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351 Conn. 798

State v. Sullivan

Supreme Court of Connecticut

Decided May 20, 2025

Supreme Court of Connecticut · decided 2025-05-20

The defendant appealed, on the granting of certification, from the judgment of the Appellate Court, which had affirmed his conviction of unlawful restraint in the second degree, sexual assault in the fourth degree, attempt to commit sexual assault in the third degree, and sexual assault in the third degree. During rebuttal closing argument, the prosecutor listed four defenses that, according to her, defendants ''usually'' raise in criminal cases, and she noted two additional defenses that she claimed defendants ''generally'' raise in sexual assault cases, which she referred to as the ''nuts and sluts'' defenses. The prosecutor then asked the jury, ''do you think [the victim] is nuts? Because she'd have to be nuts to make all of this up.'' The defendant claimed that the Appellate Court had incorrectly determined that the prosecutor's remarks during rebuttal were not improper and that he was entitled to a new trial. Held: Although the Appellate Court incorrectly concluded that the prosecutor's statements during rebuttal closing argument were not improper, the impro- prieties nevertheless did not deprive the defendant of a fair trial, and, accord- ingly, this court affirmed the Appellate Court's judgment. The prosecutor's use of the phrase ''nuts and sluts'' improperly appealed to the jurors' emotions and diverted their attention from their duty to decide the case solely on the evidence, as it was a highly inflammatory and crass phrase that the jurors would likely find offensive, it suggested that the jury's legal duty required passing moral judgment on the victim, and it strayed from the evidence presented at trial, which concerned whether the victim had a motive to lie and not whether the victim was insane or promiscuous. The prosecutor did not shift the burden of proof to the defense by listing the defenses that can be asserted in criminal cases, including those involving allegations of sexual assault. However, by suggesting that the theory of defense was that the victim was ''nuts,'' the prosecutor distorted the state's burden of proof, as she essentially argued that, unless the jury finds that the victim was ''nuts,'' it must find the defendant guilty, and as the prosecutor mispresented the defendant's actual theory of defense, which was that the victim had a motive to lie, and substituted her own theory, which was that the victim would have to be ''nuts'' to fabricate her allegations. The prosecutor's listing of four defenses that, according to the prosecutor, defendants ''usually'' raise in criminal cases was improper because the list was drawn from the prosecutor's own experience and was unrelated to the evidence. This court recognized that the prosecutor's use of the inflammatory phrase ''nuts and sluts'' was inappropriate and that her conduct sometimes fell short of the high ethical and professional standards to which prosecutors are to be held, but, upon applying the factors set forth in State v. Williams (204 Conn. 523), this court concluded that the identified improprieties did not deprive the defendant of his right to a fair trial. Specifically, the prosecutor's statements were not severe when viewed in light of the entire trial, as defense counsel failed to object, to request curative instructions, or to move for a mistrial in response to those statements, the improprieties were isolated or infrequent, and the state's case was relatively strong. (One justice dissenting) Argued December 9, 2024—officially released May 20, 2025

Cited by 6 later decisions — most recently October 2025

6 state decisions

Relies on In the Matter of Samuel Winship · State v. Golding · American Manufacturers Mutual Insurance v. United States

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 2025-05-20

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

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                                         State v. Sullivan


                     STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. CASEY
                             LIEM SULLIVAN
                                (SC 20965)
                        Mullins, C. J., and McDonald, D’Auria, Ecker,
                                 Alexander and Dannehy, Js.

                                             Syllabus

         The defendant appealed, on the granting of certification, from the judgment
         of the Appellate Court, which had affirmed his conviction of unlawful
         restraint in the second degree, sexual assault in the fourth degree, attempt
         to commit sexual assault in the third degree, and sexual assault in the third
         degree. During rebuttal closing argument, the prosecutor listed four defenses
         that, according to her, defendants ‘‘usually’’ raise in criminal cases, and she
         noted two additional defenses that she claimed defendants ‘‘generally’’ raise
         in sexual assault cases, which she referred to as the ‘‘nuts and sluts’’ defenses.
         The prosecutor then asked the jury, ‘‘do you think [the victim] is nuts?
         Because she’d have to be nuts to make all of this up.’’ The defendant claimed
         that the Appellate Court had incorrectly determined that the prosecutor’s
         remarks during rebuttal were not improper and that he was entitled to a
         new trial. Held:

         Although the Appellate Court incorrectly concluded that the prosecutor’s
         statements during rebuttal closing argument were not improper, the improprieties nevertheless did not deprive the defendant of a fair trial, and, accordingly, this court affirmed the Appellate Court’s judgment.

         The prosecutor’s use of the phrase ‘‘nuts and sluts’’ improperly appealed to
         the jurors’ emotions and diverted their attention from their duty to decide
         the case solely on the evidence, as it was a highly inflammatory and crass
         phrase that the jurors would likely find offensive, it suggested that the jury’s
         legal duty required passing moral judgment on the victim, and it strayed
         from the evidence presented at trial, which concerned whether the victim
         had a motive to lie and not whether the victim was insane or promiscuous.

         The prosecutor did not shift the burden of proof to the defense by listing
         the defenses that can be asserted in criminal cases, including those involving
         allegations of sexual assault.

         However, by suggesting that the theory of defense was that the victim was
         ‘‘nuts,’’ the prosecutor distorted the state’s burden of proof, as she essentially
         argued that, unless the jury finds that the victim was ‘‘nuts,’’ it must find
         the defendant guilty, and as the prosecutor mispresented the defendant’s
         actual theory of defense, which was that the victim had a motive to lie, and
         substituted her own theory, which was that the victim would have to be
         ‘‘nuts’’ to fabricate her allegations.
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                                       State v. Sullivan
       The prosecutor’s listing of four defenses that, according to the prosecutor,
       defendants ‘‘usually’’ raise in criminal cases was improper because the list
       was drawn from the prosecutor’s own experience and was unrelated to
       the evidence.

       This court recognized that the prosecutor’s use of the inflammatory phrase
       ‘‘nuts and sluts’’ was inappropriate and that her conduct sometimes fell
       short of the high ethical and professional standards to which prosecutors
       are to be held, but, upon applying the factors set forth in State v. Williams
       (
204 Conn. 523
), this court concluded that the identified improprieties did
       not deprive the defendant of his right to a fair trial.

       Specifically, the prosecutor’s statements were not severe when viewed in
       light of the entire trial, as defense counsel failed to object, to request curative
       instructions, or to move for a mistrial in response to those statements,
       the improprieties were isolated or infrequent, and the state’s case was
       relatively strong.
                                     (One justice dissenting)

               Argued December 9, 2024—officially released May 20, 2025

                                     Procedural History

          Substitute information charging the defendant with
       the crimes of unlawful restraint in the second degree,
       sexual assault in the fourth degree, attempt to commit
       sexual assault in the third degree, and sexual assault
       in the third degree, brought to the Superior Court in the
       judicial district of Windham, geographical area number
       eleven, and tried to the jury before Chaplin, J.; verdict
       and judgment of guilty, from which the defendant
       appealed to the Appellate Court, Cradle, Clark and Palmer,
       Js., which affirmed the trial court’s judgment, and the
       defendant, on the granting of certification, appealed to
       this court. Affirmed.

          Trent A. LaLima, with whom was Virginia M. Gillette, for the appellant (defendant).

