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State v. Sullivan
STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. CASEY
LIEM SULLIVAN
(SC 20965)
Mullins, C. J., and McDonald, D’Auria, Ecker,
Alexander and Dannehy, Js.
Syllabus
The defendant appealed, on the granting of certification, from the judgment
of the Appellate Court, which had affirmed his conviction of unlawful
restraint in the second degree, sexual assault in the fourth degree, attempt
to commit sexual assault in the third degree, and sexual assault in the third
degree. During rebuttal closing argument, the prosecutor listed four defenses
that, according to her, defendants ‘‘usually’’ raise in criminal cases, and she
noted two additional defenses that she claimed defendants ‘‘generally’’ raise
in sexual assault cases, which she referred to as the ‘‘nuts and sluts’’ defenses.
The prosecutor then asked the jury, ‘‘do you think [the victim] is nuts?
Because she’d have to be nuts to make all of this up.’’ The defendant claimed
that the Appellate Court had incorrectly determined that the prosecutor’s
remarks during rebuttal were not improper and that he was entitled to a
new trial. Held:
Although the Appellate Court incorrectly concluded that the prosecutor’s
statements during rebuttal closing argument were not improper, the improprieties nevertheless did not deprive the defendant of a fair trial, and, accordingly, this court affirmed the Appellate Court’s judgment.
The prosecutor’s use of the phrase ‘‘nuts and sluts’’ improperly appealed to
the jurors’ emotions and diverted their attention from their duty to decide
the case solely on the evidence, as it was a highly inflammatory and crass
phrase that the jurors would likely find offensive, it suggested that the jury’s
legal duty required passing moral judgment on the victim, and it strayed
from the evidence presented at trial, which concerned whether the victim
had a motive to lie and not whether the victim was insane or promiscuous.
The prosecutor did not shift the burden of proof to the defense by listing
the defenses that can be asserted in criminal cases, including those involving
allegations of sexual assault.
However, by suggesting that the theory of defense was that the victim was
‘‘nuts,’’ the prosecutor distorted the state’s burden of proof, as she essentially
argued that, unless the jury finds that the victim was ‘‘nuts,’’ it must find
the defendant guilty, and as the prosecutor mispresented the defendant’s
actual theory of defense, which was that the victim had a motive to lie, and
substituted her own theory, which was that the victim would have to be
‘‘nuts’’ to fabricate her allegations.
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State v. Sullivan
The prosecutor’s listing of four defenses that, according to the prosecutor,
defendants ‘‘usually’’ raise in criminal cases was improper because the list
was drawn from the prosecutor’s own experience and was unrelated to
the evidence.
This court recognized that the prosecutor’s use of the inflammatory phrase
‘‘nuts and sluts’’ was inappropriate and that her conduct sometimes fell
short of the high ethical and professional standards to which prosecutors
are to be held, but, upon applying the factors set forth in State v. Williams
(204 Conn. 523), this court concluded that the identified improprieties did
not deprive the defendant of his right to a fair trial.
Specifically, the prosecutor’s statements were not severe when viewed in
light of the entire trial, as defense counsel failed to object, to request curative
instructions, or to move for a mistrial in response to those statements,
the improprieties were isolated or infrequent, and the state’s case was
relatively strong.
(One justice dissenting)
Argued December 9, 2024—officially released May 20, 2025
Procedural History
Substitute information charging the defendant with
the crimes of unlawful restraint in the second degree,
sexual assault in the fourth degree, attempt to commit
sexual assault in the third degree, and sexual assault
in the third degree, brought to the Superior Court in the
judicial district of Windham, geographical area number
eleven, and tried to the jury before Chaplin, J.; verdict
and judgment of guilty, from which the defendant
appealed to the Appellate Court, Cradle, Clark and Palmer,
Js., which affirmed the trial court’s judgment, and the
defendant, on the granting of certification, appealed to
this court. Affirmed.
Trent A. LaLima, with whom was Virginia M. Gillette, for the appellant (defendant).
Jonathan M. Sousa, assistant state’s attorney, with
whom, on the brief, was Anne Mahoney, state’s attorney, for the appellee (state).
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State v. Sullivan
Opinion
McDONALD, J. The defendant, Casey Liem Sullivan,
appeals from the judgment of the Appellate Court,
which affirmed the trial court’s judgment of conviction,
rendered after a jury trial, of unlawful restraint in the
second degree, sexual assault in the fourth degree,
attempt to commit sexual assault in the third degree,
and sexual assault in the third degree. See State v.
Sullivan, 220 Conn. App. 403, 406, 429,
298 A.3d 1238
(2023). In this certified appeal, the defendant claims
that the prosecutor in this case, State’s Attorney Anne
Mahoney, engaged in certain improprieties during her
closing argument that deprived him of his due process
right to a fair trial. We conclude that, although the
prosecutor’s statements were improper, they did not
deprive the defendant of his constitutional right to a
fair trial. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the
Appellate Court.
The Appellate Court’s decision sets forth the procedural history and many of the relevant facts, which we
summarize and supplement with additional facts that
the jury could have reasonably found. See id., 406–12.
On March 29, 2017, K1 texted the defendant to let him
know that her daughter, C, would be spending the night
with her. By this time, K had been living in the basement
apartment of the defendant’s raised ranch house for
approximately three months. When C arrived at the
defendant’s house that evening after work, K was away
at band practice at the house of her bandmate, M. C
stayed in K’s apartment, where no one else was present.
Sometime before 10 p.m., the defendant went downstairs and knocked on the basement door. C opened
the door, and the defendant asked her if she needed
1
In accordance with our policy of protecting the privacy interests of the
victims of sexual abuse, we decline to identify the victim or others through
whom the victim’s identity may be ascertained. See General Statutes § 54-86e.
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State v. Sullivan
anything and invited her upstairs to meet his dogs. She
followed the defendant upstairs and through a dog gate
that was at the top of the stairs. After C petted the
defendant’s dogs, the defendant approached C and gave
her a hug. C kept her hands by her side because she
did not feel comfortable being touched by someone
who was unfamiliar to her. She then moved away from
the defendant and told him that the interaction was
‘‘weird . . . .’’ Because she was scared, C hopped over
the dog gate that was at the top of the basement stairs
and went back downstairs to K’s basement apartment.
