35 W. Va.
Volume 35 — West Virginia Reports
78 opinions
- 35 W. Va. 1Feamster v. Feamster (1891)
<p>1. Judgment — AssignmeNt—Trusts.</p> <p>Where a judgment is assigned to a party for the benefit of infant children, and the same judgment was assignedto another party for the benefit of said children, and in a chancery suit pending both of said assignees file petitions respectively, claiming to be entitled to the control of said judgment, the successful party in said contest must be regarded as having accepted said assignment, and subsequently as holding said judgment as trustee for said infant children.</p> <p>2. Judgment — Assignment—Lien—Trusts.</p> <p>Said judgment being a lien upon the lands of a party, and-prior judgment liens existing against the same lands, which is the only estate of the judgment-debtor, said land, under the circumstances, must be regarded as the trust-subject, and can not be purchased by the trustee for his individual benefit at a judicial sale.</p> <p>3. Judgment — Assignment—Lien—Tbusts.</p> <p>If said land is purchased by said trustee at a price which fails to satisfy the judgment of the cestui que trust, and is resold by said trustee at a profit, said cestui que trust may have said profits applied towards the payment of their judgments so held by said trustee.</p>
- 35 W. Va. 15Bensimer v. Fell (1891)
<p>cited 2 Gratt. 199; 9 Gratt. 859; 12 W. Ya. 143; 28 W. Ya. 388; 23 W. Ya. 594; 11 S. E. Rep. 1007; 4 W. Ya. 443; 7 W. Ya. 437; 25 W. Ya. 590; 11 S. E. Rep. 932; 21 W. Ya. 523; 16 W. Ya. 732; 23 W. Ya. 556; 17 W. Ya. 655 ; 16 W. Ya. 625; 16 W. Ya. 732; Code, c. 139, s. 7; 33 W. Ya. 644.</p> <p>cited 21 W. Ya. 108; 31 W. Ya. 410; 2 Pom. Eq. § 937; 10 Wheat. 367; 5 Leigh 65; Id. 487, 491, 502, 510; 12. W. Ya. 587 p’ts 1 and 2, syll. and pp. 607-609; 4 W. Ya. 249, p’t 2 syll.; 8 Leigh 20, p’t 2 Syll.; 3 Rand. 373; 12 Leigh 462; 2 Min. Inst 839; 3 W. Ya. 163; 7 W. Ya. 569; 21 W. Ya. 568; 26 W. Ya. 829 ; 29 W. Ya. 604; 26 W. Ya. 807; 28 W. Ya. 744; Code, c. 73, s. 6; 2 Min. Inst. 847 et seq.; 83 Ya. 589; 32 W. Ya. 134, p’ts 3 and 4 Syll.; Code, c. 139, s. 7; 31 W. Ya. 410, p’t 6 Syll. and p. 422; 20 W. Ya. 140; 21 W. Ya. 108; 28 W. Ya. 323; 22 W. Ya. 297 ; 13 W. Ya. 573, p’t 7 Syll.; 19 W. Ya. 366; Code, c. 73, s. 4; 32 W. Ya. 139; 22 W. Ya. 292; Id. 297; 19 W. Ya. 336, p’t 4 Syll.; 12 W. Ya. 70, p’t 1, Syll.; 22 W. Ya. 444, p’t 3, Syll.; 17 W. Ya. 656; 16 W. Ya. 625.</p>
- 35 W. Va. 36Kanawha Valley Bank v. Wilson (1891)
<p>Watts Ashby cited 29 W. Ya. 655, 657; 24 W. Ya. 702; 25 W. Ya. 242, 253, 257; Code, c. 104, s„ 14; 27 W. Ya. 58, 67, 68; 24 W. Ya. 360; 17 W. Ya. 313; 6 W. Ya. 417.</p> <p>Flournoy $ Price cited 25 W. Ya. 609; 20 Gratt. 484; 29 W. Ya. 659; 33 W.' Ya. 152; 27 W. Ya. 778; 19 W. Ya. 172; 8 Pet. 262; 12 W. Va. 371; 13 Pet. 6 ; 25 W. Ya. 208; 22 W. Ya. 570.</p>
- 35 W. Va. 40Bright v. Knight (1891)
<p>cited 4 Mon. 488 ; 3 Bibb 177; Id. 502; 7 Dana 235 ; 3 Gratt. 518 ; 27 W. Ya. 717; Id. 475; 15 W. Ya. 567.</p> <p>cited 30 W. Ya. 258; 32 W. Ya. 17; 23 W. Ya. 480; 30 Gratt. 751.</p>
- 35 W. Va. 52Williamson v. Hays (1891)
<p>cited 32 W. Va. 304; 75 Va. 130.</p> <p>cited 12 W. Va. 116; 23 W. Va. 229.</p>
- 35 W. Va. 57Ohio River R'y Co. v. Gibbens (1891)
<p>JuRisdiction — Consent.</p> <p>Where the law does not give a court of equity jurisdiction of the subject-matter, consent of parties can not invest the court with power to award dariiages or ascertain and decree compensation.</p>
- 35 W. Va. 60Baxter v. Tanner (1891)
<p>cited 28 W. Ya. 514; Id. 387; 23 W. Ya. 222; 5 Wheat. 424; Id. 332; 17 W. Ya. 131; 32 Me. 474; 2 Wash. C. 0. 475 ; 5 Leigh. 4.</p>
- 35 W. Va. 65Cobb v. Ches. & Ohio R'y Co. (1891)
<p>cited Code, e. 39, s. 10; 9 W. Ya. 703; 15 Pet. 449; Acts 1872-3, c. 15, s. 16;'Id. c. 17, s. 22; 22 W. Ya. 106; Acts 1879, c. 49, s. 8; 3 W. Ya. 566; 7 W. Ya. 232; 2 Ror. R’ds 960; 6 Am. Rep. 345; 33 W. Ya. 433; 31 W. Ya. 220.</p> <p>cited 15 W. Ya. 208; 17 W. Ya. 879; Const. Art. YIII, s. 24.</p>
- 35 W. Va. 70Foutty v. Poar (1891)
<p>cited Code, c. 125, ss. 35, 36, 38; 32 W. Ya. 19; 10 W. Ya. 42; Bar. Ch’y Pr. § 78; Id. p. 227; Id. s. 101; 14 W. Ya. 637; 23 W. Ya. 760; 22 G-ratt. 814; 2 Sto. Eq. § 779 (a.).</p> <p>cited Big. Estop. (4th Ed.) 687; 4 H. & M. 405 ; Sto. Eq. PI. 896; 3 Sumn. 583 ; 2 Rob. (old) Pr. 316 ; 4 Johns. Ch’y 375 ; 4 Min. Inst., p’t 2, p. 1194; Sand’s'Suit Eq. (2d Ed.) 374; 3 W. Ya. 138; Code, c. 134, s. 4; 10 W. Ya. 42; 32 W. Ya. 19; 32 Wend. 156; 23 How. 235 ; 2 P. & H. 140; 5 Rob. Pr. 271.</p>
- 35 W. Va. 73State v. Caddle (1891)
<p>1 Burglaby — Intent.</p> <p>To constitute the animus furandi, the thing must be taken unlawfully without fair claim of right, with intent to appropriate so as to deprive the owner of it permanently.</p> <p>2. Burglary.</p> <p>iMcri causa, does not form an essential element of larceny.</p> <p>3. Burglary.</p> <p>Quce-re: Does a mere bona fide claim of right to the thing itself exclude larceny, if there is no such claim of right to do the act by which it is obtained.</p> <p>4.Instruction.</p> <p>As a general rule of practice in this State, failure by the trial court to correct and give as corrected an improper instruction asked is not error.</p>
- 35 W. Va. 84Glascock v. Brandon (1891)
<p>cited 94 IT. S. 580; 83 W. Va. 888 ; 69 Md. 348; 76 Va. 663; 78 Va. 460 ; 2 Min. Inst. 610 ; 24 W. Va. 441; 27 W. Va. 206; 3 Md. Ch’y 106; 10 w'. Va. 321; 80 Va. 311; 84 Va. 726; Bump. Brand. Conv. 283, 285, 289 ; Big. Fraud. 199; "Wait Fraud. Conv. §§ 329, 239 ; 10 W. Va. 87; 1 Sto. Eq. § 355; 61 Md. 451; 3 Md. Cli’y 106; 33 Md. 587; 51 Md. 453; 22 W. Va. 365 ; 40 Md. 424; 45 Md. 291; 3 Gratt. 33.</p> <p>cited Dan. Ch’y Pr. (Am Ed.) 795; 9 Paige Ch’y 247; 8 Paige Ch’y 79; 2 Johns. Ch’y 475; 1 Ves. Jr. 401; 18 Barb. 590; 4 Myl. & C. 194; 13 Fed. Hep. 112 ; 136 Mass. 192 ; 4 Paige Ch’y 227 ; 25 IIow. Pr. 358; Walk. Cli’y 360 ; 1 Dick. 280; 4 Munf. 207; 7 Abb. fU. S.) 39; 1 Hilt. 265 ; 14 How. Pr. 287; 13 How. Pr. 258; 36 How. Pr. 240; 76 Va. 63; Id. 766; 24 W. Va. 279 ; 133 Mass. 141; 7 Peck 541 ; 18 Wall. 141; 3 Paige Ch’y 440; 53 N. Y. 303; 30 Hun. 559; 11 Hun. 224; 5 Hun. 557; 56 Wis. 188 ; 15 .Fla. 155 ; 26 FT. J. Eq. 376 ; 17 Ill. 560; 8 B. Mon. 326 ; 11B. Mon. 175 ; 5 B. Mon. 298; 4 Mete. (Ky.) 59; 21 Ind. 398; 18 Hun. 474; 32 Oliio St. 327; 17 Mo. 564; 2 Kent. Comm. 164; Sto. Eq. §§ 1372-3; 10 Pet. 594; lOVes. 164; 46 Oliio St. 407; 4 Munf. 251; 6 Munf. 1; 1 Rand. 219; 2 Rand. 563; Gilm. 209; 29 W. Va. 1; 15 W. Va. 444; 28 W. Va. 653 ; .Code c. 104, s. 14; 10 S. E. R. 382; 10 W. Va. 321.</p>
- 35 W. Va. 95Brown Oil Co. v. Caldwell (1891)
<p>1. Biparian Bights — Low Water Mark.</p> <p>Bights of riparian owners of land on the Ohio river extend to low water mark.</p> <p>2. Biparian Eights — Boundaries—Low Water Mark.</p> <p>A conveyance of land calls “thence 1ST., 8° W., 26 9-10 poles to a stake at Ohio river marked 1; ’ thence down said river S., 62° W., 81 6-10 poles, to a stake on point at mouth of French creek.” The line along the river is low water mark.</p> <p>3. Biparian Bights — Boundaries—Low Water Mark.</p> <p>This is not changed by the facts that before the conveyance actual survey was made fixing the point at I just over the river bank, and running thence a straight line to the point at the mouth of French creek, leaving a space between it and low water mark, and that a diagram representing such surveying- and straight line was made, and the further fact that the deed conveying three parcels of land contains the clause: “These said calls are controlled by diagram made by B. A. G., county surveyor.”</p>
- 35 W. Va. 103Barrett v. McAllister (1891)
<p>cited 20 W. Ya. 415; 24 W. Ya. 763; 31 W. Ya. 510; Code, c. 125, s. 20; Mitf. Ch’y PL 171; 7 Leigli 402; 1 Dan. CILy Pr. 656; 3 W. Ya. 138; 5 Munf. 308; 14 W. Ya. 261; 9 Gratt. 389; 13 W. Ya. 215 ; 9 Leigh 347; 12 W. Ya. 688; 22 W. Ya. 381; 14 W. Ya. 744; 28 W. Ya. 336; Pom. Spec. Perf. § 493.</p> <p>cited 6 W. Ya. 336; 9 Leigh 347; 1 Rob. (Ya.) 591; 6 Gratt. 673; 12 W. Ya. 688; 14 W. Ya. 744; 13W. Ya.215; Sto. Ecp PL § 658 ; 1 Bar. Oh’y Pr. § 114; Ban. Oh’y Pr.655; Sto. Eq. PL 761; 2 Sto. Eq Juri. §§ 755, 756; Sto. Eq. PI. § 763; Code, c. 125, s. 53; 3 W. Ya. 138; 14 W. Ya. 261; Sto. Eq. PI. § 896; 1 Dan. Oh’y Pr. 778, 779; 5 Mmif. 308.</p>
- 35 W. Va. 117Christy's Adm'r v. Ches. & O. R'y Co. (1891)
<p>cited Code (1884) c. 135, s. 1, cl. 9 ; 32 W. Ya. 494; 31 W. Ya. 116 ; 32 W. Ya. 6; Code (1884) c. 54, s. 61; Code (1887) c. 43, s. 31; 30 W. Ya. 228; Id. 778; 1 Her. Est. 2, 6 ; 2 Her. Est. 754, 876; 45 Mo. 252 ; 2 Wood R’ys 1319 ; Id. 1302,1303,1305 ; 59 Ala. 471; 38 la. 120 ; 33 Ind. 366 ; 59 Ala. 471; 44 Pa. St. 175 ; 30 W. Ya. 228; 29 Minn. 465, 109 H. S. 478; 61 Cal. 326 ; 14 Nev. 351; 45 N. Y. 846 ; 31 Pa. 510 ; 40 Ohio 128; 48 Wis. 606; 17 Wall. 657; 28 W. Ya. 610; 128 U. S. 91; Id. 443.</p> <p>cited 23 W. Ya. 229; 12 W. Ya. 116 ; 24 W. Ya. 357; 25 W. Ya. 692; Code, c. 54, s. 61; 32 W. Ya. 6; 29 W. Ya. 407; 4 A. & E. R. R. Cas. 580 ; 19 A. & E. R. R. Cas. 20; 109 H. S. 478; 32 W. Ya. 116; 28 W. Ya. 732; Beach Contrib. Neg. 14, 15, 37; Woods R’y Law 1064; Id 1320 ; 39 N. Y. 358; 31 A. & E. R. R. Cas. 441; 34 Id. 60 ; Woods R’y Law 1265 ; 12 A. & E. R. R. Gas. 77; 8 A. & E. R. R. Gas. 217; 25 Mich. 274; 15 A. & E. R. Cas. 469 ; 37 la. 316; 19 la. 492 ; 95 H. S. 697; 14 A. & E. R. R. Oas. 687 ; 42 N. Y. 468; 6 R. I. 211; Bish. Cont. § 665; 53 Ill. 336 ; 18 N. Y. 432 ;• 8 Ohio St. 250 ; 72 Ind. 31; 30 Minn. 31; McKenney Law Eel. Serv. 284.</p>
- 35 W. Va. 124Curtis v. Borland (1891)