         Jonathan M. Sousa, assistant state’s attorney, with
       whom, on the brief, was Anne Mahoney, state’s attorney, for the appellee (state).
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                                       State v. Sullivan

                                           Opinion

            McDONALD, J. The defendant, Casey Liem Sullivan,
         appeals from the judgment of the Appellate Court,
         which affirmed the trial court’s judgment of conviction,
         rendered after a jury trial, of unlawful restraint in the
         second degree, sexual assault in the fourth degree,
         attempt to commit sexual assault in the third degree,
         and sexual assault in the third degree. See State v.
         Sullivan, 
220 Conn. App. 403, 406, 429
, 
298 A.3d 1238
         (2023). In this certified appeal, the defendant claims
         that the prosecutor in this case, State’s Attorney Anne
         Mahoney, engaged in certain improprieties during her
         closing argument that deprived him of his due process
         right to a fair trial. We conclude that, although the
         prosecutor’s statements were improper, they did not
         deprive the defendant of his constitutional right to a
         fair trial. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the
         Appellate Court.
           The Appellate Court’s decision sets forth the procedural history and many of the relevant facts, which we
         summarize and supplement with additional facts that
         the jury could have reasonably found. See 
id.,
 406–12.
         On March 29, 2017, K1 texted the defendant to let him
         know that her daughter, C, would be spending the night
         with her. By this time, K had been living in the basement
         apartment of the defendant’s raised ranch house for
         approximately three months. When C arrived at the
         defendant’s house that evening after work, K was away
         at band practice at the house of her bandmate, M. C
         stayed in K’s apartment, where no one else was present.
           Sometime before 10 p.m., the defendant went downstairs and knocked on the basement door. C opened
         the door, and the defendant asked her if she needed
           1
             In accordance with our policy of protecting the privacy interests of the
         victims of sexual abuse, we decline to identify the victim or others through
         whom the victim’s identity may be ascertained. See General Statutes § 54-86e.
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                             State v. Sullivan

       anything and invited her upstairs to meet his dogs. She
       followed the defendant upstairs and through a dog gate
       that was at the top of the stairs. After C petted the
       defendant’s dogs, the defendant approached C and gave
       her a hug. C kept her hands by her side because she
       did not feel comfortable being touched by someone
       who was unfamiliar to her. She then moved away from
       the defendant and told him that the interaction was
       ‘‘weird . . . .’’ Because she was scared, C hopped over
       the dog gate that was at the top of the basement stairs
       and went back downstairs to K’s basement apartment.
         Approximately one-half hour later, the defendant
       again went downstairs to the basement apartment,
       where C was. The defendant was holding his cell phone
       with C’s Instagram account visible on the screen. He
       proceeded to show C photographs from her account,
       and he told her that she was attractive. Because of their
       previous interaction, the defendant’s comments made
       C uncomfortable. During their brief conversation, the
       defendant invited C to come to his garage to view sculptures that he had made. To be polite, she said yes and
       followed the defendant to the doorway of the garage.
       C remained in the doorway to keep some distance from
       the defendant but watched the defendant show her the
       sculptures and other items in the garage.
          The defendant then invited C upstairs to see more
       sculptures. She followed him upstairs, through the dog
       gate at the top of the stairs, and into a hallway leading
       to the defendant’s bedroom. When the defendant entered
       the bedroom, C again remained in the doorway because
       she felt uncomfortable. While in the bedroom, the defendant told C that he had a projector in his room and that
       he wanted to ‘‘Netflix and chill’’ with her. C refused.
       The defendant walked toward the doorway to leave the
       room, at which point C moved back toward the hallway
       wall to give him space to walk by her and to keep
       her eyes on him. Instead of walking past C, who was
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         standing with her back against the wall, the defendant
         approached C and put his hands on her hips. She shifted
         away from him and moved toward the basement stairs.
         She hopped over the dog gate to return downstairs to
         K’s apartment. But, as C landed on the top step, the
         defendant, who had followed her, grabbed C under her
         arms and stopped her. He told C that she was ‘‘so light,
         [he] could just pick [her] up,’’ and he proceeded to lift
         her back over the dog gate. The defendant carried C a
         short distance to a couch in his living room and set her
         on the couch. The defendant then lay on top of C and
         started kissing her neck and rubbing her breasts and
         her genitalia over her clothing. He told C that she was a
         ‘‘bombshell,’’ that he ‘‘couldn’t pass up the opportunity,’’
         and that she was ‘‘being quarantined.’’ Because the
         defendant weighed significantly more than C, she was
         unable to move.
            At some point, the defendant shifted his position on
         C. This allowed C to free her right hand and to use her
         cell phone. She immediately texted ‘‘help me’’ to K via
         a text messaging application, which was previously
         open on her cell phone. The defendant shifted his position again, which allowed C to wiggle out from underneath him. She told the defendant that she was expecting
         a phone call and moved toward the dog gate.
           The defendant got up from the couch and followed
         C. As the defendant approached her, C turned toward
         him because she was afraid to have her back to him.
         The defendant used one of his legs to pin one of C’s
         legs against the dog gate. The defendant then exposed
         his penis, grabbed C’s free hand, and moved her hand
         toward his penis. C ripped her hand away and pushed
         the defendant. This enabled C to swing one leg over
         the dog gate as she attempted to get away. As this was
         happening, the defendant pulled down C’s V-neck shirt
         and her bra, exposing her breasts. He then licked one
         of her exposed breasts and her neck. Once C lifted
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                                     State v. Sullivan

       her second leg over the dog gate, she ran downstairs,
       entered K’s apartment, and locked the door. As C ran
       downstairs, she heard the defendant yell ‘‘fuck’’ in an
       aggravated tone.
         While attempting to flee from the defendant, C missed
       a phone call from K. After securing herself in K’s apartment, C frantically called K. C told K what the defendant
       had done to her and begged K to get her out of the house.
       After hearing C’s description of what had transpired,
       K sent angry text messages to the defendant. The texts
       stated, among other things: ‘‘Jail [a]sshole’’; ‘‘[s]he’s a
       kid you fuck’’;2 and ‘‘[h]ere they come.’’ K arrived
       shortly thereafter.
         When K pulled up to the defendant’s house, C exited
       the house and got into K’s car. K then drove C toward
       M’s house, stopping along the way to call the police to
       report what had happened. During the drive, and at M’s
       house, C was crying and shaking as she explained the
       details of the incident to K.
          At some point after K picked up C and called the
       police, K sent an additional text message to the defendant. K threatened to sue the defendant for allegedly
       locking her and her two year old son out of the house
       after she had failed to pay rent earlier that winter. K
       claimed that, because the defendant had locked her
       out, Connecticut law required that he pay her three
       months of rent. Prior to this incident, K had also been
       late in paying the security deposit that the defendant
       required as part of their oral rental agreement.
         State troopers arrived at M’s house less than one-half hour after C and K entered the house. The troopers
       spoke with C and K separately and took their written
       statements. C gave her statement to Trooper Kyle Cormier. C told Cormier the details of what had happened
        2
            C was twenty years old at the time of the incident.
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         at the defendant’s house. In response to C’s statement
         that the defendant had kissed and licked her neck, Cormier photographed the area on C’s neck that C identified
         and swabbed it for forensic evidence. Cormier also collected a ‘‘confirmatory sample’’ of C’s saliva by swabbing the inside of her mouth. He did not take DNA
         swabs of the breast that the defendant had allegedly
         licked to avoid further victimizing C. He also did not
         collect any of C’s clothing for testing. C declined to go
         to the hospital for medical treatment because she did
         not believe she was injured.
           After collecting evidence from C, Cormier drove to
         the defendant’s house. As part of his investigation, Cormier took photographs of the inside of the house and
         compared his observations of the house with what C
         had described to him. Several items corroborated C’s
         story, including a sculpture on the coffee table, the
         couch in the living room, the dog gate, and the sculptures and projector in the bedroom. State troopers
         arrested the defendant the next day.
           In September, 2017, an inspector collected a DNA
         sample from the defendant and later delivered the sample to the state forensic laboratory for comparative
         analysis. Forensic science examiners analyzed the sample collected from C’s neck for the presence of amylase,
         an enzyme found in human saliva. No amylase was
         detected, which indicated that amylase either was not
         present or was present below a detectable level. The
         forensic science examiners then analyzed the same
         sample from C’s neck for the presence of DNA. The
         results established that the sample contained a mixture
         of DNA that included DNA from C, the defendant, and
         one unknown individual. The results showed that the
         profile detected in the sample was at least 100 billion
         times more likely to occur if it originated from C, the
         defendant, and one unknown individual than if it origi-
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                             State v. Sullivan

