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State v. Ziolkowski
STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. KARIN ZIOLKOWSKI
(SC 20801)
Mullins, C. J., and McDonald, D’Auria, Ecker,
Alexander and Dannehy, Js.
Syllabus
Convicted of the murder of her minor son, E, and of arson in the second
degree, the defendant appealed to this court. The defendant claimed, inter
alia, that the trial court had improperly admitted into evidence certain
posts from her purported social media account and that the evidence was
insufficient to find her guilty of the offenses of which she had been convicted. Held:
The defendant’s claim on appeal that her inability to remember the twenty-four to thirty-six hour period surrounding the murder and arson deprived
her of her constitutional right to a fair trial failed under the first prong of
State v. Golding (213 Conn. 233) insofar as the defendant had not asked
the trial court to make the requisite posttrial determination regarding the
fairness of the trial, and, consequently, the record was inadequate for this
court’s review of this unpreserved claim.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting into evidence certain
posts from the defendant’s purported social media account, that court having
correctly concluded that the posts were properly authenticated.
The testimony at trial was sufficient to satisfy the low bar for a prima facie
showing of authenticity, and, although this court recognized the potential
for manipulation in the context of electronically stored information, the
threshold for authentication continues to be a modest one, and any doubts
that existed with respect to the reliability or authorship of the posts went
to the weight of the evidence rather than its admissibility.
The evidence was sufficient to support the defendant’s conviction of murder,
as the jury reasonably could have found from the cumulative force of the
evidence presented at trial that it was the defendant who caused E’s death
and that she had the intent to do so.
The evidence was sufficient to support the defendant’s conviction of arson
in the second degree, as the jury reasonably could have found that the
defendant started the fires that formed the basis of her arson conviction
and that she did so with the intent to damage or destroy the family home
and to conceal the murder of E.
Argued November 7, 2024—officially released January 28, 2025
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State v. Ziolkowski
Procedural History
Information charging the defendant with the crimes
of murder and arson in the second degree, brought to
the Superior Court in the judicial district of New Haven
and tried to the jury before Alander, J.; verdict and
judgment of guilty, from which the defendant appealed
to this court. Affirmed.
Hope J. Estrella, deputy assistant public defender,
for the appellant (defendant).
Rocco A. Chiarenza, senior assistant state’s attorney,
with whom, on the brief, were John P. Doyle, Jr., state’s
attorney, Stacey M. Miranda, supervisory assistant
state’s attorney, Melissa Holmes, assistant state’s attorney, and Lisa D’Angelo, executive assistant state’s attorney, for the appellee (state).
Opinion
MULLINS, C. J. Following a trial, the jury found the
defendant, Karin Ziolkowski, guilty of murder in violation of General Statutes § 53a-54a (a) and arson in the
second degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-
112 (a) (1) (B). For those crimes, the trial court sentenced the defendant to forty years of imprisonment.
In this direct appeal, pursuant to General Statutes § 51-
199 (b) (3), the defendant asserts that (1) her amnesia
during a twenty-four to thirty-six hour period around
the time of the incident in question prevented her from
receiving a fair trial, (2) the trial court improperly admitted into evidence several postings on a Twitter (now
X) account, and (3) there was insufficient evidence to
find her guilty of murder and of arson in the second
degree. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The jury reasonably could have found the following
facts. For approximately one year before the incident
in question, which occurred on or about November 14,
2016, the defendant and her husband had been estranged.
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State v. Ziolkowski
During that time, her husband was involved in extramarital affairs. At one point during this period, the defendant had moved out of the marital home in Meriden and
into an apartment with her minor son, E. The defendant
then became unable to pay the expense of the additional
apartment and moved back in with her still estranged
husband. Her husband continued to engage in extramarital affairs, was frequently absent, and failed to financially support the defendant and E. The situation was
so difficult that the defendant wanted to move to North
Carolina, but her husband forbade her from taking E
with her.
Days before the incidents in question, the defendant
made various posts on her Twitter account under the
handle ‘‘@IamnotEliza.’’ On November 10, 2016, she posted:
‘‘Fire extinguisher #takethatasyouwill.’’ On November
11, 2016, she posted: ‘‘Empty promises #takethatasyouwill.’’ On November 12, 2016, she posted: ‘‘Why did I
😩😩
have a child ????.’’ During this same period of time, the
defendant also complained to friends and family about
her husband, calling him ‘‘an asshole’’ and telling people
that he refused to provide financial support.
On or about November 14, 2016, the defendant
sedated E by giving him a substantial amount of diphenhydramine,1 approximately twice the recommended dosage for an adult. The defendant also removed ductwork
in the basement immediately below E’s first floor bedroom. Thereafter, she used an accelerant to set two
fires. She set one fire in the basement near the missing
ductwork, immediately below E’s bedroom. She set the
second fire in another first floor bedroom.
At approximately 7 a.m., Meriden firefighters responded
to a fire at the defendant’s residence. When they arrived,
1
‘‘Diphenhydramine is an antihistamine with sedative properties that is
found in many . . . medications, [including] Benadryl.’’ (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) State v. LeRoya M., 340 Conn. 590, 598,
264 A.3d 983 (2021).
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State v. Ziolkowski
the firefighters observed smoke rising from the roofline.
This indicated that none of the windows or doors was
open, which limited the oxygen available to fuel the
fire. A neighbor informed the firefighters that two people were inside. Finding all of the entrances locked and
deadbolted, the firefighters forced open the front door
to gain entry.