<p>cited 18 W. Va. 759; Acts 1882, c. 31; Id., c. 130, §§ 17, 18, 31; 15 Am. Dec. 681, n., 690.</p>
- 35 W. Va. 139Spragins v. W. Va. C. & P. R'y Co. (1891)
<p>cited "Warth’s Code, c. 125, ss. 1, 4, 5 ; 3Y. Ya. 26 ; 7 W. Ya. 22.</p>
- 35 W. Va. 143Crotty v. Eagle's Adm'r (1891)
<p>1. ATTORNEY AT LAW — ADMINISTRATORS AND EXECUTORS — Accounts — Infants—Prochein Ami.</p> <p>where infants sue in equity by a prochein ami to compelan administrator to settle his accounts as such administrator of an estate in which they are interested as distributees, and such proehein ami employs an attorney to represent their interests, such attorney can not bind said infants by an agreement signed by himself or by another attorney authorized by him to waive proof of the vouchers and accounts presented by said administrator in the settlement of his administration accounts, or to allow commissions to such administrator which are not allowed by statute.</p> <p>2. Attorney at Law.</p> <p>Where an attorney has been employed to prosecute a suit, in the absence of direction from his client he can not delegate his authority as such to another attorney.</p> <p>3. Attorney at Law.</p> <p>An attorney at law can not by an agreement in pais commute the debt of his client, or compromise his suit, without express authority so to -do.</p> <p>4. Administrators and Executors.</p> <p>It is the duty of an administrator to protect the estate of his decedent by interposing every legal defence, and he can not by an agreement in pais, where infants are concerned and are made parties, either obtain commissions as administrator, to which he is not entitled by statute, or provide for the allowanee of claims against said estate without proof of their correctness and validity.</p>
- 35 W. Va. 155Hull's Adm'r v. Hull's Heirs (1891)
<p>1. Sales — Judicial Sale — Substitution</p> <p>A purchaser of land under a void decree, whose money has been applied upon liens on the land valid against the owner of the land, will be entitled to charge such money upon such land by substitution to the right of the creditor, upon disaffirmance of the sale.</p> <p>2. Sales — Judicial Sale — Creditors’ Bill.</p> <p>Such purchaser may maintain a bill to enforce such right, and as incident to his relief make his bill a creditors’ bill.</p> <p>8. Sales — Judicial Sale — Decree.</p> <p>A decree, which simply confirms a commissioner’s report of debts and directs a sale of lands therefor in default of payment, though that report specifies the debts and priorities, is erroneous, because the decree does not itself adjudicate and declare what debts are to be paid, and fix their order and priority as to the lands to be sold therefor.</p> <p>4. Evidence — AdmiNistrators and Executors — Beoord.</p> <p>A record of a suit by an administrator and widow of a decedent, brought in Virginia against his heirs to sell lands there to pay debts and satisfy the widow’s dower, wherein debts are decreed against decedent’s estate and subjecting its assets, is not evidence, in a suit in this Stateaga-inst such heirs to subject lands of such decedent to pay such debts, to establish such debts or their amounts.</p> <p>5. Statute of Limitations — Decree.</p> <p>A decree in a suit by an administrator and a widow of a decedent brought in Virginia against his heirs to sell lands to pay debts and satisfy widow’s dower will not save such debts from the statute of limitations for the purposes of a suit prosecuted in this State against lands here.</p> <p>6. Purchase-Money — Lien.</p> <p>Where a bond is given for purchase-money for land, and secured by a lien in the deed of conveyance, the mere giving of a new bond or note in place of the original does not release the lien, but the lien is good for the new bond or note.</p> <p>7. Purchase-Money — Statute of Limitation-.</p> <p>The statue of limitation does not apply to a lien for purchase-money reserved in a conveyance of land.</p> <p>8. Warranty.</p> <p>A deed conveys the “entire interest” of a grantor in land, and contains a covenant of general warranty. This warranty is limited and restricted to the interest conveyed, and does not warrant the land.</p> <p>9. Warranty.</p> <p>A covenant of warranty applies to the estate conveyed, and can not enlarge that estate.</p>
- 35 W. Va. 167Hall v. Wilkinson (1891)
<p>2. Lost Instrument — Equity—Jurisdiction.</p> <p>Equity has jurisdiction wherever a lost instrument is to be sot up, notwithstanding courts of law now exercise jurisdiction in the same case.</p> <p>2. Lost Instrument — Equity—Jurisdiction.</p> <p>In such a case, a court of chancery, having jurisdiction for one purpose, will adjudicate the whole merits of the cause.</p> <p>S. DECEBE — PERSONAL DECREE — ADMINISTRATORS AND EXECUTORS Purchase-money.</p> <p>An administratrix entered into a personal agreement, whereby she bound herself to sell a portion of her intestate’s land to the plaintiff for a valuable consideration, which by said agreement under seal she acknowledges to have been j>aid to her, and possession was delivered in pursuance of the agreement. Subsequently finding herself unable to carryout said illegal agreement, she assumes to take the land back, and enters into possession of it, and promises to return the purchase-money. Held, there is no error in rendering a personal decree against her for said purchase-money, with- interest.</p>
- 35 W. Va. 174Cross v. W. Va. Cent. & Pa. R'y Co. (1891)
<p>cited 17 W. Va. 620; Id. 396; 99 17. S.624; 13 Otto 480; Code, c. 52, ss. 18, 20 ; Id. c. 124, ss. 2, 7, 13 ; Id., c. 54, ss. 24, 36, 37, 40, 67, 70 ; 3 Key. 81; 27 W. Va. 762; 7 Pet. 252; 2 Pet. 556 ; 3 Wheat. 591; 9 Wheat. 738; 2 Madd. Oh’y 142 ; 7 Wall. 425 ; 18 Wall. 391; 113 IT. S. 465 ; 15 Ohio St. 21; 22 Ohio St. 411; 132 U. S. 75 ; 2 Mor. Corp. 1095 ; 15 Wall. 478, 498; 13 Wall. 214; Tayl. Priv. Corp. § 499 ; Cool. Const. Lim. §§ 151, 152; 12 Mass. 555-563; 8 W. Va. 74, 87; Id. 720, 730-733; 18 Graft. 300; 26 W. Va. 257; Const. Art. VI, s. 30 ; 17 Wall. 425; 26 W. Va. 62-75; 7 W. Va. 525; 9 W. Va. 162; 1 Vroom368; 2Vroom 575 ; 18 Gratt. 295; 25 W. Va. 325, 373; 28 W. Va. 698 ; 11 W. Va. 501; 13 Mich. 482-497; Code (1868) c. 53, ss. 6, 7; 16 W. Va. 402 ; 13 W. Va. 686; Acts 1872-3, c. 88 ; 5Ind. 49; 31 W. Va. 781.</p> <p>cited Code, c. 123, s. 3 ; 41 N. J. L. 250; 42 N. J. L. 402; High Ex. Leg. Bern. §§ 9, 16, 49, 440; 17 Otto 174; 2 Otto 665; 37 Md. 537-567; 113 ü. S. 465; Const. Art. XI, s. 4; Code, c. 53, ss. 5, 9; Id. c. 54, ss. 12, 56, 70; Acts 1872-3 c. 181, s. 44; 8 W. Va. 74’; 25 W. Va. 324; 4 Wheat. 518 ; 82 Pa. St. 518; 78 Mo. 185; 109 Pa. St. 471; 44 Conn. 318; 3 Johns. Cas. 78 ; 2 Johns. Cas. 217; 12 Am. Dec. 26; 58 Am. Dec. 398; 1 Wood B’y Law § 144; 18 Ind. 327; 1 Ark. 513; 3 Ark. 570; 39N.J. L. 677; 17 W. Va. 640; 19 Wend. 37; 13 N. E. Bep. 279.</p>
- 35 W. Va. 186Ringold v. Suiter (1891)
<p>1. Garnishment.</p> <p>The remedy by garnishment is a creature of the statute, and limited by it.</p> <p>2. Garnishment — Verdict.</p> <p>A finding by ajury as to indebtedness of a garnishee to the attachment debtor and effects in his hands, rendered upon a -suggestion of the insufficiency of the garnishee’s answer, must be sufficiently definite and certain to warrant judgment against the garnishee. The finding here is too vague.</p> <p>3. Evidence.</p> <p>Evidence certified can not be read to find facts essential to judgment, which should have been, but were not, found by verdict.</p> <p>4. Partneksand Partnership — Married Woman.</p> <p>A partnership between a married woman living with her husband and another person is void. She can not be sued at law on a contract of such partnership; but the other member of the firm may be rendered liable therefor, and judgment given against him alone.</p> <p>3. Garnishment.</p> <p>An attachment served on a garnishee indebted to or having effects of the debtor binds debts existing or effects in the garnishee’s hands at the date of service of the attachment, as also debts arising or effects coming to the hands of the garnishee until the answer of such garnishee, but not later than such answer.</p> <p>6. Fraudulent Conveyances.</p> <p>There may be a money recovery against a fraudulent grantee of property, who has sold such property to a bona fide purchaser and realized money therefrom, in favor of the defrauded creditor.</p>
- 35 W. Va. 194Bumgardner v. Leavitt (1891)
<p>1. Specific Performance — Contract—Equity.</p> <p>As a general rule equity will not enforce specific performance of contracts for the delivery of shares of stock; but when a purchaser has bargained for or taken an option upon such shares, because they have to him a unique and special value, the loss of which could not be adequately compensated by damages at law, the chancellor in the exercise of a sound discretion may decree specific execution.</p> <p>2. Specifc Performance — Contract^-Equity.</p> <p>Where such relief would be granted to the purchaser, were he to apply, the seller, who has given to the purchaser such preference or option, is entitled to like relief by reason of the operation of the principle of mutuality of right and remedy.</p> <p>3. Specific Performance — Contract—Equity.</p> <p>Where the remedy at lawwould be incomplete and inadequate, because the court of law could not give a conditional or modified judgment and would be unable to preserve the benefit of the agreement to all the parties interested, equity hasjuvisdiqtion to enforce the agreement.</p>
- 35 W. Va. 205Wheeling B. & T. R'y Co. v. Camden Cons. Oil Co. (1891)