       nated from C and two unknown individuals, taken at
       random.
          The state charged the defendant with unlawful
       restraint in the second degree in violation of General
       Statutes § 53a-96, sexual assault in the fourth degree
       in violation of General Statutes § 53a-73a (a) (2),
       attempt to commit sexual assault in the third degree
       in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-49 (a) (2) and
       53a-72a (a) (1), and sexual assault in the third degree
       in violation of § 53a-72a (a) (1). On the last day of a
       three day jury trial, during her closing argument, the
       prosecutor argued that the testimony and the other
       evidence supported the state’s theory that the defendant
       had intended to sexually assault C and that he knew
       that C did not provide consent. The prosecutor emphasized that the outcome of the case largely turned on
       whether the jury found C’s testimony credible. After
       summarizing the state’s theory of the case, the prosecutor concluded by arguing to the jury, among other
       things, that, ‘‘when [you] put together what [C] said,
       and you look at the evidence in terms of the exhibits
       and whatnot, you will see that what [C] has given you
       is a credible account, and you will see, by virtue of her
       testimony, [that] the elements [of the crimes charged]
       are proven beyond a reasonable doubt.’’
          During his summation, defense counsel began by
       arguing that C and K lacked credibility because they
       had both lied. Counsel emphasized that C testified that
       March 29, 2017, was the first time she had stayed overnight in K’s basement apartment but that K testified
       that C had spent the previous night there too. Counsel
       also challenged C’s testimony by highlighting inconsistencies in C’s story and by questioning whether the
       timeline of events that C had provided was plausible.
       As for K, defense counsel began his discussion of her
       testimony by reminding the jury that it must consider
       ‘‘the truth and the veracity of the person or witness.’’
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         Counsel pointed out that, when seeking to rent the
         apartment from the defendant, K had told the defendant
         that she had the $500 security deposit, yet she moved
         in without paying him the deposit. Defense counsel
         argued that this ‘‘[l]ie’’ went to K’s veracity.
            With respect to C, defense counsel argued that she
         had a motive to fabricate her story because K had an
         ongoing rent dispute with the defendant. As evidence,
         counsel noted that K had sent the defendant a text
         message demanding rent repayment while she was with
         C after the alleged sexual assault occurred. Defense
         counsel also emphasized that the tests conducted by
         forensic science examiners at the state forensic laboratory did not detect amylase in the sample collected
         from C’s neck despite her claim that the defendant had
         ‘‘heavily’’ kissed and licked her neck, insinuating that
         she had lied. Counsel further argued that, although the
         defendant’s DNA was found in the sample from C’s
         neck, the DNA testing was so sensitive that the defendant’s DNA could have been detected in the sample if
         C had touched items in the defendant’s house and then
         touched her own neck. Counsel concluded by telling
         the jurors that, ‘‘if you put your emotions aside, rely
         on your intellect, all we have here is . . . a witness
         who was emotional, an actress, by the way, who lied
         about being there the night before, who gave you a
         timeline, and that timeline doesn’t add up to her story.
         She tells you [that the defendant] made out on [her]
         neck, licked all over [her] neck heavily. But the evidence
         doesn’t support that. And we have a coin flip [on] the
         DNA. So, based on all of that, I ask you to find [the
         defendant] not guilty of all charges.’’
           The prosecutor began her rebuttal closing argument
         by addressing defense counsel’s arguments about the
         timeline of events and the DNA and enzyme tests. She
         then turned to the issue of whether C had fabricated her
         story. The prosecutor made the following statements,
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                              State v. Sullivan

       which the defendant now challenges on appeal: ‘‘So,
       usually in that case, there are in criminal cases basically
       four defenses. It’s alibi; somebody else did it; I did [it],
       [but] I was justified; or I did it, [but] I was out of my
       mind. In sex[ual] [assault] cases, it’s generally nuts and
       sluts is what they call it. Either the victim has had other,
       you know, situations, [so] that you’re not [going to]
       believe that she wasn’t consenting, or she’s nuts. And
       the question is, do you think [C] is nuts? Because she’d
       have to be nuts to make all of this up. There’s no reason
       for her to fabricate this, is there? What does she gain
       out of this?’’ The prosecutor summed up the state’s
       argument and concluded by saying to the jury that,
       ‘‘when you review the evidence, you’ll find [that] it [is]
       proven beyond a reasonable doubt.’’ Defense counsel
       did not object to the prosecutor’s statements, request
       a curative instruction, or move for a mistrial. During
       the remainder of the prosecutor’s rebuttal, she correctly
       stated that the jury’s task was to determine whether C
       was credible.
          After closing arguments, the trial court instructed the
       jury on the applicable law, including the presumption
       of innocence, the definition of ‘‘reasonable doubt,’’ and
       the state’s burden of proving each element of the
       charged offenses beyond a reasonable doubt. The jury
       found the defendant guilty on all charges. Thereafter,
       the trial court imposed a total effective sentence of ten
       years of incarceration, execution suspended after four
       years, followed by ten years of probation. The defendant
       was also ordered to register as a sex offender for his
       lifetime.
          On appeal to the Appellate Court, the defendant
       claimed, among other things, that the prosecutor’s use
       of the phrase ‘‘ ‘nuts and sluts’ ’’ was improper because
       it was highly inflammatory. State v. 
Sullivan, supra,
       