Once inside, the firefighters found that the house was
filled with smoke. They discovered two separate fires:
the fire in the basement, directly below E’s bedroom,
and a second fire in another first floor bedroom. Eventually, one of the firefighters discovered E and the defendant lying on a twin bed in E’s bedroom. The firefighter
did not have to move the defendant in order to move
E. Instead, he placed both hands under E, lifted his
‘‘lifeless’’ body and exited the home. Once outside, he
and the other firefighters tried to resuscitate E.
Thereafter, three firefighters removed the defendant
from the home. She was unconscious and unresponsive.
No other individuals were found in the home.
Paramedics transported E to MidState Medical Center in Meriden, where he was later pronounced dead.
The defendant was taken to Hartford Hospital, where
she was admitted. Upon admission, the defendant had
a burn mark on one of her hands.
After an investigation, the fire department determined that the defendant had intentionally set the two
fires using an accelerant that the state forensic laboratory later confirmed was on both her clothes and E’s
clothes. The accelerant was consistent with tiki torch
fuel. A melted, cut open, tiki torch fuel bottle was found
in the living room. Additionally, the police discovered
that the batteries had been removed from the smoke
and carbon monoxide detectors inside the home.
Subsequently, the medical examiner, Gregory Vincent, performed an autopsy on E. Vincent determined
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State v. Ziolkowski
that E’s cause of death was homicidal asphyxia, with
acute diphenhydramine intoxication as a contributing
cause.2 The autopsy revealed that E did not have any
carbon monoxide in his blood, and there was no evidence of soot in his lungs, indicating that his death
occurred before he inhaled any smoke from the fires.
The state charged the defendant with the murder of E
and arson in the second degree for intentionally starting
a fire with the intent to conceal the crime of murder.
The jury found the defendant guilty of both crimes.
This appeal followed. Additional facts and procedural
history will be set forth as necessary.
I
On appeal, the defendant claims that her inability
to remember the twenty-four to thirty-six hour period
surrounding the alleged offenses prevented her from
receiving a fair trial. Specifically, she argues that her
inability to remember prevented her from assisting her
counsel in her defense or testifying at trial. In response,
the state asserts that the defendant failed to preserve
her claim and cannot prevail under State v. Golding,
213 Conn. 233, 239–40,
567 A.2d 823 (1989), as modified
by In re Yasiel R., 317 Conn. 773, 781,
120 A.3d 1188
(2015), because the record is inadequate for review in
that the defendant did not request a posttrial hearing
regarding the fairness of the trial. The state contends
that, without such a hearing, the trial court did not have
the opportunity to make the requisite observations and
findings regarding whether the defendant had received
a fair trial and, therefore, that the record is inadequate
to review the defendant’s claim. We agree with the state
that the record is inadequate for review, and, accordingly, the defendant’s claim fails under the first prong
of Golding.
2
Vincent testified that diphenhydramine intoxication occurs when the
effect of the drug exceeds the expected effect.
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State v. Ziolkowski
We begin with the legal framework that governs this
claim. In State v. Gilbert, 229 Conn. 228,
640 A.2d 61
(1994), this court addressed whether the defendant’s
amnesia deprived him of the right to a fair trial. See
id., 232–47. In doing so, this court adopted the framework set forth in Wilson v. United States,
391 F.2d 460,
463–64 (D.C. Cir. 1968), which ‘‘requires a trial court
both to conduct a pretrial competency hearing and [to]
make a posttrial determination as to whether the defendant had been able to perform the functions essential
to the fairness and accuracy of the particular proceedings in which he [was] presently involved as measured
by six factors . . . .’’3 (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Gilbert, supra, 233; see
also id., 236–37.
This court further explained that the Wilson framework ‘‘accords with the principle articulated by this
court that in all cases involving what is or is not due
process . . . no [hard-and-fast] rule can be laid down.
The pattern of due process is picked out in the facts
and circumstances of each case. . . . We continue to
adhere to that position and agree with the many jurisdictions that have either followed the Wilson approach
3
In Wilson v. United States, supra,391 F.2d 460, the court identified the
following six factors: ‘‘(1) The extent to which the amnesia affected the
defendant’s ability to consult with and assist his lawyer.
‘‘(2) The extent to which the amnesia affected the defendant’s ability to
testify in his own behalf.
‘‘(3) The extent to which the evidence in suit could be extrinsically reconstructed in view of the defendant’s amnesia. Such evidence would include
evidence relating to the crime itself as well as any reasonably possible alibi.
‘‘(4) The extent to which the [g]overnment assisted the defendant and
his counsel in that reconstruction.
‘‘(5) The strength of the prosecution’s case. Most important here will be
whether the [g]overnment’s case is such as to negate all reasonable hypotheses of innocence. If there is any substantial possibility that the accused
could, but for his amnesia, establish an alibi or other defense, it should be
presumed that he would have been able to do so.
‘‘(6) Any other facts and circumstances [that] would indicate whether
. . . the defendant had a fair trial.’’ (Footnote omitted.) Id., 463–64.
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State v. Ziolkowski
strictly or have engaged in a factual analysis of the
effect of amnesia on the fairness of the trial.’’ (Citations
omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 237.
The following facts and procedural history are relevant to the resolution of this claim. Prior to trial, the
defendant filed a request for a competency hearing pursuant to General Statutes § 54-56d.4 The trial court
granted the defendant’s request. The trial court, Clifford, J., conducted a hearing over the course of four
days, during which it heard testimony from multiple
experts, including Nadia Gilbo, a forensic psychiatrist
who testified on behalf of the state, and David Lovejoy,
a neuropsychologist who testified on behalf of the
defendant.
