Volume 35 — United States Reports

Held: by intermediate conveyances, the premises in controversy, in fee simple.

A motion was made by Mr. Underwood for the defendant in error, to docket and dismiss this suit, according to the amended rule of the court passed at tht last term, for want of its being duly entered on the docket; the writ of error having been sued out before the last January term, and the suit not having been docketed at that term, or at the present term.

<p>Certain streets were laid out by the town of Charlestown, Masrachusefts, and thb proceedings relative to the same were afterwards confirmed by an act of the legislature. The streets passed over the land of John Harris, arid he afterwards re- . ceived a compensation from the town for taking the land occupied by the streets. In 1800, the United States, under the authority of an act of the legislature of Massachusetts, purchased of Mr. Harris several parcels of land, now occupied as a navy yard, and in 1801. By an arrangement between the town of Charlestown and the United States, the streets, so far as they were within the limits of the navy yard, were closed up, and have éver since been discontinued ^ and have been used' as apart of. the navy yard. The agent of the United States and Mr. Harris, not agreeing as to the value of the land taken for the navy yard, the value was ascertained and determined by a jury proceeding under a law authorizing the same, and the amount of the valuation paid to Mr. Harris by the United States. The juijy did not appraise the land on which the streets were laid Out/ One lot of ground was appraised “ with the appurtenances.” This action was instituted by the hens of Mr. Harris claiming to be paid the value of the land on which the streets had been laid out, but which had been discontinued. The defendant was the con mandant of the navy yard.</p> <p>By the Court. The term “ appurtenancis,” in common parlance, and in legal acceptation, is used to signify something appertaining to another thing as principal and which passes as incident to the principal thing. Land cannot be appurtenarit to land. The soil and’ freehold of the streets did not pass to the United States, under and by virtue of the term “ appurtenances.”</p> <p>The right of the plaintiffs to the freehold of the streets.is not barred by the first section of the act of the legislature of Massachusetts of 30tb October 1830.</p> <p>The law in Massachusetts is well settled, that where a mere easement is taken fór a public highway, the soil and freehold remain in the owner of the land, encumbered only with the easement; and that upon the discontinuance of the highvs ay, the soil and freehold revert to the owner of the land.</p> <p>It has been repeatedly ruled in this court, that thé Whole case cannot be brought here, under the act of 1802, upon such a general question. This act provides only for bringing up in this manner specific questions, upon which the judges in the circuit court may be opposed in opinion.</p>

Held: that an infant cannot bind himself in a bond with a penalty, and especially to pay interest. In the case of Baylis v. Dineley, Lord Ellenborough said: “ In the case of the infant lessor, that being a lease, rendering rent, imported on the face of it a benefit to the infant; and his accepting the rent' at full age was conclusive that it was for his benefit.

This action was commenced by the plaintiffs in error in the superior court of the city of New York, and on the suggestion of the defendant, that the suit was instituted against him for a.ets done by him under the revenue laws, as collector for the district of the city of New York, and praying that the same should be removed to the circuit court of the United States for the southern district of New York; the cause was so removed to October term, 1833.

A petition was filed on the 22d day of August 1824, by Antoine Soulard, in the district court of the United States for the district of Missouri, for the confirmation of a tract of land under the authority of the act of Congress passed May 26, 1824, entitltled an act enabling the claimants of lands within the limits of the state of Missouri and territory of Arkansas, to institute proceedings to try the validity of their claims; and stating that on the 26th of April 1796, the…

BILL in equity from the district court' of Louisiana, brought by . appeal to this court, from a decree of the district court dimissing the bill upon a demurrer. It was Suggested by Mr. Porter, as counsel for appellee, that Linton was dead, and he was ready to enter his appearance for his executor, and to revive the suit; and as no person appeared to prosecute the suit for the appellants, he moved for a dismissal of the appeal.

The ship Hope was bound to Mobile from Havana, in January, 1832, with a cargo of fruit, sugar, coffee, segars, and. tobacco. She arrived off the port of Mobile on the 24th January, 1832, took a pilot, and was carried safely within Mobile Point, to a place at which the pilots are usually discharged; the pilot then left her, and she proceeded some distance up the bay, and came to anchor about six miles within Mobile Point.

This case was before the court at January term 1832, on a writ of error, to the district court of Louisiana, prosecuted by Nathaniel Cox, Nathaniel and James Dick, plaintiffs in error, v. the United States, 6 Peters’s Reports, 172. Nathaniel Cox, and John Dick, the father of Nathaniel and James Dick, were the sureties of Joseph H. Hawkins, in .his official bond to the United States,' as navy agent of the United States, at New Orleans.