220 Conn. App. 412
. The defendant also argued that the
       prosecutor improperly discussed general defenses in
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                                 State v. Sullivan

          criminal law cases and defenses specific to sexual
          assault cases, which suggested that the defendant had
          a duty to present one of those defenses. See 
id.
 The
          defendant contended that these improprieties deprived
          him of a fair trial. See 
id.
 The Appellate Court disagreed
          and concluded that the prosecutor’s statements were
          not improper because they simply prefaced the state’s
          response to defense counsel’s argument that C had fabricated her story. See 
id.,
 416–20. The Appellate Court
          further reasoned that, even if the statements were
          improper, they did not deprive the defendant of a fair
          trial. See 
id.,
 420–23. This certified appeal followed.
            The sole issue on appeal is whether the Appellate
          Court correctly determined that the prosecutor’s statements during her rebuttal closing argument did not
          constitute prosecutorial impropriety that deprived the
          defendant of a fair trial. See State v. Sullivan, 
348 Conn. 927
, 
305 A.3d 631
 (2023). The defendant argues that
          the Appellate Court’s decision was incorrect for two
          reasons. First, the defendant claims that the prosecutor’s ‘‘nuts and sluts’’ statement was ‘‘highly inflammatory’’ and that it improperly appealed to the jurors’
          emotions. Second, the defendant claims that the prosecutor’s listing of defenses improperly shifted the burden
          of proof and distorted the state’s burden because the
          prosecutor implied that the defendant had a duty to
          present one of the six enumerated defenses.
             The state contends that the prosecutor’s use of the
          phrase ‘‘nuts and sluts’’ and listing of defenses were
          not improper. The state concedes that the prosecutor’s
          use of the ‘‘nuts and sluts’’ phrase was ‘‘distasteful
          . . . .’’ But it argues that the use of the phrase was a
          proper ‘‘rhetorical flourish’’ because the prosecutor was
          responding to defense counsel’s allegation that C had
          fabricated her story. Regarding the defendant’s claim
          that the prosecutor improperly shifted the burden of
          proof to the defense and distorted the state’s burden,
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       the state argues that the Appellate Court was correct
       that the prosecutor’s listing of defenses should also be
       understood as a response to defense counsel’s suggestion that C had fabricated her story. See State v. Sulli-
       
van, supra,
 220 Conn. App. 416–17. Accordingly, the
       state claims that the prosecutor’s listing of defenses
       was simply an exhortation to the jury to adopt a ‘‘commonsense view of the evidence’’ and a preface to her
       discussion of the defendant’s actual theory. The state
       also emphasizes that the prosecutor never expressly
       told the jury that the defendant was required to prove
       one of the defenses she listed. The state finally contends
       that, even if we assume, for purposes of our analysis,
       that the statements were improper, they did not deprive
       the defendant of a fair trial. We disagree with the defendant that the prosecutor shifted the burden of proof to
       the defense by listing the six defenses. But we agree
       that the prosecutor’s use of the phrase ‘‘nuts and sluts’’
       was improper because it distorted the state’s burden
       of proof. We also conclude that the prosecutor’s listing
       of defenses was improper because the list was based
       on her personal experience and was unrelated to the
       evidence presented at trial. We conclude, however, that
       the statements did not deny the defendant a fair trial.
       Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Appellate
       Court.
         We begin with the guiding legal principles. ‘‘[A] claim
       of prosecutorial impropriety, even in the absence of an
       objection, has constitutional implications and requires
       a due process analysis under State v. Williams, 
204 Conn. 523
, 535–40, 
529 A.2d 653
 (1987). . . . In analyzing claims of prosecutorial impropriety, we engage in a
       two step process.’’3 (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
         3
           Although defense counsel did not object to the prosecutor’s statements,
       and, therefore, the defendant’s claim is unpreserved, ‘‘under settled law, a
       defendant who fails to preserve claims of prosecutorial [impropriety] need
       not seek to prevail under the specific requirements of State v. Golding, 
213 Conn. 233
, 239–40, 
567 A.2d 823
 (1989) [as modified by In re Yasiel R., 
317 Conn. 773
, 781, 
120 A.3d 1188
 (2015)] . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks
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          14                                   ,0                         0 Conn. 1
                                        State v. Sullivan

          State v. Washington, 
345 Conn. 258, 280
, 
284 A.3d 280
          (2022). ‘‘First, we must determine whether any impropriety in fact occurred; second, we must examine
          whether that impropriety, or the cumulative effect of
          multiple improprieties, deprived the defendant of his
          due process right to a fair trial.’’ (Internal quotation
          marks omitted.) 
Id.,
 280–81.
             ‘‘It is well established that prosecutorial impropriety
          can occur during final or rebuttal argument. . . . To
          prove prosecutorial [impropriety], the defendant must
          demonstrate substantial prejudice. . . . In order to
          demonstrate this, the defendant must establish that the
          trial as a whole was fundamentally unfair and that the
          [impropriety] so infected the trial with unfairness as to
          make the conviction a denial of due process.’’ (Citation
          omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v.
          Ortiz, 
343 Conn. 566, 580
, 
275 A.3d 578
 (2022).
              We have previously observed that, ‘‘[w]hen making
          closing arguments to the jury, [counsel] must be allowed
          a generous latitude in argument . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Ciullo, 
314 Conn. 28
, 37,
          
100 A.3d 779
 (2014). The exact ‘‘limits of legitimate
          argument and fair comment cannot be determined precisely by rule and line, and something must be allowed
          for the zeal of counsel in the heat of argument. . . .
          Thus, as the state’s advocate, a prosecutor may argue
          the state’s case forcefully, [provided the argument is]
          fair and based [on] the facts in evidence and the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) 
Id.
 Consistent with this latitude,
          ‘‘[i]t does not follow . . . that every use of rhetorical
          language or device [by the prosecutor] is improper.’’
          (Internal quotation marks omitted.) 
Id.
          omitted.) State v. Ortiz, 
343 Conn. 566, 579
, 
275 A.3d 578
 (2022). Accordingly,
          ‘‘it is unnecessary for a reviewing court to apply the four-pronged Golding
          test.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.
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                              State v. Sullivan

           ‘‘Nevertheless, the prosecutor has a heightened duty
       to avoid argument that strays from the evidence or
       diverts the jury’s attention from the facts of the case.’’
       (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. The heightened
       duty of prosecutors stems from their unique position
       and responsibilities in our judicial system. See, e.g.,
       State v. Stevenson, 
269 Conn. 563
, 571–72, 
849 A.2d 626
       (2004). As this court has often emphasized, a prosecutor
       ‘‘is not only an officer of the court, like every attorney,
       but is also a high public officer, representing the people
       of the [s]tate, who seek impartial justice for the guilty
       as much as for the innocent.’’ (Emphasis added; internal
       quotation marks omitted.) State v. Ciullo, supra, 314
       Conn. 37–38; see, e.g., State v. Dabate, 
351 Conn. 428, 472
, 
331 A.3d 1159
 (2025) (noting that prosecutors are
       ‘‘constitutional officers’’); see also, e.g., Division of
       Criminal Justice, Connecticut Prosecution Standards
       (1st Ed. May, 2023) standard 1-1.1, p. 1, available at
       https://portal.ct.gov/dcj/-/media/dcj/07202023dcj-ct-prosecution-standards.pdf (last visited May 14, 2025) (recognizing that ‘‘[t]he primary responsibility of a prosecutor
       is to seek justice within the bounds of the law, not
       merely to [obtain a] convict[ion]’’). ‘‘A prosecutor has
       the responsibility of a minister of justice and not simply
       that of an advocate.’’ Rules of Professional Conduct 3.8,
       commentary. Accordingly, although ‘‘the privilege of
       counsel in addressing the jury should not be too closely
       narrowed or unduly hampered, it must never be used
       as a license to state, or to comment [on], or to suggest
       an inference from, facts not in evidence, or to present
       matters [that] the jury ha[s] no right to consider.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Ciullo, supra, 38.
                                     I
          Having set forth the general legal principles guiding
       our review of the defendant’s claims, we now consider
       whether the prosecutor’s use of the phrase ‘‘nuts and
       sluts’’ and her listing of defenses were improper.
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                                State v. Sullivan