<p>1. RAILROAD COMPANIES.</p> <p>A railroad company chartered under the general law of the state may complete and operate a part of its railroad, and, as to the part so completed and operated, retain its corporate existence, franchise and powers. Chapter 54, § 66, Code' (Ed. 1887.)</p> <p>2. Railroad Companies.</p> <p>A railroad company organized under such general law may build and construct lateral and branch roads not exceeding fifty miles in length, and use and operate any part or portion of their main line and branch or branches when completed, the same as though the whole of the proposed railroad were fully completed. Chapter 54, § 69, Code 1887.</p> <p>3. RAXXjROAD COMPANIES!</p> <p>Such branches may have, in part, a common stem, leading from the main line — that is, there may be a branch from a branch— provided the limit as to length is not exceeded.</p> <p>'4. Raiiaxoad Companies — Condemnation of Land.</p> <p>Under the provisions of the general law of this state, the filing of the map and profile of the location of the railroad in the office of the secretary of state, and in the office of the clerk of the county court of each county in which any part of the road is located, is not in law a condition precedent to the appointment of commissioners to ascertain a just compensation to the owners of the real estate proposed to be lawfully taken for the purpose of such road; but the circuit court may, in its discretion, require such map and profile, or such part as may bo needed, to be filed or produced before appointing such commissioners.</p> <p>5. Raiijboad Comi>anies — Condemnation of Land.</p> <p>The delivery of the certificate of incorporation of such company, or of a copy thereof properly certified, to the clerk of the county court for record in the county in which the principal office or place of business of such. company is, is not a condition precedent to the proper and lawful exercise of the right to 'condemn.</p>
- 35 W. Va. 217Town of Moundsville v. Velton (1891)
<p>cited 1 Dill. Mun. Corp. §§ 413, 422; Abb. Tr. Ev. 40, 470; 30 la. 291; 23 Minn. 254; Acts 1889, c. 4, s. 15 ; 118 ü. S. 356, 369 ; 96 U. S. 107 ; 110 U. S. 516 ; 115 IT. S. 512, 519; Dent v. State of W. Ya. Id.; 21 W. Ya. 796, 800; 25 W. Ya. 692, 704; 12 How. (H. S.) 246; 20 Graft. 143 ; 1 Chitt. PI. (16th Ed.) 404; 1 Dill. Mun. Corp. 176, 181; 7 Blackf. 36; Whar. Or. Ev. §§ 103,104; 14 R, I. 331; 5 Mich. 305, 327; 5 Gibb. Or. Rep. 332-335 ; 4 W. Ya. 180 ; 26 W. Ya. 583; Id. 106, 109.</p> <p>cited Acts 1889, c. 4,s. 16; 9 Ill. App.339; 12 III. App. 318; 25 W. Ya. 267-281; 19 Mich. 352 ; 21 S. 0. 319; 11 la. 407; 12 B. Mon. 28; 47 la. 572; 24 Kan. 211; , 37 0. St. 24; 20 W. Ya. 672; 69 Mo. 626; 74 Mo. 79; 3 Yeat. 475,476 ; 62 Wis. 305 ; 78 Ill. 11; 47 Ind. 208; 92 Ind. 13; 39 Me. 212; 25 W. Ya. 119,120, 122; 27 W. Ya. 182,183.</p>
- 35 W. Va. 222Hartley v. Henretta (1891)
<p>Intoxicating Liquors — Nuisance—Abatement—Injun ction.</p> <p>Under section 18 of chapter 32 of the Code, a court of equity can not restrain by injunction a party charged with selling intoxicating liquors contrary to law, or abate the house, building, or place where such intoxicating liquors are alleged to be sold contrary to law, until the owner or keeper of such house or place has been convicted of such unlawful selling at the place named in the bill.</p> <p> (A Divided Court.) </p>
- 35 W. Va. 240Janesville Hay Tool Co. v. Boyd (1891)
<p>cited Rollins v. Menager, 22 W. Va.; MeMillen v. Eagan, 21 W-Va.; 14 Gratt. 513 ; Henderson v. Smith 26 W. Ya.; Harkins v. Eorsyth, 2 Leigh ; 29 W. Ya. 1; People v. Snyder, 21 N. Y.; 15 Mass. 572; 6 Minn. 25; 33 la. 130; 24 Wend. 9; 1 Johns. 498; 1 Cow. 278 ; 90 N. Y. 629; 32 N. Y. 137; 4 N. Y. 568; 19 Hun 67; 43 Mich. 219 ; 28 Mich. 488; Carpenter v. Dexter, 8 Wall.; Bradley v. West, 60 Mo.; 21 W. Ya. 687 ; Hainston v. Randolph, 12 Leigh.; 75 Ya. 60 ; 22 W. Ya. 470; 5 Gratt. 230; 26 W. Ya. 816; 1 Am. & Eng. Ency. 147; Const. Art. YIIL; Code, 764; Id. 761; 2 Gratt. 492 ; Acts 1863, c. 1; Acts 1882, c. 149 ; Acts 1883, c. 13; Code (1884) c. 137, s. 7.</p> <p>cited 22 W. Ya. 469; 21 W. Ya. 233; 75 Ya. 594; 12 Leigh. 459 ; 11 Leigh. 294; 5 Gratt. 212 ; 26 W. Ya. 829; 12 Gratt. 286; 14 Gratt. 515'; 2 Gratt. 471; 41 N. Y. 397; 8 Wall 513 ; 60 Mo. 33, 39, 40; Code (1868) c. 73, s. 2; Acts 1875, c. 67, s. 2; Acts 1882, c. 149, s. 2.</p>
- 35 W. Va. 247State v. Hudkins (1891)
<p>cited 27 Graft. 955,976; 25 AY. Ya. 226, p’t 4, Syll.; 27 Graft. 934, 940, 942; 9 Yeag. 357; 10 W. Ya. 794; 4 W. Ya. 755.</p> <p>cited 2 Leacli 708; 1 Leacli 448 ;2 C. & P. 635.; 12 Serg. & B. 391; 8 Allen 545; 13 Mass. 455; 105 Mass. 53; 33 Ala. 389; 39 Ala. 229; 26 Ark. 260; 42 Ind. 420; 2 Ya. Gas. 273; 1 Bish. Or. Proc. § 752 ; Thump. & M. Jur. §§ 6, 7; 31 W. Ya. 162.</p>
- 35 W. Va. 255Brown Manufacturing Co. v. Deering (1891)
<p>cited 31 Bed. Rep. 254; Code, c. 100, s. 13 ; 33 W. Ya. 566 ; 7 So. Rep. 225 ; Id. 499 ; 135 IJ. S. 100; Const. Art. III. s. 10.</p> <p>cited Code, c. 100 s. 13; And. L. Diet. “Trader,” p. 1093; 76 Me. 500; 4 Pa. 472 ; And. L. Diet. 443 ; 52 Miss. 13; Sto. Ag. §§ 33, 357 ; 50 Barb. 298; Whar. Ag. § 784 ; Ew. Ev. Ag. 3 ; 69 Ill. 237 ; 3 Am. & Eng. Ency. Law 317; 50 Ala. 154; 8 Bush. 12; 23 Wall 330; And. L. Diet. 818 ; 111 TJ. S. 707; 8 Saw. 274, 275; 66 Wis. 188; 6 Am. & En. Ency. Law 43; Cool. Const. Lim. 437; 117 Ill. 294; 6 PTeb. 37; 44 Conn. 291; 71 Mo. 434 ; 74 IT. Y. 519 : 6 Am. & En. Ency. Law 47.</p>
- 35 W. Va. 260State v. Morgan (1891)
<p>cited 26 "W. Va. 379; 2 W. Va. 581; 29 Cal. 622; 27 Ga. 287 ; 30 Mo. 286; 8 Car. & P. 297; 14 Ga. 55 ; 2 Halst. 220 ; 1 Bis. Crim. Pro. (2nd Ed.) § 1087; Elibn Gregg v. State, 3 "W. Va. 705; Apoc. His. Susanna, verses 51-2; Whar. Crim. Ev. (9th Ed.) §§ 635, 675; 19 Cal. 40; 39 N. Y. 39; 73 Mo. 695; 10 Gratt. 734-37, 742; 83 Ala. 1; 54 Ala. 241; 68 Ala. 569 ; Chit. Crim. Law 572 ; 18 Am. Dec. 404; 20 Am. Dee. 401; 22 Am. Dec. 454; 36 Am. Dec. 557; 34 Am. Dec. 672; 61 Am. Dec. 793 ; 32 Gratt. 914; 8 C. & P. 609; Crim. Evidence 136; "Whar. Crim. Ev. (9th Ed.) § 448 and bottom notes §§ 749-50; 91 Pa. St. 493; IN. Y. Crim. Rep. 180, 283; 55 la. 517; "Wills Cir. Ev. 34-35; 22 W. Ya. 776; 25 W. Ya. 227; Wliar. Crim. Ev. (9th Ed.) 380, 698.</p> <p>cited 1 G-reenl. Ev. (Redf. Ed.) § 432 note and cases cited; 1 Thomp. Tr. 252-259; 25 Ill. 136; 66 Ala. 244; 2 Rest Ev. 636; 6 Gratt. 584; 32 Gratt. 946; Code (1887) c. 156, s. 13; 3 W. Ya. 705 ; 111 Ind. 515; 95 Mo. 68; 98 Ind. 59 ; 3 lit. 133; 69 Ga. 404; 67 Ga. 739; 4 Lea (Tenn.) 428; Code (Ky.) §601; 82 Ky. 84; 89 N. C. 42; 13 Tex. App. 244; 10 Gratt. 742; 14 Gratt; 659; 24 Gratt. 643; 30 Gratt. 833; 27 Gratt. 980 ; 33 Gratt. 845 ; 2 Wliar. Crim. Law § 227 et seq; 2 Hawk P. C. c. 29, s. 16; 20 W. Ya. 679; 26 W. Ya. 117.</p>
- 35 W. Va. 280State v. McClung (1891)
<p>cited 3 Greenl. Ev. § 79 ; 2 Greenl. Ev. 82; Whar. Grim. Ev. § 763; 27 W. Va. 376.</p> <p>cited Whar. OrimvPl.'&Pr. §401; 39 Ala. 247; 9 Gratt. 738; 20 W. Va. 32; .Code (1887) c. 145, s. 11; 2 Leach 712; 3 Chitt. Crim. Law (Perkin’s Ed. 1836) 1118; 'Whar. Prec. Ind. 433, 434; May. G-ni. Burglary, 144; 31 W. Ya. 491; Kel. 30 ; 9 W. Ya. 456; 22 W. Ya. 766 ; Whar. Am. Crim. Law, § 1531; Dav. Crim. Law 145 ; 1 Blacks. Comm. 224; 1 Russ. Cr. 785; 4 Blacks. Comm. 229; 1 Hawk. P. C. 105 ; 2 East. P. C. 511; 3 Greenl. Ev. § 82; 6 Mete. 238; 12 Mete. 244; 1 Car. & K. 62; Id. 421; 22 Pick. 1; 26 W. Ya. 53; 14 W. Ya. 175 ; 15 W. Ya. 664; 1 Whar. Crim. Law'(8th. Ed.) §§ 791, 808, 813; 2 Russ. Cr. 21; 32 W. Ya. 183; 26 W. Ya. 338; 23 W. Ya. 773; 28 Gratt. 969; Whar. Crim. Ev. § 763; 27 W. Va. 379.</p>
- 35 W. Va. 287Dunlap v. Hedges (1891)
<p>cited High Rec. § 10 ; 2 Bar. Ch’y Pr. § 144; Code (1887) c. 89 ; Id. c. 50; 15 W. Ya. 444; ■ Code (1887) c. 135, s. 1, par. 7 ; 27 W. Ya. 428.</p> <p>cited 16 Ill. 141; 2 Par. Con. 677-679 ; 1 Ben. Sales § 335 et seq.; Chitt. Con. (5th Ed.) 742; 2 Dan. Ch’y Pr. 1280; 15 Gratt. 288; 2 Min. Inst. 334 (287); High Pec. § 11; 1 Tuck. Comm. 103-106.</p>
- 35 W. Va. 297McClain v. Lowther (1891)
<p>cited 19 W. Ya. 312; 21 Gratt. 1; 5 W. Ya. 156 ; 19 W. Ya. 312; 2 Graft.. 536 ■ Code c. 99, s. 3 ; Sto. Prom. BT. (6th ed.) §:15 ; 20 W. Ya. 46; Dan. !Neg, Inst. 926, 1073, 1074, 1076, 1084„ 1198, 1587, 15.88, 1597, 1600, 1630. , .</p>
- 35 W. Va. 300Smith v. Lowther (1891)
<p>cited 6 Johns. 543; 14 W. Ya. 264; 2 Robinson 179; 5 State Repts. 369; 6 Call 308 ; 28 Gratt. 737 ; 1 Mitf. 266; 8 State Repts. 640; 9 Leigh 101; 1 Sandf. N. Y. 374; 2 Mun. Repts. 196; 5 Ind. 492; 4 Gratt. 125; 26 W. Ya. 612; 6 Gratt. 147-48; Bump 15 & 325; 4 W. Ya. 514; 15 W. Ya. 567; 23 W. Ya. 475 & 717; 77 Ya. 619; 2 Story’s Eq. Jur., § 1201; Code ch. 93, 691; 16 Amer. Decís. 610; 2 Gratt. 497; 12 Gratt. 153; 5 State Repts. 59; Perry on Trusts §§ 402, 499, 602; 3 N. Y. 396 ; 1 Story, § 194; 14 W. Ya. 747; 24 Howard 407; 12 Peters 178 ; 4 Rand. 272 ; 3 Rand. 14; 3 Story’s Repts. 182; 9 Peters 86; 14 Johns. 14 & 15 ; 4 Wall. 513 ; 77 Ya. 619 ; 10 W. Ya. 321; 2 Wharton 387 ; 3 Leigh 619; 2 Robison 177 ; 22 Gratt. 370; Adams Equity 264-5; Bump on Frauds 198; 2 Leigh 451; 77 Ya. Repts. 827 ; 12 Amer. Repts. 76; 12 Amer. Decís. 258; 2 Story’s Equity 12Í7-18; 12 Amer. Dec. 258; 4 Mins. Inst. 67-8; 1 Sandf. 297; 42 Penn. 330; 5 W. Ya. 107 ; 22 W. Ya. 348 & 567; 26 W. Ya. 754; 78 Ya. 76; 7 Leigh 566; Bump 205, 449, 450; 2 Gratt. 280; 13 Gratt. 427; 5 Leigh 403; Acts of 1870, c. 51, § 6; Hill on Trusts 175 ; Bump 18, 223,237, 256 ; 1 Story §§ 208, 205 ; 4 Peters 66 ; 3 Wall. 461; 4 Peters 295 ; Brown on Frauds §§ 448, 465, 466, 467,480, 490; 1 Rand. 249.</p> <p>cited 23 W. Ya. 522; 23 Gratt. 737; 2 Black (U. S.) 585; Pom. Eq. Jur. § 397; 1. Rob. Prac. (New) 320; 24 Gratt. 51.2; 26 W. Ya. 328; Kerr Fraud 42-44; 8>to. Eq. Jur. §§ 186-192; 2 Bar. Ch’y Prac. 911, 912; 1 Per. Trusts ■ (1889) §§ 124,137; 26 W. Ya. 754; 4 S. E. Rep. 278; 13 S. E. Rep. 63; Bar. Ch’y Prac. 253-255; Sto. Eq. Jur. §§ 271-286; Pom. Eq. Jur. § 1083 ; 23 W. Ya. 675; Perr. Trusts § 863; 11 S. E. Rep. 261.</p>