Approximately one-half hour later, the defendant
again went downstairs to the basement apartment,
where C was. The defendant was holding his cell phone
with C’s Instagram account visible on the screen. He
proceeded to show C photographs from her account,
and he told her that she was attractive. Because of their
previous interaction, the defendant’s comments made
C uncomfortable. During their brief conversation, the
defendant invited C to come to his garage to view sculptures that he had made. To be polite, she said yes and
followed the defendant to the doorway of the garage.
C remained in the doorway to keep some distance from
the defendant but watched the defendant show her the
sculptures and other items in the garage.
The defendant then invited C upstairs to see more
sculptures. She followed him upstairs, through the dog
gate at the top of the stairs, and into a hallway leading
to the defendant’s bedroom. When the defendant entered
the bedroom, C again remained in the doorway because
she felt uncomfortable. While in the bedroom, the defendant told C that he had a projector in his room and that
he wanted to ‘‘Netflix and chill’’ with her. C refused.
The defendant walked toward the doorway to leave the
room, at which point C moved back toward the hallway
wall to give him space to walk by her and to keep
her eyes on him. Instead of walking past C, who was
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State v. Sullivan
standing with her back against the wall, the defendant
approached C and put his hands on her hips. She shifted
away from him and moved toward the basement stairs.
She hopped over the dog gate to return downstairs to
K’s apartment. But, as C landed on the top step, the
defendant, who had followed her, grabbed C under her
arms and stopped her. He told C that she was ‘‘so light,
[he] could just pick [her] up,’’ and he proceeded to lift
her back over the dog gate. The defendant carried C a
short distance to a couch in his living room and set her
on the couch. The defendant then lay on top of C and
started kissing her neck and rubbing her breasts and
her genitalia over her clothing. He told C that she was a
‘‘bombshell,’’ that he ‘‘couldn’t pass up the opportunity,’’
and that she was ‘‘being quarantined.’’ Because the
defendant weighed significantly more than C, she was
unable to move.
At some point, the defendant shifted his position on
C. This allowed C to free her right hand and to use her
cell phone. She immediately texted ‘‘help me’’ to K via
a text messaging application, which was previously
open on her cell phone. The defendant shifted his position again, which allowed C to wiggle out from underneath him. She told the defendant that she was expecting
a phone call and moved toward the dog gate.
The defendant got up from the couch and followed
C. As the defendant approached her, C turned toward
him because she was afraid to have her back to him.
The defendant used one of his legs to pin one of C’s
legs against the dog gate. The defendant then exposed
his penis, grabbed C’s free hand, and moved her hand
toward his penis. C ripped her hand away and pushed
the defendant. This enabled C to swing one leg over
the dog gate as she attempted to get away. As this was
happening, the defendant pulled down C’s V-neck shirt
and her bra, exposing her breasts. He then licked one
of her exposed breasts and her neck. Once C lifted
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State v. Sullivan
her second leg over the dog gate, she ran downstairs,
entered K’s apartment, and locked the door. As C ran
downstairs, she heard the defendant yell ‘‘fuck’’ in an
aggravated tone.
While attempting to flee from the defendant, C missed
a phone call from K. After securing herself in K’s apartment, C frantically called K. C told K what the defendant
had done to her and begged K to get her out of the house.
After hearing C’s description of what had transpired,
K sent angry text messages to the defendant. The texts
stated, among other things: ‘‘Jail [a]sshole’’; ‘‘[s]he’s a
kid you fuck’’;2 and ‘‘[h]ere they come.’’ K arrived
shortly thereafter.
When K pulled up to the defendant’s house, C exited
the house and got into K’s car. K then drove C toward
M’s house, stopping along the way to call the police to
report what had happened. During the drive, and at M’s
house, C was crying and shaking as she explained the
details of the incident to K.
At some point after K picked up C and called the
police, K sent an additional text message to the defendant. K threatened to sue the defendant for allegedly
locking her and her two year old son out of the house
after she had failed to pay rent earlier that winter. K
claimed that, because the defendant had locked her
out, Connecticut law required that he pay her three
months of rent. Prior to this incident, K had also been
late in paying the security deposit that the defendant
required as part of their oral rental agreement.
State troopers arrived at M’s house less than one-half hour after C and K entered the house. The troopers
spoke with C and K separately and took their written
statements. C gave her statement to Trooper Kyle Cormier. C told Cormier the details of what had happened
2
C was twenty years old at the time of the incident.
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State v. Sullivan
at the defendant’s house. In response to C’s statement
that the defendant had kissed and licked her neck, Cormier photographed the area on C’s neck that C identified
and swabbed it for forensic evidence. Cormier also collected a ‘‘confirmatory sample’’ of C’s saliva by swabbing the inside of her mouth. He did not take DNA
swabs of the breast that the defendant had allegedly
licked to avoid further victimizing C. He also did not
collect any of C’s clothing for testing. C declined to go
to the hospital for medical treatment because she did
not believe she was injured.
After collecting evidence from C, Cormier drove to
the defendant’s house. As part of his investigation, Cormier took photographs of the inside of the house and
compared his observations of the house with what C
had described to him. Several items corroborated C’s
story, including a sculpture on the coffee table, the
couch in the living room, the dog gate, and the sculptures and projector in the bedroom. State troopers
arrested the defendant the next day.
In September, 2017, an inspector collected a DNA
sample from the defendant and later delivered the sample to the state forensic laboratory for comparative
analysis. Forensic science examiners analyzed the sample collected from C’s neck for the presence of amylase,
an enzyme found in human saliva. No amylase was
detected, which indicated that amylase either was not
present or was present below a detectable level. The
forensic science examiners then analyzed the same
sample from C’s neck for the presence of DNA. The
results established that the sample contained a mixture
of DNA that included DNA from C, the defendant, and
one unknown individual. The results showed that the
profile detected in the sample was at least 100 billion
times more likely to occur if it originated from C, the
defendant, and one unknown individual than if it origi-
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State v. Sullivan
nated from C and two unknown individuals, taken at
random.
The state charged the defendant with unlawful
restraint in the second degree in violation of General
Statutes § 53a-96, sexual assault in the fourth degree
in violation of General Statutes § 53a-73a (a) (2),
attempt to commit sexual assault in the third degree
in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-49 (a) (2) and
53a-72a (a) (1), and sexual assault in the third degree
in violation of § 53a-72a (a) (1). On the last day of a
three day jury trial, during her closing argument, the
prosecutor argued that the testimony and the other
evidence supported the state’s theory that the defendant
had intended to sexually assault C and that he knew
that C did not provide consent. The prosecutor emphasized that the outcome of the case largely turned on
whether the jury found C’s testimony credible. After
summarizing the state’s theory of the case, the prosecutor concluded by arguing to the jury, among other
things, that, ‘‘when [you] put together what [C] said,
and you look at the evidence in terms of the exhibits
and whatnot, you will see that what [C] has given you
is a credible account, and you will see, by virtue of her
testimony, [that] the elements [of the crimes charged]
are proven beyond a reasonable doubt.’’