ON a certificate of division from the circuit court of the United States for the southern district of New York. The suit was originally instituted in the superior court of the city of New York, by the plaintiff against the defendant, the collector pf the port of New York; and was removed by certiorari into the circuit court of the United States.

After the argument, the court, on inspecting the record, became satisfied that the amount m controversy between the parties, was not sufficient to give the plaintiff a right to bring the casé up by writ of error.

<p>IN error 10 the district court of the United States for the district of Mississippi.</p> <p>John Clark, of the state of ÁIabamaKdíed in 1818, owning and posssessed of certain slaves; and after his decease, administration of his estate was granted to his widow. She afterwards intermarried with John Farrington, and an inventory of the estate was filed, the slaves being included in the same. On the first day of November, 1819, Neal Smith, and his co-security for the administratrix, by an application to the proper court, had the letters of administration revoked, on the ground that the administratrix and her husband were embezzling the estate of John Clark ; and they stated that the negroes had been sold. Administration was granted to Neal Smith. The slaves were carried from the state of Alabama to the state of Mississippi, and were there sold. The county court of Clark county, in the state of Alabama, in August, 1819, authorized the administratrix of John Clark to sell ail the. personal property of the intestate, except the slaves; and it did not appear that any order to sell the slaves had ever been obtained. Neal Smith, sometime after he had been appointed administrator of the estate of John Clark,, in Alabama, procured letters of administration, ad colligendum, from the probáte court of Wilkinson county, in the state of Mississippi. They were in the following terms :</p> <p>“ State of Mississippi, Wilkinson county. To all to whom these presents shall come, greeting: Know ye, that whereas John Clark, of Clark county,, in the state of Alabama, as it is said, had, at his decease, personal property within this state, the administration whereof cannot immediately, be granted, but which,' if speedy ' care be not taken, maybe lost, destroyed, or diminished; to the end, therefore, that the. same may be preserved for those who shall appear to have a legal right or interest therein, we do hereby request and anthorize Neal Smith to secure and collect the said property, wheresoever the same may be, in this state or in Wilkinson county, whether it be goods, chattels, debts, or credits, and to make, or cause to be made, a true and perfect inventory thereof, and to exhibit the same, with all convenient speed, together with a reasonable account of his collection, in the office of the register of the orphans court of the county of Wilkinson. Witness, the honorable Thomas H. Prosser, judge of probates of Williinson county.</p> <p>[No seal of office.] C. G. West, Reg. W. C. P.”</p> <p>Neal Smith, under the authority of the letters of administration ad colligendum, on the 5th day of April, Í822, instituted, in the district court of the United States for Mississippi, an action of trover against Lovic Ventress, for the recovery of the slaves which had belonged to his intestate ; and with the declaration in trover, a copy of the letters of administration ad colligendum was filed. The defendant appeared and pleaded to the suit, and it was continued to April term 1823, when the death of the defendant was suggested, the case continued, and a scire facias was issued to Elizabeth Ventress, his administratrix. The administratrix appeared, by her attorney, at the succeeding October term, and the cause was “ legally continued” until April term, 1825; when the death of the administratrix was suggested, and. the cause again continued. On the 21st day of February, 1827, a scire facias was issued to William C. S. Ventress and others, the plaintiffs in error, executors of the last will and testament of Lovic Ventress, and at January term of the district court, they appeared, and the case was tried by a jury ; and a verdict was rendered in favor of the plaintiff, on which judgment was entered by the district court.</p> <p>On the trial, the defendant offered no evidence other than a bill of sale for the slaves, made by James McDonald to Lovic Ventress, in consideration of $1,900; with proof that the same was paid at the time of sale, and that it was deemed a fair' value for the slaves.</p> <p>The plaintiffs offered in evidence the deposition of Neil McNair, and the defendant objected to the admission of a part of the same.</p> <p>The court overruled the objection, and the following bill of exceptions was sealed-:</p> <p>“ On the trial of this cause, the "plaintiff offered in evidence the deposition of Neii McNair, the answer of which witness to the 10th crossinterrogatory — (10th cross interrogatory: Were' they not sent, away, of intrusted to some person to be removed and sold, by the administrator or administratrix, or other person • al reprepresentative of said John Clark, in the state of Alabama ? Answer.. Deponent saith that he hath reason to believe, and doth believe, that the said negroes were removed and sold, not by thp authority or request of the administratrix or any other person representing said estate) — the defendants, by their counsel, objected to as evidence to the jury, on the ground of being inadmissible from the manner-of its answer, and moved the court to rule it out as inadmissible testimony. But the court overruled the application of the defendant’s counsel, and permitted the said answer to be read to the jury as evidence in the cause.”</p> <p>Upon the submission of the cause to the jury, the plaintifPs counsel requested the court to charge the jury—</p> <p>1. That it must appear in evidence to the jury, that Abigail Clark was authorized, by an order of the court in Alabama, to sell the slaves, or she could convey no legal title to the defendant.