) describes substantive requirements that incident reports must meet, and the failure to meet those requirements renders a report inadmissible insofar as it fails to satisfy the exception for the report to be admitted without the need to produce the arresting officer at the suspension hearing. In the present case, it was undisputed that the arresting officer failed to comply with the three business day requirement prescribed by § 14- 227b (c), the plaintiff's attorney objected to the admission of the report on the grounds that that requirement was not met and that the arresting officer was not present at the hearing to offer testimony, and, by admitting the report without hearing testimony from the arresting officer, the hearing officer abused her discretion. Moreover, the Appellate Court's conclusion that an incident report that fails to strictly comply with § 14-227b (c) nevertheless may be admissible if it meets some of that provision's requirements was based on that court's incorrect determination that the preparation and mailing requirement is directory, and, therefore, that conclusion could not stand. Argued October 27, 2023—officially released April 9, 2024

The plaintiff financing company sought to recover damages from the defen- dants, a limited liability company and its principal, D, for breach of contract in connection with the defendants' alleged failure to make payments under a motor vehicle lease agreement. After the defendants were defaulted for failure to appear, the trial court granted the plaintiff's motion for judgment and rendered a default judgment for the plaintiff. Less than four months later, and more than two years after the plaintiff had commenced its action, the defendants moved to open and set aside the default judgment pursuant to statute ((Rev. to 2019) § 52-212). In an affidavit accompanying the motion to open, D attested that the vehicle in question had serious defects that made it dangerous to operate and that the defendants had declared the lease void and returned the vehicle to the car dealership from which it was leased. D further attested that he mistakenly thought that the case had been resolved, that there were good defenses to the plaintiff's action, including breach of warranties and misrepresentations, and that the defendants would file a counter- claim when the judgment was opened. The plaintiff objected, and, after a hearing, the trial court denied the motion to open, concluding that the motion had been untimely filed and had no basis. The defendants appealed to the Appellate Court, which acknowledged that the trial court incorrectly had determined that the motion was untimely but determined that the trial court had not abused its discretion in denying the motion on the ground that it had no basis. On the granting of certification, the defendants appealed to this court. Held that the Appellate Court incorrectly concluded that the trial court had not abused its discretion in denying the defendants' motion to open, and, accordingly, this court reversed the Appellate Court's judgment and remanded with direction to reverse the trial court's judgment and for further proceedings: This case originally was scheduled to be argued before a panel of this court consisting of Chief Justice Robinson and Justices McDonald, D'Auria, Mullins, Ecker Alexander and Dannehy. Although Chief Justice Robinson was not present at oral argument, he has read the briefs and appendices, and listened to a recording of the oral argument prior to participating in this decision. The legal standard set forth in § 52-212 (a) for opening default judgments, pursuant to which a movant must establish that a good defense existed at the time the trial court rendered judgment and that the movant was prevented from asserting that defense because of mistake, accident, or other reasonable cause, applies when the motion to open is timely filed, that is, within four months of the date the trial court rendered judgment, whereas, once that four month window has lapsed, the trial court has the inherent authority to open a judgment when the movant establishes that the judgment was obtained by fraud, duress, or mutual mistake, or, under certain circumstances, when newly discovered evidence exists to challenge the judgment. In the present case, it was undisputed that the trial court's timeliness determination was incorrect because the defendants had timely moved to open the judgment within four months of the date the trial court rendered it, and this court could not conclude that this critical error did not affect the trial court's determination as to which legal standard to apply in ruling on the merits of the motion or did not adversely impact the trial court's exercise of discretion under the proper legal standard. Although it was unclear which legal standard the trial court had applied in concluding that there was no basis for the motion to open, the trial court's application of either standard constituted an abuse of its dis- cretion. Specifically, if the trial court's decision that the motion was untimely led it to deny the motion on the ground that the defendants had failed to establish that the judgment was procured by fraud, duress, or mutual mistake, its decision would have been unfounded both because the motion was timely and there was no discussion or mention by the trial court of fraud, duress, or mutual mistake, and if the trial court determined that the motion was untimely and also had no basis because the defen- dants had failed to satisfy the two part test prescribed by § 52-212 (a), then its decision would have resulted from the application of an incorrect legal standard, that is, the standard applicable to timely filed motions to open. Moreover, the trial court's misapprehension of the timeliness of the motion impacted not only which legal standard to apply, but also its consideration of whether the defendants had satisfied § 52-212 (a). Accordingly, the trial court's decision whether to grant the defendants' motion to open was founded on an improper subsidiary determination, namely, its erroneous determination that the defendants' motion was untimely, reversal of the Appellate Court's judgment was necessary because an injustice apparently occurred, and, on remand, the defendants were entitled to an evidentiary hearing, before a different judge with a correct understanding that the defendants' motion was timely filed, at which they will have the opportunity to satisfy the requirements of § 52- 212 (a). (Two justices dissenting in one opinion) Argued November 15, 2023—officially released April 16, 2024