During his summation, defense counsel began by
arguing that C and K lacked credibility because they
had both lied. Counsel emphasized that C testified that
March 29, 2017, was the first time she had stayed overnight in K’s basement apartment but that K testified
that C had spent the previous night there too. Counsel
also challenged C’s testimony by highlighting inconsistencies in C’s story and by questioning whether the
timeline of events that C had provided was plausible.
As for K, defense counsel began his discussion of her
testimony by reminding the jury that it must consider
‘‘the truth and the veracity of the person or witness.’’
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State v. Sullivan
Counsel pointed out that, when seeking to rent the
apartment from the defendant, K had told the defendant
that she had the $500 security deposit, yet she moved
in without paying him the deposit. Defense counsel
argued that this ‘‘[l]ie’’ went to K’s veracity.
With respect to C, defense counsel argued that she
had a motive to fabricate her story because K had an
ongoing rent dispute with the defendant. As evidence,
counsel noted that K had sent the defendant a text
message demanding rent repayment while she was with
C after the alleged sexual assault occurred. Defense
counsel also emphasized that the tests conducted by
forensic science examiners at the state forensic laboratory did not detect amylase in the sample collected
from C’s neck despite her claim that the defendant had
‘‘heavily’’ kissed and licked her neck, insinuating that
she had lied. Counsel further argued that, although the
defendant’s DNA was found in the sample from C’s
neck, the DNA testing was so sensitive that the defendant’s DNA could have been detected in the sample if
C had touched items in the defendant’s house and then
touched her own neck. Counsel concluded by telling
the jurors that, ‘‘if you put your emotions aside, rely
on your intellect, all we have here is . . . a witness
who was emotional, an actress, by the way, who lied
about being there the night before, who gave you a
timeline, and that timeline doesn’t add up to her story.
She tells you [that the defendant] made out on [her]
neck, licked all over [her] neck heavily. But the evidence
doesn’t support that. And we have a coin flip [on] the
DNA. So, based on all of that, I ask you to find [the
defendant] not guilty of all charges.’’
The prosecutor began her rebuttal closing argument
by addressing defense counsel’s arguments about the
timeline of events and the DNA and enzyme tests. She
then turned to the issue of whether C had fabricated her
story. The prosecutor made the following statements,
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State v. Sullivan
which the defendant now challenges on appeal: ‘‘So,
usually in that case, there are in criminal cases basically
four defenses. It’s alibi; somebody else did it; I did [it],
[but] I was justified; or I did it, [but] I was out of my
mind. In sex[ual] [assault] cases, it’s generally nuts and
sluts is what they call it. Either the victim has had other,
you know, situations, [so] that you’re not [going to]
believe that she wasn’t consenting, or she’s nuts. And
the question is, do you think [C] is nuts? Because she’d
have to be nuts to make all of this up. There’s no reason
for her to fabricate this, is there? What does she gain
out of this?’’ The prosecutor summed up the state’s
argument and concluded by saying to the jury that,
‘‘when you review the evidence, you’ll find [that] it [is]
proven beyond a reasonable doubt.’’ Defense counsel
did not object to the prosecutor’s statements, request
a curative instruction, or move for a mistrial. During
the remainder of the prosecutor’s rebuttal, she correctly
stated that the jury’s task was to determine whether C
was credible.
After closing arguments, the trial court instructed the
jury on the applicable law, including the presumption
of innocence, the definition of ‘‘reasonable doubt,’’ and
the state’s burden of proving each element of the
charged offenses beyond a reasonable doubt. The jury
found the defendant guilty on all charges. Thereafter,
the trial court imposed a total effective sentence of ten
years of incarceration, execution suspended after four
years, followed by ten years of probation. The defendant
was also ordered to register as a sex offender for his
lifetime.
On appeal to the Appellate Court, the defendant
claimed, among other things, that the prosecutor’s use
of the phrase ‘‘ ‘nuts and sluts’ ’’ was improper because
it was highly inflammatory. State v. Sullivan, supra,
220 Conn. App. 412. The defendant also argued that the
prosecutor improperly discussed general defenses in
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State v. Sullivan
criminal law cases and defenses specific to sexual
assault cases, which suggested that the defendant had
a duty to present one of those defenses. See id. The
defendant contended that these improprieties deprived
him of a fair trial. See id. The Appellate Court disagreed
and concluded that the prosecutor’s statements were
not improper because they simply prefaced the state’s
response to defense counsel’s argument that C had fabricated her story. See id., 416–20. The Appellate Court
further reasoned that, even if the statements were
improper, they did not deprive the defendant of a fair
trial. See id., 420–23. This certified appeal followed.
The sole issue on appeal is whether the Appellate
Court correctly determined that the prosecutor’s statements during her rebuttal closing argument did not
constitute prosecutorial impropriety that deprived the
defendant of a fair trial. See State v. Sullivan, 348 Conn.
927,
305 A.3d 631 (2023). The defendant argues that
the Appellate Court’s decision was incorrect for two
reasons. First, the defendant claims that the prosecutor’s ‘‘nuts and sluts’’ statement was ‘‘highly inflammatory’’ and that it improperly appealed to the jurors’
emotions. Second, the defendant claims that the prosecutor’s listing of defenses improperly shifted the burden
of proof and distorted the state’s burden because the
prosecutor implied that the defendant had a duty to
present one of the six enumerated defenses.