</p> <p>2. That it must also appear by evidence to the jury, that James McDonald was authorized, either by a legal purchase or by a power from the administratrix, to sell the slavey or his conveyance could not divest the estate of Clark of the legal title in his representatives.</p> <p>3. That unless both of the above facts appeared, to wit, the authority of the administratrix to sell, and the authority of McDonald, either by a legal purchase or power of attorney from the administratrix, that the title to the slaves still remained in the legal representatives of John Clark, deceased.</p> <p>4. That if the plaintiffs were entitled to recover, they were entitled to the value of the hire of the slaves, by way of damages, from the 'time the slaves came into the possession of Ventress.</p> <p>The defendants’ counsel also presented the court with the following points in writing, which they requested the court to give in charge to the jury:</p> <p>1. That if the jury shall believe, from the evidence before them, that Abigail Clark became the administratrix of the estate John Clark, deceased, in the state of Alabama, and, as such administratrix, held and possessed the slaves sued for, till her intermarriage with John Farrington, and that said Farrington and wife, in virtue of the administration of said Abigail, were also possesséd of the slaves sued for ; and that the possession of these defendants, or their testator, of the slaves sued for, was acquired by, through, or from the said Farrington and wife, either directly or indirectly ; then the plaintiff, as administrator to collect the estate of John Clark, deceased, has no right to recover in this action against these defendants. '</p> <p>2. Will charge the jury — if they shall believe, from the evidence, that the slaves sued for in this action were, since the death of said John Clark, held and possessed by Abigail .Clark, his administratrix, in the state of Alabama, and that during her administration, she intermarried with John Farrington, and that Farrington and wife possessing said slaves by virtue of the administration of said Abigail, eloigned, wasted, embezzled, sold, or other-wise converted or disposed of them, in violation of their duties as administrators of said Clark’s estate, by which devastavit of said administrators, the slaves sued for passed to the possession of one James McDonald, who brought them to this state and sold them for a full and bona fide consideration, to Lovic Ventress, defendants’ testator, who purchased in good faith, and without notice of such devastavit of said administrator; then the testator, Lovic Ventress, acquired a good title as against the plaintiff, and the verdict should be for the defendants.</p> <p>3. Will charge the jury — that if they believe, from the evidence, the slaves sued for belonged to the estate of John Clark, deceased, at the time of his death, and passed into the possession of his administrators, in the state of Alabama, who embezzled and disposed of the same, in disregard of their duties as administrators ; but that defendants’ testator, Lovic Ventress, became an innocent purchaser of said slaves, (in this state,) fora valuable consideration, without notice of the mal-administration of said Clark’s estate in Alabama ; then they should find their verdict for the defendants.</p> <p>The court refused to instruct the jury in all or either of the several points as sought for and requested by the defendants’ counsel, as aforesaid; but did charge the jury as requested by the plaintiff, .except upon thfe fourth point; in which the court was of opinion that hire, as damages, could be recovered only from the commencement of the suit.</p> <p>The counsel of the defendants excepted to the opinion of the court in charging as requested by the counsel for the plaintiff, and refusing to charge the jury as requested by them, on behalf of the defendants.</p> <p>The defendants prosecuted this writ of error.</p> <p>1. That the letters ad colligendum from the court of probates in Mississippi vested not in the plaintiff below, but in terms excluded, any title to the possession of, or to maintain any possessory action for the property in question, under the peculiar circumstances and relations of that property and of these parties; even if a good title were shown in the legal representatives of Clark in Alabama.</p> <p>2. That the process of the suit in the record shows a discontinuance and a mis-trial.</p> <p>3; That the evidence excepted to by defendants in the first bill of exceptions, and admitted by the court, was inadmissible.</p> <p>4. That the right of Ventress (defendants’testator) by purchase, bona fide, for a valuable and full consideration, without any noticé of breach of trust or other fraud in the vendors, who had possession and the right of possession, clothed with a Iégat title ; a purchase consummated longbefore.the second letters o('administration granted to the'plaintiff in Alabama, and his letters ad colligendum in Mississippi, and whilst the original _ letters of -administration, granted to the vendor in Alabama, stood unrevokéd and in full torce; were valid and indefeasible: conséquently, that the several, opinions and instructions,‘both-those delivered and those rejected, by the court below, and both-affirmatively an.d negatively: dis-I paraging that-title, and sustaining the plaintiffs’ title, are erroneous. . \ .</p> <p>Upon the first point, Mr. Jones cited Stat. Edward 3, ch. 11. Lord Coke’s Commentaries on the Stat. of Edw. 3, 2 Inst. 397, 398, Stat. 4 Edw. 3, 31 Edw. 3, 1 Comy. Dig. Adm. E. 13, 2 Doug. Rep. 545, 1 Hen. Black. 184, 1 Bos. and Pull, 330, 1 Maul and Selw. 409.</p> <p>Upon the 4th point, Mr. Jones cited 4 T. Rep. 625, 621, 1 Bos. and Pul. 293, 7 Ves. 152, 8 Ves. 209, Williams on Executors and Administrators vol. 303.</p> <p>contended, that the testimony objected in the first exception was peoperly admitted. The instruction prayed for by appellee properly given; and those asked by appellant properly refused.</p> <p>He cited 1 Williams on Executors and Administrators 333, 609, 611, Statutes of Mississippi 281, Walker’s Rep. 386, Holt’s Nisi Prius Reports 485, 1 Payne’s Rep. 400, 2 Wheaton’s Rep. 263, Randolph’s Rep. 195, 4 Mumford 194, Laws of Alabama (Toulmin’s Digest) 334, act of 1809.</p>