At that hearing, Judge Clifford considered the defendant’s claim that she could not receive a fair trial
because of her amnesia. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court issued an oral ruling in which it
observed that the party challenging competency bears
the burden of overcoming the presumption in favor of
finding a defendant competent. See General Statutes
§ 54-56d (b). The court, consistent with § 54-56d (a),
then identified the two parts of the competency inquiry:
first, whether the defendant was able to understand
the nature of the proceedings against her, and, second,
whether the defendant could assist counsel in her
defense. The court acknowledged that the defendant’s
claim that her amnesia rendered her incompetent to
stand trial presented a rather ‘‘unique’’ circumstance
but observed that ‘‘the general proposition is that . . .
having no recollection of a time period within which a
crime was committed certainly does not bar a prosecuAlthough § 54-56d was the subject of amendments in 2024; see Public
4
Acts 2024, No. 24-137, § 6; those amendments have no bearing on the merits
of this appeal. In the interest of simplicity, we refer to the current revision
of the statute.
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State v. Ziolkowski
tion or lead to an automatic finding of incompetence
to stand trial.’’
Relying on the testimony of Gilbo and Lovejoy, understood in the context of both Gilbert and Wilson, the trial
court observed that the ultimate question was what, if
any, effect the defendant’s ‘‘amnesia [had] on the fairness of [the] trial.’’ The court concluded that the defendant’s amnesia did not implicate the first prong of the
competency inquiry. The defendant, the court observed,
‘‘understands the function and role of all the players
and personnel. She knows the charges and allegations.
Quite frankly, she has an [intelligence quotient (IQ)] at
the 92nd percentile, if my notes are accurate.’’
Instead, the trial court noted, the defendant’s amnesia
implicated the second prong of the competency inquiry.
As to that prong, the court observed that Gilbo had
testified that ‘‘the defendant has a present ability to
assist counsel, [and] that the defendant understands
her attorney has her best interest at stake. The defendant has a factual and rational understanding of the
facts. She can look at options and decide between trial
and plea bargaining. She can look at information that’s
supplied to her and make decisions. She’s fully able to
exercise and use her cognitive ability, and she has a
good rapport with her counsel and certainly can [collaborate] with her.’’ Lovejoy, the court noted, did not necessarily disagree with these observations. Rather, the
court stated, Lovejoy ‘‘just disagrees as to the ability of
the defendant to assist counsel because of the amnesia.’’
The trial court reasoned that ‘‘Lovejoy’s opinion was
that [the] defendant cannot assist her attorney in a
defense if that defense requires her recollection. [The
defendant] cannot testify [as to] what was in her mind
[during the twenty-four to thirty-six hour period surrounding the alleged offenses], whether [she was] suffering from some kind of a mental breakdown. These
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State v. Ziolkowski
are things, according to . . . Lovejoy, that a defendant
suffering from this [condition] cannot do over that time
period. And, quite frankly, it’s a commonsense argument that, if someone can’t recall what happened leading to . . . crime[s] such as [arson] and murder, then
how can [that person] assist in [his or her] own defense.
. . . So . . . Gilbert and Wilson make it appear that
there is almost this preliminary hearing, and, if [the
court were to] find the defendant competent, it almost
sounds like that same kind of a hearing could occur
again. It could occur during the course of any trial, if
there’s going to be a trial. Things may arise concerning
the overall fairness of the trial.’’
The trial court then went on to address the Wilson
factors, particularly the last factor, which requires the
trial court to consider any other facts and circumstances that would indicate whether the defendant had
a fair trial. See Wilson v. United States, supra,391
F.2d 464; see also footnote 3 of this opinion. The court
observed that this final factor required it to ‘‘monitor
and evaluate’’ in an ongoing manner during the course
of the trial, and, in light of that obligation, the court
reiterated that its ‘‘decision is really a preliminary one,
and . . . the fairness of the trial will be the main issue.’’
At the end of its oral ruling, the trial court again
emphasized the preliminary nature of its finding that
the defendant was competent to stand trial: ‘‘I think it’s
going to be put to a future judge who hears all of the
evidence to . . . under these factors that I just summarily went through . . . evaluate the fairness of the
trial and whether things change at that particular time.
So, for those reasons, I am finding that the defendant
is competent at this time to go forward with the trial.’’
Thereafter, the case proceeded to trial before the
trial court, Alander, J. Importantly, the defendant did
not request any additional hearing or for Judge Alander
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State v. Ziolkowski
to make any determinations as to the fairness of the
trial. In fact, the defense never revisited the issue of
competence during or after the trial.
Although the defendant concedes that, after the trial
court, Clifford, J., issued its preliminary ruling, she did
not again raise the issue of her competence before the
trial court at any time, she asserts that her original
motion for a competency hearing was sufficient to preserve her claim. We disagree. As the foregoing discussion demonstrates, our general case law and the trial
court’s specific ruling after the competency hearing in
this case demonstrate that due process requires both
a preliminary pretrial hearing and a posttrial hearing
to determine the fairness of the actual trial that occurs.
By failing to request a posttrial hearing to determine
the fairness of the trial, the defendant failed to create
a record that would enable this court to review whether
the defendant was able to assist and participate in her
defense, and, therefore, the record is inadequate to
review her claim that her lack of memory surrounding
the incidents in question deprived her of her constitutional right to a fair trial.