The state contends that the prosecutor’s use of the
phrase ‘‘nuts and sluts’’ and listing of defenses were
not improper. The state concedes that the prosecutor’s
use of the ‘‘nuts and sluts’’ phrase was ‘‘distasteful
. . . .’’ But it argues that the use of the phrase was a
proper ‘‘rhetorical flourish’’ because the prosecutor was
responding to defense counsel’s allegation that C had
fabricated her story. Regarding the defendant’s claim
that the prosecutor improperly shifted the burden of
proof to the defense and distorted the state’s burden,
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State v. Sullivan
the state argues that the Appellate Court was correct
that the prosecutor’s listing of defenses should also be
understood as a response to defense counsel’s suggestion that C had fabricated her story. See State v. Sulli-
van, supra, 220 Conn. App. 416–17. Accordingly, the
state claims that the prosecutor’s listing of defenses
was simply an exhortation to the jury to adopt a ‘‘commonsense view of the evidence’’ and a preface to her
discussion of the defendant’s actual theory. The state
also emphasizes that the prosecutor never expressly
told the jury that the defendant was required to prove
one of the defenses she listed. The state finally contends
that, even if we assume, for purposes of our analysis,
that the statements were improper, they did not deprive
the defendant of a fair trial. We disagree with the defendant that the prosecutor shifted the burden of proof to
the defense by listing the six defenses. But we agree
that the prosecutor’s use of the phrase ‘‘nuts and sluts’’
was improper because it distorted the state’s burden
of proof. We also conclude that the prosecutor’s listing
of defenses was improper because the list was based
on her personal experience and was unrelated to the
evidence presented at trial. We conclude, however, that
the statements did not deny the defendant a fair trial.
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Appellate
Court.
We begin with the guiding legal principles. ‘‘[A] claim
of prosecutorial impropriety, even in the absence of an
objection, has constitutional implications and requires
a due process analysis under State v. Williams, 204
Conn. 523, 535–40,
529 A.2d 653 (1987). . . . In analyzing claims of prosecutorial impropriety, we engage in a
two step process.’’3 (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
3
Although defense counsel did not object to the prosecutor’s statements,
and, therefore, the defendant’s claim is unpreserved, ‘‘under settled law, a
defendant who fails to preserve claims of prosecutorial [impropriety] need
not seek to prevail under the specific requirements of State v. Golding, 213
Conn. 233, 239–40,
567 A.2d 823 (1989) [as modified by In re Yasiel R.,
317
Conn. 773, 781,
120 A.3d 1188 (2015)] . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks
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State v. Sullivan
State v. Washington, 345 Conn. 258, 280,
284 A.3d 280
(2022). ‘‘First, we must determine whether any impropriety in fact occurred; second, we must examine
whether that impropriety, or the cumulative effect of
multiple improprieties, deprived the defendant of his
due process right to a fair trial.’’ (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) Id., 280–81.
‘‘It is well established that prosecutorial impropriety
can occur during final or rebuttal argument. . . . To
prove prosecutorial [impropriety], the defendant must
demonstrate substantial prejudice. . . . In order to
demonstrate this, the defendant must establish that the
trial as a whole was fundamentally unfair and that the
[impropriety] so infected the trial with unfairness as to
make the conviction a denial of due process.’’ (Citation
omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v.
Ortiz, 343 Conn. 566, 580,
275 A.3d 578 (2022).
We have previously observed that, ‘‘[w]hen making
closing arguments to the jury, [counsel] must be allowed
a generous latitude in argument . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Ciullo, 314 Conn. 28, 37,
100 A.3d 779 (2014). The exact ‘‘limits of legitimate
argument and fair comment cannot be determined precisely by rule and line, and something must be allowed
for the zeal of counsel in the heat of argument. . . .
Thus, as the state’s advocate, a prosecutor may argue
the state’s case forcefully, [provided the argument is]
fair and based [on] the facts in evidence and the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. Consistent with this latitude,
‘‘[i]t does not follow . . . that every use of rhetorical
language or device [by the prosecutor] is improper.’’
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.
omitted.) State v. Ortiz, 343 Conn. 566, 579,
275 A.3d 578 (2022). Accordingly,
‘‘it is unnecessary for a reviewing court to apply the four-pronged Golding
test.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.
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State v. Sullivan
‘‘Nevertheless, the prosecutor has a heightened duty
to avoid argument that strays from the evidence or
diverts the jury’s attention from the facts of the case.’’
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. The heightened
duty of prosecutors stems from their unique position
and responsibilities in our judicial system. See, e.g.,
State v. Stevenson, 269 Conn. 563, 571–72,
849 A.2d 626
(2004). As this court has often emphasized, a prosecutor
‘‘is not only an officer of the court, like every attorney,
but is also a high public officer, representing the people
of the [s]tate, who seek impartial justice for the guilty
as much as for the innocent.’’ (Emphasis added; internal
quotation marks omitted.) State v. Ciullo, supra, 314
Conn. 37–38; see, e.g., State v. Dabate, 351 Conn. 428,
472,
331 A.3d 1159 (2025) (noting that prosecutors are
‘‘constitutional officers’’); see also, e.g., Division of
Criminal Justice, Connecticut Prosecution Standards
(1st Ed. May, 2023) standard 1-1.1, p. 1, available at
https://portal.ct.gov/dcj/-/media/dcj/07202023dcj-ct-prosecution-standards.pdf (last visited May 14, 2025) (recognizing that ‘‘[t]he primary responsibility of a prosecutor
is to seek justice within the bounds of the law, not
merely to [obtain a] convict[ion]’’). ‘‘A prosecutor has
the responsibility of a minister of justice and not simply
that of an advocate.’’ Rules of Professional Conduct 3.8,
commentary. Accordingly, although ‘‘the privilege of
counsel in addressing the jury should not be too closely
narrowed or unduly hampered, it must never be used
as a license to state, or to comment [on], or to suggest
an inference from, facts not in evidence, or to present
matters [that] the jury ha[s] no right to consider.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Ciullo, supra, 38.
I
Having set forth the general legal principles guiding
our review of the defendant’s claims, we now consider
whether the prosecutor’s use of the phrase ‘‘nuts and
sluts’’ and her listing of defenses were improper.
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State v. Sullivan
A
The defendant first claims that the prosecutor’s use
of the phrase ‘‘nuts and sluts’’ improperly appealed to
the jurors’ emotions. He argues that the phrase was
‘‘highly inflammatory,’’ that its use improperly invoked
the jury’s sympathy by suggesting that the jury’s legal
duty required passing moral judgment on C, and that it
strayed from the evidence. We agree with the defendant.
It is well established that a prosecutor should ‘‘not
appeal to the emotions, passions and prejudices of the
jurors. . . . [S]uch appeals should be avoided because
they have the effect of diverting the [jurors’] attention
from their duty to decide the case on the evidence. . . .