- 35 W. Va. 313Spence v. Robinson (1891)
<p>1. Appeal — Error—Declaration.</p> <p>Where there is error in the declaration, pleadings, or judgment, committed against the protest, or over the demurrer or other objection of a party as shown by the record, the same may be reviewed and corrected in this court, although no motion has been made for a new trial in the court below, and.no exception was reserved by bill of exceptions or otherwise.</p> <p>2. Promissory Notes and Bills op Exchange — Negotiable Instruments.</p> <p>If a negotiable instrument, not payable to bearer, be endorsed specially to a particular person, while such person remains the holder and legal owner the right of action is in him alone, and none but he, or his personal representative, can sue.</p> <p>3. Appeal — Error—New Trial.</p> <p>Tf a special replication has been permitted to be filed over the objection of the defendant, and his demurrer thereto overruled to his manifest injury, the error will be corrected in this court by setting aside the judgment, and directing the trial court to award a new trial.</p>
- 35 W. Va. 320State v. Pearis (1891)
<p>cited Code, c. 5, s. 10 ; 1 Bisli. Crim. Pro. § 627; 1 Snead 63; Code, c. 116, s. 17 ; 15 W. Ya. 362; 1 Bisli. Crim. L. § 247.</p> <p>cited 15 W. Ya. 364; 31 W. Ya. 124; 30 Am. Pep. 617; 98 Mass. 6; 41 N. J. Law 552; 47 Ark. 109 ; 63 Ind. 551; 138 Mass. 492; Id. 511; 88 Ind. 145 ; 23 Minn. 549; 35 Mo. App. 475; 57 Conn. 173 ; 12 Ill. App. 200; 36 Ark. 58 ; 38 Am. liep. 24; 37 Ark. 108; Id. 399; 27 Minn. 153; 92 Ill. 400; 49 la. 650 ; 43 la. 282; 6 Bush 400 ; 24 Wia. 60; 69 Ill. 523; 77 Ill. 322; 69 Ill. 601; 50 Ind. 22.</p>
- 35 W. Va. 323Watt v. Brookover (1891)
<p>cited Code, c. 127; Id. c. 99, s. 12 ; Id. c. 138, s. 9; 28 W. Va. 601.</p> <p>cited 33 Gratt. 351; 2 Tuck. Ooimu. 209-214; Bar. L. Pr. 93; 2 Patt. & II. 144; 1 Gliitt. PI. 19.</p>
- 35 W. Va. 328Taylor v. Ohio River R'y Co. (1891)
<p>cited 31 W. Ya. 366; Ereem. Jdgmts. §§ 495, 521; 34 ~W. Ya. 207.</p> <p>cited 31 "Wl Ya. 366.</p>
- 35 W. Va. 333Long v. Ohio River R'y. Co. (1891)
<p>cited Code (1887) c. 42, s. 14; 9 AY. Ya. 254, pt. 11 Syll.; 15 AY Ya. 628; 17 AY. Ya. 191; 9 AY Va. 270 ; 25 AY Ya. 570 ; 26 AY Ya. 455; 32 W. Ya. 436; 51 Pa. St. 240; 67 1ST. Y. 153 ; 27 Ill. 198 ; 55 Ill. 226 ; 85 III. 288; 88 Ill. 368; 39 Me. 274; 79 Mo. 504; 44 Ind. 444 ; 45 Ind. 91; 36 la. 102; 30 la. 459; 37 la. 422; 40 la. 292; 77 Ill. 160; 30 Minn. 18; 61 la. 323; 38 Ohio 410 ; 161ST. Y. 476; 6 Ill. 295; 22 Barb. 525 ; 32 Barb. 568; 29 Ind. 40; 30 Ind. 324; 72 Ind. 107 ; 78 Ey. 621; 25 AY Ya. 571; 27 Yt. 643 ; 16 Ill. 198; 30 Ill. 451; 40 la. 337; 14 Ind. 80 ; 50 Miss. 572; 26 Tex. 604; 42 Miss. 603; 35 Midi. 507; 83 Mo. 309; 4 Jones L. 432; 62 Mo. 562 ; 8 Rev. Ill; 7 Am. & E. R. R. Co’s. 588, 590; 13 Id. 534; 2 Slier. &R. Reg. (4fcli Ed.) § 419; 23 Am. & E. R. R. Oas. 237; 19 Id. 480; 1 Am. Ref. 339.</p> <p>cited 24 W. Va. 520; 25 W. Va. 577; Cooley Torts 673; 26 W. Va. 457 ; 9 W. Va. 270.</p>
- 35 W. Va. 337Thompson v. Douglass (1891)
<p>cited Code,' c. 116, s. 17 ; 2 W. 59, 165; 12 W. Va. 23; 11 S. W. Rep. 451; 3 W. Va. 556; 27 W. Va. 147; 1 C. Bates Partner §§ 443, 447; Id. c. 8 ; 4 Bo. Rep. 639 ; 4 S. E. Rep. 122; 6 Mich. 168; Schon. Bailm. & Carr. (2d Ed.) § 494; 93 IT. S. 575; 56 N. Y. 544; 45 N. Y. 587; Sclion. Bailm. (2d Ed.) §§ 294, 501; 27 W. Va. 75 ; 18 W. Va. 771; Beuj. Sales (4th Ed.) § 703; 20 N. E. Rep. 670; 21 N. E. Rep. 1076; 19 S. W. Rep. 305; 5 So. Rep. 714; 22 Pac. Rep. 136 ; 8 S. E. Rep. 65.</p> <p>cited Code, c. 116, s. 17; 19 Johns. 115; 4 Ben. 9; 18 "W. Va. 771.</p>
- 35 W. Va. 347Burdett v. Allen (1891)
<p>cited 9 W. Va. 165; 11 W. Ya. 501; 28 W. Va. 699; Hon- & Bean. Man. Pol. Ord. §§ 33, 139; 27 W. Va. 268; 3 Wheat. 246; 14 Wall, 56; 15 Pac. Rep. 399; 95 U. S. 97; 111 TJ. 8. 701; 6 Waite 639; Bill. Mim. Corp. (14th Ed.) §§ 421, 350; 8 A. M. St. Rep. 271; 55 Am. Rep. 589; 97 Am. Bee. 88; 86 Ala. 354; 5 So. Rep. 678 ; 15 Pac. Rep. 599 ; Sedw. Stat. & Con. 435; 44 Barb'. 472; 60 Barb. 391; 4 la. 296; 30 Ill. 459; Cool. Cox Lim. 586 note 587 ; 8B. Mon. 433; 1 La. Ann. 385; 6 Ired. 268; 5 Am. St. Rep. 500 ; 80 Ohio 523; 26 NT. J. 67; 78 Ky. 86; 80 Ind. 487.</p> <p>cited 80 Ind. 489; 18 Ohio 523 ; Bill. Mum Corp. (8 Ed.) §§ 150, 347, 348; 2 Butch 67 ; Cool. Con, Lim. 363, 364 and note; 11 Mich. 147; 35 R. Y. 307; 51 Ill. 286; 78 Ky. 88; 41 Pa. St. 482; 44 Ill. 362; 51 Ill. 286; 4 Ark. 161.</p>
- 35 W. Va. 357Morgantown Bank v. Foster (1891)
<p>1. Assum psit — -Pleading—Demurrer—J udgment.</p> <p>Where issue was joined on the plea of non assumpsit and defendant then filed two special pleas, to which plaintiff demurred and the court overruled the demurrers, and gave final judgment against the plaintiff. It was error to give final judgment till the issue on the plea of non assumpsit had been tried, withdrawn-or otherwise disposed of.</p> <p>2. Assumpsit — Pleading—Demurrer—Judgment.</p> <p>If there be one or more pleas, and the demurrer thereto be sustained, the party may plead further if he has any other defence, and if he,has not, judgment may he rendered, if it is such a case that judgment by default or without a jury might have been rendered on it; otherwise, a writ of inquiry or its equivalent must be executed.</p>
- 35 W. Va. 367State v. Workman (1891)
<p>1.Congealed Weapons — Constitutional Law.</p> <p>The seventh section of chapter 148 of our Code provides as follows : “If a person carry about his person any revolver or other pistol, dirk, bowie-knife, razor, slung-shot, billy, metallic or other false knuckles, or any other dangerous or deadly weapon of like kind or character, he shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and fined not less than twenty five nor more than two hundred dollars, and may, at the discretion of the court, be confined in jail not less than one nor more than twelve months; and if any person shall sell or furnish any such weapon as is hereinbefore mentioned to a person whom he knows, or has reason, from his appearance or otherwise, to believe, to be under the age of twenty one years, he shall be punished as hereinbefore provided. But nothing herein contained shall be so construed as to prevent any person from keeping or carrying about his dwelling-house or premises any such revolver or other pistol, or from carrying the same from the place of purchase to his dwelling-house, or from his dwelling house to any place where repairing is done, to have it repaired, and back again. And if upon the trial of an indictment for carrying any such pistol, dirk, razor, or bowie-knife the defendant shall prove to the satisfaction of the jury that he is a quiet and peaceable citizen, of good character and standing in the community in which he lives, and at the time he was found with such pistol, dirk, razor, or bowie-knife, as charged in the indictment, he had good cause to believe, and did believe, that he was, in danger of death or great bodily harm at the hands of another person, and that he was, in good faith, carrying such weapon for self-defence and for no other purpose, the jury shall find him not guilty.” These provisions are not in conflict with the constitution of the United States, nor that of West Virginia.</p> <p>2. CONSTRUCTION OP STATUTES.</p> <p>Whenever an act of the legislature can be so construed as to avoid conflict with the constitution, such construction will be adopted by the courts.</p> <p>3. Congealed Weapons — Constitutional Law.</p> <p>This section requires a statutory acquittal as mandatory in favor of persons who prove good character and standing in the community, and that they were in good faith armed only for self-defence ; hut though not mandatory as to persons who fail to prove such good character, it nevertheless does not in terms deprive them of any right or guaranty to which they may be entitled under the constitution, nor should such deprivation be constructively implied.</p> <p>4. Congealed Weapons.</p> <p>A mere indefinite threat of violence, the nature and extent of which is not given in evidence, unaccompanied by any act or conduct on the part of the party making such threat evincing a design to do violence to the prisoner, will not justify the carrying of a pistol under section 7, c. 148, of the Code.</p>
- 35 W. Va. 375Hall v. Wadsworth (1891)
<p>cited Code, c. 142, s. 1; 31 W. Va. 44.</p> <p>cited Code, c. 93, s. 10; Id. s. 14; 15 Gratt. 518; 3 W. Va. 260; 8 Gratt. 560; 18 Gratt. 235; 15 Gratt. 518; 4 Rand. 189; Big. Estop. 267; 1 Greenl. Ev. 207; 2 Pars. Cont. (1860) 340; 3 Call 523; 2 Gratt. 178.</p>
- 35 W. Va. 384Maxwell v. Martin (1891)
<p>cited 2 Worn. Am. L. Ad. § 491; 23 W. Va. 26; 32 G-ratt. 215 ; 2 Beas. 138 ; 29 W. Va. 784; 2 Loin. Ex. (2d Ed.) 167 ; 6 Band. 590 ; Id. 587; 1 Leigh 490; Code (1887) c. 86, ss. 7, 8; 8 W. Va. 321; 1 Muni.' 427; 3 Munf. 520; 3 Leigh 736 ; 28 W. Va. 378 ; 8 W. Va. 219; 3 W. Va. 480; 33 W. Va. 600; 23 W. Va. 565; 13 W. Va. 440; 21 W. Va. 83; Code (1887) c. 139, s. 7 ; 23 W. Va. 558 ; 54 Vt. 293; 77 Ind. 437; 21 Mo. App. 296.</p> <p>cited 23 W. Va. 26; Code c. 86, s. 3; 9 G-ratt. 449; 24 W. Va. 599 ; Code, c. 133, s. 8; 19 W. Va. 159; Id. 135.</p>
- 35 W. Va. 385Kinney v. Balt. & Ohio Emp. Rel. Ass'n (1891)