The same considerations lead us to conclude that the
defendant cannot obtain relief under Golding. We have
explained that ‘‘a defendant can prevail on a claim of
constitutional error not preserved at trial only if all
of the following conditions are met: (1) the record is
adequate to review the alleged claim of error; (2) the
claim is of constitutional magnitude alleging the violation of a fundamental right; (3) the alleged constitutional violation . . . exists and . . . deprived the
defendant of a fair trial; and (4) if subject to harmless
error analysis, the state has failed to demonstrate harmlessness of the alleged constitutional violation beyond
a reasonable doubt.’’ (Emphasis in original; footnote
omitted.) State v. Golding, supra, 213 Conn. 239–40; see
In re Yasiel R., supra, 317 Conn. 781 (modifying third
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State v. Ziolkowski
prong of Golding). ‘‘The first two [prongs of Golding]
involve a determination of whether the claim is reviewable; the second two . . . involve a determination of
whether the defendant may prevail.’’ (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) State v. Gray, 342 Conn. 657, 668,
271
A.3d 101 (2022).
The state asserts that the defendant’s claim fails
under the first prong of Golding because the judge who
presided over the trial never made the requisite posttrial
determination regarding ‘‘whether the defendant had
been able to perform the functions essential to the
fairness and accuracy of the particular proceedings in
which [s]he [was] presently involved as measured by
[the] six factors’’ identified in Wilson v. United States,
supra, 391 F.2d 463–64. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v.
Gilbert, supra,229 Conn. 233. We agree
with the state. As we discussed, both Gilbert and Wilson
are premised on the understanding that memory loss
itself is not enough to demonstrate a lack of fairness
at trial and that the fair trial determination can be made
only after the trial court engages in a fact intensive
inquiry into the Wilson factors on the basis of its own
observations at trial. See id., 233, 236–37. In this case,
the defendant did not request that the trial court conduct any such inquiry, despite being told before trial
that the ultimate fair trial determination must be made
by ‘‘a future judge who hears all of the evidence . . . .’’
Consequently, the trial court made no determination
as to whether the defendant’s amnesia impacted the
fairness of the trial.
Without such a hearing or any determination by the
trial court related to the fairness of the trial, we conclude that the record is inadequate for review, and,
therefore, the defendant’s claim fails under the first
prong of Golding.
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State v. Ziolkowski
II
The defendant also claims that the trial court abused
its discretion in admitting evidence regarding three
posts on a Twitter account, which the state attributed
to the defendant. The defendant asserts that the trial
court should not have allowed these Twitter posts to be
admitted into evidence because they were not properly
authenticated. We conclude that the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in admitting the three Twitter posts
after concluding that they were properly authenticated.
At trial, the state offered the testimony of the defendant’s aunt, who stated that she communicated with
the defendant on a regular, almost daily basis regarding
their lives. The aunt further testified that she followed
the defendant’s posts on Facebook and that she routinely communicated with the defendant through private messaging on Facebook. The aunt also explained
that the defendant maintained a Twitter account under
the handle ‘‘@IamnotEliza’’ and that the aunt frequently
communicated with the defendant through private messages, or direct messages, on Twitter. The aunt explained
that she knew that the defendant operated this Twitter
account because the defendant had told her so. The
aunt further testified that the substance of their private
messages through the Twitter account was consistent
with their telephone conversations and text messages.
The aunt further testified that the defendant sometimes
posted photographs of herself on that same Twitter
account.
During her testimony, the aunt mentioned three particular posts on the defendant’s Twitter account that
were posted during the week prior to E’s death. Defense
counsel objected and requested a hearing outside the
presence of the jury. The trial court excused the jury,
and the prosecutor conducted a voir dire of the aunt
in order to authenticate the three posts she had seen
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State v. Ziolkowski
on the defendant’s Twitter account. The aunt explained
that she had accessed the account from her cell phone
shortly after E’s death and that it was the same account
through which she had communicated with the defendant in the past. With respect to the three Twitter posts,
she identified each of them as posts that were made
by the defendant. The aunt also testified that she had
communicated with the defendant through this account
over a period of a couple of years and that, during
that time, she had never known anyone other than the
defendant to use the account or to post anything on it.
The aunt further testified that, after seeing the three
posts, she brought her cell phone to the police department and showed the police the posts.
Thereafter, defense counsel also questioned the aunt
about the Twitter account. They engaged in the following colloquy:
‘‘Q. . . . [D]o you have to sign into Twitter with . . .
a username or password?
‘‘A. Yes.
‘‘Q. Okay. And that’s how you signed into your
own account?
‘‘A. Correct.
‘‘Q. Okay. But the posts that you’re—you were just
shown, those were public, meaning anybody could see
them, correct, who—
‘‘A. Yes.
‘‘Q. —signed into their account?’’
The trial court then heard argument from both the
prosecutor and defense counsel regarding the authenticity of those Twitter posts. The trial court ultimately
concluded: ‘‘I’ve read State v. Smith, [100 Conn. App.
313,
917 A.2d 1017, cert. denied,
282 Conn. 920, 925
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State v. Ziolkowski
A.2d 1102 (2007)]. I’ve also read, which I think is apropos, State v. Manuel T., [337 Conn. 429,
254 A.3d 278
(2020)], and authentication is . . . a low burden. The
state just simply needs to show prima facie evidence
that the defendant was the author of these messages.