When the prosecutor appeals to emotions, he invites
the jury to decide the case, not according to a rational
appraisal of the evidence, but on the basis of powerful
and irrelevant factors [that] are likely to skew that
appraisal.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks
omitted.) State v. Ciullo, supra, 314 Conn. 56. ‘‘It must
be acknowledged that the line between comments that
risk invoking the passions and prejudices of the jurors
and those that are permissible rhetorical flourishes is
not always easy to draw. The more closely the comments are connected to relevant facts disclosed by the
evidence, however, the more likely they will be deemed
permissible.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State
v. O’Brien-Veader, 318 Conn. 514, 526,
122 A.3d 555
(2015). By contrast, statements that have no reasonable
connection to evidence offered or issues presented in
a case are more likely to be deemed improper. See, e.g.,
State v. Albino, 312 Conn. 763, 775,
97 A.3d 478 (2014).
By using the phrase ‘‘nuts and sluts,’’ the prosecutor
used patently inflammatory language. Instead of using
innocuous terms to describe these defenses, as she did
with the general defenses and proceeded to do when
explaining what ‘‘nuts and sluts’’ meant, the prosecutor
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instead chose to use a crass phrase that the jurors would
likely find offensive and would cause them to reflexively
side with the person baselessly accused of being insane
or promiscuous. Its inflammatory nature was compounded by the fact that the prosecutor used the phrase
during her rebuttal closing argument. As a result,
defense counsel had no opportunity to respond.
The prosecutor’s use of the phrase was also unrelated
to the evidence in this case. Although the defendant’s
theory was primarily that C had a motive to lie because
of K’s rent dispute with the defendant, defense counsel
never argued or suggested that C was either insane or
promiscuous. Although defense counsel argued that C
had a motive to lie, that is quite different from claiming
that C is ‘‘nuts.’’ Nor did defense counsel’s argument
warrant invocation of the inflammatory and misogynistic term ‘‘sluts.’’ By defending C from a nonexistent
allegation that she was either ‘‘nuts’’ or a ‘‘slut,’’ the
prosecutor inserted highly inflammatory language that
was disconnected from the evidence and ‘‘calculated
solely to appeal to the jurors’ emotions.’’ State v. Albino,
supra, 312 Conn. 775. The prosecutor’s use of the term
‘‘nuts and sluts’’ was, in short, gratuitous and inflammatory. Accordingly, we conclude that the prosecutor
improperly appealed to the jurors’ emotions and
‘‘divert[ed] the [jurors’] attention from their duty to
decide the case on the evidence.’’ (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) State v. Ciullo, supra, 314 Conn. 56.
Although the state and the Appellate Court agree
that the language was distasteful; see State v. Sullivan,
supra,
220 Conn. App. 420; the state argues that the
Appellate Court correctly concluded that the phrase
was not improper because the prosecutor’s purpose in
using it was to challenge defense counsel’s claim that
C had a motive to lie. See id., 418. Even if the prosecutor
was directly responding to the defendant’s theory of
the case, her purpose in using the phrase does not
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mitigate the inflammatory nature of the phrase itself.
Nor is it of any consequence that the prosecutor may
not have intended to use the phrase to personally attack
the defendant—its use was improper because it was
highly inflammatory and unrelated to the evidence. See,
e.g., State v. Michael T., 338 Conn. 705, 725,
259 A.3d
617 (2021) (‘‘[a]n improper appeal to the jurors’ emotions can take the form of a personal attack on the
defendant’s character . . . or a plea for sympathy for
the victim or her family’’ (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
B
The defendant next claims that the prosecutor, in
her rebuttal closing argument, improperly shifted the
burden of proof to the defendant and distorted the
state’s burden of proof by listing four defenses that she
claimed defendants ‘‘usually’’ raise in all criminal cases
and two additional defenses that she claimed defendants ‘‘generally’’ raise in sexual assault cases. Although
we agree that the prosecutor’s remarks were improper,
we disagree that they shifted the burden of proof to
the defendant. However, we conclude that the prosecutor, by suggesting that the defendant’s defense was that
C was ‘‘nuts,’’ distorted the state’s burden of proof both
by violating the principles set forth in this court’s decision in State v. Singh, 259 Conn. 693,
793 A.2d 226
(2002), and by mischaracterizing the defendant’s theory
of the defense. Additionally, we conclude that the prosecutor’s listing of four defenses that may be asserted in
criminal cases was improper because it was drawn from
the prosecutor’s own experience and was unrelated to
the evidence.
We note that the defendant argues, at times, that the
prosecutor shifted the burden of proof to the defendant
and, at other times, that the prosecutor distorted the
state’s burden of proof. Because our case law has not
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precisely articulated the differences between each
claim—and has sometimes used them interchangeably—we take the opportunity to clarify those differences here.
A prosecutor improperly shifts the state’s burden of
proof to a defendant when the prosecutor argues that
the defendant has a duty to produce evidence or otherwise bears some burden to prove their innocence or to
disprove that an element of a crime can be established.
See, e.g., State v. Andrews, 313 Conn. 266, 309,
96 A.3d
1199 (2014) (prosecutor did not impermissibly shift burden of proof to defendant by remarking that state did
not have to prove moment of victim’s death because
relevant statute did not require proof of that fact as
element of offense); see also, e.g., United States v. Bautista, 23 F.3d 726, 733 (2d Cir.) (addressing defendant’s
burden shifting claim and observing that ‘‘[t]he government may not . . . suggest that the defendant has the
burden of producing evidence’’), cert. denied sub nom.
Minier-Contreras v. United States, 513 U.S. 862,
115
S. Ct. 174,
130 L. Ed. 2d 110 (1994); United States v.
Clark, 982 F.2d 965, 968–69 (6th Cir. 1993) (‘‘it would
be improper for the prosecutor to suggest that the
defendant had the burden of proof or any obligation
to produce evidence to prove his innocence’’); United
States v. Parker, 903 F.2d 91, 98 (2d Cir.) (prosecutor
may not ‘‘suggest that the defendant has any burden of
proof or any obligation to adduce any evidence’’), cert.