<p>cited 67 Md. Bep. 433 ; 9 Cent. Bep.-82, 84 (57 Md. 98); 58 Md.463 ; 104 U. S. 252; Kirsch. Frat. 32, 33; 96 N/Y. 1; 94 U. S. 400; 33 Md. 592 ; 5 N. Y. 48; Ad. & Ell. 737 ; 6 En. B’y. & Con. Cas. 438; 5 Bara. & Cress. 560; 6 M. & "W. 497; 9 M. & W. 709; 95 N. Y. 267; 4 W. H. & G. 254; Id. 244; 31 Minn. 351; -L. B. 6 Q. B. 318; M. & S. 630; 9 S. E. Bep. 471; 9 Pet. 319.</p>
- 35 W. Va. 389Carrico v. W. Va. Cent. & Pa. R'y. Co. (1891)
<p>1. Damages — Deglabation.</p> <p>In his declaration against a corporation for injury as the result of negligence, the plaintiff need not aver that he was not guilty of contributory negligence, that being a matter of defence to be alleged or proved, if it exist, by the defendant.</p> <p>2. Exclusion or Evidence.</p> <p>After the defendant has given in his own evidence, a motion to strike out all the evidence, on the ground that it is insufficient to sustain the issue on the part of the plaintiff, should not be granted.</p> <p>3. Exclusion or Evidence.</p> <p>A motion by the defendant to exclude the plaintiff's evidence, upon the ground that it is not sufficient to warrant a verdict in his favor, will not be granted, if there be any evidence which tends in any degree, however slight, to prove the plaintiff's case. If it tend to prove the plaintiff’s case in any degree whatever, the case can not be withdrawn from the jury. The motion can never prevail qr be sustained merely because the court may think the weight of evidence is against the plaintiff.</p> <p>4. Damages — Negligence.</p> <p>In cases where the common experience of mankind, and the common consensus of prudent persons, have recognized that to do or omit to do certain acts is prolific of danger, we may cail the doing or omission of them “negligence per sej’ or “legal negligence.” Theomission of a duty enjoined by law for the protection and safety of the public by a common carrier, or the doing of an act by such a carrier, which, by the common experience and consensus of prudent persons, would create danger to passengers, is legal negligence.</p> <p>5. Damages — Contributory Negligence.</p> <p>It is legal negligence for a passenger to ride in a fast-going passenger coach, with his arm protruding out of the window, and beyond the line of the body of the car.</p> <p>6. Damages — Railroad Companies — Contributory Negligence —Burden op Proof.</p> <p>It is the absolute duty of a railroad company to keep its track free from dangerous obstructions of every sort, and, when a passenger is injured by reason of any such obstruction along the line of its road, the burden devolves upon it to prove that the accident was the result of the plaintiff's own negligence, or that the most thorough and perfect diligence could not have foreseen and prevented the injury. Neither can the company relieve itself from liability in regard to the condition and construction of its road by undertaking to confide these duties which it owes to passengers to other hands, no 'matter what precaution it may have taken in selecting such agencies.</p> <p>7. Damages — Contributory Negligence.</p> <p>The general rule in regard to contributory negligence is that if the negligence be mutual on the part of plaintiff and defendant there can not be a recovery. But if the injury would have happened just the same, although the plaintiff had been ip no wise negligent, his negligence will not prevent his recovery ; or if the defendant, after he has discovered the dangerous exposure, refuses or neglects to practice any care or precaution to prevent the injury, he will he held liable.</p> <p>8. Damages — Negligence—Burden op Proop.</p> <p>When a party is confessedly guilty of legal negligence, or when it is so proved by the evidence, the burden devolves upon him to bring himself within some recognized exception to the legal presumption.</p> <p>9. Damages — Trespasses—Railroad Companies — Contributory Negligence.</p> <p>As between the company and a trespasser or stranger, contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff renders the defendant liable only for gross or wanton or willful neglect, where otherwise he would be held liable for ordinary negligence. While this is the general principle, it is necessary to observe that in the transportation of its passengers a railroad company is bound to exercise more than ordinary care and dilligence, and is liable for the slightest negligence against which prudence and foresight could have guarded, and is held to the utmost care in the removal of obstructions, repair of bridges and switches, and all other matters properly pertaining to the condition and safety of its track. Consequently the degree of care exacted from the company for a passenger is greater than that to be exercised in respect to a stranger or trespasser. Hence there are cases where contributory negligence on the part of a stranger or trespasser would entirely defeat a recovery, unless gross or wanton negligence were brought home to the defendant, but, had such person stood in the relation of a passenger, his contributory negligence would relieve the company of the duty to exercise that extreme care ordinarily exacted, but would still leave it liable for the failure to use ordinary precautions for the safety of such passenger after his danger had been discovered, or brought to its notice, if by its use the injury could have been avoided.</p> <p>10. Damages — CONTRIBUTORY Negligence.</p> <p>To rest the arm upon the window-sill of a car, provided it does not protrude, is not negligence per se; but if it does protrude, the act becomes negligent, in the contemplation of law.</p> <p>11. Instructions.</p> <p>Where an instruction is ambiguous and equivocal, and would not readily be comprehended by the average juryman, the court should not refuse to grant it, if by so doing the jury might be misled; but, if it be correct upon one construction of it, the court should properly modify it so as to remove the ambiguity, and make it clearly intelligible to the jury, and, after such modification, grant it; or the court should grant it, with an explanation giving it the meaning which will make it proper.</p>
- 35 W. Va. 406Phillips v. City of Huntington (1891)
<p>cited 70 la. 436; 30 N. W. Rep. 861; 11 East 60; Beach Con. Neg. § 4; 31 W. Va. 842; Id. 477; 33 W. Va. 548.</p> <p>cited 15 W. Va. 300; 30 W. Va. 40; 1 Min. Inst. 28 ; 16 W. Va. 307.</p>
- 35 W. Va. 418White v. Ward (1891)
<p>cited 8 W. Va. 406, 483 et seq.</p>
- 35 W. Va. 422Baer's Sons v. Wilkinson (1891)
<p>1. Partners and Partnership — Assets—Sale—Trusts And Trustees.</p> <p>Tlie syllabus in Darby & Co. v. Gittigan et at. approved and reaffirmed, as follows: “When one member of a mercantile firm purchases the interest of another member, and in consideration thereof assumes to pay all the partnership debts, the firm and both members being at the time insolvent or on the eve of insolvency, ancl shortly thereafter the purchasing partner, without paying any of the Arm debts, conveys the whole of the assets of the late firm to a trustee in such a manner as to devote the whole thereof to the payment of his individuat debts, held, such sale, being without any valuable consideration, is ineffectual to con-. vert the social assets into individual property, and, as to the equitable rights of the Ann creditors, such trust-deed is fraudulent and void. ”</p> <p>2. PARTNERS AND PARTNERSHIP — ASSETS—FRAUDULBNT CONVEYANCE.</p> <p>There are two partners composing a Arm, one of whom undertakes to convey the whole Ann property by a deed in which his individual debts, or debts other than those of the Arm, are given preference. The deed is made at a time when the copartner is present, or within easy reach, but he is not consulted, and does not ratify, and does not concur in such assignment. Query: Is such a deed, made under these circumstances, but not otherwise fraudulent, valid and effectual to deprive the creditors of the Arm of their right to have the social assets applied to pay the social debts? It seems not.</p> <p>3. Partners and Partnership— Attachment — Fraudulent Conveyance-Priority op Debts.</p> <p>An attachment issued under paragraph 6 of section 1, c. 10, of the Code, by a Arm creditor who seeks to set aside a fraudulent deed made by oue partner under circumstances Arst above described, if directed against the trustee or one partner only, will be ineffectual to create a lien upon the Arm property, and will give no priority to such attaching creditor.</p>
- 35 W. Va. 433Teter v. W. Va. Cent. & Pa. R'd (1891)
<p>cited Code, c. 42; Id. e. 52, s. 14; Id. c. 54, s. 49 ; 24 W. Va. 698; 20IV. Va. 175 ; 2 "Wood R’y Law 794; 113 Ind. 233; 25 Gratt. 825; Kerr Inj. 199 ; High Inj. § 350 ; 7 Johns Cli’y 315; 76 Va. 777; 6 W. Va. 504; 9 W. Va. 218; 15 W. Va. 399 ; 17 W. Va. 396; 23 W. Va. 406; 13 Gratt. 40; 30 W. Va. 606.</p> <p>cited 30 W. Va. 606 ; Code c. 125, s. 38; 23 W. Va. 406.</p>
- 35 W. Va. 438Layne v. Ohio River R'd (1891)