The plaintiff sought visitation with L, the minor child of the defendant and the plaintiff's deceased sister, pursuant to the third-party visitation statute (§ 46b-59). The plaintiff had lived with L and L's mother since L was born in 2010, while the defendant lived elsewhere. After the death of L's mother in 2021, L initially continued to live with the plaintiff, but the defendant eventually took L to live with him full-time. The defendant moved to dismiss the plaintiff's visitation petition for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, claiming that the plaintiff lacked standing under § 46b-59 (b) because she failed to allege sufficient facts to establish that she had a parent-like relationship with L and that L would suffer real and significant harm if visitation were to be denied. The plaintiff then filed an amended petition for visitation with L, in which she alleged that, in a series of video calls that occurred while L was living with the defendant, L appeared very stressed, sad, and anxious. During those calls, L reported, inter alia, that she was miserable living with the defen- dant and devastated to be cut off from the plaintiff. L stated that she was crying herself to sleep and had lost weight. L also told the plaintiff that the defendant had mocked her for crying about the loss of her mother and had thrown her up against a car. The defendant objected to the amended petition, arguing that it would be improper for the court to consider the amended petition while the motion to dismiss the initial petition for lack of subject matter jurisdiction was pending. Following a hearing, the court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss the initial petition, concluding, without elaboration, that it did not satisfy the requirements of § 46b-59. The court also dismissed, sua sponte, the amended petition, concluding that its allegations, if proven by clear and convincing evidence, would not establish the plaintiff's parent-like relationship with L or establish that L would suffer real and significant harm if visitation were to be denied. Thereafter, the plaintiff appealed from the trial court's judgment. Held that the trial court improperly dismissed the plaintiff's amended petition for visitation with L, the plaintiff having adequately alleged therein both the existence of a parent-like relationship and that the denial of visitation would cause L real and significant harm, and, accordingly, this court reversed the trial court's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings: 1. The trial court improperly treated the defendant's motion to dismiss as implicating the court's subject matter jurisdiction rather than its statu- tory authority to act pursuant to § 46b-59: In Roth v. Weston (259 Conn. 202), this court applied a judicial gloss to a prior version of § 46b-59 to render the statute constitutional and, in doing so, concluded that the parent-like relationship and the real and significant harm requirements were matters of standing that implicated the court's subject matter jurisdiction, but the legislature's subsequent amendment (P.A. 12-137, § 1) to § 46b-59, in accordance with the gloss adopted in Roth, created a new statute that carried with it a strong presumption of constitutionality such that the statute no longer required a gloss to function within the bounds of the constitution. The trial court has plenary and general subject matter jurisdiction over legal disputes in family relations matters pursuant to statute (§ 46b- 1), § 46b-1 (a) (12) defines family relations matters to include matters affecting or involving rights and remedies provided for in chapter 815j of the General Statutes, § 46b-59 falls within chapter 815j and expressly provides the court with the power to order visitation to any person who meets the statutory standard, and, accordingly, §§ 46b-1 and 46b- 59 together provided the trial court in the present case with subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiff's third-party visitation petitions. Because the motion to dismiss implicated the trial court's statutory authority to act pursuant to § 46b-59 rather than its subject matter juris- diction, this court treated that motion as raising the question of whether the plaintiff had sufficiently proffered specific and good faith allegations that both a parent-like relationship existed between her and L and that the denial of visitation would cause real and significant harm to L. 2. Because the trial court should have allowed the plaintiff to amend her initial petition for visitation, and because the trial court considered the plaintiff's amended petition, it was permissible for this court to consider the allegations therein to determine whether the trial court properly had declined to exercise its statutory authority under § 46b-59: The defendant's objection to the plaintiff's amended petition was prem- ised on his claim that the plaintiff had failed to comply with the rule of practice (§ 10-60) governing amendments to pleadings in civil matters, but visitation is governed by the less restrictive rule of practice (§ 25- 7) pertaining to amendments to pleadings in family matters, and, because the trial court should have allowed the plaintiff to amend her initial petition under the more liberal provision of Practice Book § 25-7, and the trial court actually considered the amended petition, this court also considered the amended petition to determine whether the plaintiff pleaded sufficient facts to demonstrate that she had a parent-like relation- ship with L and that L would suffer real and significant harm if visitation were to be denied. 3. The trial court incorrectly concluded that the amended petition did not include the specific and good faith allegations necessary to demonstrate the existence of the plaintiff's parent-like relationship with L and that L would suffer real and significant harm if visitation were to be denied: With respect to the parent-like relationship requirement, the plaintiff alleged, inter alia, that she lived with L for more than ten years, was L's primary caretaker, and was involved in every aspect of L's day, including transporting L to school, assisting L with homework, enrolling L in extracurricular activities, and taking L to medical appointments, and that, after the death of L's mother, she served as L's primary provider of emotional support, comfort, and care, and those allegations establish- ing the duration, regularity, and magnitude of the care that the plaintiff provided to L were sufficient to plead a parent-like relationship pursuant to § 46b-59 (b) and (c). This court emphasized that the parent-like relationship and real and significant harm requirements should be analyzed separately and that the severance of emotional ties between a nonparent who has developed a parent-like relationship and a child, without more, should not be the end of the analysis with respect to the harm requirement, but it also recognized that there may be circumstances, such as when a child is coping with the death of a parent in addition to the severance of substan- tial emotional ties with a nonparent, that the denial of visitation with the nonparent itself could cause serious and immediate harm to that child. With respect to the real and significant harm requirement, the plaintiff alleged, inter alia, that she was L's primary caretaker and provider of emotional support, that L was abruptly taken away from her home and had been very emotional since she was cut off from her former life, that L was very sad, anxious, fearful, crying excessively, experiencing suicidal ideation, and losing weight, and that the defendant's actions compounded the emotional harm that he caused to L by depriving her of a relationship with the plaintiff, and those allegations were more than sufficiently specific to satisfy the statutory pleading requirement by demonstrating that L was suffering significant emotional harm, manifesting itself through her conduct, statements, and physical symptoms, as a result of the deprivation of her relationship with the plaintiff. Igersheim v. Bezrutczyk (197 Conn. App. 412), to the extent that it held that it is improper for a trial court to consider an amended third-party visitation petition that is filed during the pendency of a motion to dismiss the initial third-party visitation petition, overruled. Argued October 26, 2023—officially released April 16, 2024