denied, 498 U.S. 872,
111 S. Ct. 196,
112 L. Ed. 2d 158
(1990), and cert. denied sub nom. Moon v. United States,
498 U.S. 874,
111 S. Ct. 201,
112 L. Ed. 2d 162 (1990).
With respect to a burden shifting theory of prosecutorial
impropriety, the central idea is that the state shifted
the burden of proof to the defendant. This is improper
because ‘‘[i]t is axiomatic that the state [bears the burden of proving] all the essential elements of the crimes
charged beyond a reasonable doubt in order to obtain
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a conviction.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State
v. Milardo, 224 Conn. 397, 410,
618 A.2d 1347 (1993);
see also, e.g., In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364,
90 S.
Ct. 1068,
25 L. Ed. 2d 368 (1970) (‘‘the [d]ue [p]rocess
[c]lause protects the accused against conviction except
upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact
necessary to constitute the crime with which he is
charged’’). By contrast, criminal defendants have no
burden to prove their innocence because they are presumptively innocent. See, e.g., State v. Brawley, 321
Conn. 583, 587,
137 A.3d 757 (2016) (‘‘[t]he presumption
of innocence, although not articulated in the [c]onstitution, is a basic component of a fair trial under our
system of criminal justice’’ (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
A prosecutor distorts the state’s burden of proof in
situations in which the prosecutor argues that, to find
the defendant guilty, the jury must find something other
than that the state has met its burden of proving the
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. See, e.g.,
State v. Courtney G., 339 Conn. 328, 356–61,
260 A.3d
1152 (2021) (concluding that prosecutor distorted state’s
burden of proof by misstating reasonable doubt standard and mischaracterizing defendant’s use of evidence); State v. Singh, supra, 259 Conn. 708–12 (holding
that prosecutor distorted state’s burden of proof by
suggesting that, to find defendant not guilty, jury must
find that state’s witnesses had lied). Whereas a claim
that a prosecutor shifted the state’s burden of proof to
the defendant emphasizes the improper burden placed
on the defendant, a claim that a prosecutor distorted
the state’s burden emphasizes how the prosecutor
improperly characterized or construed the burden that
the state must meet.
We first consider the defendant’s claim that the prosecutor’s listing of six defenses improperly shifted the
burden to the defendant by suggesting that he was obli-
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gated to present one of those defenses. We disagree
that the prosecutor’s remarks reasonably could have
been understood by the jury to make that suggestion.
It would require a leap in logic to conclude that, by
merely listing available defenses, without more, the
prosecutor improperly argued that the defendant had
the burden to present one of those defenses. In the
present case, we conclude that, for three reasons, it is
unnecessary for us to address whether merely providing
such a list would suffice to impermissibly suggest that
the defendant was obligated to present one of the enumerated defenses. First, the prosecutor twice used language indicating that the list of defenses was not
intended to be exhaustive or exclusive. She stated that
the first four listed defenses were defenses ‘‘usually’’
presented in criminal cases and that the two defenses
to sexual assault offenses were ones ‘‘generally’’ made.
The prosecutor thus recognized that, in some cases,
the listed defenses may not be asserted. Second, at the
time that the remarks were made, defense counsel had
already presented to the jury the defense that C was
not credible and that the alleged incident did not happen. Third, at no point did the prosecutor suggest that
the defendant was obligated to present one of the listed
defenses or that he otherwise bore the burden to present any defense. Accordingly, we cannot conclude that
the prosecutor’s remarks improperly shifted the burden
to the defendant. In addition, the prosecutor noted several times, both in her initial closing argument and her
rebuttal, that the state bore the burden of proving the
defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The trial
court’s instructions also made clear that the state bore
the burden of proving each element of the charged
offenses beyond a reasonable doubt and that the defendant was not obligated to testify or prove his innocence.
The defendant also contends that the prosecutor distorted the state’s burden of proof by telling the jury
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that C would ‘‘have to be nuts to make all of this up.’’
We agree. The prosecutor listed, as general background,
six different defenses that can be asserted in criminal
cases that involve allegations of sexual assault, one of
which was that the alleged victim was ‘‘nuts . . . .’’ By
telling the jury that C would ‘‘have to be nuts to make
all of this up,’’ the prosecutor suggested that the defendant’s theory was that C was ‘‘nuts’’ and essentially
argued that the jury would have to find that C was
‘‘nuts’’ to find the defendant not guilty. That is, the
prosecutor substituted the defendant’s actual theory,
which was that C, motivated by K’s rent dispute with
the defendant, had fabricated the allegations of sexual
assault, with the prosecutor’s version of the defendant’s
theory, which was that C had fabricated the allegations
because she was ‘‘nuts . . . .’’
By substituting the ‘‘nuts’’ theory for the defendant’s
actual theory, the prosecutor distorted the state’s burden of proof. The prosecutor essentially argued that,
unless the jury found that C was ‘‘nuts,’’ it must find
the defendant guilty. This distortion is similar to that
which this court held to be improper in State v. Singh,
supra,
259 Conn. 693. In Singh, we held that a prosecutor improperly distorts the state’s burden of proof by
arguing that the jury may find a defendant not guilty
only if it finds that the state’s witnesses had lied. See
id., 708–12; see also, e.g., State v.
Dabate, supra,
351
Conn. 445 (relying on Singh for proposition that prosecutor’s remark that jury could find defendant not guilty
only if it found that other witnesses had lied ‘‘distort[ed]
[the] prosecutor’s burden of proof’’). In the present
case, the prosecutor made a similar argument, improperly implying that the jury could find the defendant not
guilty only if it believed that C was ‘‘nuts . . . .’’
In addition to violating the principles that this court
has set forth in Singh, the prosecutor’s remarks mischaracterized the defendant’s theory of the defense,
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further distorting the state’s burden of proof. As we
previously explained, defense counsel argued that both
C and K had lied. The defendant’s theory of the case,
therefore, was that the sexual assault never happened
and that C and K had fabricated the allegations. At no
point in his summation did defense counsel explicitly
state or even imply that C was somehow insane or
‘‘nuts.’’ He argued, rather, that C had a motive to lie
because K was behind in her rent payments to the
defendant. Accordingly, by suggesting that the defendant’s theory was that C was ‘‘nuts,’’ the prosecutor
misrepresented the defendant’s theory of the case.
Because no evidence or argument had been presented
regarding C’s sanity, the prosecutor set an easier task
for herself than rebutting the defendant’s actual theory.
See, e.g., State v. Thierry, 190 Wn. App. 680, 694,
360
P.3d 940 (2015) (‘‘[t]he tactic of misrepresenting
defense counsel’s argument in rebuttal, effectively creating a straw man easily destroyed in the minds of the
jury, does not comport with the prosecutor’s duty to
seek convictions based only on probative evidence and
sound reason’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)),
review denied, 185 Wn. 2d 1015,
368 P.3d 171 (2016).
The prosecutor’s misrepresentation of the defendant’s
theory of the defense was not remedied by the prosecutor’s subsequent, correct statement that the jury’s primary task was to determine whether C was credible.
That correct statement of the law was clouded by the
earlier suggestion that C would have to be ‘‘nuts’’ to
fabricate the allegations of sexual assault.