                                       A
             The defendant first claims that the prosecutor’s use
          of the phrase ‘‘nuts and sluts’’ improperly appealed to
          the jurors’ emotions. He argues that the phrase was
          ‘‘highly inflammatory,’’ that its use improperly invoked
          the jury’s sympathy by suggesting that the jury’s legal
          duty required passing moral judgment on C, and that it
          strayed from the evidence. We agree with the defendant.
             It is well established that a prosecutor should ‘‘not
          appeal to the emotions, passions and prejudices of the
          jurors. . . . [S]uch appeals should be avoided because
          they have the effect of diverting the [jurors’] attention
          from their duty to decide the case on the evidence. . . .
          When the prosecutor appeals to emotions, he invites
          the jury to decide the case, not according to a rational
          appraisal of the evidence, but on the basis of powerful
          and irrelevant factors [that] are likely to skew that
          appraisal.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks
          omitted.) State v. Ciullo, supra, 
314 Conn. 56
. ‘‘It must
          be acknowledged that the line between comments that
          risk invoking the passions and prejudices of the jurors
          and those that are permissible rhetorical flourishes is
          not always easy to draw. The more closely the comments are connected to relevant facts disclosed by the
          evidence, however, the more likely they will be deemed
          permissible.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State
          v. O’Brien-Veader, 
318 Conn. 514
, 526, 
122 A.3d 555
          (2015). By contrast, statements that have no reasonable
          connection to evidence offered or issues presented in
          a case are more likely to be deemed improper. See, e.g.,
          State v. Albino, 
312 Conn. 763
, 775, 
97 A.3d 478
 (2014).
            By using the phrase ‘‘nuts and sluts,’’ the prosecutor
          used patently inflammatory language. Instead of using
          innocuous terms to describe these defenses, as she did
          with the general defenses and proceeded to do when
          explaining what ‘‘nuts and sluts’’ meant, the prosecutor
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       0 Conn. 1                    ,0                          17
                              State v. Sullivan

       instead chose to use a crass phrase that the jurors would
       likely find offensive and would cause them to reflexively
       side with the person baselessly accused of being insane
       or promiscuous. Its inflammatory nature was compounded by the fact that the prosecutor used the phrase
       during her rebuttal closing argument. As a result,
       defense counsel had no opportunity to respond.
          The prosecutor’s use of the phrase was also unrelated
       to the evidence in this case. Although the defendant’s
       theory was primarily that C had a motive to lie because
       of K’s rent dispute with the defendant, defense counsel
       never argued or suggested that C was either insane or
       promiscuous. Although defense counsel argued that C
       had a motive to lie, that is quite different from claiming
       that C is ‘‘nuts.’’ Nor did defense counsel’s argument
       warrant invocation of the inflammatory and misogynistic term ‘‘sluts.’’ By defending C from a nonexistent
       allegation that she was either ‘‘nuts’’ or a ‘‘slut,’’ the
       prosecutor inserted highly inflammatory language that
       was disconnected from the evidence and ‘‘calculated
       solely to appeal to the jurors’ emotions.’’ State v. Albino,
       supra, 
312 Conn. 775
. The prosecutor’s use of the term
       ‘‘nuts and sluts’’ was, in short, gratuitous and inflammatory. Accordingly, we conclude that the prosecutor
       improperly appealed to the jurors’ emotions and
       ‘‘divert[ed] the [jurors’] attention from their duty to
       decide the case on the evidence.’’ (Internal quotation
       marks omitted.) State v. Ciullo, supra, 
314 Conn. 56
.
         Although the state and the Appellate Court agree
       that the language was distasteful; see State v. 
Sullivan, supra,
 
220 Conn. App. 420
; the state argues that the
       Appellate Court correctly concluded that the phrase
       was not improper because the prosecutor’s purpose in
       using it was to challenge defense counsel’s claim that
       C had a motive to lie. See 
id., 418
. Even if the prosecutor
       was directly responding to the defendant’s theory of
       the case, her purpose in using the phrase does not
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          18                           ,0                 0 Conn. 1
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          mitigate the inflammatory nature of the phrase itself.
          Nor is it of any consequence that the prosecutor may
          not have intended to use the phrase to personally attack
          the defendant—its use was improper because it was
          highly inflammatory and unrelated to the evidence. See,
          e.g., State v. Michael T., 
338 Conn. 705
, 725, 
259 A.3d 617
 (2021) (‘‘[a]n improper appeal to the jurors’ emotions can take the form of a personal attack on the
          defendant’s character . . . or a plea for sympathy for
          the victim or her family’’ (internal quotation marks
          omitted)).
                                        B
             The defendant next claims that the prosecutor, in
          her rebuttal closing argument, improperly shifted the
          burden of proof to the defendant and distorted the
          state’s burden of proof by listing four defenses that she
          claimed defendants ‘‘usually’’ raise in all criminal cases
          and two additional defenses that she claimed defendants ‘‘generally’’ raise in sexual assault cases. Although
          we agree that the prosecutor’s remarks were improper,
          we disagree that they shifted the burden of proof to
          the defendant. However, we conclude that the prosecutor, by suggesting that the defendant’s defense was that
          C was ‘‘nuts,’’ distorted the state’s burden of proof both
          by violating the principles set forth in this court’s decision in State v. Singh, 
259 Conn. 693
, 
793 A.2d 226
          (2002), and by mischaracterizing the defendant’s theory
          of the defense. Additionally, we conclude that the prosecutor’s listing of four defenses that may be asserted in
          criminal cases was improper because it was drawn from
          the prosecutor’s own experience and was unrelated to
          the evidence.
            We note that the defendant argues, at times, that the
          prosecutor shifted the burden of proof to the defendant
          and, at other times, that the prosecutor distorted the
          state’s burden of proof. Because our case law has not
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       0 Conn. 1                   ,0                         19
                             State v. Sullivan

       precisely articulated the differences between each
       claim—and has sometimes used them interchangeably—we take the opportunity to clarify those differences here.
          A prosecutor improperly shifts the state’s burden of
       proof to a defendant when the prosecutor argues that
       the defendant has a duty to produce evidence or otherwise bears some burden to prove their innocence or to
       disprove that an element of a crime can be established.
       See, e.g., State v. Andrews, 
313 Conn. 266
, 309, 
96 A.3d 1199
 (2014) (prosecutor did not impermissibly shift burden of proof to defendant by remarking that state did
       not have to prove moment of victim’s death because
       relevant statute did not require proof of that fact as
       element of offense); see also, e.g., United States v. Bautista, 
23 F.3d 726, 733
 (2d Cir.) (addressing defendant’s
       burden shifting claim and observing that ‘‘[t]he government may not . . . suggest that the defendant has the
       burden of producing evidence’’), cert. denied sub nom.
       Minier-Contreras v. United States, 
513 U.S. 862
, 
115 S. Ct. 174
, 
130 L. Ed. 2d 110
 (1994); United States v.
       Clark, 
982 F.2d 965
, 968–69 (6th Cir. 1993) (‘‘it would
       be improper for the prosecutor to suggest that the
       defendant had the burden of proof or any obligation
       to produce evidence to prove his innocence’’); United
       States v. Parker, 
903 F.2d 91, 98
 (2d Cir.) (prosecutor
       may not ‘‘suggest that the defendant has any burden of
       proof or any obligation to adduce any evidence’’), cert.
       denied, 
498 U.S. 872
, 
111 S. Ct. 196
, 
112 L. Ed. 2d 158
       (1990), and cert. denied sub nom. Moon v. United States,
       