Held: it can have-none in favor of Chiles, whose only claim is under the equity of Thomas Boone, and against whom the pre *207 sent suit was brought in six years after he first interfered with it. It cannot be permitted to him to acquire the legal title of Hoy, in virtue of Boone’s equity, and to hold it to his own use ; on the ground that Boone’s right had become extinct by the lapse of time, before he acquired it.

Held: that when two are bound jointly and severally in a bond, they both appear as principals, and the surety-cannot aver that he is bound as surety: but if he 'could establish that at law, the principle at lav/ is that he has an interest in the condition; and if the time of payment is extended, that totally defeats the condition, and the consequence is that the surety is rel'eased from his engagement.

Held: and declared to be the settled law drawn from all the decisions, that, a party having claim to lands entered and surveyed by another, should have recourse to the statutory remedy of *277 .caveat to prevent the emanation of a patent; that he is not to be sustained in a court .qf equity on such grounds as might have been used on the trial of the-caveat; but that upon a case suggesting or proving that he was prevented…

States for the eastern district of Louisiana. The defendant in error instituted a suit in.the district court, on a promissory note:'and the defendant having applied, after the suit was brought, to a court of Louisiana for the benefit.of the insolvent law of that state; pleaded a respite, obtained in those proceedings against his creditors.

ON a certificate of division in opinion from the circuit court of the United States-for West Tennessee. At September term 1825, an action of detinue was instituted in the circuit court, by John H. Davis against Alexander Braden, to recover a negro slave. During the progress of the suit, the plaintiff died, and the suit was revived in. the name of Elizabeth Davis, his administratrix, on the 1st day of October 1S30.

This case was submitted to the court on the record, by Mr Brent, for the plaintiff in error. Afterward, Coxe, for the defendant, gave to the court the following statement, in support of a motion to dismiss the suit for want of jurisdiction. This suit was instituted to recover 10,000 dollars, with interest. This was the alleged consideration money paid by Keene,, for the conveyance of a tract of land described in the record.

ON a certificate of division in opinion between the judges of the circuit court of the United States for the district of Rhode Island.

Held: that notwithstanding this mistake in the entry, if the plea was bad it was no estoppel; and .the court accordingly took notice of the plea, and said upon that matter, as it fails out to be good or otherwise, 'the-second action is maintainable or not.

<p>APPEAL from the superior court for the district of East Florida.</p>

This is an appeal from a decree of the judge of the superior court for the eastern district of Florida, confirming the claim of the appellee to sixteen thousand acres (65 km²) of land; pursuant to the Acts of Congress for the adjustment of land claims in Florida.

