Volume 351 — Connecticut Reports

The plaintiff appealed, on the granting of certification, from the judgment of the Appellate Court, which had affirmed the trial court's judgment dissolv- ing his marriage to the defendant, who was a partner at a large law firm. The plaintiff claimed, inter alia, that the Appellate Court had incorrectly concluded that the defendant's interest in a potential stream of retirement payments, which was to be paid pursuant to the relevant provisions of the firm's partnership agreement, was too speculative to constitute marital property subject to equitable distribution under the statute (§ 46b-81) govern- ing, inter alia, the assignment of property in marital dissolution cases. Held: A trial court's determination of whether an asset or interest constitutes marital property for purposes of § 46b-81 presents a mixed question of law and fact subject to de novo review, the trial court's underlying factual findings are reviewed for clear error, and the question of how such determi- nations as to any particular asset fit into the mosaic of the trial court's financial orders is reviewed for abuse of discretion. The Appellate Court correctly determined that the defendant's interest in the retirement payments did not constitute property subject to equitable distribution for purposes of § 46b-81. The defendant did not have an enforceable right to receive the retirement payments insofar as the defendant's firm had a contractual right under the partnership agreement to unilaterally reduce or eliminate them at any time, even after the defendant started receiving them, and, accordingly, the defen- dant's receipt of the retirement payments was too speculative. Moreover, changes in the law firm's demographics and compensation struc- ture supported this court's conclusion that the firm's exercise of its authority to modify or terminate the retirement payments was more than a theoretical possibility, and equitable considerations weighed in favor of a conclusion that those payments should be treated as a source of potential income for alimony rather than a nonmodifiable property distribution. This case originally was argued before a panel of this court consisting of Chief Justice Robinson and Justices McDonald, D'Auria, Mullins, Ecker, Alexander and Dannehy. Thereafter, Chief Justice Robinson retired from this court and did not participate in the consideration of the case. The listing of justices reflects their seniority status on this court as of the date of oral argument. 351 Conn. 1 JANUARY, 2025 3 D. S. v. D. S. The Appellate Court correctly concluded that the trial court had not abused its discretion in awarding the plaintiff alimony that was contingent on the defendant's remaining an active partner at her law firm or on her being a retired partner receiving retirement payments from the firm. The trial court weighed all of the factors enumerated in the alimony statute (§ 46b-82 (a)), as well as the equitable factors and the circumstances relevant to the dissolution of the parties' marriage, and crafted an alimony order with the intent of ensuring that the plaintiff would be financially supported for a limited time period and of incentivizing the plaintiff to initiate a good faith job search and to acquire employment commensurate with his earn- ing capacity. (One justice dissenting) Argued February 7, 2024—officially released January 7, 2025

Convicted of two counts of murder and one count of assault in the first degree, among other crimes, in connection with the shooting of multiple victims, the defendant appealed to this court. The defendant claimed that the evidence was insufficient to defeat his claims of self-defense and defense of others with respect to the murder of one of the murder victims, W, and that the trial court improperly denied his request to admit evidence that another victim, T, previously had been convicted in New Jersey of the crime of arson to demonstrate T's violent character. Held: The evidence was sufficient to defeat the defendant's claims of self-defense and defense of others with respect to the murder of W. The defendant did not contest the sufficiency of the evidence to defeat his justification defenses with respect to his shooting of certain other victims, the evidence plainly demonstrated that those shootings, as well as the shoot- ing of W, were part of a single, continuous episode occurring at the same location and time, and the jury reasonably could have credited testimony that W was acting defensively, rather than offensively toward the defendant, in an unsuccessful effort to protect one of the other victims from the defen- dant's violent assault. Any error in the trial court's exclusion of evidence of T's New Jersey arson conviction was harmless, as that evidence would not have substantially swayed the jury's verdict. There was no evidence that T was armed or the aggressor in the shootings, although the facts underlying T's arson conviction were not reflected in the record, the fact that T intentionally had set fire to a building or structure at some point in time for some unknown purpose did not make it more likely that he would use a firearm with the intent to kill or to inflict serious bodily injury, and there was abundant evidence to support a finding that, even if T had been the aggressor during the confrontation, the defendant had a duty to retreat. Argued November 4, 2024—officially released January 14, 2025

The plaintiffs appealed from the judgment of the trial court for the defendant, a reproductive endocrinologist who, in connection with certain in vitro fertilization procedures he performed, allegedly used his own sperm to impregnate the plaintiffs' mothers without consent. The plaintiffs claimed that, in striking their amended complaint, the trial court had incorrectly determined that their negligence claims sounded in wrongful life, which the defendant argued was not a legally cognizable cause of action in Connecticut, rather than ordinary negligence. Held: The trial court incorrectly determined that the plaintiffs' negligence claims sounded in wrongful life rather than ordinary negligence. The plaintiffs' negligence claims bore none of the hallmarks of wrongful life claims and, instead, could be properly adjudicated as ordinary negligence claims, as the plaintiffs alleged that the defendant, through his deception, was directly responsible for the mental anguish, physical injury and compromised familial relations they have suffered, and they were not seeking to be made whole by being restored to a state of nonbeing but, rather, to be compensated for injuries and losses that they claimed could have been prevented or substantially mitigated if the defendant had acted with due care. Accordingly, this court reversed the trial court's judgment with respect to the plaintiffs' negligence claims and remanded the case with direction to deny the defendant's motion to strike as to those claims and for further pro- ceedings. Argued October 30, 2024—officially released January 14, 2025

Pursuant to statute ((Rev. to 2019) § 53a-193 (13)), ''child pornography'' means ''any visual depiction . . . of sexually explicit conduct, where the production of such visual depiction involves the use of a person under sixteen years of age engaging in sexually explicit conduct . . . .'' Pursuant further to statute ((Rev. to 2019) § 53a-193 (14)), ''sexually explicit conduct'' means ''actual or simulated (A) sexual intercourse . . . (B) besti- ality, (C) masturbation, (D) sadistic or masochistic abuse, or (E) lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic area of any person.'' The defendant appealed from his conviction of possession of child pornogra- phy in the first degree. The defendant claimed, inter alia, that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction because the state was required to prove under the applicable statute ((Rev. to 2019) § 53a-196d (a) (1)) that he had possessed fifty or more images of child pornography and thirteen of the fifty-seven images in evidence depicted child nudity that constituted protected expression under the first amendment to the United States consti- tution rather than sexually explicit conduct, as defined by § 53a-193 (14). The defendant also claimed, inter alia, that the trial court had improperly instructed the jury that it could consider the six factors articulated in United States v. Dost (636 F. Supp. 828) in determining whether the images in evidence depicted a lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic area for purposes of § 53a-193 (14) (E). Held: The evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's conviction of pos- sessing fifty or more visual depictions of child pornography, this court having determined that at least eleven of the thirteen challenged images depicted a lascivious exhibition of a child's or children's genitals or pubic areas and, thus, constituted child pornography under § 53a-193 (13) and (14), and, accordingly, the state met its burden of proving that the defendant had possessed a total of fifty-five images of child pornography. This court determined that the first five Dost factors—whether the focal point of the visual depiction is on the child's genitalia or pubic area; whether the setting of the visual depiction is sexually suggestive; whether the child is depicted in an unnatural pose or in inappropriate attire, considering the age of the child; whether the child is fully or partially clothed, or nude; and The listing of judges reflects their seniority status on this court as of the date of oral argument. whether the visual depiction suggests sexual coyness or a willingness to engage in sexual activity—are helpful in assessing whether a depiction is a lascivious exhibition, but they should not be used to define the term ''lascivious exhibition'' and are simply nonexhaustive considerations that may help in assessing whether a depiction is a lascivious exhibition. This court also determined that the sixth Dost factor, whether the visual depiction is intended or designed to elicit a sexual response in the viewer, should not be considered for the purpose of determining whether an image constitutes child pornography under this state's child pornography statutes, as Connecticut law does not make possession of child pornography turn on the subjective reaction of a particular viewer. The trial court's instruction to the jury that it could consider the Dost factors, including the sixth factor, in determining whether an image depicted a lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic area was not improper, this court having determined that it was not reasonably probable that this instruc- tion misled the jury when the court did not expressly instruct the jury to focus on the subjective response of the viewer and instructed the jury that it was not obligated to consider any of the Dost factors. The trial court did not err in declining the defense's request for a specific unanimity instruction directing the jurors that they had to be unanimous as to which fifty images constituted child pornography and into which of the five categories of sexually explicit conduct set forth in § 53a-193 (14) each of those images fell. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting into evidence certain exhibits that showed the file names of two images that had been deleted from the defendant's cell phone and that were associated with the defen- dant's email address, as those exhibits were probative of the issue of whether the defendant had knowledge that he possessed child pornography on his phone, the defendant failed to demonstrate unfair prejudicial impact to counter the substantial probative value of the exhibits, and the trial court took measures to mitigate any potential undue prejudice. Argued September 18, 2024—officially released January 21, 2025

The plaintiff appealed from the judgment of the trial court, which had dismissed his defamation action against the defendant, and from the court's decision to award the defendant attorney's fees and costs pursuant to the anti-SLAPP statute (§ 52-196a). The plaintiff claimed, inter alia, that the trial court incorrectly concluded that he had failed to meet his burden under § 52-196a (e) (3) of showing that there was probable cause that he would prevail on the merits of his defamation per se claim, which was based on the defendant's statement on a social media page characterizing the plaintiff as a white supremacist. Held: The trial court properly granted the defendant's special motion to dismiss the plaintiff's defamation action under § 52-196a. The plaintiff expressly waived any challenge to the trial court's determination that the defendant had met her initial burden under § 52-196a (e) (3) of establishing, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the plaintiff's com- plaint implicated the defendant's exercise of her constitutional right of free speech on a matter of public concern. The trial court correctly determined that the plaintiff had failed to satisfy his burden of demonstrating that there was probable cause that he would prevail on the merits of his defamation claim, this court having concluded that the characterization of someone as a white supremacist, without more, is a nonactionable opinion rather than actionable defamation per se. Characterizing a person as a white supremacist, without more, is not a fact that can be objectively verified, the use of that term, without more, does not necessarily imply that the declarant knew existing, undisclosed defamatory facts, and, in the present case, given the context in which the defendant called the plaintiff a white supremacist, a reasonable reader of the comment would not have expected that the defendant was stating a fact about the plaintiff or that the defendant had private, firsthand knowledge supporting her characterization of the plaintiff. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding the defendant attor- ney's fees and costs under § 52-196a (f) (1). Argued September 25, 2024—officially released January 21, 2025

Convicted of the murder of her minor son, E, and of arson in the second degree, the defendant appealed to this court. The defendant claimed, inter alia, that the trial court had improperly admitted into evidence certain posts from her purported social media account and that the evidence was insufficient to find her guilty of the offenses of which she had been con- victed. Held: The defendant's claim on appeal that her inability to remember the twenty- four to thirty-six hour period surrounding the murder and arson deprived her of her constitutional right to a fair trial failed under the first prong of State v. Golding (213 Conn. 233) insofar as the defendant had not asked the trial court to make the requisite posttrial determination regarding the fairness of the trial, and, consequently, the record was inadequate for this court's review of this unpreserved claim. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting into evidence certain posts from the defendant's purported social media account, that court having correctly concluded that the posts were properly authenticated. The testimony at trial was sufficient to satisfy the low bar for a prima facie showing of authenticity, and, although this court recognized the potential for manipulation in the context of electronically stored information, the threshold for authentication continues to be a modest one, and any doubts that existed with respect to the reliability or authorship of the posts went to the weight of the evidence rather than its admissibility. The evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's conviction of murder, as the jury reasonably could have found from the cumulative force of the evidence presented at trial that it was the defendant who caused E's death and that she had the intent to do so. The evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's conviction of arson in the second degree, as the jury reasonably could have found that the defendant started the fires that formed the basis of her arson conviction and that she did so with the intent to damage or destroy the family home and to conceal the murder of E. Argued November 7, 2024—officially released January 28, 2025

The defendant town appealed to this court, upon certification by the Chief Justice pursuant to statute (§ 52-265a) that a matter of substantial public interest was involved, from certain decisions issued by the trial court in the course of adjudicating the plaintiff property owners' tax appeals. The trial court had initially granted the defendant's motions to dismiss five of the six underlying tax appeals for the plaintiffs' failure to timely file appraisals of their respective properties with the court, as required by the relevant statute ((Rev. to 2023) § 12-117a (a) (2)). The trial court subsequently granted motions to open the judgments of dismissal and for reargument, and it denied the defendant's corrected motion to dismiss the sixth tax appeal. On appeal from the trial court's decisions granting the motions to open and denying the corrected motion to dismiss, the defendant claimed that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiffs' tax appeals because the plaintiffs had failed to comply with the appraisal filing require- ment set forth in § 12-117a (a) (2). Held: The appeal was not rendered moot by the fact that the plaintiffs in the five dismissed appeals filed new tax appeals in the Superior Court pursuant to a recent amendment (P.A. 24-151, §114) to § 12-117a (a) (2) that allows certain taxpayers whose tax appeals were dismissed under certain circum- stances to commence a new appeal subject to certain conditions. The trial court did not lack subject matter jurisdiction over the underlying tax appeals due to the plaintiffs' failure to timely file their respective apprais- als with the court in accordance with § 12-117a (a) (2). The appraisal filing requirement did not implicate the plaintiffs' statutory standing to pursue their tax appeals, as the plaintiffs were the type of parties to which the statute was directed, and the plaintiffs' failure to timely file their appraisals by the statutory deadline did not otherwise divest the trial court of subject matter jurisdiction over the tax appeals, this court having concluded that the appraisal filing requirement in § 12-117a (a) (2) is not subject matter jurisdictional but, rather, is a mandatory requirement arising after the commencement of a tax appeal, with the time period for filing the appraisal subject to extension by the court for good cause. Argued November 4, 2024—officially released January 28, 2025

The plaintiff law firm sought to recover from the defendant, a former client, for, inter alia, breach of contract in federal court. The United States District Court for the District of Connecticut certified to this court a question of law concerning whether a law firm can recover common-law punitive dam- ages from a former client for his or her wilful and malicious breach of an agreement to compensate the law firm for legal services. Held: This court concluded that, in Connecticut, a law firm may not recover common-law punitive damages for its client's breach of contract unless it pleads and proves the existence of an independent tort for which punitive damages may be recoverable. Connecticut appellate courts have followed the general rule that punitive damages are not ordinarily recoverable for a breach of contract claim, and the Appellate Court has allowed punitive damages in connection with such claims only in the insurance and surety contexts. After consideration of the applicable Restatements of Contracts and Torts, and the case law of other jurisdictions, this court concluded that the majority rule, which permits the recovery of punitive damages for breach of contract only when the conduct causing the breach is also a tort for which punitive damages are recoverable, strikes the appropriate balance among the compet- ing policy interests and is strongly supported by the different purposes for which breach of contract damages and punitive damages are awarded. This court declined to adopt a rule proposed by the plaintiff and the amicus curiae that would have broadly permitted the recovery of common-law punitive damages when the conduct causing the breach of contract was wilful, malicious, or reckless, regardless of whether the conduct constituted an independent tort, the court having concluded that the majority rule that it adopted afforded adequate protection for plaintiffs and offered clear guidance concerning the circumstances under which punitive damages may be recovered. Argued September 19, 2024—officially released February 4, 2025 The listing of justices reflects their seniority status on this court as of the date of oral argument.

Convicted of multiple counts of sexual assault in the first degree and risk of injury to a child in connection with the sexual abuse of the minor victims, D and T, the defendant appealed to this court. He claimed, inter alia, that the trial court had violated his due process right to a fair trial by instructing the jury, in accordance with this court's directive in State v. Daniel W. E. (322 Conn. 593), that it was not to consider the victims' approximately nine year delay in officially reporting the abuse at issue in assessing their credibility. Held: This court overruled that portion of Daniel W. E. that modified the constancy of accusation doctrine, as set forth in State v. Troupe (237 Conn. 284), and returned to the standard previously articulated in Troupe, which provides that a person to whom a sexual assault victim has reported the assault may testify only with respect to the fact and timing of the victim's complaint, that constancy evidence is admissible only to corroborate the victim's testi- mony and not for substantive purposes, and that a defendant is entitled to an instruction that a victim's delay in reporting is a factor that the jury can consider in evaluating the victim's credibility. This court concluded that Troupe, along with other avenues available to negate juror biases, such as expert testimony and the application of the rules of evidence, sufficiently balanced the defendant's interest in being free from the undue prejudice that may result from the presentation of multiple constancy witnesses with the state's interest in overcoming poten- tial jury bias against sexual assault victims who delay in reporting. The defendant was not entitled to a new trial because any error with respect to the trial court's instructing the jury in accordance with Daniel W. E. was harmless, as any such error was not constitutional in nature and it was not reasonably probable that the instruction misled the jury in arriving at its verdict. In accordance with our policy of protecting the privacy interests of the victims of sexual abuse and the crime of risk of injury to a child, we decline to use the defendant's full name or to identify the victims or others through whom the victims' identities may be ascertained. See General Statutes § 54-86e. The listing of justices reflects their seniority status on this court as of the date of oral argument. The jury charge, as a whole, directed the jury to consider the victims' general credibility on the basis of factors other than their delay in reporting and emphasized that it was the state's burden to prove the requisite elements of the charged offenses, it was not reasonably probable that the jury believed that the challenged instruction precluded it from considering the victims' credibility more generally, neither the jury's verdict nor the primary theory of defense turned on the victims' delayed reporting, and the state's case was strong. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in permitting D to testify that the defendant told her that he had played the same sex ''games'' with his daughter that he played with D and T, as D's testimony was probative of the defendant's attempts to groom or pressure her to engage in sexual intercourse with him, and the trial court took measures to mitigate any prejudicial effect of D's testimony. (One justice concurring in part and dissenting in part) Argued September 26, 2024—officially released February 11, 2025

The plaintiffs sought to recover from the defendants in federal court for, inter alia, the defendants' alleged violations of the Connecticut Product Liability Act (§ 52-572m et seq.). The United States District Court for the District of Connecticut certified to this court, pursuant to statute (§ 51-199b (d)), a question of law concerning whether Connecticut law recognizes a parent's claim for loss of filial consortium of a minor child who was severely injured as result of a defendant's allegedly tortious conduct. Held: This court concluded that Connecticut law does not recognize a cause of action for loss of filial consortium. Although this court has recognized causes of action for loss of spousal consortium and loss of parental consortium, the justifications for imposing liability for third-party emotional injuries in those circumstances, namely, the mutual dependence and reliance between spouses and a child's depen- dence on his or her parents, did not support the recognition of a cause of action for loss of filial consortium, as the relational interests at issue were sufficiently distinguishable. The injury that is experienced by a parent whose child sustains a severe and potentially disabling injury is a form of emotional distress, rather than the type of relational loss or loss of society for which the tort of loss of consortium affords a remedy. Although a substantial minority of other jurisdictions allow the parent of an injured child to recover for loss of filial consortium under certain circum- stances, this court found more persuasive the reasoning of those jurisdictions that have recognized a clear conceptual and practical distinction between parental consortium and filial consortium, which militated against this court's recognition of a common-law cause of action for loss of filial con- sortium. (One justice concurring separately; one justice dissenting) Argued September 19, 2024—officially released February 11, 2025

Pursuant to the Connecticut Fair Employment Practices Act (§ 46a-94a (a)), ''[t]he [Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities], any respondent or any complainant, aggrieved by a final order of a presiding officer, may appeal to the Superior Court in accordance with'' the Uniform Administrative Procedure Act. Pursuant to the Uniform Administrative Procedure Act (§ 4-183 (a) and (b)), ''[a] person who has exhausted all administrative remedies available within the agency and who is aggrieved by a final decision may appeal to the Superior Court,'' and ''[a] person may appeal a preliminary, procedural or intermediate agency action or ruling to the Superior Court if (1) it appears likely that the person will otherwise qualify under this [act] to appeal from the final agency action or ruling and (2) postponement of the appeal would result in an inadequate remedy.'' The defendants, the Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities, its Office of Public Hearings, and the complainant, W, appealed to this court, upon certification by the Chief Justice pursuant to statute (§ 52-265a) that a matter of public interest was involved, from the trial court's decision to deny their motions to dismiss the plaintiff employer's administrative appeal from a ruling by commission's human rights referee. The referee had granted W's motion to amend his employment discrimination complaint to add a new claim regarding the denial of reasonable accommodations in light of W's disability. In moving to dismiss the plaintiff's administrative appeal, the defendants contended that interlocutory rulings are not appealable under § 46a-94a (a) and, alternatively, that the appeal was not permitted under § 4-183 (b) because the statutory requirements were not satisfied. The trial court denied the defendants' motions to dismiss on the ground that the referee's ruling was a final decision within the meaning of § 4-183 (a) and, therefore, was appealable under § 46a-94a (a). On appeal to this court, the defendants claim that the referee's ruling allowing W to amend his complaint was not an appealable ''final order'' under § 46a-94a (a) because it was not a ''final decision'' within the meaning of § 4-183 (a) and because the statutory criteria for interlocutory appeals under § 4-183 (b) had not been satisfied. Held: The referee's ruling allowing W to amend his complaint was not an appeal- able ''final order'' under § 46a-94a (a) because it was neither a ''final decision'' Office of Public Hearings under § 4-183 (a) nor a ''preliminary, procedural or intermediate agency action or ruling'' under § 4-183 (b), and, because the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiff's administrative appeal from the referee's ruling, this court reversed the trial court's denial of the defendants' motions to dismiss the appeal and remanded the case with direction to grant those motions. The trial court incorrectly concluded that the referee's ruling was a ''final decision'' under § 4-183 (a) rather than a preliminary, procedural or interme- diate agency action or ruling, this court having concluded that the statutory (§ 4-166 (5)) definition of the term ''final decision'' expressly distinguishes between an agency's final decision and its interlocutory ruling or order, there was no indication that the referee intended his ruling to be final or to terminate any aspect of the case, the ruling did not determine any rights or obligations or result in any legal consequences, and the process of judicial review in this case unquestionably disrupted the orderly process of adjudi- cation. This court concluded that § 46a-94a (a) authorizes an appeal from a ''prelimi- nary, procedural or intermediate agency action or ruling'' under § 4-183 (b), as the legislative history of those statutory provisions established that the legislature had intended for the term ''final order'' in § 46a-94a (a) to not only encompass a ''final decision'' under § 4-183 (a) but also a ''preliminary, procedural or intermediate agency action or ruling'' under § 4-183 (b). Nonetheless, the referee's ruling to allow W to amend his complaint was not appealable as a preliminary, procedural or intermediate agency action or ruling under § 4-183 (b) when postponement of the plaintiff's appeal would not have resulted in an inadequate remedy, as the plaintiff's putative right not to have to litigate the amendment to W's complaint, in the absence of a colorable claim of immunity, was simply an indirect result of an agency proceeding and not the sort of irreparable harm that would justify immediate resort to the courts. Argued November 6, 2024—officially released February 25, 2025

Convicted of murder in connection with the shooting death of the victim, the defendant appealed. He claimed that the trial court improperly had admitted into evidence certain testimony related to his alleged gang affilia- tion and certain evidence related to his actions after law enforcement person- nel attempted to arrest him. Held: The trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing evidence of the defendant's alleged gang affiliation, as the probative value of that evidence outweighed any unfair prejudicial impact. The state offered the gang affiliation evidence to establish a motive for the shooting, there was a sufficient link between the defendant's gang affiliation and the shooting, and the trial court took steps to mitigate the danger of any unfair prejudice. The trial court properly allowed evidence of the defendant's evasive conduct after law enforcement personnel attempted to arrest him, as such evidence was probative of the defendant's consciousness of guilt. Although the defendant's evasive conduct occurred more than sixteen years after the shooting, that conduct occurred close in time to when law enforce- ment attempted to arrest him and to when he learned that the police had a reason for his arrest, which was a strong indicator of his consciousness of guilt. Argued November 7, 2024—officially released February 25, 2025

The plaintiffs, a friend and two grandchildren of the decedent, W, appealed from the judgment of the trial court, which had dismissed their professional negligence and breach of contract claims relating to the defendant attorney's preparation of W's will. The plaintiffs alleged, inter alia, that the defendant had failed to execute W's estate plan in accordance with W's wishes insofar as W intended that, upon his death, his interest in a certain security account would be distributed in five equal shares to the plaintiffs and two other individuals but all the account's assets ultimately were distributed to only one of those individuals, who previously had been designated as the sole beneficiary of the account. The court's dismissal of the plaintiffs' profes- sional negligence claim was based on its determination that the plaintiffs lacked standing because, under Connecticut law, an attorney can be held liable to a third-party beneficiary of a will only for errors relating to the drafting or execution of the will, and the allegations relating to that count concerned the defendant's failure to ensure that W changed the account's designated beneficiary. The subsequent dismissal of the plaintiffs' breach of contract claim was based on the court's conclusion that that claim was functionally identical to the previously dismissed professional negligence claim. On appeal, the plaintiffs challenged the trial court's dismissal of their claims. Held: The trial court improperly dismissed the plaintiffs' professional negligence claim but properly dismissed their breach of contract claim, and, accordingly, this court reversed in part the trial court's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings with respect to the plaintiffs' professional negligence claim to the extent that that claim was premised on the defendant's failure to advise W about the effect that the account's beneficiary designation would have on W's estate plan. This court rejected the plaintiffs' contention that their professional negli- gence claim encompassed an allegation that the defendant had committed an error in drafting W's will, and, accordingly, such an alleged drafting error This case originally was argued before a panel of this court consisting of Chief Justice Mullins and Justices McDonald, D'Auria, Ecker, Alexander and Dannehy. Thereafter, Judge Westbrook was added to the panel and has read the briefs and appendices, and listened to a recording of the oral argument prior to participating in this decision. could not serve as a basis for the plaintiffs' standing to bring a professional negligence claim against the defendant. This court nevertheless concluded that public policy supported the imposi- tion of liability on an attorney who fails to comply with the standard of care in connection with the advising of a client about the effect that an account's beneficiary designation can have on the client's estate plan. In situations in which a client informs an attorney of the client's intention to transfer assets from a security account according to terms set forth in an estate planning instrument, the attorney has a duty to the intended beneficiaries to comply with the applicable standard of care regarding the advice that must be communicated to the client as to the steps the client must take to make necessary changes to the beneficiary designation in order to effectuate his or her intentions, as set forth in the estate planning instrument. In view of the allegations set forth in the operative complaint, the plaintiffs sufficiently pleaded that the defendant did not properly advise W about the consequences of using a will to transfer the account's assets when W previously had designated a beneficiary for that account, and, accordingly, the plaintiffs had standing, under this theory of liability, to assert their professional negligence claim against the defendant. This court, however, rejected the plaintiff's contention that the defendant had a duty to go beyond advising the client of the interrelationship between a will and a security account with a beneficiary designation and to ensure that the account beneficiary designation is actually changed. The trial court properly dismissed the plaintiffs' breach of contract claim, as the allegations supporting that claim did not sound in breach of contract. (Three justices concurring in part and dissenting in part in one opinion) Argued October 28, 2024—officially released March 4, 2025

Convicted of murder, tampering with or fabricating physical evidence, and making a false statement in connection with the shooting death of his wife and his alleged staging of the crime scene to replicate a home invasion, the defendant appealed to this court. The defendant claimed, inter alia, that multiple instances of prosecutorial impropriety deprived him of his right to a fair trial. Held: Although the defendant established four distinct instances of prosecutorial impropriety, this court concluded that those improprieties did not, either individually or collectively, deprive him of a fair trial. With respect to certain instances in which the prosecutor allegedly did not comply with trial court rulings, the prosecutor did not violate those rulings when he questioned the defendant about his finances and whether he was a ''ticking time bomb,'' but the prosecutor's failure to rephrase his question about whether the defendant was ''trying to create a little mini Cheshire scene'' was improper, as the reference to the word ''Cheshire'' was in direct violation of the court's order not to use that word, and the question was unnecessarily inflammatory because it compared the defendant to other notorious offenders or infamous figures. With respect to certain instances in which the prosecutor allegedly violated State v. Singh (259 Conn. 693) by purportedly asking the defendant to comment on other witnesses' testimony, none of the prosecutor's questions violated Singh because the prosecutor did not ask the defendant to charac- terize another witness' testimony as wrong, mistaken or a lie, or imply to the jury that it must find that the witness had lied in order to find the defendant not guilty; rather, the prosecutor sought to impeach the defen- dant's testimony with inconsistencies in light of other evidence, and the prosecutor's questions were unlikely to confuse the issues and did not shift the state's burden of proof. With respect to the prosecutor's allegedly improper use of uncharged mis- conduct evidence, the prosecutor's questions regarding the defendant's drinking habits, his withdrawing his children from therapy, and the fact that the children were no longer in his care were proper inquiries for impeach- ment during cross-examination, as the prosecutor had a good faith basis for them in light of the evidence, and that line of questioning did not serve to establish the bad character, propensities, or criminal tendencies of the defendant. 351 Conn. 428 MARCH, 2025 3 State v. Dabate The prosecutor's question regarding whether the defendant had planned to kill the victim during a trip to Vermont shortly before the murder, however, was improper, as the prosecutor did not establish a proper foundation for the question by stating a good faith belief that there was an adequate factual basis for his inquiry. With respect to certain alleged improprieties committed by the prosecutor during closing arguments, although the prosecutor's comments that the victim had accused the defendant of stealing money from the family and that ''truth in our society is under attack'' were not improper, the prosecutor's comments that the defendant was counting on the jury to be gullible, lazy, and unintelligent were improper, as such comments served to inflame the jurors' passions and had the effect of diverting the jurors' attention from their duty to decide the case on the basis of the evidence before them. The prosecutor's question concerning the defendant's failure to contact the police after the defendant read a published newspaper article about the victim's murder, which the defense had introduced at trial, did not constitute an improper comment on the defendant's exercise of his right to counsel but, rather, constituted proper impeachment of the defendant with evidence of his silence prior to his arrest and before his receipt of warnings pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona (384 U.S. 436). With respect to the prosecutor's alleged violation of the rules of disclosure by failing to disclose the anticipated testimony of a certain expert witness that the defendant's injuries appeared to be self-inflicted, that nondisclosure did not violate Brady v. Maryland (373 U.S. 87) because the testimony was not exculpatory in nature, but the nondisclosure constituted an impropriety insofar as the prosecutor had failed to comply with his obligations under the rule of practice (§ 40-11 (a)) governing disclosure by the prosecuting authority, as the record indicated that the state was aware of the anticipated testimony for months prior to the trial and failed to disclose it, even though it would have been material to the preparation of the defense and was introduced as evidence in the state's case-in-chief. Applying the factors set forth in State v. Williams (204 Conn. 523), this court concluded that the identified improprieties did not deprive the defendant of his right to a fair trial because there was not a reasonable likelihood that the jury's verdict would have been different in the absence of those impro- prieties. This court declined the defendant's request to exercise its supervisory authority over the administration of justice to reverse his conviction as a sanction for the prosecutorial improprieties, as the four instances of impropriety did not impact the perceived fairness of the judicial system as a whole or warrant the extraordinary remedy of reversal under this court's supervisory authority. 4 MARCH, 2025 351 Conn. 428 State v. Dabate The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting data from the victim's Fitbit activity tracker under State v. Porter (241 Conn. 57), as there was ample evidence in the record to support that court's findings that the professional credentials of the state's expert witness qualified him as an expert, that the witness' Fitbit study had been subject to peer review, that the Fitbit was generally accepted in the scientific community, that the Fitbit had been tested extensively and deemed accurate, and that the Fitbit had been devel- oped for extrajudicial purposes. The trial court properly denied the defendant's motion to suppress a state- ment that he had made to the police during an interview at the hospital. There was ample evidence in the record to support the trial court's factual findings underlying its determination that the defendant was not in custody during the hospital interview for purposes of Miranda, and, moreover, the totality of the circumstances established that the defendant was not in custody because a reasonable person in the defendant's position would not have believed that he was restrained to a degree associated with a formal arrest. Argued October 30, 2024—officially released March 11, 2025

The plaintiff employee appealed, on the granting of certification, from the judgment of the Appellate Court, which had affirmed the decision of the Compensation Review Board. The board had upheld the decision of an administrative law judge to grant the defendant employer's request, after a determination that the plaintiff reached maximum medical improvement, to convert the ongoing temporary partial incapacity benefits that the plaintiff was receiving pursuant to statute (§ 31-308 (a)) to permanent partial disabil- ity benefits under § 31-308 (b). The plaintiff claimed that the Appellate Court had incorrectly concluded that an administrative law judge lacks the authority to award ongoing temporary partial incapacity benefits to a claimant who has reached maximum medical improvement, at which point the claimant becomes eligible to receive permanent partial disability benefits under § 31-308 (b). Held: The Appellate Court incorrectly concluded that an administrative law judge lacks the discretion under § 31-308 to award a claimant, after he or she reaches maximum medical improvement, ongoing temporary partial incapac- ity benefits under § 31-308 (a) in lieu of permanent partial disability benefits under § 31-308 (b), up to the statutory maximum of 520 weeks, and, accord- ingly, this court reversed the Appellate Court's judgment, and the case was remanded to the administrative law judge for further proceedings. The clear and unambiguous language of § 31-308 affords an administrative law judge the discretion to award a claimant who has reached maximum medical improvement ongoing temporary incapacity benefits under § 31- 308 (a), as § 31-308 (b) provides that the administrative law judge ''may,'' but is not required to, award permanent partial disability benefits under § 31-308 (b) ''in lieu of other compensation,'' meaning that the administrative law judge has the discretion to award a claimant who has reached maximum medical improvement other benefits under the Workers' Compensation Act (§ 31-275 et seq.), such as total or partial incapacity benefits, in lieu of permanent partial disability benefits. Argued December 2, 2024—officially released March 18, 2025

The plaintiff sought, inter alia, damages from the defendant, the Department of Children and Families, alleging that it had discriminated against him on the basis of his religion in violation of statute (§§ 46a-58 (a) and 46a-71 (a)) during the course of prior child protection proceedings in which his parental rights were ultimately terminated. The trial court granted in part the defen- dant's motion to dismiss, dismissing the majority of the plaintiff's allegations of discrimination on the ground that they were time barred pursuant to statute ((Rev. to 2019) § 46a-82 (f)). The court declined, however, to dismiss certain other timely allegations, namely, those relating to the defendant's alleged discrimination during the termination of parental rights trial. There- after, the court denied the defendant's motion to reargue, rejecting the defendant's argument, raised for the first time in that motion, that the litigation privilege barred the remaining, timely allegations that the trial court declined to dismiss. Subsequently, the defendant filed an interlocutory appeal with the Appellate Court, challenging the trial court's denial of the motion to reargue and the court's determination that the litigation privilege did not bar the remaining, timely allegations. The Appellate Court concluded that the trial court had incorrectly determined that the litigation privilege did not bar the remaining, timely allegations and remanded the case, ordering the trial court to dismiss the plaintiff's complaint in its entirety. In response to the Appellate Court's remand order and prior to the plaintiff's filing of a petition for certification to appeal to this court, the trial court rendered judgment dismissing the plaintiff's complaint in its entirety. Thereafter, the plaintiff, on the granting of certification, appealed from the Appellate Court's judgment to this court. The plaintiff and the intervenor, the Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities, claimed, inter alia, that the Appellate Court had incorrectly determined that the remaining, timely allegations were barred by the litigation privilege. Held: The Appellate Court correctly concluded that the litigation privilege barred the plaintiff's timely allegations pertaining to the defendant's alleged discrim- ination during the termination of parental rights trial. In accordance with the spirit and intent of General Statutes § 46b-142 (b) and Practice Book § 79a-12, the names of the parties involved in this appeal are not disclosed. The records and papers of this case shall be open for inspection only to persons having a proper interest therein and upon order of the court. The plaintiff's discrimination claim was akin to one of defamation, to which the litigation privilege applies, and was not akin to a vexatious litigation claim, which challenges the purpose for which an underlying action was commenced, insofar as the remaining, timely allegations pertained exclu- sively to the words and conduct of the defendant's agents during the termina- tion of parental rights trial and did not challenge the origin of the termination proceedings, and there were other available remedies to adequately address the defendant's conduct. The defendant, as a governmental entity, was entitled to invoke the litigation privilege in connection with its in-court conduct, and this court declined the intervenor's invitation to adopt a new rule precluding all nonpersons from invoking the litigation privilege. Insofar as the Appellate Court's order on remand that the trial court dismiss the plaintiff's complaint in its entirety and the trial court's execution of that order prior to this appeal had hindered the plaintiff's ability to seek appellate review of the trial court's dismissal of the majority of his allegations as untimely, this court reversed in part the judgment of the Appellate Court and directed the Appellate Court on remand to vacate the trial court's prior judgment of dismissal and to remand the case to the trial court with direction to render a new judgment of dismissal, from which the plaintiff could appeal and challenge the trial court's granting of the defendant's motion to dismiss with respect to those allegations that the trial court had deemed untimely. Argued October 31, 2024—officially released April 1, 2025

Convicted of murder and criminal violation of a standing criminal protective order, the defendant appealed to this court. Although the defendant had elected to represent himself during his trial, the trial court determined amid the trial proceedings that it was necessary to reappoint the defendant's former standby counsel to represent the defendant on the basis of the defendant's conduct, including his conscious decision not to appear in court on a particular occasion. On appeal, the defendant claimed that he was entitled to a new trial because the trial court had violated his constitutional right to self-representation. Held: The trial court did not violate the defendant's right to self-representation, the defendant's conduct, including his conscious decision not to appear in court, having functioned as a forfeiture of that right. The record indicated that there were multiple instances during which the defendant either had refused court-ordered transportation, failed to appear at scheduled hearings, or threatened to leave trial proceedings, and, although his conduct was not violent, it nonetheless reflected an intolerable pattern of obstructionist and disruptive behavior. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the defendant had forfeited his right to self-representation when he refused to return to court to continue voir dire after a lunch break, as that finding was based on the court's subsidiary finding that the defendant had engaged in dilatory, disruptive, and manipulative conduct, the court's decision to reappoint standby counsel was not a premature or impulsive response to the defen- dant's conduct but was made in an effort to regain control of the courtroom and the trial schedule, and the defendant was aware that his refusal to appear in court without a justification would constitute a forfeiture of his right to represent himself. Contrary to the defendant's argument that his refusal to return to court to continue voir dire after the lunch break served only as a waiver of his right to be present for voir dire that afternoon, such conduct also could serve as a forfeiture of his right to represent himself for the remainder of the trial proceedings. Argued December 5, 2024—officially released April 1, 2025

In accordance with this court's decision in Persels & Associates, LLC v. Banking Commissioner (318 Conn. 652), for purposes of the provision (§ 36a-671c (1)) of the debt negotiation statutes (§§ 36a-671 through 36a- 671f) that exempts from certain licensing and registration requirements those attorneys who engage in or offer debt negotiation services as an ancillary matter to such attorneys' representation of clients, there is a rebut- table presumption that such attorneys are engaged in the practice of law and, therefore, fall within the Judicial Branch's exclusive authority to regulate the practice of law. The plaintiffs, C Co., a national consumer advocate law firm, and S Co., an affiliate of C Co. that provides various administrative support services to C Co., sought injunctive and declaratory relief in the trial court in response to an ongoing administrative enforcement action that the defendant, the Department of Banking, had brought against S Co. for allegedly engaging in debt negotiation activities without a license to do so, in violation of § 36a- 671 (b). The defendant moved to dismiss the plaintiffs' action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, claiming that the plaintiffs had failed to exhaust their administrative remedies. The trial court denied the defendant's motion to dismiss, concluding that the plaintiffs were not required to exhaust their administrative remedies before asking the court to adjudicate whether the Persels presumption applied to S Co. On appeal from the denial of its motion to dismiss, the defendant claimed that the Commissioner of Banking should have the exclusive authority to make factual findings and to determine, during the course of an administrative proceeding, whether individuals or entities are engaged in the practice of law for purposes of Persels. Held: The trial court properly denied the defendant's motion to dismiss, this court having concluded that the plaintiffs were not required to wait for the Commissioner of Banking to resolve the issue of whether he had the author- ity, under Persels, to enforce the debt negotiation statutes against S Co. before the plaintiffs could seek judicial intervention with respect to that issue. Although a party generally must exhaust its administrative remedies before seeking judicial intervention, if an agency has no expertise in resolving the issue of whether it has acted in excess of its statutory authority, a party need not exhaust its administrative remedies prior to challenging the agency's exercise of that authority by seeking declaratory or injunctive relief in the trial court with respect to that issue. The plaintiffs were not required to exhaust their administrative remedies before seeking injunctive and declaratory relief in the trial court because the Commissioner of Banking did not have the expertise to determine whether the Persels presumption applied to S Co. and, if so, whether that presumption could be rebutted. Specifically, the Commissioner of Banking has expertise in regulating debt negotiation practices and in enforcing the debt negotiation statutes but not in determining whether individuals or entitles are engaged in the practice of law, and, because the applicability of the Persels presumption requires resolution of the latter issue, permitting the commissioner to resolve the Persels presumption issue would necessarily implicate separation of powers concerns and involve matters outside the purview of his expertise. Argued December 11, 2024—officially released April 8, 2025

The plaintiff, C Co., sought to foreclose two municipal tax liens for the grand lists of 2012 and 2013 of the city of Bridgeport on real property owned by the defendant. The city purportedly had assigned the tax liens to C Co.'s predecessor in interest, which then allegedly assigned its interest in the liens to C Co. After the defendant filed its answer and several special defenses, C Co. moved for summary judgment as to liability only. The defendant objected to C Co.'s motion, claiming, inter alia, that the Bridgeport City Council had failed to validly assign the liens to C Co. pursuant to the statute ((Rev. to 2015) § 12-195h) allowing for the assignment of liens secur- ing unpaid taxes on real property by a resolution of a municipality's legisla- tive body. The trial court granted C Co.'s motion for summary judgment as to liability, concluding that there was no genuine issue of material fact as to the validity of the assignments and that that determination resolved certain, but not all, of the defendant's special defenses. Subsequently, B Co. was substituted as the plaintiff, and the trial court rendered judgment of foreclosure by sale, from which the defendant appealed to the Appellate Court. Thereafter, the Appellate Court affirmed the trial court's judgment, and the defendant, on the granting of certification, appealed to this court. Held: The Appellate Court correctly determined that the trial court had properly granted C Co.'s motion for summary judgment as to liability on the basis of the trial court's conclusion that there was no genuine issue of material fact as to whether the tax liens at issue had been validly assigned to C Co. in compliance with § 12-195h. To establish the validity of the tax lien assignments, C Co. submitted certified copies of the agendas and minutes from two of the city council's meetings, at which the council approved the assignment of any or all tax liens and authorized the mayor of Bridgeport to enter into any agreements necessary to effectuate such assignments, and also approved each of the specific assignments at issue, which listed the defendant's name and property address, a bill number corresponding to each of the grand list years, and the specific amount of the tax debt from each grand list, and those documents Group 315, Polish National Alliance were sufficient to establish that the city had properly assigned the tax liens to C Co.'s predecessor in interest. This court clarified that it was C Co., as the plaintiff, which ultimately bore the burden of establishing the validity of the assignments and, thus, of establishing its standing to foreclose the tax liens under § 12-195h, and concluded that C Co. had satisfied that burden and that the defendant had failed to establish that a genuine issue of material fact existed as to the validity of the assignments. Moreover, this court clarified that motions for judgment in foreclosure actions are reserved for situations in which all defendants have had defaults entered against them, or all questions of liability, including all special defenses relating to liability, have been resolved in the plaintiff's favor, and determined that, although there were irregularities in the manner in which certain issues in the present case were raised and addressed in the trial court, the defendant had failed to object to those irregularities and, accord- ingly, waived any claims relating to them. Argued December 9, 2024—officially released April 15, 2025

The defendant, who previously had been convicted of risk of injury to a child, appealed, on the granting of certification, from the judgment of the Appellate Court. The Appellate Court had upheld the trial court's decision to grant the state's motion for a standing criminal protective order prohib- iting, inter alia, the defendant's contact with the victim. The trial court had issued this order approximately nine years after the defendant was sentenced in connection with his risk of injury conviction. The defendant claimed, inter alia, that the trial court had improperly issued the protective order without a finding of changed circumstances. Held: The trial court having failed to apply, in issuing the protective order in question, the proper legal standard under the statute (§ 53a-40e) governing standing criminal protective orders, this court concluded that the Appellate Court had improperly upheld the trial court's decision to issue the protective order, reversed the Appellate Court's judgment, and remanded the case with direction to vacate the order. Contrary to the Appellate Court's conclusion, the defendant adequately briefed his claim before the Appellate Court that additional requirements, beyond those expressly set forth in § 53a-40e, apply to a trial court's determi- nation of whether it should issue a standing criminal protective order after a defendant has been sentenced for the underlying offense. A review of the text of § 53a-40e and its legislative history led this court to conclude that, before a court determines whether to exercise its discretion to issue a standing criminal protective order postsentencing, it must make certain predicate findings, namely, that the defendant had been convicted of a qualifying offense set forth in § 53a-40e (a) (1) or (2), that the history and character and nature and circumstances of the defendant's criminal conduct indicate that a standing criminal protective order will best serve the interests of the victim and the public, and that additional evidence, not presented to the sentencing court at the time of sentencing, also indicates that a standing criminal protective order will best serve the interests of the victim and the public. In the present case, the trial court made no finding either that the defendant had been convicted of a qualifying offense or that, on the basis of the history and character and nature and circumstances of the defendant's criminal conduct, a protective order would best serve the interests of the victim and the public, and the state did not present any evidence or make any claim that additional evidence beyond what was presented at the defendant's sentencing, also supported the interests of the victim and the public. Argued December 11, 2024—officially released April 29, 2025

The intervening foster parents and the minor child, A, filed separate appeals, on the granting of certification, from the judgment of the Appellate Court. In 2017, the petitioner, the Commissioner of Children and Families had obtained an order of temporary custody and placed A in the care of the foster parents. In response to the respondent father's motion to revoke A's commitment years later, the foster parents filed a motion to intervene, which was granted in 2020. In 2021, a court denied the respondent's motion to revoke commitment, granted the foster parents' motion to transfer guardian- ship of A to the foster parents, and rendered judgment thereon. In 2023, the Appellate Court decided In re Ryan C. (220 Conn. App. 507), holding that nonrelative foster parents are prohibited by statute (§ 46b-129 (p)) from intervening in neglect proceedings. In response to In re Ryan C., the respondent filed in 2023 a motion to open and vacate the 2021 judgment transferring guardianship of A to the foster parents on the ground that the court in In re Ryan C. determined that foster parents do not have standing to intervene and, consequently, that the court in 2021 had no subject matter jurisdiction to entertain the foster parents' motion to transfer guardianship, rendering the resulting 2021 judgment void. The trial court agreed with the respondent, granting the respondent's motion to open, vacating the order granting the foster parents' motion to intervene, and vacating the judgment transferring guardianship of A to the foster parents. The Appellate Court thereafter upheld the trial court's decision to grant the motion to open and vacate, reasoning that, in light of In re Ryan C., the court's lack of subject matter jurisdiction in 2021 was entirely obvious so as to render that court's judgment transferring guardianship invalid. In the present appeals, the foster parents and A claimed that the Appellate Court had incorrectly concluded that there was a lack of subject matter jurisdiction to grant the foster parents' motion to intervene. While the present appeals were pending, this court decided In re Jewelyette M. (351 Conn. 51), which overruled In re Ryan C. in concluding that § 46b-129 (p) does not limit the trial court's authority to In accordance with the spirit and intent of General Statutes § 46b-142 (b) and Practice Book § 79a-12, the names of the parties involved in this appeal are not disclosed. The records and papers of this case shall be open for inspection only to persons having a proper interest therein and upon order of the court. 351 Conn. 784 MAY, 2025 3 In re Andrew C. permit a nonrelative foster parent to intervene in the dispositional phase of neglect proceedings. Held: The Appellate Court improperly upheld the trial court's decision to grant the respondent's 2023 motion to open and vacate the 2021 judgment transferring guardianship, and, accordingly, this court reversed the Appellate Court's judgment and remanded the case with direction to reverse the trial court's decision to grant the respondent's motion to open and vacate, and to reinstate the earlier order granting the foster parents' motion to intervene and the 2021 judgment transferring guardianship of A to the foster parents. This court having determined in In re Jewelyette M. that § 46b-129 (p) does not prohibit courts from granting foster parents permission to intervene in neglect proceedings, the respondent's challenge to the court's authority to grant the foster parents' motion to intervene and to transfer guardianship of A to them in 2021 did not implicate subject matter jurisdiction. Insofar as the court had jurisdiction to grant the foster parents' motion to intervene and their motion to transfer guardianship in 2021, the trial court lacked authority to open the 2021 judgment transferring guardianship more than four months after notice of that judgment was sent on the ground that it was entirely obvious that the court that rendered the 2021 judgment was without subject matter jurisdiction to do so. Argued April 9—officially released May 19, 2025

The defendant appealed, on the granting of certification, from the judgment of the Appellate Court, which had affirmed his conviction of unlawful restraint in the second degree, sexual assault in the fourth degree, attempt to commit sexual assault in the third degree, and sexual assault in the third degree. During rebuttal closing argument, the prosecutor listed four defenses that, according to her, defendants ''usually'' raise in criminal cases, and she noted two additional defenses that she claimed defendants ''generally'' raise in sexual assault cases, which she referred to as the ''nuts and sluts'' defenses. The prosecutor then asked the jury, ''do you think [the victim] is nuts? Because she'd have to be nuts to make all of this up.'' The defendant claimed that the Appellate Court had incorrectly determined that the prosecutor's remarks during rebuttal were not improper and that he was entitled to a new trial. Held: Although the Appellate Court incorrectly concluded that the prosecutor's statements during rebuttal closing argument were not improper, the impro- prieties nevertheless did not deprive the defendant of a fair trial, and, accord- ingly, this court affirmed the Appellate Court's judgment. The prosecutor's use of the phrase ''nuts and sluts'' improperly appealed to the jurors' emotions and diverted their attention from their duty to decide the case solely on the evidence, as it was a highly inflammatory and crass phrase that the jurors would likely find offensive, it suggested that the jury's legal duty required passing moral judgment on the victim, and it strayed from the evidence presented at trial, which concerned whether the victim had a motive to lie and not whether the victim was insane or promiscuous. The prosecutor did not shift the burden of proof to the defense by listing the defenses that can be asserted in criminal cases, including those involving allegations of sexual assault. However, by suggesting that the theory of defense was that the victim was ''nuts,'' the prosecutor distorted the state's burden of proof, as she essentially argued that, unless the jury finds that the victim was ''nuts,'' it must find the defendant guilty, and as the prosecutor mispresented the defendant's actual theory of defense, which was that the victim had a motive to lie, and substituted her own theory, which was that the victim would have to be ''nuts'' to fabricate her allegations. The prosecutor's listing of four defenses that, according to the prosecutor, defendants ''usually'' raise in criminal cases was improper because the list was drawn from the prosecutor's own experience and was unrelated to the evidence. This court recognized that the prosecutor's use of the inflammatory phrase ''nuts and sluts'' was inappropriate and that her conduct sometimes fell short of the high ethical and professional standards to which prosecutors are to be held, but, upon applying the factors set forth in State v. Williams (204 Conn. 523), this court concluded that the identified improprieties did not deprive the defendant of his right to a fair trial. Specifically, the prosecutor's statements were not severe when viewed in light of the entire trial, as defense counsel failed to object, to request curative instructions, or to move for a mistrial in response to those statements, the improprieties were isolated or infrequent, and the state's case was relatively strong. (One justice dissenting) Argued December 9, 2024—officially released May 20, 2025