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State v. McFarland
STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. WILLIE MCFARLAND
(SC 20802)
Mullins, C. J., and McDonald, D’Auria, Ecker,
Alexander and Dannehy, Js.
Syllabus
Convicted of two counts of murder, the defendant appealed to this court.
Although the murders occurred in 1987, the case remained unresolved until
scientific advancements in DNA testing led to new findings that resulted in
the defendant’s arrest in 2019. In a pretrial motion to dismiss the murder
charges, which the trial court denied, the defendant claimed that the thirty-two year delay between the murders and his arrest violated his rights under
the due process clauses of the federal and state constitutions. On appeal,
the defendant renewed his constitutional claims and also challenged the
trial court’s decision not to order a new competency hearing as well as an
evidentiary ruling. Held:
The trial court properly rejected the defendant’s federal and state due process claims arising from the prearrest delay, as the defendant failed to
establish that his conviction offended the community’s sense of fair play
and decency.
With respect to its rejection of the defendant’s claim under the federal
constitution, this court unanimously adhered to existing precedent applying
a two-pronged test to prearrest delay claims pursuant to which a defendant,
to establish a due process violation, must demonstrate that actual and
substantial prejudice resulted from the delay and that the state delayed
the defendant’s arrest to obtain an unfair tactical advantage or for other
improper purposes.
With respect to this court’s rejection of the defendant’s claim under the
state constitution, a majority of this court adopted a balancing test similar
to that endorsed by the trial court, pursuant to which the defendant must
make a threshold showing of actual and substantial prejudice, the state then
must establish the reasons for the delay, and, finally, the trial court balances
the prejudice to the defendant against the state’s reasons for the delay.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it declined to order a new
competency evaluation of the defendant after finding him competent to
stand trial.
The trial court had already ordered four competency evaluations, and, in
the absence of a substantial change in circumstances raising a reasonable
doubt as to the defendant’s competency, the trial court properly declined
to order a fifth competency evaluation.
State v. McFarland
Moreover, contrary to the defendant’s claims, it was not improper for the
trial court to rely on its own observations of the defendant’s behavior or
to consider a prior competency report in denying the defendant’s request
for another competency evaluation.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to admit certain outof-court statements by a deceased witness, S, under the residual exception
to the hearsay rule because, although there was a reasonable necessity for
their admission, the statements were disjointed, inconsistent, implausible
and unreliable, S was never subject to cross-examination regarding the
numerous inconsistencies in her statements, the statements contained multiple layers of hearsay, and the fact that S signed two of the statements under
penalty of law and made handwritten edits to one of them did not otherwise
render the statements trustworthy and reliable.
(Six justices concurring separately in three opinions)
Argued October 31, 2024—officially released September 2, 2025
Procedural History
Substitute information charging the defendant with
two counts of the crime of murder, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of New Haven, where
the case was tried to the jury before Vitale, J.; verdict
and judgment of guilty, from which the defendant appealed
to this court. Affirmed.
Lisa J. Steele, assigned counsel, for the appellant
(defendant).
Robert J. Scheinblum, special assistant state’s attorney, with whom, on the brief, were John Doyle, state’s
attorney, Seth Garbarsky, supervisory assistant state’s
attorney, and Lisa M. D’Angelo, executive assistant
state’s attorney, for the appellee (state).
Opinion
PER CURIAM. In August, 1987, the decomposed bodies of the victims, Fred Harris and his son, Gregory
Harris, were found murdered in an apartment they
shared in Hamden. The crime went unsolved until 2019,
when scientific advancements in DNA testing led to the
arrest of the defendant, Willie McFarland. The defendant now appeals from his conviction of both murders,
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State v. McFarland
following a jury trial in 2022. The primary issue on
appeal is whether the thirty-two year delay between
the 1987 murders and his 2019 arrest violated the defendant’s right to due process under the federal and state
constitutions. The defendant also claims that the trial
court abused its discretion by (1) declining to order a
new competency evaluation after previously finding
him competent to stand trial, and (2) finding that a
deceased witness’ statements included in police reports
were not admissible under the residual exception to the
hearsay rule because they did not manifest the required
guarantees of trustworthiness and reliability. We affirm
the judgment of conviction.
The jury reasonably could have found the following
facts. On August 27, 1987, the Hamden police received
a call from a relative of the victims indicating that they
had not been seen or heard from since August 21. The
police conducted a welfare check of the victims’ apartment and discovered their badly decomposed bodies
lying side by side in an upstairs bedroom. Both victims
had sustained fatal throat lacerations, and their hands
and feet had been bound with cord or wire. Gregory
Harris also had a nonfatal stab wound to his chest, and
Fred Harris had two fatal stab wounds to his chest.