498 U.S. 874
, 
111 S. Ct. 201
, 
112 L. Ed. 2d 162
 (1990).
       With respect to a burden shifting theory of prosecutorial
       impropriety, the central idea is that the state shifted
       the burden of proof to the defendant. This is improper
       because ‘‘[i]t is axiomatic that the state [bears the burden of proving] all the essential elements of the crimes
       charged beyond a reasonable doubt in order to obtain
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          20                          ,0                0 Conn. 1
                                State v. Sullivan

          a conviction.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State
          v. Milardo, 
224 Conn. 397, 410
, 
618 A.2d 1347
 (1993);
          see also, e.g., In re Winship, 
397 U.S. 358, 364
, 
90 S. Ct. 1068
, 
25 L. Ed. 2d 368
 (1970) (‘‘the [d]ue [p]rocess
          [c]lause protects the accused against conviction except
          upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact
          necessary to constitute the crime with which he is
          charged’’). By contrast, criminal defendants have no
          burden to prove their innocence because they are presumptively innocent. See, e.g., State v. Brawley, 
321 Conn. 583
, 587, 
137 A.3d 757
 (2016) (‘‘[t]he presumption
          of innocence, although not articulated in the [c]onstitution, is a basic component of a fair trial under our
          system of criminal justice’’ (internal quotation marks
          omitted)).
             A prosecutor distorts the state’s burden of proof in
          situations in which the prosecutor argues that, to find
          the defendant guilty, the jury must find something other
          than that the state has met its burden of proving the
          defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. See, e.g.,
          State v. Courtney G., 
339 Conn. 328
, 356–61, 
260 A.3d 1152
 (2021) (concluding that prosecutor distorted state’s
          burden of proof by misstating reasonable doubt standard and mischaracterizing defendant’s use of evidence); State v. 
Singh, supra,
 259 Conn. 708–12 (holding
          that prosecutor distorted state’s burden of proof by
          suggesting that, to find defendant not guilty, jury must
          find that state’s witnesses had lied). Whereas a claim
          that a prosecutor shifted the state’s burden of proof to
          the defendant emphasizes the improper burden placed
          on the defendant, a claim that a prosecutor distorted
          the state’s burden emphasizes how the prosecutor
          improperly characterized or construed the burden that
          the state must meet.
            We first consider the defendant’s claim that the prosecutor’s listing of six defenses improperly shifted the
          burden to the defendant by suggesting that he was obli-
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       0 Conn. 1                   ,0                        21
                             State v. Sullivan

       gated to present one of those defenses. We disagree
       that the prosecutor’s remarks reasonably could have
       been understood by the jury to make that suggestion.
       It would require a leap in logic to conclude that, by
       merely listing available defenses, without more, the
       prosecutor improperly argued that the defendant had
       the burden to present one of those defenses. In the
       present case, we conclude that, for three reasons, it is
       unnecessary for us to address whether merely providing
       such a list would suffice to impermissibly suggest that
       the defendant was obligated to present one of the enumerated defenses. First, the prosecutor twice used language indicating that the list of defenses was not
       intended to be exhaustive or exclusive. She stated that
       the first four listed defenses were defenses ‘‘usually’’
       presented in criminal cases and that the two defenses
       to sexual assault offenses were ones ‘‘generally’’ made.
       The prosecutor thus recognized that, in some cases,
       the listed defenses may not be asserted. Second, at the
       time that the remarks were made, defense counsel had
       already presented to the jury the defense that C was
       not credible and that the alleged incident did not happen. Third, at no point did the prosecutor suggest that
       the defendant was obligated to present one of the listed
       defenses or that he otherwise bore the burden to present any defense. Accordingly, we cannot conclude that
       the prosecutor’s remarks improperly shifted the burden
       to the defendant. In addition, the prosecutor noted several times, both in her initial closing argument and her
       rebuttal, that the state bore the burden of proving the
       defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The trial
       court’s instructions also made clear that the state bore
       the burden of proving each element of the charged
       offenses beyond a reasonable doubt and that the defendant was not obligated to testify or prove his innocence.
         The defendant also contends that the prosecutor distorted the state’s burden of proof by telling the jury
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          22                           ,0                  0 Conn. 1
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          that C would ‘‘have to be nuts to make all of this up.’’
          We agree. The prosecutor listed, as general background,
          six different defenses that can be asserted in criminal
          cases that involve allegations of sexual assault, one of
          which was that the alleged victim was ‘‘nuts . . . .’’ By
          telling the jury that C would ‘‘have to be nuts to make
          all of this up,’’ the prosecutor suggested that the defendant’s theory was that C was ‘‘nuts’’ and essentially
          argued that the jury would have to find that C was
          ‘‘nuts’’ to find the defendant not guilty. That is, the
          prosecutor substituted the defendant’s actual theory,
          which was that C, motivated by K’s rent dispute with
          the defendant, had fabricated the allegations of sexual
          assault, with the prosecutor’s version of the defendant’s
          theory, which was that C had fabricated the allegations
          because she was ‘‘nuts . . . .’’
             By substituting the ‘‘nuts’’ theory for the defendant’s
          actual theory, the prosecutor distorted the state’s burden of proof. The prosecutor essentially argued that,
          unless the jury found that C was ‘‘nuts,’’ it must find
          the defendant guilty. This distortion is similar to that
          which this court held to be improper in State v. 
Singh, supra,
 
259 Conn. 693
. In Singh, we held that a prosecutor improperly distorts the state’s burden of proof by
          arguing that the jury may find a defendant not guilty
          only if it finds that the state’s witnesses had lied. See
          
id.,
 708–12; see also, e.g., State v. 
Dabate, supra,
 
351 Conn. 445
 (relying on Singh for proposition that prosecutor’s remark that jury could find defendant not guilty
          only if it found that other witnesses had lied ‘‘distort[ed]
          [the] prosecutor’s burden of proof’’). In the present
          case, the prosecutor made a similar argument, improperly implying that the jury could find the defendant not
          guilty only if it believed that C was ‘‘nuts . . . .’’
            In addition to violating the principles that this court
          has set forth in Singh, the prosecutor’s remarks mischaracterized the defendant’s theory of the defense,
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       0 Conn. 1                   ,0                        23
                             State v. Sullivan

       further distorting the state’s burden of proof. As we
       previously explained, defense counsel argued that both
       C and K had lied. The defendant’s theory of the case,
       therefore, was that the sexual assault never happened
       and that C and K had fabricated the allegations. At no
       point in his summation did defense counsel explicitly
       state or even imply that C was somehow insane or
       ‘‘nuts.’’ He argued, rather, that C had a motive to lie
       because K was behind in her rent payments to the
       defendant. Accordingly, by suggesting that the defendant’s theory was that C was ‘‘nuts,’’ the prosecutor
       misrepresented the defendant’s theory of the case.
       Because no evidence or argument had been presented
       regarding C’s sanity, the prosecutor set an easier task
       for herself than rebutting the defendant’s actual theory.
       See, e.g., State v. Thierry, 
190 Wn. App. 680, 694
, 
360 P.3d 940
 (2015) (‘‘[t]he tactic of misrepresenting
       defense counsel’s argument in rebuttal, effectively creating a straw man easily destroyed in the minds of the
       jury, does not comport with the prosecutor’s duty to
       seek convictions based only on probative evidence and
       sound reason’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)),
       review denied, 
185 Wn. 2d 1015
, 
368 P.3d 171
 (2016).
       The prosecutor’s misrepresentation of the defendant’s
       theory of the defense was not remedied by the prosecutor’s subsequent, correct statement that the jury’s primary task was to determine whether C was credible.
       That correct statement of the law was clouded by the
       earlier suggestion that C would have to be ‘‘nuts’’ to
       fabricate the allegations of sexual assault.
         The state nevertheless contends that the prosecutor’s
       statements were not improper because the defendant’s
       theory of the case was unreasonable. The state argues
       that the defendant’s theory was unreasonable because
       the defense did not present direct evidence to show
       that C had knowledge of K’s rent dispute with the defendant. We are not persuaded. Whether the defendant’s
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          24                            ,0                   0 Conn. 1
                                  State v. Sullivan