<p>APPEAL from the superior court-for East Florida.</p>

Held: that the first survey of five hundred and twenty acres was valid, and that the survey of fifteen thousand four hundred and eighty acres was invalid; but that the grantee has a ti.tle to fifteen thousand four hundred and eighty acres of vacant land; Which he has aright to have surveyed, adjoining the survey of five hundred and twenty acres.

Held: that the grantee was entitled to the whole sixteen thousand acres. By the eighth article of the treaty of cession of Spain to the United States, the same time is allowed to the owners of land granted under the authority of - Spain, to fulfil the conditions of their grants, after the date of .the treaty, as was' limited in the grants.

Held: that in ascertaining what titles would have been perfected if no cession had been made to' the United States, we must refer to the general course of the law of Spain, to local usage and custom; and not to what might have been, or would have been done by the special favour, or arbitrary power of the king or his officers.

<p>On the 18th of April 1802, the lieutenant-governor of Upper Louisiana granted sixteen hundred arpents of land near certain rivers named in the grant, with directions to survey the same in a vacant place of the royal domain; but no survey was made before the cession of Louisiana to the United States. By the Court. As the grant contained no description of the land granted, and was not located within the time prescribed by the act of congress of the 10th of March 1804, it comes directly within the point decided by this court in the case of John Smith, T., and cannot be confirmed.</p>

<p>A grant of land in Missouri, made by the lieutenant-governor of Upper Louisiana, before the treaty of 1803, confirmed.</p> <p>In repeated decisions, the supreme court have affirmed the authority of local governors, under the crown of Spain, to grant land in Louisiana', before the same was ceded by Spain to France: and the court have also affirmed the validity of descriptive grants, though not surveyed before the 11th of March 1804 in Missouri, and the 24th of January 1818 in Florida.</p>

Held: that the United States being a body politic, as an incident to their'general right of sovereignty, have a capacity to enter into contracts,- and -take bonds in cases within the sphere of their constitutional powers, and appropriate to the just exercise of those powers; through the instrumentality of the proper department to which thosé powers are *344 confided, whenever such contracts or bonds are not prohibited by…

ON a certificate of division, from the circuit court of the United States for the district of Pennsylvania.

Held: that to give this court appellate jurisdiction, two things should have occurred and be apparent in the record: first, that some one of the questions stated in the section did arise in the court below; and secondly,' that, a decision was actually made thereon by the same court in the manner required by the section. If both of these do not appear on the record, the appellate jurisdiction fails.

Held: that the instruction was correct, liad the property remained in the possession of the sheriff, under the first levy, it is clear the marshal could not have taken it in execution, for the property could not be subject to two jurisdictions at the same timé. The first levy, whether it were made under the federal or. state authority, withdraws .the property from the reach of the process of the other.

<p>IN error' to the court of appeals for the territory of Florida.</p>

ON a certificate of division of opinion from the circuit court of the United States, for the. eastern district of Pennsylvania.

Held: that the circuit court did not err in rejecting this evidence. The evidence was not merely hearsay ; but hearsay not to matters of general reputation, or common interest among many.

Held: that although, from the terms made use of in creating the power, detached from other parts of the will, it might be considered a mere naked power to sell; yet, if, from its connexion with other provisions in the will, it clearly appears to have been the intention of the testator, that the land should be sold to execute the trusts in the will, and such sale is necessary for the purpose of executing such trusts, it…

<p>The transcript of the record had been lodged by the plaintiffs in error with the clerk of the court on the 24th of October 1835; who refused to file it or docket the cause, until the plantiffs had given the fee bond in pursuance of the thirty-seventh rule of the court. The counsel for the plaintiffs in error moved to have the transcript filed and docketed; alleging they had done all the law required to bé done in order to bring the case before this court. On the part of the defendant in error, his counsel filed and read in open court certified copies of the writ of error, citation and appeal bond, and of the judgment of the circuit court; and having stated that the plaintiffs in error had failed to have the case docketed according to the thirtieth rule of the court, they moved to have the case docketed and dismissed. The court overruled the motion to docket and dismiss the cause; and also, the motion to have the transcript filed, and the cause docketed without the fee bond being first given.. These motions were overruled on the 18th of January 1836; and the court allowed the plaintiffs in error until the 1st day of March following to give to the clerk the fee bond : on the failure so to give the' same, the writ of error to be dismissed.</p>

Held: that although the court have jurisdiction of the subject matter, yet if the proceedings are not according to the .course of the common law, and the statute be.not.strictly followed, the judgment is absolutely void, and vests no right. See also, Davol v. Davol, 13 Mass. Rep. 264 . The statute respecting attachments,- in force at the time of these proceedings, will be found in 1 Chase’s Stat. p. 462, passed in 1805.