<p>1. Justice oe the Peace — Summons—Motion.</p> <p>The proper method to take advantage of any defect in the summons or in the return thereto in a justice’s court, is by a motion to quash, because in that court there areno formal pleadings, and hence the question can not be raised by plea in abatement, as it might and ought to be raised in the Circuit Court, where the suit is brought orig’inallyin that Court.</p> <p>2. Justice oe ti-ie Peace — Summons—Motion—Appearance.</p> <p>In order to take advantage of such a defect in the summons or return, the defendant must appear for that purpose only and must so state in submitting the motion. If he appears, generally, whether to move a continuance or for any other purpose, he will be regarded as having waived all defects in the writ or the return.</p> <p>3. Justice oe the Peace — Summons—Motion—Waiver—Appearance.</p> <p>If in the justice’s court the defendant appears and submits two motions simultaneously, one for a continuance, and one to quash the return on the writ, and at a subsequent day, to which the case has been continued, he appears and without requiring the justice to act upon his motion to quash, files an informal plea in bar, and proceeds to trial, he will be deemed to have waived his objection to the writ.</p> <p>4. Justice of the Peace — Summons—'Waiver—Appeal.</p> <p>A defendant who has waived all objection to the summons and return in the justice’s court by appearing there and submitting to a trial, can not on appeal to the Circuit Court, take advantage of any defect in the writ or return, either by motion to quash or by a plea in abatement.</p> <p>5. Damages.</p> <p>Where an action is brought to recover damages for the killing of stock upon a railroad track, the rights, liabilities and duties of the respective parties have been well defined and settled in this state in the causes of Blaine v. Railroad Co., 9 W. Va. 252; Baylor v. Railroad Co., 9W. Va. 270; Sawlcerv. Railroad Co., 15 W. Va. 628; Washington v. Railroad Co., 17 W. Va. 190; and Johnsons. Railroad Co., 25 W. Va. 570; and the principles laid down in those cases are approved and re-affirmed.</p> <p>6. Damages — Railroad Companies — Stock.</p> <p>In the abseu.ee of special legislation on the subject requiring a railroad, to fence its track, there is no general law which requires them to do so in this State; neither is there any general law against the owners of stock allowing animals to run at large or to depasture public roads: consequently the bare fact that a railway is unenclosed, or unprotected by cattle-stops where it crosses a public road does notin general render the railroad company liable to pay for such stock, straying upon the track and killed by a train ; nor upon the other hand can contributory negligence be attributed to the plaintiff for allowing his stock to run at large.</p> <p>7. Damages — Railkoad Companies — Stock.</p> <p>The servants of the company in charge of its train are bound to use ordinary care to avoid injuring stock straying upon the track, and they are equally bound to adopt the ordinary precaution to discover danger as to avoid its consequences after it becomes known.</p>
- 35 W. Va. 458Farland v. Wood (1891)
<p>cited 31 Pa. St. 896; Ed’wd Cli’y 213; 9 Paige 323; 9 Sup. C’t Rep. 504; 24 Gratt. 279 • 30 W. Va. 561; 11 Gratt. 499.</p>
- 35 W. Va. 463Watson v. Coast (1891)
<p>cited 4 W. Ya. 107; 23 W. Ya. 480; 28 W. Ya. 1, 14,15; 29 W. Ya. 250 ; 14 Pet. 77; Pry Spec. Perf. §§ 164, 173; 31 W. Ya. 9; 21 Gratt. 463 ; 29 Gratt. 714; 3 Leigh 235; Id. 381; 2 Pom. Eq. § 755 ; 24 Gratt. 475; 5 W. Va. 339.</p> <p>cited 1 Bradw. 153, 158; 31 W.Ya. 736, 744 ; Fry Spec. Perf. (1871) § 166; 1 Sto. Eq. J nris. § 736 b. Wat. Spec. Perf. §§ 414, 419; 33 W. Ya. 749 ; 35 W. Ya. 40; 29 W. Ya.245 ; Pom.Eq. Juris. §§ 367, 368 (note 1), 372,1406 ; 5 Kan. 615 ; 10 W. Ya. 677; 1 Hilly. Yend. § 1; 5 Laws. Prop. Eight § 2231; IBenj. Sales (Corbin) § 38; 129 Mass. 383; 1 Pick. 520; 2 Allen 193; 2 Chitt. Cont. (11th Am. Ed.) 1022; 1 Id. 140; 19 W. Ya. 440, pt. 12 Syll.; 26 W. Ya. 469 ; 31 W. Ya. 77; 18 W. Ya. 513; 2 Sto. Eq. Juris. § 1531; 16 W. Ya. 651; 20 W. Ya. 398, 410; Id. 415 ; 26 W. Ya. 469; 3 Pom. Eq. Juris. 442 ; 1 W. Ya. 543; 34 W. Ya. 49; Wat. Spec. Perf. 614; 24 Ill. 617; 1 Perry Trusts § 82; 1 Johns. Ch’y 590; 31W. Ya. 9, 13; Sugd. Yend.; 78 Ya. 707; 46 Ill. 279; Wat. Spec. Perf. (1881) § 158, n. 2, 32 AN. Va. 614, 625; 21 Miss. 391; 19 AN. Ya. 240, 251.</p>
- 35 W. Va. 481Ward v. Ohio River R'd (1891)
<p>cited 23 W. Va. 407; 33 W. Va. 113; .1 Call (s. p.) 382 ; 2 Call (s. p.) 369; 9 Graft. 294; 11 W. Va. 584; 22 W. Va. 1; 7 W. Va. 717; 35 W. Va. 57.</p> <p>cited 23 W. Va. 443; 2 Wood R’y Law § 253 ; 1 Wood R’y Law § 231; Mills Em. Dom. § 30 ; 17 W. Va. 386; 13 Rep. 306 ; 56 Jow. 605; 1 Johns. Oh’y (Phillips v. Thompson); 4 W. Va. 610; 11 W. Va. 628; 29 W. Va. 201; Id. 569; 11 W. Va. 482.</p>
- 35 W. Va. 492Bess v. Chesapeake & Ohio Railroad (1891)
<p>Damages — Railboad Companies — Employer and Employe.</p> <p>To charge a railroad company for the willful wrong of an employe in forcing a boy from a freight train while in motion, whereby he is injured, it must appear that the act was in the course of the employe’s business and within the scope of his authority, the boy being a trespasser, not a passenger.</p> <p>Special Findings.</p> <p>A finding in answer toaparticular question under sec. 5, ch. 131, Code (1887), inconsistent with a general verdict prevails over such general verdict, and judgment should be given according to the finding.</p>
- 35 W. Va. 500McKelvey v. Ches. & Ohio R'y Co. (1891)
<p>1. Evide.voe — Experts.</p> <p>A locomotive engineer, without auy experience or skill in the construction or repair of boilers, is not an expert as to the effect of broken stay bolts in the boiler or of mud packed therein. His opinion is not admissible.</p> <p>2. INTERROGATORIES.</p> <p>Interrogatories as to material questions of fact offered after argument of counsel before tlie jury and the giving of instructions and submitted to the jury, are withdrawn after the jury have been deliberating upon them for more than two hours, against the protest of the party offering them. Their withdrawal is error, not justified on the plea-that they were offered too iate.</p> <p>3. DaMages — Instructions—Railroad Companies.</p> <p>An instruction that if a locomotive engine is in defective, dangerous condition and the defendant company knew it, and by conduct, actions or words lulls its engineer into a feeling of security, whereby he is killed, the company is liable, is erroneous because it omits altogether the element of the engineer’s ignorance of the defective and dangerous condition of the locomotive. (Point 10 in the syllabus of Hoffmann. Diokcmon, 31 W. Va. 142.)</p> <p>4. Damages — Instructions—Railroad Companies.</p> <p>An instruction that if the death of a locomotive engineer is caused by explosion of the boiler of the locomotive, and the explosion was caused by the defective condition of the boiler, and the company operating the locomotive knew of such condition of the boiler, and could have repaired it, even if the engineer knew of such condition of the boiler, but had ground to believe that the company would immediately cure the defects, the jury must find for the plaintiff in a suit to recover for the death of the engineer, is erroneous: 1. Because it contains no element of a promise to repair, express or fairly implied ; 2. If it did, it takes it from the jury to say whether the engineer’s continuing to run the engine, with knowledge of its condition, was from the character of the defects under all the circumstances, such contributory negligence in the engineer as to prevent recovery.</p> <p>5. Instructions.</p> <p>Instructions must not be inconsistent with each other.</p> <p>6. Instructions.</p> <p>A bad instruction is not cured by a good one, though they be given on the motion of adverse litigants. The bad instruction should be withdrawn.</p>
- 35 W. Va. 518Bland v. Stewart (1891)
<p>1. Deoree — Parties—Res Judicata.</p> <p>Where a bill iu equity neither ípakes one a party nor contains matter touching him and asks no relief as to him, any decree touching him is void and not res judie,ata.</p> <p>2. Administration — Decree—Accounts—Res Judicata — Uar.</p> <p>Settlement of accounts of administrator and decree confirming same, he not being a party and no matter touching such accounts or his administration appearingin the bill, will not, on the ground of res judicata, bar a bill brought to surcharge and falsify such account by those who were parties to the suit in which such settlement was made.</p> <p>3. Administration — Order of Reference — Settlement.</p> <p>An order of reference in such cause provides for certain objects of reference, but not for such settlement. After specifying- such objects it contains a clause requiring the commissioner to report upon such other matters as he may deem pertinent or any party require. Such clause will not justify such settlement, it not being pertinent for want of matter touching it in the bill.</p> <p>4. Administration — Decree—Appearance—Res Judicata.</p> <p>The appearance of the administrator before the commissioner and making such settlement will not make hiní a party or bring the matter of the administration into the cause so as to render the decree upon it res judicata as to any party.</p> <p>ó. Administration — Settlement—Laches.</p> <p>But parties to such suit interested in such settlement having actual knowledge of it, delay bringing a suit to surcharge and falsify such settlement and to have a settlement of the administration for very nearly ten years after its confirmation; and because of such laches and the loss of important papers touching the matters of the account, relief will be denied them.</p>
- 35 W. Va. 524Thrasher v. Ballard (1891)
<p>cited 1 Graft. 1; 18 Graft. 541; 11 Graft. 454; 6 Mnnf. 356; 13 W. Va. 510; 2 Min. Inst. 823; 73 Am. Dec. 1886 ; 47 Am. Dec. 601.</p> <p>cited 11 Graft. 466; 2 Graft. 1; Lom. Dig. 232-234, 517 ; 2 Min. Inst. 821, 823.</p>
- 35 W. Va. 531Rock v. Mathews (1891)