          theory of the case was reasonable is of no consequence.
          Even if the defendant’s theory of the case was unreasonable, a prosecutor is not authorized to make any argument they wish, regardless of what the parties argued
          and what the evidence reasonably established. Rather,
          the prosecutor could have argued that the defendant’s
          theory of the case was implausible and that the state’s
          theory was more likely. As an impartial minister of
          justice, a prosecutor has a duty to avoid straying from
          the evidence and the facts of the case, even when advocating for the state’s position during closing arguments.
          See, e.g., State v. Ciullo, supra, 314 Conn. 37–38. In
          other words, a prosecutor’s closing arguments must,
          within reason, be limited to the facts established and
          the theory the state is advancing. Statements that stray
          far beyond these bounds cannot simply be excused as
          rhetorical flourish. Nor are we persuaded by the state’s
          argument that the prosecutor was merely inviting the
          jury to take a ‘‘commonsense view of the evidence.’’
          Telling the jury that C would have to be ‘‘nuts’’ to fabricate her story is not ‘‘common sense’’ in the context
          of the whole trial and defense counsel’s summation.
          Defense counsel never mentioned insanity or presented
          any evidence from which the jury could have reasonably
          inferred that C was insane. Claiming that C lied is not
          the same as claiming that she is insane. The prosecutor’s
          ‘‘nuts’’ remark served only to divert the jury’s attention
          from the real facts and issues presented in the case.
             Finally, we also conclude that the prosecutor’s listing
          of the four defenses that she claimed were ‘‘usually’’
          presented in criminal cases—‘‘[i]t’s alibi; somebody else
          did it; I did [it], [but] I was justified; or I did it, [but] I
          was out of my mind’’—was improper because it was
          unrelated to the evidence presented at trial. In making
          these remarks, the prosecutor appeared to be sharing
          her general legal knowledge, drawn from her own experience, with the jury. Such remarks have no place in a
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       0 Conn. 1                    ,0                         25
                              State v. Sullivan

       criminal trial and are improper. See, e.g., State v. Daniel
       G., 
147 Conn. App. 523
, 560–61, 
84 A.3d 9
 (prosecutor
       improperly injected personal knowledge into case by
       describing how he would have reacted in defendant’s
       situation), cert. denied, 
311 Conn. 931
, 
87 A.3d 579
       (2014); State v. Houle, 
105 Conn. App. 813
, 823–24, 
940 A.2d 836
 (2008) (it was improper for prosecutor to discuss personal experiences with alcohol in closing argument); State v. McCarthy, 
105 Conn. App. 596, 631
, 
939 A.2d 1195
 (prosecutor improperly discussed personal
       disappointment with automatic focus camera when
       there was lack of evidence adduced at trial regarding
       disappointing results produced by type of camera used
       by defendant’s private investigators), cert. denied, 
286 Conn. 913
, 
944 A.2d 983
 (2008). These remarks, by referencing theories unrelated to the evidence presented at
       trial, risked distracting the jury from its primary task
       of determining whether C was credible. We agree with
       the dissenting opinion that the prosecutor’s list of standard defense theories also risked distracting the jury
       for another, related reason: the list suggested to the
       jury that the prosecutor had knowledge of evidence
       that the jury had not seen and that supported the
       state’s position.
                                     II
         Having concluded that the prosecutor’s remarks were
       improper, we must now determine whether they deprived
       the defendant of a fair trial. ‘‘To prove prosecutorial
       [impropriety], the defendant must demonstrate substantial prejudice. . . . In order to demonstrate this,
       the defendant must establish that the trial as a whole
       was fundamentally unfair and that the [impropriety]
       so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the
       conviction a denial of due process. . . . In weighing
       the significance of an instance of prosecutorial impropriety, a reviewing court must consider the entire context of the trial, and [t]he question of whether the
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          26                           ,0                  0 Conn. 1
                                 State v. Sullivan

          defendant has been prejudiced by prosecutorial [impropriety] . . . depends on whether there is a reasonable
          likelihood that the jury’s verdict would have been different [in the absence of] the sum total of the improprieties.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v.
          Hinds, 
344 Conn. 541, 563
, 
280 A.3d 446
 (2022).
             To aid this court in determining whether a prosecutorial impropriety so infected the proceedings with
          unfairness as to deprive a defendant of a fair trial, this
          court applies the factors set forth in State v. 
Williams, supra,
 
204 Conn. 540
. These factors include (1) ‘‘the
          extent to which the [impropriety] was invited by
          defense conduct or argument,’’ (2) ‘‘the severity of the
          [impropriety],’’ (3) ‘‘the frequency of the [impropriety],’’
          (4) ‘‘the centrality of the [impropriety] to the critical
          issues in the case,’’ (5) ‘‘the strength of the curative
          measures adopted,’’ and (6) ‘‘the strength of the state’s
          case.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v.
          
Hinds, supra,
 344 Conn. 563–64; accord State v. Wil-
          
liams, supra, 540
.
             Applying these factors, we conclude that the prosecutor’s improprieties did not deprive the defendant of a
          fair trial. As to the first Williams factor, although
          defense counsel argued that C had fabricated the sexual
          assault allegations, the prosecutor’s list of defenses and
          use of the ‘‘nuts and sluts’’ phrase were unrelated to
          these allegations and the evidence. Accordingly, we
          conclude that the prosecutor’s improprieties were not
          invited by defense conduct or argument.
             As to the second Williams factor, we conclude that
          the prosecutor’s statements were not severe when
          viewed in light of the entire trial. In determining
          whether prosecutorial impropriety is severe, this court
          ‘‘consider[s] it highly significant [if] defense counsel
          failed to object to . . . the improper remarks, [to]
          request curative instructions, or [to] move for a mis-
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       0 Conn. 1                    ,0                           27
                              State v. Sullivan

       trial.’’ State v. Thompson, 
266 Conn. 440, 479
, 
832 A.2d 626
 (2003). Defense counsel’s failure to do these things
       is ‘‘a strong indication that [the improper remarks] did
       not carry substantial weight in the course of the trial
       as a whole and were not so egregious that they caused
       the defendant harm.’’ State v. Weatherspoon, 
332 Conn. 531, 558
, 
212 A.3d 208
 (2019). In the present case,
       defense counsel did not object to the improper list of
       defenses and use of the ‘‘nuts and sluts’’ phrase, request
       a curative instruction, or move for a mistrial. Because
       defense counsel failed to do these things, ‘‘only instances
       of grossly egregious [prosecutorial impropriety] will be
       severe enough to mandate reversal.’’ State v. 
Thompson, supra, 480
. Although we think it is a close call, we conclude
       that the prosecutor’s mention of the four general defenses
       and use of the phrase ‘‘nuts and sluts’’ were not grossly
       egregious improprieties. We reiterate that the use of
       that phrase was gratuitous and inflammatory and has
       no place in our courts. It is surprising that such language
       would needlessly be used by any attorney, let alone by
       a seasoned state’s attorney. Nevertheless, we cannot
       conclude that this isolated incident, when viewed
       within the context of the entire trial, was sufficiently
       egregious so as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial.
          Next, with respect to the third Williams factor, we
       observe that the prosecutor’s listing of defenses and
       use of the ‘‘nuts and sluts’’ phrase occurred only once
       and within a brief time frame. See, e.g., State v. 
Hinds, supra,
 