There was no sign of forced entry, and the door was
locked when the police arrived. The apartment had
been ransacked, and a boom box in the bedroom had
apparent stab marks. The police found a baking pan
with melted butter and a butter wrapper next to the
victims’ bodies, as well as a yellow work glove that
matched another glove discovered outside of the apartment. A black handled kitchen knife, later identified as
the murder weapon, was found in the bathroom sink,
and Fred Harris’ brown leather wallet, containing his
identification cards and a volunteer firefighter’s badge,
was found on the living room floor.
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State v. McFarland
The defendant was released from prison on August
20, 1987, which was the day before the victims were
last seen alive. In the early morning hours of August
22, the Hamden police arrested the defendant approximately one mile away from the victims’ apartment for
sexually assaulting a female acquaintance, C.1 During
the sexual assault incident, the defendant had used a
knife and was discovered with ‘‘a fair amount of blood’’
on him at the time of that arrest. The following week,
after the discovery of the bodies of the victims in the
present case, detectives interviewed the defendant about
his location at the time of the murders. The defendant
denied any involvement in the murders. He initially
denied knowing the victims but later acknowledged
that he might have known Gregory Harris from a car
wash where they had worked together. The detectives
initially accepted his explanation that he was covered
in his own blood when he was arrested because C had
accidentally stabbed him. The bloody clothing that he
was wearing was not preserved or connected by the
police to the victims’ murders.
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the police explored
the possibility that Lee Copeland, a friend of Gregory
Harris, had been involved in the murders. Donald Bruce
Hankins gave a statement to the police that appeared to
implicate Copeland. Copeland’s friend, Veronica Saars-Doyle, also gave a series of inconsistent statements
to the police that implicated Copeland, Hankins, and,
eventually, herself in the murders.
In March, 1996, the defendant, still incarcerated after
pleading guilty to sexually assaulting C in 1987, contacted the Hamden police to confess to the victims’
murders. He explained that he was motivated to confess
1
In accordance with our policy of protecting the privacy interests of the
victims of sexual abuse, we decline to identify C or others through whom
her identity may be ascertained. See General Statutes § 54-86e.
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State v. McFarland
because he had found religion. The defendant also had
been diagnosed with a serious medical condition and
believed that he would die in prison. Between that time
and February, 1997, he provided a series of written and
verbal confessions that evolved over time and contained
many internal inconsistencies. Notably, although the
defendant’s earlier confessions minimized his own
involvement while attempting to implicate C, the Latin
Kings street gang, and others against whom he harbored
resentments, in his later confessions, he took sole
responsibility for the murders. In his confessions, the
defendant accurately described numerous aspects of
the crime scene that only the perpetrator could have
known. These included the exact locations and orientations of the victims’ bodies in the apartment, the cord
or wire used to bind their hands and feet, the injuries
inflicted, the location of and damage to the boom box,
the identification and location of the murder weapon in
the upstairs bathroom sink, the presence of the melted
butter and butter wrapper, and a description of Fred
Harris’ wallet and badge. The defendant stated that he
had socialized with Gregory Harris in the apartment on
two or three prior occasions and that he had been
welcomed into the apartment on the night of the murders and had locked the door upon leaving. Law
enforcement officials were unable to confirm other
aspects of the defendant’s confessions that were not
consistent with the crime scene evidence, and the state
elected not to prosecute the defendant at that time.
By 2006 or so, scientific advancements allowed the
police to isolate and test small amounts of DNA, otherwise known as ‘‘touch DNA.’’ The police obtained a
sample of the defendant’s DNA pursuant to a search
warrant. In 2009, examiners at the state forensic science
laboratory conducted an analysis and concluded that
the defendant could be eliminated as a contributor to
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State v. McFarland
the DNA inside the yellow work glove found at the
crime scene.
The case remained unsolved for an additional decade.
In 2018, after further scientific advancements in DNA
testing, the police resubmitted the DNA to the state
forensic science laboratory for analysis. Examiners
used a newly developed test that was much more effective at generating data from degraded samples of
genetic material. On the basis of this new analysis, the
examiners concluded that the DNA found inside the
yellow work glove was ‘‘consistent with . . . being a
mixture of four contributors, with at least one of them
being male,’’ and that ‘‘the DNA profile . . . [would
be] at least 1.5 million times more likely to occur if it
originated from [the defendant] and three unknown
individuals than if it originated from four unknown individuals.’’ Around the same time, the police requested
a DNA sample from Copeland, which he voluntarily
provided. The match between the crime scene DNA and
Copeland’s DNA sample was deemed ‘‘inconclusive.’’
Michael T. Bourke, a DNA analyst with the state forensic
science laboratory, testified that the ‘‘inconclusive’’
result indicated that it was somewhere between 1 and
1000 times more likely that the crime scene sample was
made up of DNA from Copeland and three unknown
individuals than four unknown individuals.
On the basis of this new DNA testing, in 2019, the
state charged the defendant with the victims’ murders.
Following his arrest, the defendant sought to represent
himself but otherwise refused to participate in the proceedings. Between January, 2020, and October, 2022,
the trial court ordered several competency evaluations
of the defendant. Initially, the court found the defendant
not competent. Ultimately, the defendant was restored
to competency, over defense counsel’s objections.
The case was tried to a jury in 2022. At trial, the
defendant sought to introduce, under the residual excep-
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State v. McFarland
tion to the hearsay rule, police reports containing Saars-Doyle’s statements implicating Copeland in the murders. The trial court denied the defendant’s request and
excluded Saars-Doyle’s statements from evidence. The
jury returned a verdict of guilty on both counts of murder in violation of General Statutes § 53a-54a (a), and
the trial court rendered judgment in accordance with
the verdict and sentenced the defendant to a total effective term of 120 years of imprisonment. This direct
appeal followed. See General Statutes § 51-199 (b) (3).
I
The defendant first claims that the thirty-two year
delay between the crimes and his arrest violated his
right to a fair trial under the due process clauses of the
federal and state constitutions.2 In State v. Morrill, 197
Conn. 507, 522,
498 A.2d 76 (1985), and State v. Carrione,
188 Conn. 681, 693–94,
453 A.2d 1137 (1982), cert.
denied, 460 U.S. 1084,
103 S. Ct. 1775,
76 L. Ed. 2d 347
(1983), this court adopted the two-pronged approach
to prearrest delay3 claims brought under the federal
due process clauses, as construed by United States v.
Marion, 404 U.S. 307,
92 S. Ct. 455,
30 L. Ed. 2d 468
(1971), and United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783,
97
S. Ct. 2044,
52 L. Ed. 2d 752 (1977). Under that two-pronged test, ‘‘[i]n order to establish a due process
violation because of [preaccusation] delay, the defendant must show both that actual substantial prejudice
resulted from the delay and that the reasons for the
delay were wholly unjustifiable, as [when] the state
seeks to gain a tactical advantage over the defendant.’’
The defendant raised these constitutional claims in a pretrial motion
2
to dismiss.
3
Courts generally use the terms ‘‘prearrest delay,’’ ‘‘preindictment delay,’’
and ‘‘preaccusation delay’’ interchangeably in the due process context. See,
e.g., United States v. Sowa, 34 F.3d 447, 450 (7th Cir. 1994), cert. denied,
513 U.S. 1117,
115 S. Ct. 915,
130 L. Ed. 2d 796 (1995); State v. Police,
343
Conn. 274, 286 n.9,
273 A.3d 211 (2022).
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State v. McFarland
State v. Morrill, supra, 522; see, e.g., State v. Roger B.,
297 Conn. 607, 614–15,
999 A.2d 752 (2010); State v.
Littlejohn, 199 Conn. 631, 645–47,
508 A.2d 1376 (1986).
In the present case, the trial court concluded that the
defendant could not prevail under the two-pronged test
because there was no evidence that the state had delayed
arresting him to obtain an unfair tactical advantage or
for other improper purposes.
The trial court then conducted a thorough analysis
pursuant to State v. Geisler, 222 Conn. 672, 684–86,
610
A.2d 1225 (1992), of the defendant’s independent claims
brought under the due process clauses of the Connecticut constitution. See Conn. Const., art. I, §§ 8 and 9. The
trial court concluded that the Connecticut constitution
confers broader protections under which courts apply
a balancing test to prearrest delay claims brought under
the state due process clauses. The trial court then concluded that the defendant could not prevail under the
balancing test. Even assuming that the defendant had
suffered the required actual and substantial prejudice,
the trial court found that the prearrest delay was wholly
justified because the state promptly initiated the prosecution once newly developed DNA testing technologies
implicated the defendant in the murders.
We unanimously conclude that the trial court properly rejected the defendant’s federal and state due process claims arising from the prearrest delay in this case
because he has failed to establish that his conviction
offended ‘‘the community’s sense of fair play and
decency . . . .’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation
marks omitted.) United States v. Lovasco, supra,431
U.S. 790. With respect to the federal constitutional
claims, we unanimously adhere to our existing precedent applying the two-pronged test. See, e.g., State v.
Roger B., supra, 297 Conn. 614–15; State v. Morrill,
supra,198 Conn. 522.
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State v. McFarland
With respect to the defendant’s claims brought under
the Connecticut constitution, a majority of this court
adopts a balancing approach similar to that endorsed by
the trial court in this case, which reflects the approach
employed by the United States Courts of Appeals for
the Fourth, Seventh and Ninth Circuits, and a minority
of other states. See, e.g., United States v. Sowa, 34 F.3d
447, 451 (7th Cir. 1994), cert. denied,
513 U.S. 1117,
115
S. Ct. 915,
130 L. Ed. 2d 796 (1995); Howell v. Barker,
904 F.2d 889, 895 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
498 U.S. 1016,
111 S. Ct. 590,
112 L. Ed. 2d 595 (1990); United States
v. Moran, 759 F.2d 777, 782–83 (9th Cir. 1985), cert.
denied, 474 U.S. 1102,
106 S. Ct. 885,
88 L. Ed. 2d 920
(1986). The specific reasoning of the majority of the
court is explained in two separate concurring opinions.
One opinion is a plurality opinion authored by Justice
Alexander and joined by Chief Justice Mullins and Justice Dannehy. The other opinion is authored by Justice
Ecker and joined in part by Justice McDonald. Both
opinions adopt the same balancing test under the Connecticut constitution, pursuant to which a criminal defendant bears the burden of proving that a delay in prosecution has caused actual and substantial prejudice; once
the defendant has made this threshold showing, the
burden shifts to the state to establish the reasons for
the delay. Both concurring opinions conclude that the
defendant’s prearrest delay claim fails under this balancing test.
In contrast, Justice D’Auria, in his concurring opinion, concludes that the Connecticut constitution provides no greater protection against prearrest delay than
the due process clause of the federal constitution. He,
therefore, would follow the approach of a majority of
the federal courts of appeals and other states, which
adopt the two-pronged test set forth in Marion and
Lovasco, as explained in State v. Morrill, supra,197
Conn. 522, that requires the defendant to prove both
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State v. McFarland
actual and substantial prejudice, and that the state
delayed arrest to obtain an unfair tactical advantage or
for other improper purposes. See, e.g., United States
v. Crouch, 84 F.3d 1497, 1514 (5th Cir. 1996), cert.
denied, 519 U.S. 1076,
117 S. Ct. 736,
136 L. Ed. 2d 676
(1997), and cert. denied sub nom. Frye v. United States,
519 U.S. 1076,
117 S. Ct. 736,
136 L. Ed. 2d 676 (1997);
see also id., 1511–12 (citing cases); D. Diethrich, Note,
‘‘If It Ain’t Broke, Don’t Fix It: Indictment Delays and
Due Process,’’ 15 Elon L. Rev. 181, 193 n.83 (2023) (‘‘[o]f
our nation’s federal appellate courts, the First, Second,
Third, Sixth, Eighth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits have
either firmly adopted the two-prong[ed] approach or
have indicated that this was the correct application to
a [preindictment] delay challenge’’). With no proof of
delay for tactical purposes or bad faith, Justice D’Auria
would also reject the defendant’s state constitutional
claims.
II
The defendant next claims that the trial court abused
its discretion by declining to order a new competency
evaluation after finding him competent to stand trial.
He argues that the trial court should not have relied
on one of several earlier competency reports and his
unwillingness to participate in the legal proceedings.
We disagree and conclude that the trial court did not
abuse its discretion when it denied defense counsel’s
request for another competency evaluation.
A
While his case was pending in the trial court, the
defendant consistently refused to participate in and
requested to be excused from the proceedings unless
he could represent himself. From the outset, he expressed
his belief that the prosecution against him was brought
in retaliation for an action he had filed against the state.
The defendant claimed that he was seeking a restraining
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State v. McFarland
order against the state, but he refused to elaborate until
‘‘the media and the grand jury’’ were present.