<p>cited 2 Pom. Eq. Juris. § 939,940 ; Ad. Eq. (s. p.) 175 ; 3 Raud. 214; Bish. Con. (Eng. Ed.) § 493 ; 22 R. E. Rep. 49 ; 74 Mich. 302 ; 45 1ST. W. Rep. 912.</p> <p>cited 78 Me. 482; Id. 473; 61 Me. 227 ; 3 W. Ya. 215 ; Id. 232 ; 9 . AY. Ya. 359; 24 AY. Va. 217; 36 Mich. 345; 46 AYis. 313; 82111. 485; 59 Mo. 125 ; 7 Ohio St. 299 ; 15 Gray (Mass.) 468; 25 R. II. 325; 60 Barb. (R. Y.) 80 ; 78 Me. 482 ; Id. 473 ; 91 Pa. St. 73 ; 115 Mass. 367; 10 R. II. 494; 22 Pick. 167; 3 B. Mon. 11; 45 Tex. 539; 2 AYoods (U. S.) 372 ; 9 AYis. 476; 12 Pet. 241; 55 Mich. 196.</p>
- 35 W. Va. 542State v. Swift (1891)
<p>cited 22 W. Va. 743.</p> <p>cited 33 W. Va. 146; 30 W. Va. 683; 20 W. Va. 672 ; Const. Art. VI. s. 46; Bish. Stat. Or. § 995; 41 Ill. 196; 323; U. S. 623; 127 U. S. 678; 134 U. S. 40; 123 U. S. 661-663; 12 B. I. 64; Cool. Const. Lim. (3d Ed.) 180, 181 (s. p.); 22 W. Va. 743; 33 "W". Va. 143.</p>
- 35 W. Va. 547Blackshire v. Pettit (1891)
<p>cited 22 W. Va. 586; 23 W. Va. 952.</p> <p>’cited 12 S. E. Rep. 509; 22 W. Va. 357 p’t 9 of Syll; 17 W. Va. 769; 23 W. Va. 639.</p>
- 35 W. Va. 554Taylor v. Philippi (1891)
<p>1. DbdiCation — Acceptance—Adverse Possession — Evidence.</p> <p>W., being the ownerof the land, surveyed, laid out .and platted the same into lots, streets and alleys, as and for a town, made a maxi thereof, and sold the lots with reference to said map, and as designated and numbered thereon; such map being afterwards duly admitted to record, and the town as laid out being- established and named by act of the legislature. Held, such acts and conduct on the part of such owner constitute prima facie evidence of the intent on his part to dedicate such streets to public use.</p> <p>2. Dedication.</p> <p>An acceptance of such dedication must be by the proper local authorities, but may be implied as well as express ; such as the recognition or naming of it as a street of the town by ordinance of the town-council, or by any actual appropriation of the property for the use designed.</p> <p>3. Dedication — Adveese Possession.</p> <p>One who claims to own and hold a definite part of such street must prove an adversary possession thereof for ten -years, the period prescribed by the law of this State; such adversary possession being made up of all the essential elements.</p> <p>4. Dedication.</p> <p>A case in which, these principles being applied, it is held that the street in question had been dedicated and accepted, and the ■ adverse claimant had failed to make good his adverse claim.</p>
- 35 W. Va. 562Hoge v. Ohio River R'd (1891)
<p>cited 30 W. Va. 228, 236-238; 9 W. Va. 253; Id. 270 ; 17 JW. Va. 190, 220 ; 25 W. Va. 570, 578.</p> <p>cited 9 W. Va. 266, 267; 32 Barb. 568 ; 29 Ind. 40 ; 30 Ind. 324; 72 Ind. 107 ; 20 Ind. 231; 36 Ind. 15; 7 Am. & Eng. R’y Cas. 545, 588, 590 ; 13 Id. 534 ; 31 Id. 528; 29 W. Va. 98 ; 17 Id. 190 ; 25 Id. 571; 27 Vt. 643; 16 Ill. 451; 30 Id. 198; 40 la. 337; 14 Ind. 30 ; 50 Miss. 572; 26 Tex. 604; 42 Miss. 603; 35 Mich. 507; 33 Mo. 309 ; 3 Jones L. 432; 62 Mo. 562 ; 8 Nev. Ill; 26 la. 549; 35 Ind. 515 ; 42 Id. 173 ; 39 Ill. 451; 72 Id. 537 ; 80 Id. 76; 34 la. 506 ; 40 Id. 337 ; 48 Mo. 558; 72 Ind. 107 ; 73 Mo. 465 ; 79 Id. 196,432 ; 91 Ind. 295 ; 98 Id. 254 ; 94 Id. 245; 96 Id. 450; 26 Tex. 604; 37 Ohio 554; 73 Mo. 456 ; 50 Miss. 572; 9 W. C. Rep. 112 ; 27 Yt. 643 ; 16 Ill. 198; 30 Id. 451; 35 la. 191; 78 Ky. 421; 26 Minn. 484; 39 Ark. 413; 40 Id. 336 ; 89 Ind. 596 ; 61 "Wis. 114 ; 72 Ind. 107 ; 4 Fed. •Rep. 862; 35 Am. & Eng. R’d Cas. 144; Whar. Neg. (2d Ed.) $ 899.</p>
- 35 W. Va. 567Lazier v. Lazier (1891)
<p>cited Beach Wills § 279 ; 19 Graft. 437-489; Jar. Wills (t. p.) 445 (M. pp. 479, 480. .</p> <p>cited 2 Redf. Wills (2d Ed.) ■§ 14.</p>
- 35 W. Va. 578Hatfield v. Workman (1891)
<p>1. Mistake — Estoppel— Botjndabi us.</p> <p>Where a large tract of land was laid off, for the convenience of selling, into smaller tracts by running a base line and laying down the division lines by protraction, which division lines were never actually surveyed, and the coterminus owners of two of said tracts attempt to survey and mark the true division line between their said lots, and in so doing a mistake is made in running said line so as to include a large portion of one of said lots within the other, there being no dispute as to the true boundary, when said mistake is discovered neither of the parties is estop-ped thereby from claiming his rights, nor can it be construed as a license from the one party to the other to cut limber between the true line and the mistaken boundary.</p> <p>2. New TRIAL.</p> <p>In a case where all the evidence introduced on the trial is clearly insufficient to warrant a verdict in favor of the plaintiff, and the jury nevertheless finds a verdict in favor of the plaintiff, it will be error to overrule the motion of the defendant to set the same aside, and grant him a new trial. Wanilling v. Straw, 25 W. Va. 692.</p>
- 35 W. Va. 588Gillingham v. Ohio River Railroad (1891)
<p>Railroad Companies — Passengers.</p> <p>A common carrier of passengers is one who undertakes for hire to carry all persons indifferently who may apply for passage, so long as there is room and there is no legal excuse for refusing.</p> <p>Railroad Companies — Passengers.</p> <p>Every one riding in a railroad car is presumed prima facie to be there lawfully as a passenger, having paid or being liable when called on to pay his fare.</p> <p>3 Railroad Com pan ies — Passengers—Conductor.</p> <p>.It is the duty of the carrier to treat the passenger properly and carry him safely — to protect the passenger against any injury from the negligence or willful misconduct of its servants while performing the contract, and of his fellow passengers and strangers, so far as practicable.</p> <p>4. Railroad Compa vies — Passengers.</p> <p>The common carrier of passengers is not an insurer of their safety, or of their proper treatment, but is liable for their injury or improper treatment due to the negligence or willful misconduct of its servants while engaged in executing the contract.</p> <p>Railroad Companies — Passengers—Fai.se Imprisonment.</p> <p>The common carrier of passengers is liable for the false imprisonment of a passenger, made or caused to be made by its conductor in charge of the train during his execution of the carrier’s contract to treat properly and convey safely.</p> <p>(i. Railroad Companies — Passengers—Conductor.</p> <p>Section 31, chapter 146 of the Code, which enacts amomr other things that “the conductor of every train of railroad cars shall have ail the powers of a conservator of the peace, while in charge of the train,” does not relievo the carrier of passengers from such liability. «</p> <p>Railroad Companies — Passengers—False Imprisonment.</p> <p>A case of false imprisonment of a passenger by the conductor, in which these principles are applied.</p>
- 35 W. Va. 605Spilman v. City of Parkersburg (1891)
<p>1. Municipal Corporations — Debt.</p> <p>A city, indebted up to the limit fixed by the constitution, can not carry on its operations upon credit, within the meaning of credit in the constitution, in any manner, or for any purpose, but must pay during the current year with funds in hand, <>r with funds already legally levied.</p> <p>2. MüNicipal Corporations — Debt.</p> <p>A city thus indebted, can not increase its indebtedness beyond tiie constitutional limit by contracting for an electric apparatus and plant; and, such indebtedness being forbidden, the contract out of which it arises, although executory, is also forbidden. The end aimed at is prohibited, which carries with it the prohibition of the means, directly and appropriately designed and adapted for its accomplishment.</p> <p>3. Municipal CoRporations — Injunctions.</p> <p>Any tax-paying resident and voter of such, city, suing on behalf of himself and of all other tax-payers of such city has a right to enjoin the creation of any such unconstitutional indebtedness,</p>
- 35 W. Va. 620Broderick v. Broderick's Ex'r (1891)
<p>CONSTRUCTION OF WILL — POWER. TO SELL LAND — PAYMENT OF LEGACIES.</p> <p>B., by his last will and testament, devised one hundred and forty three acres of land to hisbrother M., for life, remainderto his two sons. He then gives to his natural son three hundred dollars, and to his nephew two hundred dollars as specific legacies; and directs that said legacies be paid out of his money, if there be sufficient available cash left at the time of his death to pay the same; but, if he did not die possessed of enough money to pay said specific legacies, then he directed that his said brother might pay them, or that said land should be sold, and, after paying said legacies from the proceeds of said sale, he gave the balance to his brother M., and by a subsequent clause of said will the testator directed and commanded that under no circumstances should the said property be sold for less than fouj.' thousand dollars; and he further directed that said legacies should not become due and payable unless his brother M. could pay them or said sums could be realized from his available cash at the date of his death, or until the said sum of four thousand dollars could be realized from a sale of said land. Held, that the intention of the testator was that under no circumstances should said land bo sold by his executor or under the provisions of his will for a sum less than four thousand dollars, and that said legacies should not be due and payable unless his brother M. paid them, or they were realized from his available cash at the time of his death, or said land brought four thousand dollars under a sale thereof made by his executor or under the directions of his will; and he did not intend that a sale thereof, made under a decree obtained against said estate by one of his creditors for a less sum than four thous- and dollars should defeat the payment of said legacies.</p>
