¶1dissenting. I respectfully dissent. As stated in the majority, there are three exceptions to the general rule that no appeal shall be allowed from a plea of guilty. Those exceptions are: (1) an appeal from a conditional plea of guilty under Ark. R. Crim. P. 24.3(b); (2) an appeal involving testimony and evidence that occurred after the guilty plea but during sentencing hearings before a jury; and (3) an appeal from a postjudgment motion to amend an incorrect or illegal sentence. While the majority correctly lays out the three exceptions to the rule, it errs in concluding that the instant case falls under the second exception. The majority opinion cites the case of Hill v. State, 318 Ark. 408, 887 S.W.2d 275 (1994), which does not support this conclusion. The Hill court made very clear that the acceptance of the appeal did not compromise the general rule because it did not constitute a review of the plea itself. Instead, the appeal involved nonjurisdictional issues, such as the admission of testimony and evidence authorized by the bifurcation statute. The instant case does not raise evidentiary matters; rather, the crux of this appeal is the trial court’s imposition of consecutive sentences “in violation of a plea agreement.”
¶2The instant case is controlled by State v. Sherman, 303 Ark. 284, 796 S.W.2d 339 (1990). There, the defendant, Sherman, challenged the validity of the sentence that he received as a direct result of his guilty plea. The court stated that if the appeal was from a sentencing procedure which was an integral part of the acceptance of the appellant’s guilty plea, then the appeal must be dismissed; in such a case, the defendant’s remedy is a motion to correct sentence, under Ark. Code Ann. § 16-90-111 (Supp. 2001), or, in the alternative, the defendant may seek relief under Ark. R. Crim. P. 37. Id. at 286-287.
¶3Here, because we are not dealing with an appeal from a bifurcated trial, but instead from the sentencing procedure which was an integral part of the acceptance of Bradford’s plea of guilty, his appeal should be dismissed under the general rule that no appeals are allowed from a plea of guilty. To rule otherwise will compromise Ark. R. App. P. — Crim. 1 (“Except as provided by ARCrP 24.3(b) there shall be no appeal from a plea of guilty or nolo contendere.”) because there shall be a right of appeal from every sentence imposed at a separate sentencing proceeding following a defendant’s entry of a plea of guilty.