350 Ga. 851
FINAL COPY
S19A0308. DAVIS v. THE STATE.
BETHEL, Justice.
Nearly twenty years ago, Appellant Donald Davis pleaded
guilty to the murder of Shereka Smith and was convicted and
sentenced. Davis did not timely pursue a direct appeal. Following
his unsuccessful pursuit of a writ of habeas corpus, he filed a motion
for an out-of-time appeal of his conviction, which the trial court
denied. Davis now appeals that denial. For the reasons set forth
below, we affirm.
On December 17, 1999, a Monroe County grand jury indicted
Davis on charges of murder, felony murder predicated on aggravated
assault, possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, and possession
of a firearm during the commission of a felony after having been
convicted of a previous felony involving the use or possession of a
firearm. After evaluation, Davis was determined competent to
stand trial.
On April 25, 2000, Davis, who was represented by counsel,
entered a guilty plea on the murder charge. The transcript of the
plea hearing shows that, in support of Davis’s plea, the following
factual basis was presented to the trial court: Davis and his victim,
Shereka Smith, were romantically involved and had lived together
before separating in August 1999. After their separation, violence
and discord continued between them. On October 4, 1999, Smith,
accompanied by her niece, went to the Monroe County courthouse to
take out a warrant on Davis, who was on parole at the time. Davis,
knowing that Smith’s actions would lead to his incarceration,
intercepted the two women on the courthouse square and, from close
range, fired four or five shots at Smith, three of which struck Smith,
causing her death. The trial court accepted Davis’s guilty plea and
sentenced him to life in prison. The remaining charges were dead
docketed.
On April 16, 2002, Davis, acting pro se, filed a petition for writ
of habeas corpus. In that petition, Davis contended, among other
things, that he was denied the effective assistance of plea counsel,
raising 14 grounds in support of that contention. The habeas court
held an evidentiary hearing at which both Davis and his trial
counsel testified. In an order containing extensive findings of fact
and conclusions of law, the habeas court denied Davis’s petition,
finding that his claims of ineffective assistance were without merit.1
Davis never pursued an appeal of that order.
On April 16, 2018, Davis, through counsel, filed a motion for
out-of-time appeal, contending, in part, that he was denied the
effective assistance of counsel based on his trial counsel’s failure to
file an appeal from his conviction. Following a hearing, the trial
court denied the motion, and Davis now appeals.
As we have explained before, a defendant is entitled to an out-
of-time appeal only where he has “allege[d] and prove[d] an excuse
of constitutional magnitude for failing to file a timely direct appeal,
which usually is done by showing that the delay was caused by his
1 Although Davis’s petition for writ of habeas corpus is not included in
the record before us, the habeas court’s order lays out the grounds raised by
Davis. Davis did not appeal the habeas court’s order nor does he argue that
the habeas court failed to rule on any grounds he raised.
trial counsel’s ineffective assistance in providing advice about or
acting upon an appeal.” Deloney v. State, 302 Ga. 142, 145 (
805
SE2d 881) (2017). Thus, the only relevant question before us is
whether Davis’s failure to file a timely appeal resulted from the
ineffective assistance of his trial counsel.
But frustrating Davis’s present effort to obtain an out-of-time
appeal is the doctrine of res judicata. “It is axiomatic that the same
issues cannot be relitigated ad infinitum.” (Citation and punctuation
omitted.) McDaniel v. State, 305 Ga. 46, 47 (
823 SE2d 734) (2019).
Three prerequisites must be satisfied before res
judicata applies — (1) identity of the cause of action, (2)
identity of the parties or their privies, and (3) previous
adjudication on the merits by a court of competent
jurisdiction. Where a convict seeks post-conviction relief
based upon grounds previously litigated in a habeas
proceeding, i.e., were raised in a habeas proceeding and
resolved by the final judgment of the habeas court, this
Court has determined that the convict is collaterally
estopped from pursuing those grounds in his effort to
obtain post-conviction relief.
(Citation and punctuation omitted.) Beasley v. State, 298 Ga. 49, 50
(
779 SE2d 301) (2015). Furthermore, “the doctrine of res judicata
precludes not only re-litigation of claims that were actually
adjudicated in the prior cause of action, but those which could have
been adjudicated therein.”
Id. As noted above, Davis filed a habeas
petition in 2002, and the habeas court denied Davis relief. Although
Davis did not “plainly raise in the [petition for writ of habeas corpus]
the issues he raises now, there is no reason he could not have.”
Brooks v. State,
301 Ga. 748, 751 (
804 SE2d 1) (2017). Therefore,
because the trial court was precluded from considering this claim, it
did not err in denying Davis’s motion for out-of-time appeal.
Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.
Decided May 20, 2019.
Murder. Monroe Superior Court. Before Judge Wilson.
Deborah R. Whitlock, Bentley C. Adams III, for appellant.
Jonathan L. Adams, District Attorney, Cynthia T. Adams,
Elizabeth K. Bobbitt, Assistant District Attorneys; Christopher M.
Carr, Attorney General, Patricia B. Attaway Burton, Deputy
Attorney General, Paula K. Smith, Senior Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee.