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Suprynowicz v. Tohan
KAYLA SUPRYNOWICZ ET AL. v.
NARENDRA B. TOHAN
(SC 20992)
Mullins, C. J., and McDonald, D’Auria,
Ecker, Alexander and Dannehy, Js.
Syllabus
The plaintiffs appealed from the judgment of the trial court for the defendant,
a reproductive endocrinologist who, in connection with certain in vitro
fertilization procedures he performed, allegedly used his own sperm to
impregnate the plaintiffs’ mothers without consent. The plaintiffs claimed
that, in striking their amended complaint, the trial court had incorrectly
determined that their negligence claims sounded in wrongful life, which the
defendant argued was not a legally cognizable cause of action in Connecticut,
rather than ordinary negligence. Held:
The trial court incorrectly determined that the plaintiffs’ negligence claims
sounded in wrongful life rather than ordinary negligence.
The plaintiffs’ negligence claims bore none of the hallmarks of wrongful
life claims and, instead, could be properly adjudicated as ordinary negligence
claims, as the plaintiffs alleged that the defendant, through his deception, was
directly responsible for the mental anguish, physical injury and compromised
familial relations they have suffered, and they were not seeking to be made
whole by being restored to a state of nonbeing but, rather, to be compensated
for injuries and losses that they claimed could have been prevented or
substantially mitigated if the defendant had acted with due care.
Accordingly, this court reversed the trial court’s judgment with respect to
the plaintiffs’ negligence claims and remanded the case with direction to
deny the defendant’s motion to strike as to those claims and for further proceedings.
Argued October 30, 2024—officially released January 14, 2025
Procedural History
Action to recover damages for, inter alia, the defendant’s alleged negligence, and for other relief, brought
to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Hartford
and transferred to the judicial district of Hartford, Complex Litigation Docket, where the court, Farley, J.,
granted the defendant’s motion to strike the plaintiffs’
amended complaint; thereafter, the court, Farley, J.,
granted the plaintiffs’ motion for judgment and ren-
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Suprynowicz v. Tohan
dered judgment for the defendant, from which the plaintiffs appealed. Reversed in part; judgment directed;
further proceedings.
David B. Newdorf, pro hac vice, with whom were
Leslie Gold McPadden and, on the brief, James R.
Brakebill, for the appellants (plaintiffs).
Thomas J. Plumridge, with whom were Joseph M.
Walsh and, on the brief, Sally O. Hagerty and Stuart
C. Johnson, for the appellee (defendant).
Opinion
MULLINS, C. J. The plaintiffs, Kayla Suprynowicz and
Reilly Flaherty, who were strangers for most of their
lives, discovered through the genetic testing company
23andMe that they are half siblings. They allege in this
action that their biological father is the defendant, Narendra B. Tohan, the reproductive endocrinologist who
assisted the plaintiffs’ parents in the parents’ efforts to
conceive children. The plaintiffs claim that, in treating
their parents’ infertility, the defendant utilized his own
sperm rather than the sperm of the men they believed
to be their fathers to impregnate their mothers, causing
the plaintiffs physical and emotional harm. Although
the plaintiffs’ causes of action were labeled in the complaint as ordinary negligence claims, the defendant
moved to strike them on the ground that they were
noncognizable wrongful life claims.1 The trial court
agreed and granted the motion to strike the plaintiffs’
complaint.
1
Courts have defined a wrongful life claim as one that is brought by or
on behalf of an individual born with a congenital abnormality who asserts
that, but for a physician’s failure to detect and educate the parents regarding
the abnormality, the child’s mother would have terminated the pregnancy,
and the child never would have been born or had to suffer the pain of his
or her existence. See Lynch v. State, 348 Conn. 478, 507, 509,
308 A.3d 1
(2024). This court has not yet determined whether claims for wrongful life
are cognizable in this state. Id., 506.
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Suprynowicz v. Tohan
The dispositive issue in this appeal is whether the
trial court correctly determined that the plaintiffs’ negligence claims sounded in wrongful life rather than ordinary negligence. We conclude that the answer to that
question is no and that our recent decision in Lynch v.
State, 348 Conn. 478,
308 A.3d 1 (2024), controls the
outcome. In Lynch, this court clarified that a claim
arising from hospital staff’s alleged negligence in using
sperm infected with a virus in the course of a therapeutic donor insemination (TDI) procedure sounded in
medical negligence, not wrongful life. See id., 484–87,
489–91, 505, 507. Similarly, the plaintiffs’ claims in the
present case are ordinary negligence claims rather than
wrongful life claims because they arise from the defendant doctor’s alleged negligence in using his own sperm
to impregnate the plaintiffs’ mothers during in vitro
fertilization (IVF) procedures. Accordingly, we reverse
in part the judgment of the trial court.2
The following facts, as alleged in the plaintiffs’
amended complaint,3 and procedural history are relevant to our resolution of this appeal. The plaintiffs, who
are both in their thirties, were conceived through IVF.
The defendant is the reproductive endocrinologist who
performed the IVF procedures for the plaintiffs’ respective parents.4 Unbeknownst to the plaintiffs’ parents,
2
The plaintiffs argue in the alternative that, if we conclude that their
allegations do not sound in ordinary negligence, then we should recognize
a cause of action for wrongful life and allow their claims to proceed under
that theory. Because we conclude that the plaintiffs’ claims sound in ordinary
negligence, we do not reach this issue.
3
It is axiomatic that, in reviewing a trial court’s granting of a motion to
strike, we take the facts to be those alleged in the complaint and construe
them in the manner most favorable to sustaining the complaint’s legal sufficiency. See, e.g., Lestorti v. DeLeo, 298 Conn. 466, 472,
4 A.3d 269 (2010).
‘‘[I]f facts provable in the complaint would support a cause of action, the
motion to strike must be denied.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Geysen
v. Securitas Security Services USA, Inc., 322 Conn. 385, 398,
142 A.3d
227 (2016).
4
The plaintiffs’ parents are not parties to this action.
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Suprynowicz v. Tohan
the defendant used his own sperm in the IVF procedures. The plaintiffs’ parents never agreed to the use
of donor sperm, and no genetic testing was performed
to ensure that the defendant was a suitable donor. Kayla
Suprynowicz’ mother acknowledged that, after she
became pregnant, she was informed that her pregnancy
was the result of ‘‘ ‘mixed sperm.’ ’’
In 2019, the plaintiffs learned of the defendant’s
deception through genetic testing. As a result, they
learned that the men they believed to be their fathers
were in fact not their biological fathers. In 2021, the
plaintiffs brought this action. In their eight count,
amended complaint, the plaintiffs alleged negligence,
fraudulent concealment, lack of informed consent and
violations of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices
Act, General Statutes § 42-110a et seq. With respect to
their negligence claims, the plaintiffs alleged that the
defendant’s unauthorized use of his own sperm has
negatively impacted their familial relations and caused
them mental anguish and physical injury.5 In her claim
of negligence against the defendant, Kayla Suprynowicz
further alleged that the defendant’s sperm carried a
genetic trait that caused her to contract ‘‘a cerebral
condition and mast cell activation disorder,’’ which has
resulted in her having a reduced earning capacity.
Before the plaintiffs filed their amended complaint,
the defendant filed a motion to dismiss the original
complaint on the ground that, notwithstanding the labels
5
Specifically, in count one of the amended complaint, Kayla Suprynowicz
alleged that the defendant ‘‘negligently [1] mixed his sperm with [Gary]
Suprynowicz’ sperm to impregnate [her mother]; [2] replaced the sperm of
Gary Suprynowicz with his own; [3] failed to offer the Suprynowiczes the
choice of sperm donor; [4] utilized sperm that contained a genetic trait,
including a genetic disease . . . .’’
In count four of the amended complaint, Flaherty alleged that, ‘‘[a]s a
result of [the defendant’s] carelessness and negligence, [the defendant] . . .
[i]mproperly used his sperm to conceive and impregnate [Flaherty’s
mother].’’
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Suprynowicz v. Tohan
applied to the individual counts, the entire complaint
sounded in medical malpractice. Consequently, he argued
that, because the plaintiffs had failed to comply with
the requirements of General Statutes § 52-190a, the trial
court had no personal jurisdiction over him. The defendant further argued that the plaintiffs lacked standing
to assert their medical malpractice claims because he
and the plaintiffs never had a doctor-patient relationship.
The trial court disagreed with both contentions, concluding that, except for Kayla Suprynowicz’ claim that
‘‘the defendant used sperm containing a disease causing
genetic trait,’’ the plaintiffs’ claims were ordinary negligence claims, not medical malpractice claims, such that
compliance with § 52-190a was not required.6 The court
further concluded that there was ‘‘a sufficient nexus
between [the plaintiffs’] injuries and the defendant’s
alleged misconduct to give [the plaintiffs] standing to
prosecute their claims.’’
The defendant thereafter filed a motion to strike the
operative amended complaint in its entirety. With respect
to the negligence counts, the defendant argued that
they should be stricken because (1) the defendant owed
no duty of care to the plaintiffs, and (2) the plaintiffs’
claims sounded in wrongful life, which is not a cognizable claim in Connecticut. In response, the plaintiffs argued
that the defendant owed them each a duty of care because
they were readily identifiable victims of his alleged misconduct, and the harm that they suffered was entirely
foreseeable. The plaintiffs also argued that, contrary to the
In denying the defendant’s motion to dismiss, the trial court noted a
6
disagreement among our trial courts as to whether § 52-190a allows for the
dismissal of only a portion of a claim. Because the defendant did not move
to dismiss only the portion of Kayla Suprynowicz’ negligence claim sounding
in medical malpractice, the trial court concluded that it need not determine
whether it would have authority to do so. The defendant does not challenge
the trial court’s decision on the applicability of § 52-190a in this appeal.
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Suprynowicz v. Tohan
defendant’s assertions, their claims sounded in ordinary
negligence, not wrongful life.
The trial court agreed with the plaintiffs that they
‘‘were sufficiently identifiable [persons] to warrant the
imposition of a duty of care upon the defendant . . . .’’
The court reasoned that ‘‘the relationship between the
defendant and the plaintiffs’ mothers was aimed specifically at the objective of producing offspring, an exceptionally narrow class of identifiable persons to which
the plaintiffs obviously belong.’’ The court agreed with
the defendant, however, that the plaintiffs’ negligence
claims sounded in wrongful life.
Specifically, the trial court reasoned: ‘‘The plaintiffs
argue that their claims do not constitute claims for
wrongful life because they are ‘styled as [negligence]
counts.’ That distinction is lost on the court. In a wrongful life claim, a child alleges that, but for the negligence
of a medical professional, the child would not have
been conceived or born, and the child has suffered harm
as a result of [his or her] birth. . . . This is precisely
what the plaintiffs allege. Had the defendant not used
his own sperm to inseminate the plaintiffs’ mothers,
the plaintiffs would not have been born. . . . The plaintiffs’ claims, like other ‘wrongful life’ claims, present
the paradox of [plaintiffs] alleging harm that could only
have been avoided if they had never been born at all.’’
(Citations omitted; footnote omitted.) The court further
observed that, of the states that recognize wrongful
life, all of them limit recovery to extraordinary medical
expenses, which the plaintiffs have not alleged. In light
of the foregoing, the court granted the defendant’s
motion to strike the amended complaint in its entirety.
The plaintiffs opted not to replead, and the trial court
rendered judgment for the defendant.
The plaintiffs appealed to the Appellate Court, claiming that the trial court incorrectly determined that their
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Suprynowicz v. Tohan
negligence claims sounded in wrongful life rather than
ordinary negligence. We transferred the appeal to this
court pursuant to General Statutes § 51-199 (c) and
Practice Book § 65-2.
After the parties filed their briefs, this court issued
its decision in Lynch v. State, supra, 348 Conn. 478,
which required us to decide whether the claims of the
plaintiffs in that case sounded in wrongful life or medical malpractice. See id., 504–505, 507. In Lynch, the
plaintiffs brought an action on behalf of their infant
son, Joshua Isaac Monroe-Lynch (Joshua), who was
conceived through a TDI procedure. See id., 484, 489.
In their complaint, the plaintiffs alleged that the hospital
staff who performed the TDI procedure negligently
impregnated Joshua’s mother with sperm from a cytomegalovirus (CMV)7 positive donor, causing Joshua
serious physical and catastrophic neurological injuries.
See id., 489–90, 514. On appeal, the named defendant,
the state of Connecticut, argued that Joshua’s claims
‘‘must be understood as ‘wrongful life’ claims and that
this court should follow the majority of states and
decline to recognize such claims.’’ Id., 505. We concluded that those claims were not wrongful life claims
but, rather, conventional medical malpractice claims.
Id., 505, 507. Our reasons for doing so are dispositive
of this appeal.8
We explained in Lynch that, ‘‘[a]t the most basic level,
courts use the terms ‘wrongful birth’ and ‘wrongful life’
to refer to claims that are based on the theory that a
7
CMV is ‘‘a type of herpes virus . . . .’’ Lynch v. State, supra, 348
Conn. 485.
8
As we previously indicated, the defendant moved to strike the plaintiffs’
negligence claims on the additional ground that he owed them no duty of
care. The trial court rejected that contention, and the defendant has not
challenged that determination on appeal. Thus, the defendant’s sole contention on appeal is that the plaintiffs’ negligence claims sound in wrongful
life and that this court should follow the vast majority of courts in other
jurisdictions and decline to recognize such claims.
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Suprynowicz v. Tohan
child would not have been born but for the defendant’s
negligence. . . . ‘Wrongful birth’ generally refers to
claims of this sort brought by the parent or parents
whereas ‘wrongful life’ refers to claims brought by the
child. . . . This court has recognized claims for wrongful birth; see Ochs v. Borrelli, 187 Conn. 253, 256–60,
445 A.2d 883 (1982); but has not yet had occasion to
[decide] the wrongful life issue.’’ (Citations omitted.)
Lynch v. State, supra, 348 Conn. 506. ‘‘Although courts
and commentators often speak of wrongful life and
wrongful birth as torts in themselves, it is more accurate
to view these terms as describing the result of a physician’s negligence. The asserted negligence may involve
any number of distinguishable negligent acts including,
but not limited to, the misdiagnosis of [a] hereditary
condition, the misrepresentation of the risks associated
with conception and delivery of a child, the negligent
interpretation of diagnostic tests, or the negligent performance of a sterilization procedure.’’ Lininger ex rel.
Lininger v. Eisenbaum, 764 P.2d 1202, 1205 (Colo.
1988).
As we noted in Lynch, there are two distinct characteristics of a wrongful life claim. See Lynch v. State,
supra, 348 Conn. 490, 507, 511–12. First, the defendant
is not directly responsible for the injury to the child.
See id., 507. ‘‘[C]ases that bear the ‘wrongful life’ label
[typically] involve a child who has a congenital abnormality born to a mother who would not have proceeded
with the pregnancy had she received timely notice of
that condition. . . . The alleged negligence is the failure to detect and educate the parents regarding the
congenital abnormality [in time for an abortion to be
performed]. Indeed, it has been said that the hallmark
of a wrongful life case is that the defendant bears no
direct responsibility for the child’s condition, and courts
have relied in part on that fact in declining to recognize
such claims.’’ (Citation omitted; emphasis omitted.) Id.;
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Suprynowicz v. Tohan
see, e.g., Wilson v. Kuenzi, 751 S.W.2d 741, 744–45 (Mo.)
(‘‘The heart of the problem in [wrongful life] cases is
that the physician cannot be said to have caused the
[abnormality]. The disorder is genetic and not the result
of any injury negligently inflicted by the doctor. In addition it is incurable and was incurable from the moment
of conception. . . . The child’s [disability] is an inexorable result of conception and birth.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 893,
109
S. Ct. 229,
102 L. Ed. 2d 219 (1988).
A second characteristic of a wrongful life claim is the
inherent difficulty of measuring damages. See Lynch v.
State, supra, 348 Conn. 511–12. ‘‘The basic rule of tort
compensation is that the plaintiff be put in the position
that he would have been in [without] the defendant’s
negligence.’’ Siemieniec v. Lutheran General Hospital,
117 Ill. 2d 230, 240,
512 N.E.2d 691 (1987), overruled
on other grounds by Clark v. Children’s Memorial Hospital, 955 N.E.2d 1065 (Ill. 2011). In the wrongful life
context, that position is nonexistence. Thus, ‘‘the cause
of action involves a calculation of damages dependent
upon the relative benefits of an impaired life as opposed
to no life at all, [a] comparison [many courts have concluded] the law is not equipped to make.’’ (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) Siemieniec v. Lutheran General Hospital, supra, 240; see also, e.g., Lininger ex
rel. Lininger v. Eisenbaum, supra,764 P.2d 1210 (‘‘a
person’s existence, however handicapped it may be,
does not constitute a legally cognizable injury relative
to [nonexistence]’’).
In Lynch, the trial court denied the named defendant’s motion to strike the plaintiffs’ medical malpractice claims on the ground that they were noncognizable
wrongful life claims. Lynch v. State, supra, 348 Conn.
490. In so doing, the trial court reasoned that the claims
the plaintiffs brought on behalf of Joshua ‘‘were ordinary medical malpractice claims in that they alleged
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Suprynowicz v. Tohan
that the negligence of [the hospital] staff, in using sperm
from a CMV positive donor to inseminate [Joshua’s
mother], caused . . . Joshua [to sustain] severe lifelasting injuries . . . . [T]he court [further] observed
that [n]owhere in [the medical malpractice] counts [did]
the plaintiffs assert that the [named defendant] negligently failed to diagnose the CMV infections in sufficient
time to allow the [plaintiffs] the ability to terminate the
pregnancy, the touchstone of a wrongful life claim.’’
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 490–91.
This court agreed with the trial court that a wrongful
life claim does not allege that the defendant caused the
mother’s pregnancy or the fetus’ congenital abnormality. See id., 507–508. We concluded that Lynch did not
involve a claim for wrongful life because the plaintiffs
had alleged and established that the named defendant
was ‘‘directly responsible both for Joshua’s birth and for
his condition; [the hospital] staff created the pregnancy,
and it was precisely their negligence in doing so that was
the proximate cause of Joshua’s injuries.’’ (Emphasis
omitted.) Id., 508. The named defendant’s direct responsibility for the injury to Joshua led this court to conclude
that the claims brought by the plaintiffs on behalf of
Joshua were not wrongful life claims but were, instead,
medical malpractice claims. See id., 507–11.
Likewise, in the present case, the plaintiffs’ claims
differ fundamentally from wrongful life claims. Unlike
wrongful life claims, in which ‘‘the defendant bears no
direct responsibility for the child’s condition’’; id., 507;
in this case, the defendant is alleged to be responsible
both for the pregnancies and the alleged harm. The
plaintiffs alleged that the defendant’s unauthorized use
of his own sperm to impregnate their mothers directly
caused the harm of which they complain. As in Lynch,
this is not a case in which the alleged injury is a condition for which the defendant bears no direct responsibility. See id., 508. To the contrary, it is the plaintiffs’
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Suprynowicz v. Tohan
contention that the defendant’s deception is directly
responsible for the mental anguish, physical injury and
compromised familial relations they have suffered.
Moreover, as in Lynch, a calculation of damages does
not require a comparison between life in an impaired
state and no life at all. See id., 509–12. The plaintiffs
do not claim that the defendant’s alleged negligence
prevented their mothers from terminating their pregnancies, or that the plaintiffs would have been better
off had they never been born. That is, the plaintiffs are
not asking to be ‘‘made whole’’ by being restored to a
state of nonbeing; rather, they are seeking compensation for injuries and losses that they claim could have
been prevented or substantially mitigated if the defendant had acted with due care. The plaintiffs’ injuries,
in other words, were directly and proximately caused
by the defendant’s misconduct.9 See, e.g., Maldonado
v. Flannery, 343 Conn. 150, 189,
272 A.3d 1089 (2022)
(‘‘[the law allows] a plaintiff [to] recover all of the damages suffered as a result of a tortfeasor’s negligence’’
(emphasis omitted)). In short, the present case bears
none of the hallmarks of a wrongful life claim and is
properly understood and can be properly adjudicated
within the context of ordinary negligence claims.
The judgment is reversed with respect to the plaintiffs’ negligence claims and the case is remanded with
9
In reaching a contrary conclusion, the trial court reasoned that the
plaintiffs’ claims, ‘‘like other ‘wrongful life’ claims, present the paradox of
[plaintiffs] alleging harm that could only have been avoided if they had
never been born at all.’’ We disagree. In fact, one can easily imagine a
scenario in which the plaintiffs were born and avoided the emotional harm
of which they complain. For example, the alleged mental anguish could
have been avoided completely if the defendant had simply advised the
plaintiffs’ parents of his intention to use his own sperm in the IVF procedures.
If the plaintiffs’ parents had agreed to proceed with the IVF procedures,
the plaintiffs could have been born without being subjected to the emotional
anguish of learning as adults, through an ancestry testing service, that the
men who raised them are not their biological fathers.
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direction to deny the defendant’s motion to strike as
to those claims and for further proceedings according
to law; the judgment is affirmed in all other respects.
In this opinion the other justices concurred.