The state nevertheless contends that the prosecutor’s
statements were not improper because the defendant’s
theory of the case was unreasonable. The state argues
that the defendant’s theory was unreasonable because
the defense did not present direct evidence to show
that C had knowledge of K’s rent dispute with the defendant. We are not persuaded. Whether the defendant’s
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theory of the case was reasonable is of no consequence.
Even if the defendant’s theory of the case was unreasonable, a prosecutor is not authorized to make any argument they wish, regardless of what the parties argued
and what the evidence reasonably established. Rather,
the prosecutor could have argued that the defendant’s
theory of the case was implausible and that the state’s
theory was more likely. As an impartial minister of
justice, a prosecutor has a duty to avoid straying from
the evidence and the facts of the case, even when advocating for the state’s position during closing arguments.
See, e.g., State v. Ciullo, supra, 314 Conn. 37–38. In
other words, a prosecutor’s closing arguments must,
within reason, be limited to the facts established and
the theory the state is advancing. Statements that stray
far beyond these bounds cannot simply be excused as
rhetorical flourish. Nor are we persuaded by the state’s
argument that the prosecutor was merely inviting the
jury to take a ‘‘commonsense view of the evidence.’’
Telling the jury that C would have to be ‘‘nuts’’ to fabricate her story is not ‘‘common sense’’ in the context
of the whole trial and defense counsel’s summation.
Defense counsel never mentioned insanity or presented
any evidence from which the jury could have reasonably
inferred that C was insane. Claiming that C lied is not
the same as claiming that she is insane. The prosecutor’s
‘‘nuts’’ remark served only to divert the jury’s attention
from the real facts and issues presented in the case.
Finally, we also conclude that the prosecutor’s listing
of the four defenses that she claimed were ‘‘usually’’
presented in criminal cases—‘‘[i]t’s alibi; somebody else
did it; I did [it], [but] I was justified; or I did it, [but] I
was out of my mind’’—was improper because it was
unrelated to the evidence presented at trial. In making
these remarks, the prosecutor appeared to be sharing
her general legal knowledge, drawn from her own experience, with the jury. Such remarks have no place in a
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criminal trial and are improper. See, e.g., State v. Daniel
G., 147 Conn. App. 523, 560–61,
84 A.3d 9 (prosecutor
improperly injected personal knowledge into case by
describing how he would have reacted in defendant’s
situation), cert. denied, 311 Conn. 931,
87 A.3d 579
(2014); State v. Houle, 105 Conn. App. 813, 823–24,
940
A.2d 836 (2008) (it was improper for prosecutor to discuss personal experiences with alcohol in closing argument); State v. McCarthy,
105 Conn. App. 596, 631,
939
A.2d 1195 (prosecutor improperly discussed personal
disappointment with automatic focus camera when
there was lack of evidence adduced at trial regarding
disappointing results produced by type of camera used
by defendant’s private investigators), cert. denied, 286
Conn. 913,
944 A.2d 983 (2008). These remarks, by referencing theories unrelated to the evidence presented at
trial, risked distracting the jury from its primary task
of determining whether C was credible. We agree with
the dissenting opinion that the prosecutor’s list of standard defense theories also risked distracting the jury
for another, related reason: the list suggested to the
jury that the prosecutor had knowledge of evidence
that the jury had not seen and that supported the
state’s position.
II
Having concluded that the prosecutor’s remarks were
improper, we must now determine whether they deprived
the defendant of a fair trial. ‘‘To prove prosecutorial
[impropriety], the defendant must demonstrate substantial prejudice. . . . In order to demonstrate this,
the defendant must establish that the trial as a whole
was fundamentally unfair and that the [impropriety]
so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the
conviction a denial of due process. . . . In weighing
the significance of an instance of prosecutorial impropriety, a reviewing court must consider the entire context of the trial, and [t]he question of whether the
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defendant has been prejudiced by prosecutorial [impropriety] . . . depends on whether there is a reasonable
likelihood that the jury’s verdict would have been different [in the absence of] the sum total of the improprieties.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v.
Hinds, 344 Conn. 541, 563,
280 A.3d 446 (2022).
To aid this court in determining whether a prosecutorial impropriety so infected the proceedings with
unfairness as to deprive a defendant of a fair trial, this
court applies the factors set forth in State v. Williams,
supra,
204 Conn. 540. These factors include (1) ‘‘the
extent to which the [impropriety] was invited by
defense conduct or argument,’’ (2) ‘‘the severity of the
[impropriety],’’ (3) ‘‘the frequency of the [impropriety],’’
(4) ‘‘the centrality of the [impropriety] to the critical
issues in the case,’’ (5) ‘‘the strength of the curative
measures adopted,’’ and (6) ‘‘the strength of the state’s
case.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v.
Hinds, supra, 344 Conn. 563–64; accord State v. Wil-
liams, supra, 540.
Applying these factors, we conclude that the prosecutor’s improprieties did not deprive the defendant of a
fair trial. As to the first Williams factor, although
defense counsel argued that C had fabricated the sexual
assault allegations, the prosecutor’s list of defenses and
use of the ‘‘nuts and sluts’’ phrase were unrelated to
these allegations and the evidence. Accordingly, we
conclude that the prosecutor’s improprieties were not
invited by defense conduct or argument.
As to the second Williams factor, we conclude that
the prosecutor’s statements were not severe when
viewed in light of the entire trial. In determining
whether prosecutorial impropriety is severe, this court
‘‘consider[s] it highly significant [if] defense counsel
failed to object to . . . the improper remarks, [to]
request curative instructions, or [to] move for a mis-
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trial.’’ State v. Thompson, 266 Conn. 440, 479,
832 A.2d
626 (2003). Defense counsel’s failure to do these things
is ‘‘a strong indication that [the improper remarks] did
not carry substantial weight in the course of the trial
as a whole and were not so egregious that they caused
the defendant harm.’’ State v. Weatherspoon, 332 Conn.
531, 558,
212 A.3d 208 (2019). In the present case,
defense counsel did not object to the improper list of
defenses and use of the ‘‘nuts and sluts’’ phrase, request
a curative instruction, or move for a mistrial. Because
defense counsel failed to do these things, ‘‘only instances
of grossly egregious [prosecutorial impropriety] will be
severe enough to mandate reversal.’’ State v. Thompson,
supra, 480. Although we think it is a close call, we conclude
that the prosecutor’s mention of the four general defenses
and use of the phrase ‘‘nuts and sluts’’ were not grossly
egregious improprieties. We reiterate that the use of
that phrase was gratuitous and inflammatory and has
no place in our courts. It is surprising that such language
would needlessly be used by any attorney, let alone by
a seasoned state’s attorney. Nevertheless, we cannot
conclude that this isolated incident, when viewed
within the context of the entire trial, was sufficiently
egregious so as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial.