I think [that the state did] that because the defendant
has admitted [to her aunt] that this is her account, [and
the aunt] communicated with [the defendant] through
this account over a number of years. [The defendant’s
aunt has] also seen personal details and . . . photos
on this account that are unique to [the defendant]. So,
I think the state has met its . . . burden.’’
After the trial court overruled defense counsel’s
objection, the prosecutor introduced into evidence
screenshots of the three posts from the Twitter account
underthehandle‘‘@IamnotEliza.’’Defensecounselobjected
again, and the trial court overruled the objection. The
first post was dated November 10, 2016, and read: ‘‘Fire
extinguisher #takethatasyouwill.’’ The second post was
dated November 11, 2016, and stated: ‘‘Empty promises
#takethatasyouwill.’’ The third post was dated November 12, 2016, and read: ‘‘Why did I have a child,’’ followed
by sad face emojis.
The following legal principles guide our analysis of
the defendant’s claim. The Connecticut Code of Evidence provides that ‘‘[t]he requirement of authentication as a condition precedent to admissibility is satisfied
by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the
offered evidence is what its proponent claims it to be.’’
Conn. Code Evid. § 9-1 (a). ‘‘[A] writing may be authenticated by a number of methods, including direct testimony or circumstantial evidence.’’ (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) State v. Manuel T., supra,337 Conn.
453.
‘‘It is widely recognized that a prima facie showing
of authenticity is a low burden.’’ Id., 454. As the com-
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State v. Ziolkowski
mentary to the Code of Evidence explains: ‘‘Before an
item of evidence may be admitted, there must be a
preliminary showing of its genuineness, i.e., that the
proffered item of evidence is what its proponent claims
it to be. The requirement of authentication applies to all
types of evidence, including . . . electronically stored
information . . . . The category of evidence known as
electronically stored information can take various forms.
It includes, by way of example only, email, Internet
website postings, text messages and ‘chat room’ content, computer-stored records, data, metadata and computer generated or enhanced animations and simulations.
As with any other form of evidence, a party may use
any appropriate method, or combination of methods,
described in this commentary, or any other proof to
demonstrate that the proffer is what its proponent
claims it to be, to authenticate any particular item of
electronically stored information. . . . The proponent
need only advance ‘evidence sufficient to support a
finding’ that the proffered evidence is what it is claimed
to be. Once this prima facie showing is made, the evidence may be admitted, and the ultimate determination
of authenticity rests with the fact finder.’’ (Citations
omitted.) Conn. Code Evid. § 9-1 (a), commentary.
We have observed in the past that the concern about
the admissibility of certain electronic communications,
such as emails, ‘‘is that [they] are inherently unreliable
because of their relative anonymity and the fact that
[although] an electronic message can be traced to a
particular computer, it can rarely be connected to a
specific author with any certainty. Unless the purported
author is actually witnessed sending the [email], there
is always the possibility it is not from whom it claims.
. . . [A]nybody with the right password can gain access
to another’s [email] account and send a message ostensibly from that person.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Manuel T., supra,337 Conn. 460. Our
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State v. Ziolkowski
response to that concern, however, was that ‘‘the same
uncertainties exist with traditional written documents.
A signature can be forged; a letter can be typed on
another’s typewriter; distinct letterhead [stationery]
can be copied or stolen. . . . We see no justification
for constructing unique rules of admissibility [for] electronic communications such as instant messages; they
are to be evaluated on a case-by-case basis as any other
document to determine whether . . . there has been
an adequate foundational showing of their relevance
and authenticity. . . . [Q]uestions about the integrity
of electronic data generally go to the weight of electronically based evidence, not its admissibility.’’ (Citations
omitted; emphasis omitted; footnote omitted; internal
quotation marks omitted.) Id., 460–61.
In the present case, the defendant asserts that the
authentication was not sufficient because the state did
not present evidence of any distinctive features of the
Twitter posts or account. We disagree. It is well established that an appropriate method of authentication is
for a witness with personal knowledge to testify that
the offered evidence is what its proponent claims it to
be. See, e.g., State v. Swinton, 268 Conn. 781, 802,
847
A.2d 921 (2004) (standard for introducing photographic
evidence is to do so ‘‘through a witness competent to
verify it as a fair and accurate representation of what
it depicts’’); see also, e.g., Conn. Code Evid. § 9-1 (a),
commentary. That is precisely what occurred here.
The aunt testified that she and the defendant were
close and regularly communicated. She testified that
she spoke with the defendant via phone and frequently
communicated via email and private messaging on
Facebook and Twitter. She also testified that she followed the defendant’s Facebook page and her Twitter
account. The aunt testified that the defendant had told
her that she had a Twitter account under the handle
‘‘@IamnotEliza’’ and that the handle was related to one
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of the defendant’s favorite characters in a musical—
Eliza Doolittle. The aunt further testified that she
believed that the posts on the account were from the
defendant because the subjects about which she communicated with the defendant via the Twitter account
were similar to the ones about which they spoke over
the phone and texted about. We agree with the trial
court that this testimony was sufficient to meet the low
bar for authentication.
The defendant asserts that the authentication in the
present case was not sufficient because the aunt was
not able to testify that she received the messages or
to establish that the defendant was the author of the
messages. We disagree.