344 Conn. 564
. Even though the trial was short
       in length, the statements at issue were still infrequent.
       The prosecutor’s statements occupied a brief paragraph
       in the transcript, and the prosecutor did not repeat any
       of the improper statements. Accordingly, we conclude
       that the third factor weighs in favor of the state.
         As to the fourth Williams factor, the jury’s resolution
       of the issues in the case largely depended on weighing
       C’s credibility. Thus, the prosecutor’s statement that
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          the jury must find that C was ‘‘nuts’’ to disbelieve her
          testimony implicated the central issue in the case, as
          the state concedes.
             As to the fifth Williams factor, the state rightly concedes that the trial court did not implement any curative
          measures. We agree with the state, however, that,
          although the trial court gave no specific curative instructions, the defendant ‘‘bears much of the responsibility
          for the fact that [the] claimed improprieties went
          uncured’’ because defense counsel did not object to
          the prosecutor’s statements at trial. (Internal quotation
          marks omitted.) State v. Angel T., 
292 Conn. 262, 291
,
          
973 A.2d 1207
 (2009); see also, e.g., 
id.
 (emphasizing
          this court’s ‘‘continue[d] . . . adhere[nce] to the well
          established maxim that defense counsel’s failure to
          object to the prosecutor’s argument . . . when [it is]
          made suggests that defense counsel did not believe that
          [it was] unfair in light of the record of the case at the
          time’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)). Moreover,
          the trial court properly instructed the jury on the applicable law, including the presumption of innocence, the
          definition of ‘‘reasonable doubt,’’ and the state’s burden
          of proving each element of the charged offenses beyond
          a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, we conclude that the
          fifth Williams factor militates against the defendant’s
          argument.
            Finally, with respect to the sixth Williams factor, we
          agree with the state that its case was relatively strong.
          As the state notes, whereas some sexual assault cases
          rest entirely on a complainant’s credibility, in this case,
          the state presented physical and documentary evidence
          to support C’s testimony. See, e.g., State v. Ritrovato,
          
280 Conn. 36, 57
, 
905 A.2d 1079
 (2006) (noting that ‘‘a
          sexual assault case lacking physical evidence is not
          particularly strong’’). The state presented DNA evidence that indicated the presence of the defendant’s
          DNA profile on C’s neck, in the place that she alleged
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                              State v. Sullivan

       he had kissed and licked her; text messages that C had
       sent to K during the sexual assault, pleading for help;
       C’s statement to Cormier; and photographs that Cormier took in the defendant’s house. This evidence corroborated C’s account of what had happened, when the
       incident occurred, and where it occurred in the house.
       Although we agree with the Appellate Court and the
       dissenting opinion that the evidence was not overwhelming; see State v. 
Sullivan, supra,
 
220 Conn. App. 423
; we conclude that the direct and circumstantial
       evidence was nonetheless sufficient evidence of the
       defendant’s guilt. See, e.g., State v. Courtney G., supra,
       339 Conn. 365–66 (this court has ‘‘never stated that the
       state’s evidence must have been overwhelming in order
       to support a conclusion that [a] prosecutorial [impropriety] did not deprive the defendant of a fair trial’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)).

         We recognize that some of the Williams factors weigh
       in the defendant’s favor. Nevertheless, we conclude
       that, when viewed in light of the entire trial, the prosecutor’s improprieties were insufficient to establish that
       the defendant was deprived of a fair trial. See, e.g.,
       State v. Wilson, 
308 Conn. 412
, 450, 454, 
64 A.3d 91
       (2013) (noting that one Williams factor was ‘‘ultimately
       dispositive of the issue of harmfulness’’); see also, e.g.,
       State v. Pereira, 
72 Conn. App. 545, 563
, 
805 A.2d 787
       (2002) (recognizing that Williams ‘‘factors are nonexhaustive, and do not serve as an arithmetic test for
       the level of prejudice flowing from [the prosecutorial
       improprieties]’’), cert. denied, 
262 Conn. 931
, 
815 A.2d 135
 (2003). Defense counsel’s failure to object, to request
       curative instructions, or to move for a mistrial, combined with the fact that the improprieties were isolated,
       demonstrates that the prosecutor’s comments did not
       substantially prejudice the defendant. See, e.g., State v.
       
Hinds, supra,
 
344 Conn. 564
.
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              The fact that we conclude that the improprieties did
          not result in an unfair trial for the defendant does not
          mean that we in any way condone the prosecutor’s
          conduct or that we believe that the use of inflammatory
          language is befitting of ‘‘ministers of justice,’’ such as
          prosecutors, who occupy ‘‘a quasi-judicial position’’ and
          who are ‘‘not only representatives of the state but are
          also the state and represent the societal interests of its
          people.’’ (Emphasis in original.) State v. 
Dabate, supra,
          
351 Conn. 472
. The residents of Connecticut rightly
          expect their prosecutors to be held to a very high standard and that ‘‘[c]ases brought on behalf of the [state]
          should be conducted with a dignity worthy of the client.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Couture, 
194 Conn. 530, 567
, 
482 A.2d 300
 (1984) (Healey,
          J., dissenting), cert. denied, 
469 U.S. 1192
, 
105 S. Ct. 967
, 
83 L. Ed. 2d 971
 (1985); see also, e.g., Division of
          Criminal Justice, supra, Foreword, p. i (referencing ‘‘the
          Division of Criminal Justice’s unwavering commitment
          to the highest standards of ethical and professional
          conduct’’). We agree with the North Carolina Supreme
          Court’s observation that the safety of a state’s citizens
          ‘‘lies in the prosecutor who tempers zeal with human
          kindness, who seeks truth and not victims, who serves
          the law . . . and who approaches his task with humility.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Williams, 
362 N.C. 628, 635
, 
669 S.E.2d 290
 (2008), quoting
          R. Jackson, The Federal Prosecutor, Address at the
          Second Annual Conference of United States Attorneys
          (April 1, 1940).

             Notwithstanding the fact that the prosecutor sometimes fell short of those high standards in the trial of
          this case, we cannot conclude that ‘‘the trial as a whole
          was fundamentally unfair and that the [prosecutorial
          impropriety] so infected the trial with unfairness’’ as
          to deny the defendant his right to due process. (Internal
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                           State v. Sullivan

       quotation marks omitted.) State v. 
Hinds, supra,
 
344 Conn. 563
.
         The judgment of the Appellate Court is affirmed.
        In this opinion MULLINS, C. J., and ECKER, ALEXANDER and DANNEHY, Js., concurred.

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