Next, with respect to the third Williams factor, we
observe that the prosecutor’s listing of defenses and
use of the ‘‘nuts and sluts’’ phrase occurred only once
and within a brief time frame. See, e.g., State v. Hinds,
supra,
344 Conn. 564. Even though the trial was short
in length, the statements at issue were still infrequent.
The prosecutor’s statements occupied a brief paragraph
in the transcript, and the prosecutor did not repeat any
of the improper statements. Accordingly, we conclude
that the third factor weighs in favor of the state.
As to the fourth Williams factor, the jury’s resolution
of the issues in the case largely depended on weighing
C’s credibility. Thus, the prosecutor’s statement that
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the jury must find that C was ‘‘nuts’’ to disbelieve her
testimony implicated the central issue in the case, as
the state concedes.
As to the fifth Williams factor, the state rightly concedes that the trial court did not implement any curative
measures. We agree with the state, however, that,
although the trial court gave no specific curative instructions, the defendant ‘‘bears much of the responsibility
for the fact that [the] claimed improprieties went
uncured’’ because defense counsel did not object to
the prosecutor’s statements at trial. (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) State v. Angel T., 292 Conn. 262, 291,
973 A.2d 1207 (2009); see also, e.g.,
id. (emphasizing
this court’s ‘‘continue[d] . . . adhere[nce] to the well
established maxim that defense counsel’s failure to
object to the prosecutor’s argument . . . when [it is]
made suggests that defense counsel did not believe that
[it was] unfair in light of the record of the case at the
time’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)). Moreover,
the trial court properly instructed the jury on the applicable law, including the presumption of innocence, the
definition of ‘‘reasonable doubt,’’ and the state’s burden
of proving each element of the charged offenses beyond
a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, we conclude that the
fifth Williams factor militates against the defendant’s
argument.
Finally, with respect to the sixth Williams factor, we
agree with the state that its case was relatively strong.
As the state notes, whereas some sexual assault cases
rest entirely on a complainant’s credibility, in this case,
the state presented physical and documentary evidence
to support C’s testimony. See, e.g., State v. Ritrovato,
280 Conn. 36, 57,
905 A.2d 1079 (2006) (noting that ‘‘a
sexual assault case lacking physical evidence is not
particularly strong’’). The state presented DNA evidence that indicated the presence of the defendant’s
DNA profile on C’s neck, in the place that she alleged
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he had kissed and licked her; text messages that C had
sent to K during the sexual assault, pleading for help;
C’s statement to Cormier; and photographs that Cormier took in the defendant’s house. This evidence corroborated C’s account of what had happened, when the
incident occurred, and where it occurred in the house.
Although we agree with the Appellate Court and the
dissenting opinion that the evidence was not overwhelming; see State v. Sullivan, supra,
220 Conn. App.
423; we conclude that the direct and circumstantial
evidence was nonetheless sufficient evidence of the
defendant’s guilt. See, e.g., State v. Courtney G., supra,
339 Conn. 365–66 (this court has ‘‘never stated that the
state’s evidence must have been overwhelming in order
to support a conclusion that [a] prosecutorial [impropriety] did not deprive the defendant of a fair trial’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)).
We recognize that some of the Williams factors weigh
in the defendant’s favor. Nevertheless, we conclude
that, when viewed in light of the entire trial, the prosecutor’s improprieties were insufficient to establish that
the defendant was deprived of a fair trial. See, e.g.,
State v. Wilson, 308 Conn. 412, 450, 454,
64 A.3d 91
(2013) (noting that one Williams factor was ‘‘ultimately
dispositive of the issue of harmfulness’’); see also, e.g.,
State v. Pereira, 72 Conn. App. 545, 563,
805 A.2d 787
(2002) (recognizing that Williams ‘‘factors are nonexhaustive, and do not serve as an arithmetic test for
the level of prejudice flowing from [the prosecutorial
improprieties]’’), cert. denied, 262 Conn. 931,
815 A.2d
135 (2003). Defense counsel’s failure to object, to request
curative instructions, or to move for a mistrial, combined with the fact that the improprieties were isolated,
demonstrates that the prosecutor’s comments did not
substantially prejudice the defendant. See, e.g., State v.
Hinds, supra,
344 Conn. 564.
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The fact that we conclude that the improprieties did
not result in an unfair trial for the defendant does not
mean that we in any way condone the prosecutor’s
conduct or that we believe that the use of inflammatory
language is befitting of ‘‘ministers of justice,’’ such as
prosecutors, who occupy ‘‘a quasi-judicial position’’ and
who are ‘‘not only representatives of the state but are
also the state and represent the societal interests of its
people.’’ (Emphasis in original.) State v. Dabate, supra,
351 Conn. 472. The residents of Connecticut rightly
expect their prosecutors to be held to a very high standard and that ‘‘[c]ases brought on behalf of the [state]
should be conducted with a dignity worthy of the client.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Couture, 194 Conn. 530, 567,
482 A.2d 300 (1984) (Healey,
J., dissenting), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1192,
105 S. Ct.
967,
83 L. Ed. 2d 971 (1985); see also, e.g., Division of
Criminal Justice, supra, Foreword, p. i (referencing ‘‘the
Division of Criminal Justice’s unwavering commitment
to the highest standards of ethical and professional
conduct’’). We agree with the North Carolina Supreme
Court’s observation that the safety of a state’s citizens
‘‘lies in the prosecutor who tempers zeal with human
kindness, who seeks truth and not victims, who serves
the law . . . and who approaches his task with humility.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Williams, 362 N.C. 628, 635,
669 S.E.2d 290 (2008), quoting
R. Jackson, The Federal Prosecutor, Address at the
Second Annual Conference of United States Attorneys
(April 1, 1940).
Notwithstanding the fact that the prosecutor sometimes fell short of those high standards in the trial of
this case, we cannot conclude that ‘‘the trial as a whole
was fundamentally unfair and that the [prosecutorial
impropriety] so infected the trial with unfairness’’ as
to deny the defendant his right to due process. (Internal
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quotation marks omitted.) State v. Hinds, supra,
344
Conn. 563.
The judgment of the Appellate Court is affirmed.
In this opinion MULLINS, C. J., and ECKER, ALEXANDER and DANNEHY, Js., concurred.