Although we recognize that the potential for manipulation exists in the context of electronically stored information, including social media posts like the ones at
issue in the present case, the fact that such information
can potentially be modified, forged or fabricated does
not necessarily lead to the conclusion that it is inadmissible unless any possibility of corruption has been definitively ruled out. Again, technological developments
have made virtually any form of evidence subject to
potential manipulation: signed or unsigned documents,
visual and aural recordings, telephone calls and photographs are common examples. The threshold standard
for authenticating this evidence, however, continues to
be a modest one.5 See, e.g., State v. Valentine, 255 Conn.
61, 77–78,
762 A.2d 1278 (2000). As we previously
explained in Manuel T., once a prima facie foundation
is laid, whatever doubts might exist with respect to the
5
We are mindful that, as the world continuously confronts constantly
evolving and more sophisticated technology, such as artificial intelligence,
the rules of evidence may need to adapt. Under the facts and circumstances
of the present case, however, we conclude that our rules of evidence provide
the appropriate framework for the authentication of the Twitter posts and
that the low threshold for authentication was met.
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reliability of the source of the messages typically go to
the weight, not the admissibility, of the messages. See,
e.g., State v. Manuel T., supra,337 Conn. 461. Defense
counsel was free to argue to the jury that it should
not conclude that the state had established that the
defendant was the author of the Twitter posts on the
basis of the evidence provided. But we cannot conclude
that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting
the Twitter posts into evidence based on the showing
made here.
III
We next address the defendant’s claim that the evidence was insufficient to sustain her conviction of murder in violation of § 53a-54a (a) and her conviction of
arson in the second degree in violation of § 53a-112 (a)
(1) (B).
The following well established principles govern our
review. ‘‘In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence
to support a criminal conviction we apply a [two part]
test. First, we construe the evidence in the light most
favorable to sustaining the verdict. Second, we determine whether [on] the facts so construed and the inferences reasonably drawn therefrom the [finder of fact]
reasonably could have concluded that the cumulative
force of the evidence established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State
v. Daren Y., 350 Conn. 393, 399,
324 A.3d 734 (2024).
A
We first address the defendant’s claim that there was
insufficient evidence to support her conviction of murder. Specifically, the defendant contends that the state
did not establish her identity as the person who killed
E or that she intended to kill him. The state asserts that
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there was sufficient evidence to support the defendant’s
conviction of murder.6 We agree with the state.
Section 53a-54a (a) provides in relevant part: ‘‘A person is guilty of murder when, with intent to cause the
death of another person, he causes the death of such
person . . . .’’ In the present case, the evidence at trial
was sufficient for the jury to find, beyond a reasonable
doubt, both that it was the defendant who caused E’s
death and that she intended to do so.
First, we address the sufficiency of the evidence to
establish that it was the defendant who caused the death
of E. The evidence showed that, when the firefighters
arrived at the defendant’s home, all of the entrances
were locked and deadbolted. After having to use force
to gain entry, they discovered that the defendant and
E were the only individuals in the home. Furthermore,
John Cerejo, a detective with the Meriden Police Department, testified that the defendant’s estranged husband,
who was the only other resident, was not at home and
was with his girlfriend, ‘‘quite a ways’’ away, at the time
of E’s death. See, e.g., State v. Patrick M., 344 Conn.
565, 574–75,
280 A.3d 461 (2022) (reasoning that evidence was sufficient to support defendant’s conviction
6
The state points out that the defendant’s position on appeal is contrary
to her position before the trial court. Specifically, the state asserts that, in
her motion for a judgment of acquittal, the defendant claimed that the
state had failed to introduce evidence of (1) motive, (2) the mechanism of
asphyxiation, and (3) any history of the defendant’s physical abuse of E.
The state also asserts that, at trial, defense counsel did not dispute that the
defendant had killed E but argued instead that E’s death was accidental.
‘‘To the extent that the defendant’s sufficiency claims were unpreserved,
we observe that any defendant found guilty on the basis of insufficient
evidence has been deprived of a constitutional right, and would therefore
necessarily meet the four prongs of [State v. Golding, supra, 213 Conn.
239–40]. There being no practical significance, therefore, for engaging in a
Golding analysis of an insufficiency of the evidence claim, we will review
the defendant’s challenge to his conviction . . . as we do any properly
preserved claim.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Lewis, 303
Conn. 760, 767 n.4,
36 A.3d 670 (2012).
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because he had opportunity and means to commit
crimes with which he was charged). Additionally, although
the defense’s theory changed course in this appeal,
defense counsel argued to the jury that the defendant
did cause the death of E but that it was an accident.
Defense counsel claimed that the defendant rolled over
onto E and accidentally killed him. Nevertheless, the
evidence that the defendant was the sole person, other
than E, in the locked house at the time of the fires
and E’s death was sufficient to establish a reasonable
inference that she was responsible for causing E’s death.
Second, the evidence also established that the defendant had the intent to cause E’s death. At trial, Vincent
testified that E’s death was not the result of natural
causes or an accident but, instead, was caused by homicidal asphyxiation. Vincent predicated his conclusion
on several pieces of evidence. To begin, he testified
that E had a substantial amount of diphenhydramine in
his system—at least two times the amount that Vincent
would expect to see in an adult who has taken the
recommended dose. Vincent testified that the amount
of diphenhydramine would have made E easy to subdue.
Vincent concluded that diphenhydramine intoxication
was a contributing cause of death. He also relied on
the fact that E was sedated—which Vincent did not
believe E did to himself—to conclude that E’s death
was not accidental.