THIS case was .before the court at January term 1834, on an appeal from the circuit court of the. United States for the eastern district of Pennsylvania, and was dismissed for want of jurisdiction: the complainants, Thomas Jackson and others, in the circuit court, having omitted to state in the body of the bill, filed on the equity side of the court, that the defendant was a citizen of the state of Pennsylvania. 8 Peters 148.

Held: that although the bill was drawn for 4250 dollars, the guarantee would have operated to bind L. for the sum of 2000 dollars included in it, if notice of the acceptance of it had been given by D. & Co. to -L.; but having omitted to give such notice, or. that they intended to accept, or had accepted and acted on the guarantee; L. was not liable to D. and Co. for any part of the bill for 4250 dollars.- A guarantee is a…

Held: that the bill was. deficient in material averments, essential to all such bills of discovery. When the legislature of Virginia passed the statute, it fixed the nature and extent of the jurisdiction of a court of equity to compel a discovery, upon oath, from an interested party, in a suit either at law or in equity; and the rules which equity had prescribed to itself to enforce its jurisdiction in this regard.

Held: that if a servant by negligence sets a house on fire, the loss is recoverable on a policy against fire. Indeed, if such losses where not within such policies, the indemnit;against such risks would be- practically of little importance; since much the larger number of fires of this sort may be traced back to some negligence, slight or otherwise, of the members of families.

Held: that the decree of the circuit court was correct.

ON a certificate of division of opinion, of the judges of the circuit court of the United States of West Tennessee. This case was submitted to the court, on a printed argument, by Mr Leigh.

Held: that the direction of the will of David Peter to sell a portion of his real estate for payment of his debts, created a power coupled with an interest that survives. That the surviving executor is, by necessary implication, the person authorized to execute that power and fulfil that trust.

Held: that the circuit court properly rejected this evidence; as. the letters did not apply to, and had no connection "with the bills which were the subject of this suit.

Held: that a husband and wife after marriage could contract, for a bona fide and valuable consideration, for a transfer of property from him to her. In Sheppard v. Sheppard, 7 Johns. Ch. Rep. 57 , it is said, husband and wife may contract, for a bona fide and valuable consideration, for a transfer of property from him to her. *595 In Walles v. Hodge, 2 Swanst. 97, it is said, husband may convey to the wife a chattel.

Held: in all these cases, to amount to a transfer of the absolute legal right to the property composing the return cargo, to the holders of the bonds; so as to enable them to recover their value from the marshal, who had levied on them by virtue of an execution at the suit of the United States, and detained them after a demand of delivery.

Held: that the head pistareen is no part of the Spanish milled dollar. That such pistareen or piece of coin is not a silver coin of Spain, made current by law in .the United States. ON a certificate of division in opinion of the judges of the circuit court of the United States for the district of New Jersey.

Held: that as both the real and personal estate had been charged with the mortgage debt, both funds must be applied, in proportion to their respective amounts, to its payment. Any debt, not covered by the mortgage, to be paid out of the personal estate.

Archibald M’Learn, a native of Scotland, and afterwards a citizen of the United States, purchased a tract of land called Gowrie, and a small island, in Chatham county, in the state of Georgia, on… Held: that the English rule prevailed in. South Carolina. As between creditors, this was of no moment when they sought to enforce the payment of the debts due to them; but as-to all others, the law is different.

IN error from the district court of the United States for the district of Missouri. An action of indebitatus assumpsit was instituted at September, term 1832, by theUnited States, in the district court of the-United States for the Missouri district, against Alphonso Wetmore, upon an account regularly adjusted, settled and certified at the treasury of the United States on the 18th .of November 1831.

The court, in their opinion, having' decided that none of the questions which were argued, were presented by the evidence in the circuit court, the arguments of counsel on those questions are omitted.

Held: that the title to the soil has passed to the city corporation, then, as it is admitted and contended by the counsel for the city that the. lands were originally designed for public use ’as a quay, the question will arise, by whom is. this servitude held? According to-the law of France (as already shown), all public places, including quays, are held by the crown for the use of the public.