- 35 W. Va. 634Elliot v. Trahern (1891)
<p>cited 4 W. Va. 56; 13 W. Va. 118, 730 ; 14 “W\ Va. 211; 11 How. Pr. 454; 16 How. Pr. 142 ; 3Edw’ds Oh’y 390 ; 12 Ohio 120; 4V.L.J.1; 18 Ohio 240; 1 Black Judgm’ts § 349 ; 13 W. Va. 29; 24 W. Va. 405; 29 W. Va. 441; 32 W. Va. 447 ; 46111. 279; Clarke Oh’y 584; 93 Ill. 400 ; 12 K. I. 61; 1 Paige Oh’y 637; 31 H. Y. 638; 2 Paige Oh’y 567; 2 Sandf. Oh’y 594; 64 Mo. 292 ; 4 Edw’ds Oh’y 538 ; 13 "Wend. 244; 26 Barb. 580; 20 Barb. 381; 2 "Wall. 249 ; 4 Johns. Ch’y 687; 27 Gratt. 479 ; 22 W. Ya. 434; 19 W. Ya. 366; 30 W. Ya. 443; 31 W. Ya. 156; 33 W. Ya. 116.</p> <p>cited 23 W. Ya. 639; 29 W. Ya. 441; 32 W. Ya. 203; 3 Munf. 521; 10 ~W. Ya. 59; 33 W. Ya. 116; 32 W. Ya. 203; Codo, c. 74, s. 1; 22 W. Ya. 357; Id. 434; Code, c. 134, s. 5; 21 W. Ya. 291; Id. 316 ; 27 Gratt. 479 ; Wait Fraud. Con. (1889) § 392 ; 3 Gratt. 34, 58; Code, c. 136, s. 27.</p>
- 35 W. Va. 647American Buttonhole Overseaming Sewing Machine Co. v. Burlack (1891)
<p>1. Axswek — Non Est Pactum — 1‘leading—Deed.</p> <p>In an action of debt founded on a bond or other deed, the defendant may put in issue the execution of the instrument by pleading non est factum generally, and in the common form.</p> <p>2 Answer — Non Est Factum — Pleading—Deed.</p> <p>But if lie wislies to separate the law from the facts, so that the court may pass upon the sufficiency of the special ground why it is not his deed, then he must allege such facts specially, concluding with an “at sic non est factum," “and so is not his act,” (or deed.)</p> <p>3. Evidence — Feaud—Non Est Factum — Deed.</p> <p>In a court of common-law fraud may be given in evidence to vacate a deed, on the plea of non est factum, if such fraud relates to the execution of the instrument, as, for example the essential element of delivery.</p>
- 35 W. Va. 666Peninsular Land Transportation & Manufacturing Co. v. Franklin Insurance Co. (1891)
<p>cited 11 Mo. 278; 18 Wis. 393; 29 Pa. St. 198; Plan. Ins. 518; 12 Wend. 452; 43 N. II. 621; 57 N. Y. 500 ; 13 N. J. L. 110; 3 Grant’s Cas. 325; 80 la. 56; 8 Gray 33; 75 Pa. St. 380; 33 Pa. St. 402; 7 Jones L. 433 ; 24 N. E. Rep. 809, 810; 10 Allen 213 ; 6 T. R. 710; 8 Exch. 819 ; 28 L. J. Q. B. 260; 41 Pa. St, 64; 70 la. 704, 708; 128 Pa. St. 392, 395 ; 21 W. Va. 368; 11 S. E. Rep. 50; 57 Vt. 527 ; 22 N. E. Rep. 578; 52 N. Y. 504.</p> <p>cited 12 Wheat. 408; Wood Ins. 45; 13 N. J. L. 110; 3 Grant. Cas. 325; 80 la. 56; 12 S. E. Rep. 771; 26 N. E. Rep. 1138 ; 70 la. 704; 100 N. Y. 417; 128 Pa. St. 392; 100 Ill. 644; 24 N. E. Rep. 808; 21 W. Va. 368 ; 11 S. E. Rep. 50 ; 43 N. J. L. 300 ; 77 N. Y. 483 ; 49 Wis. 389; 115 Pa. St. 407; 57 Vt. 527 ; 102 Pa. St. 281; 52 Ilun 249; 90 Pa. St. 118; 13 S. W. Rep. 882; Id. 1016; 22 N. E. Rep. 578; 12 W. Va. 116; 136 U. S. 287; 49 Wis. 389 ; 32 W. Va. 283 ; 57 Vt. 527 ; 86 Va. 811 ; 11 S. E. Rep. 1009.</p>
- 35 W. Va. 682Bowen v. City of Huntington (1891)
<p>cited 8 S. E. Rep. 493; 17 W. Ya. 683.</p> <p>cited 2 Shear. & Redf. Neg. (4th Ed.) § 742 ; 38 Wis. 584; 2 Dill. Mun. Corp. (4th Ed.) § 1047 et seq.</p>
- 35 W. Va. 698Green v. Campbell (1891)
<p>1. PARENT AND Cl-IILD — HABEAS CÍORPUS.</p> <p>The writ of habeas corpus is the proper remedy for the ascertainment and enforcement of the legal or proper custody of an infant, and is of an equitable nature, applied to this class of cases.</p> <p>2. PARENT AND CHILD.</p> <p>Where the father has not the custody of the child, but is seeking to be restored to such custody, the court will exercise its discretion according to the facts, consulting the wishes of the infant, if of years of discretion, having, however, due regard to the legal rights of the party claiming the custody.</p> <p>3. Parent and Child.</p> <p>The father is the natural guardian of his infant children, and in the absence of good and sufficient cause shown, is entitled to their custody.</p> <p>4. Parent and Ci-iild.</p> <p>But the court is in no case bound to deliver the child into the custody of any claimant, but may leave it in such custody as the welfare of the child at the time appears to require.</p> <p>5. Parent and Child.</p> <p>Such order as to the custody of the child is not an unalterable, final judgment, but will last until the-ehild may have the right to nominate its own guardian, or until a material change of circumstances require a change of custody.</p> <p>6. Parent and Child.</p> <p>When a parent has transferred to another the custody of his infant child by fair agreement which has been acted on by such other person, to the manifest interest and. wellfare of the child, the parent will not be permitted to reclaim the custody of the child, unless he can show that a change of custody will materially promote liis child’s welfare, moral, or physical.</p>
- 35 W. Va. 705McMillan v. Hickman (1891)
<p>citocl 16 W. Ya. 725; Id. 625 ; 17 W. Va. 655 ; 28 W. Ya. 656 ; 31 W. Ya. 688; 33 W. Ya. 652; 4 Black Comm. 133, 134; Bar. Law Pr. 93 ; 1 Bob. (old) Pr. 121; 122; 2 Leigh 733; 14 Gratt. 42; Sto. .Eq. PI. § 498; 1 Caines 519 ; 70 Ill.- 65 ; 5 So. Ca. 159 ; 24 W. Va. 416, 492 ; Taney C. C. 362-; 3 II. & M. 67; 3 Black. Comm. 301; Tidd Pr. 418, 419 ; 5.Rob. Pr. 2,10, 12, 49 ; Id. 11; 21 Gratt. 685; Sto. Eq. PI. §§ 14, 707, 708, 710 ; 3 H. & M. 79, 83-85; 9 Gratt. 379 ; 11 Gratt. 625 ; 16 Gratt. 360, 361; 21 Gratt. 362-364; Code, c. 125, s. 16; 3 W. Va. 586 ; 4 Min. Inst. 625,-1059; Dan. Ch’y Pr. (4th Am. Ed.) 690; Id. 630; Sto. Eq. PI. § 727; 4 Min. Inst. 627 ; 1 Laws Rights Rem. Pr. §§ 161, 167 ; 21 W. Ya. 361; 93 TJ. S. 277; 6 Pet. 709; 22 W. Ya. 181; 29 W. Ya. 326; 27 W. Ya. 658 ; 7 Gray 505; 44 Cal. 286 ; 28 W. Ya. 601; 127 Mass. 326; 3 Allen 326; 33 W. Ya. 229 ; 12 Am. & Eng. Ency. Law 247 note, 248-251.</p> <p>cited 4 Min. Inst. 627, 1054; 5 Rob. Pr. 49; Id. 14; 6 Rand. 121, 122; 2 Leigh 735; 8 Watts 462; 1 Munf. 284; 2 Munf. 240 ; Code, c. 125, s. 16; 4 Min. Inst. 1059; Code, c. 125, s. s. 46, 47 ; 1 Chitt. PI. 472; Bar. L. Pr. (1877) 100 ; Code, c. 104, s. 6; Id. c. 89, s. 12; 28 W. Ya. 607, 608; 8 Tenn. Ch’y 187; 13 Gratt. 152; 20 W- Ya. 351; 27 Gratt. 628; 33 Gratt. 358 ; 75 Ya. 480; Code, c. 134, s. 5; 21 Gratt. 382; 12 W. Ya. 298; Id. 750; 20 W. Ya. 59; 10 Pet. 447, 449; 27 Graft. 630, 631; 1 Bar. Ch’y Pr. 248; Code, e. 125, s. 39 ; 10 W. Ya. 507; Sto. Eq. PI. § 708 and n. ; 29 W. Ya. 332 ; 23 W. Va. 656, p’t4 Syll.; Code, e. 139, s. 7; 22 W. Ya. 444; 1 Bar. Ch’y Pr. 273; 2 Ban. Ch’y Pr. 1522, 1538; 16 W. Ya. 724; 23 W. Ya. 656; Code, c. 76; Sedg. & W. Tit. § 336 ; 2 Band. 422 ; 31 W; Ya. 688 ; 33 W: Ya. 644.</p>
- 35 W. Va. 719Bartlett v. Cleavenger (1891)
<p>cited .85 Va. 955; 22 W. Va. 356; Kerr Frauds 382 ; 2 Muirf. 310 ; 17 W. Va. 717; 10 W. Va. 87.</p> <p>cited 23 "W. Va. 644; 29 "W. Va. 441; 32 W. Va. 303; 27 W. Va. 639; 28 W. Va. 715 ; 31 W. Va. 137; 33 W. Va. 159; Waite Fraud. Conv. (1889) § 281; 17 W. Va. 717; 22 W. Va. 357; Waite Fraud. Conv. §§ 239-243 ; Code, c. 74, s. 1; 3 Gratt. 34, 58; Waite Fraud. Conv. § 279; 104 Ind. 495, 498; Waite Fraud. Conv. § 192; Code, e. 135, s. 27.</p>
- 35 W. Va. 735Clark v. Gordon (1891)
<p>cited 27 W. Va. 17; 7 Wait Act. & Def. c. 51, § 1; 21 W. Va. 516; Sto. Eq. Juris. § 1212; 16 Atl. R.ep. 921; 5 Wait Act. & Def. 679 ; Sto. Eq. Juris. 784; 32 W. Va. 277; Sto. Eq. Juris. §§ 777, 779 ; 25 Gratt. 195; 22 Gratt. 83; 128 Ill. 340; 3 S. E. Rep. 376; 26 W. Va. 451; 18 W. Va. 521; 26 W. Va. 447; 30 W. Va. 335; Code, c. 74, s. 9 ; 10 W. Va. 87; 1 Am. Lead. Cas. (5th Ed.) 37 ; 21 la. 205; 44 la. 642; 14 Mass. 136; 18 Pick. 136; 20 Pick. 49; 7 B. Mon. 11; 3 Conn. 450; 1 Rob. 131; Wait Fraud. Conv. § 369; 17 W. Va. 717.</p> <p>cited 15 W. Va. 567; 18 W. Va. 755; 21 W. Va. 469; 4 Rand. 368; 23 W. Va. 522; 6 Ohio St. 52; 9 Pick. 93; 10 Yerg. 486 ; 1 Sto. Eq. § 371; 8 Leigh 510 ; 10 Leigh 321; 12 Leigh 427 ; 9 W. Va. 154; Id. 552 ; 24 W. Va. 730 ; 22 W. Va. 676 ; 10 Ohio 162; 1 Ohio 469 ; 5 Munf. 28 ; 4 Munf. 187 ; 5 Wait Act. & Def. 797; 2 Brook. 185 ; 25 W. Va. 470.</p>
- 35 W. Va. 754Hutchinson's Ex'x v. Boltz (1891)
<p>cited 23 W. Ya. 499, 089; 22 Id. 585; 10 Id. 87, 321; 29 Id. 440; 30 Id. 203, 619; 32 Id. 34, 514, 515 ; 27 Id. 206, 447 ; 28 Id. 16 ; 32 Id. 101, 406; 11 Id. 122; 24 Id. 405, 730 ; 29 Id. 389, 395, 703, 708 ; 30 Id. 555, 443; 31 Id. 519; 22 Pa. St. 179; 17 W. Ya. 717 ; 15 Id. 521; 28 Id. 33; 12 S. E. Bep. 828, 881; Code, c. 74; 3 Graft. 34, 58 ; 27 W. Ya. 697; Code, c. 65, s. 8.</p>
- 35 W. Va. 771Thorn v. Phares (1891)
<p>1. Tithe— Vendor and Vendee — Executory Contract — PurCHASER.</p> <p>A purchaser of laud who has acquired and holds the same by executory contract, duly executed, acknowledged, and admitted to record, has from the time it is thus admitted to record a good title against all subsequent creditors and purchasers. Chapter 74, 14 Code (Ed. 1891)’ p 650.</p> <p>2. Title — Trusts and Trustees</p> <p>Such subsequent purchaser is regarded and treated in a court of equity as a kind of trustee holding the legal title for such equitable owner as the real and true owner, and will be compelled to convey to him the legal title.</p> <p>3. Description’.</p> <p>The main object of a d scription of the land sold or conveyed, in a deed of conveyance, or in a contrae' of sale, is not in and of itself to identify the land sold — that it rarely does or can do without helping evidence — but to furnish the means of identification, and when this is done it is sufficient That is certain which can thus be made certain. «</p> <p>4. Ccise in which these principles are applied.</p>