Vincent testified that he ruled out the possibility that
the fires caused E’s death. He pointed out that there
was no carbon monoxide in E’s blood and no soot in
his lungs, and, thus, that there was no evidence that E
had inhaled smoke. He concluded, therefore, that E
‘‘died from an asphyxial mechanism caused by somebody else . . . .’’ ‘‘Asphyxiation,’’ Vincent testified, is
a ‘‘broad term’’ that means ‘‘without oxygen’’ and is
caused by external or internal blockage of the airways
or from neck compression. There were signs, Vincent
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testified, of strangulation. Specifically, Vincent pointed
out that the presence of numerous petechial hemorrhages7 on E’s face and around his eyes was consistent
with strangulation. Vincent also explained that E had
‘‘blanching’’8 around his nose and mouth, which could
have resulted from the nose and mouth being blocked.
In addition, he identified ‘‘a distinct pale line’’ on E’s
neck, which was consistent with a ligature having been
tied around E’s neck to strangle him. Vincent could not,
however, rule out the possibility that the pale line was
merely the result of lividity.9
The state also presented evidence that the defendant
had a motive to kill E. ‘‘Although motive is not an element of the crime of murder that the state must prove
beyond a reasonable doubt, we have nonetheless held
that an intent to kill may be inferred from evidence that
the defendant had [a] motive to kill.’’ (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) State v. Otto, 305 Conn. 51, 73–74,
43
A.3d 629 (2012). At trial, the evidence established that
the defendant’s situation with her husband had escalated to a point that she found intolerable and that
caused her emotional distress. The evidence showed
that the defendant’s husband was having an extramarital affair and that the defendant had moved out of the
family home with E but had returned when she did not
have sufficient money to keep a separate apartment.
Additionally, the evidence at trial established that the
defendant’s husband was not providing sufficient finan-
7
‘‘Petechiae’’ are ‘‘[m]inute hemorrhagic spots, of pinpoint to pinhead
size, in the skin, which are not blanched by pressure.’’ Stedman’s Medical
Dictionary (28th Ed. 2006) p. 1468.
8
Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary defines ‘‘blanch’’ as ‘‘to take
the color out of’’ or ‘‘to make ashen or pale’’; Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate
Dictionary (11th Ed. 2003) p. 130; which, according to Vincent, refers to the
lack of lividity.
9
‘‘Livor’’ is ‘‘[t]he livid discoloration of the skin on the dependent parts
of a corpse. [L. a black and blue spot].’’ Stedman’s Medical Dictionary (28th
Ed. 2006) p. 1112.
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cial support for her and E and that he was not helping
to pay for the phone bill, rent or food. The evidence
also established that the defendant wanted to move out
of state with E but that her husband would not let her.
The evidence showed that all of these issues caused
the defendant to be very angry with her husband. The
state also presented evidence at trial that, in the days
before E’s death, the defendant posted a variety of
alarming comments to Twitter, such as ‘‘[w]hy did I
have a child,’’ ‘‘[e]mpty promises #takethatasyouwill,’’
and ‘‘[f]ire extinguisher #takethatasyouwill.’’
The state also presented evidence of the defendant’s
conduct after the fires that the jury could have relied
on in support of its finding that the defendant had
intended to cause E’s death. The social worker who
met with the defendant when she arrived at the hospital
testified that the defendant had never asked about what
happened to E or how he died. The jury properly could
have credited that testimony as evidence tending to
show the defendant’s intent to kill E. See, e.g., State v.
Mejia, 233 Conn. 215, 225,
658 A.2d 571 (1995) (jury
was free to infer intent to kill from defendant’s failure
to show concern for coworker’s welfare after shooting
him). In addition, the aunt testified that, when she visited the defendant before E’s funeral, the defendant
never cried or became upset, even when discussing
how she likely could not attend his services. On the
basis of the defendant’s lack of an emotional response
to E’s death, the jury could have reasonably inferred
that she had intended to and did cause E’s death. See,
e.g., State v. Otto, supra,305 Conn. 66 (‘‘[b]ecause direct
evidence of the accused’s state of mind is rarely available . . . intent is often inferred from conduct . . .
and from the cumulative effect of the circumstantial
evidence and the rational inferences drawn therefrom’’
(internal quotation marks omitted)). Viewing the foregoing evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining
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the verdict, we conclude that the jury reasonably could
have found that the cumulative force of the evidence
established the defendant’s guilt of murder beyond a
reasonable doubt.
B
We next address the defendant’s claim that the evidence was not sufficient to support her conviction of
arson in the second degree. Specifically, the defendant
alleges that, because the evidence was not sufficient to
support her conviction for murder, and because the
state charged her with setting the fires to conceal the
murder, the evidence was also insufficient to find her
guilty of arson in the second degree. She also asserts
that the evidence did not establish that she set the fires.
The defendant further claims that, even if the evidence
showed that she set the fires, it did not demonstrate
that she set the fires to cover up E’s murder. Instead,
the defendant argues that the evidence demonstrates
that she started the fires in an attempt to commit suicide. We find no merit in these arguments.
Section 53a-112 (a) provides in relevant part: ‘‘A person is guilty of arson in the second degree when, with
intent to destroy or damage a building, as defined in
section 53a-100, (1) he starts a fire . . . and . . . (B)
such fire . . . was intended to conceal some other
criminal act . . . .’’ In this case, the evidence established each of these elements beyond a reasonable
doubt.
Much of the same evidence that defeats the defendant’s sufficiency claim as it relates to her murder conviction; see part III A of this opinion; also compels us
to reject her challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence
to support her second degree arson conviction. The
state introduced sufficient evidence to support the
jury’s finding that the defendant had set the fires to
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conceal the murder of E.10 We have already determined
that the evidence at trial was sufficient for the jury to
find that the defendant intentionally caused E’s death.
The jury also reasonably could have concluded, on the
basis of the evidence before it, that E died before the
defendant set the fires. Vincent testified that E had no
carbon monoxide in his blood and no soot in his lungs,
which indicates that E did not inhale any smoke prior
to his death. Moreover, during defense counsel’s closing
argument, counsel argued that the defendant had set
the fires. In fact, the defense’s theory at trial was that
the defendant set the fires but did so to commit suicide.
Even separate and apart from the evidence connecting the arson to the murder, the evidence at trial was
sufficient to demonstrate that the defendant had started
the fires. At trial, Steven Trella, Meriden’s fire marshal,
testified that the two fires in the defendant’s home were
independently and deliberately set using an accelerant.
As we discussed in part III A of this opinion, the evidence established that, when the firefighters arrived on
the scene, the defendant and E were the only individuals
in the home, and the doors were locked and deadbolted.
10
The defendant asserts that, even if the evidence shows that she set the
fires, her sole intent was to commit suicide when she started the fires rather
than to conceal E’s murder. We are unpersuaded because, when evaluating
sufficiency claims, ‘‘we do not ask whether there is a reasonable view of
the evidence that would support a reasonable hypothesis of innocence. We
ask, instead, whether there is a reasonable view of the evidence that supports
the [jury’s] verdict of guilty.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v.
Rhodes, 335 Conn. 226, 229,
249 A.3d 683 (2020); see, e.g., State v. Ramey,
127 Conn. App. 560, 567–68,
14 A.3d 474 (rejecting defendant’s theory that,
because suicide was his primary goal, he lacked specific intent to damage
or destroy building), cert. denied, 301 Conn. 910,
19 A.3d 177 (2011). The
jury did not have to disbelieve that the defendant had intended to commit
suicide to reasonably conclude that her intent in setting the fires included
an intent to cover up the murder of her son, E. Even if the jury believed
that she had intended to die in the fire and that her survival was not her
intent, it could still believe that, by setting the fire, she intended to cover
up evidence that she murdered E, so that it would appear that he, too, died
as a result of the fire.
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The evidence also established that the defendant had
fire accelerant on her clothing and a burn on one of
her hands. See, e.g., State v. Stephenson, 207 Conn. App.
154, 181,
263 A.3d 101 (2021) (reasoning that intent to
commit arson in second degree can be inferred when
flammable liquid is present), cert. denied, 342 Conn.
912,
272 A.3d 198 (2022). The burn on one of the defendant’s hands is significant because the evidence demonstrated that the fires never made it to E’s bedroom,
where the firefighters found E dead and the defendant
unconscious. The jury reasonably could have inferred
that the burn was related to the defendant’s having
started the fires before she went to lie down next to E.
The state also produced evidence that, approximately
four days before the fires, the defendant posted on
Twitter: ‘‘Fire extinguisher #takethatasyouwill.’’ A reasonable jury could infer that the defendant’s post only
four days before the fires is further evidence that she
intended to start the fires.
The state also produced sufficient evidence at trial
to support the jury’s finding that the defendant had
intended to damage or destroy the home. Cerejo testified that the smoke and carbon monoxide detectors in
the home were disconnected and that the batteries were
removed prior to the fires. The state also produced
evidence that the ductwork below E’s bedroom, near
where one of the fires was set, was removed. A reasonable jury could infer that the ductwork was removed
to allow the fire to move more easily throughout the
home. Given that a jury may infer that a defendant
intends the natural consequences of her actions, the
jury reasonably could have inferred that the defendant
set the fires and did so with the intent to damage the
home. See, e.g., State v. Gary, 273 Conn. 393, 407,
869
A.2d 1236 (2005) (‘‘it is a permissible, albeit not a necessary or mandatory, inference that a defendant intended
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State v. Ziolkowski
the natural consequences of his voluntary conduct’’
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
Additionally, the state presented the testimony of
Allison Gingell, a forensic examiner with the state forensic laboratory, who testified that testing of E’s clothing
revealed the presence of the same accelerant as the
tiki torch fuel in the melted bottle found in the home’s
living room. The jury reasonably could infer that the
defendant had doused E in accelerant in hopes of making it appear like he died in the fire, thereby concealing
that she asphyxiated him. In fact, according to the testimony at trial, the only reason why the fire did not reach
E’s room was because the home was sealed shut, thus
depriving the fire of oxygen.
Finally, given that the defendant set one of the fires
directly below E’s bedroom and removed the ductwork
from the basement to his room, a reasonable jury could
infer that the defendant had intended for the fire to
travel up to E’s room, where he was found lying on the
bed, already subdued with a large dose of diphenhydramine and asphyxiated, with accelerant on his clothes.
Although a firefighter testified that the fire was oxygen
deprived and, therefore, the flames did not travel far,
a reasonable jury could infer that the defendant had
intended the flames to reach E but simply miscalculated
the effect that the lack of oxygen would have on blunting the spread of the fire.
Viewing the evidence introduced at trial in the light
most favorable to sustaining the verdict, we conclude
that the jury reasonably could have found that the evidence established the defendant’s guilt of arson in the
second degree beyond a reasonable doubt.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other justices concurred.