In January, 2020, the trial court found that the defendant was not competent to stand trial or to represent
himself, but that he could be restored to competency
with inpatient hospitalization and treatment. The court
ordered that the defendant be transferred to Whiting
Forensic Hospital (Whiting) for sixty days to restore
his competency.
In July, 2020, the trial court held another hearing on
the defendant’s competency. Although the defendant
continued to refuse to participate in the proceedings,
the forensic monitor at Whiting, Susan McKinley, testified that he had ‘‘certainly demonstrated the ability to
cooperate and collaborate’’ with the evaluation team.
On the basis of this testimony and other evidence, the
court found that the defendant was competent to stand
trial and scheduled a separate hearing to determine his
competency to represent himself.
In May, 2021, the trial court held that separate hearing
to determine whether the defendant was competent to
represent himself. After excusing the defendant at his
request, the court heard the testimony of Evan Vitiello,
a psychiatrist, and reviewed the competency reports
that he had prepared. It was Vitiello’s opinion that the
defendant was not competent to represent himself
because he showed deficits in communication, attention, and concentration, as well as an extreme distrust
of the criminal justice system. The court credited Vitiello’s
opinion and found that the defendant was not competent to represent himself.
In September, 2022, as jury selection was scheduled
to begin, defense counsel expressed his belief that the
defendant still was not competent to stand trial. The
defendant interjected and requested to be excused, and
the trial court granted his request. Defense counsel
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State v. McFarland
requested that the court order another competency evaluation because the defendant had refused to meet with
him on numerous occasions over the course of two
years and had not replied to his letters. Defense counsel
indicated that the defendant continued to harbor delusions regarding the nature of the prosecution and that
he expected that the case would be resolved by a nonexistent civil action. The court ordered another competency evaluation.
The evaluators at the Connecticut Mental Health Center reported that they were unable to complete another
competency evaluation because the defendant refused
to participate. In October, 2022, the trial court held
another competency hearing. The court admitted into
evidence the prior competency reports, and the state
presented testimony from a counselor who regularly
interacted with the defendant at the correctional facility
where the defendant was being held and had observed
that the defendant appropriately interacted with him
and other inmates. The defendant introduced testimony
from Howard Zonana, a forensic psychiatrist at the Connecticut Mental Health Center. Zonana testified that he
had never met or interacted with the defendant and
that his review of the prior competency evaluations
provided the basis for his opinion. He testified that
the defendant’s conduct and diagnoses were consistent
with a person suffering from narrow, specific delusions
that rendered his behavior nonvolitional.
The trial court issued a comprehensive oral ruling,
concluding that the defendant was competent to stand
trial. The court, relying on its own observations, as
well as the opinions of the evaluators, found that the
defendant had the ability to participate in the proceedings but chose not to ‘‘because of what he believes to
be his own self-interest, a position arguably borne of
his lengthy past and presumably negative interactions
with the criminal justice system and periods of incarcer-
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State v. McFarland
ations, which [have] created a mistrust of the legal system
in him.’’ The court did not credit Zonana’s opinion that
the defendant’s delusions rendered him incompetent.
The court denied defense counsel’s motion for reconsideration and request that the staff at Whiting reevaluate
the defendant’s competency.
B
The following well established legal principles govern
our review of this claim. ‘‘[T]he due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment to the United States constitution prohibits the criminal prosecution of a defendant
who is not competent to stand trial.’’ (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) State v. Dort, 315 Conn. 151, 162,
106
A.3d 277 (2014). ‘‘[T]he test for competency must be
whether [the defendant] has sufficient present ability
to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of
rational understanding—and whether he has a rational
as well as factual understanding of the proceedings
against him.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State
v. Johnson, 253 Conn. 1, 21,
751 A.2d 298 (2000). This
standard for competency to stand trial is ‘‘a relatively
low one’’ and will not be satisfied by proof of ‘‘mental
illness or reduced mental capacity’’ alone. State v. Con- nor, 292 Conn. 483, 524,
973 A.2d 627 (2009).
This constitutional rule has been codified in General
Statutes § 54-56d, which establishes the procedures and
standards governing the determination of a defendant’s
competence to stand trial. See State v. Campbell, 328
Conn. 444, 485–86,
180 A.3d 882 (2018). Under § 54-
56d, ‘‘[a]ny party before the court—including the court
itself—may raise the issue of the defendant’s competency at any time during a criminal proceeding by
requesting that the court order a competency examination.’’ State v. Dort, supra, 315 Conn. 163–64. Section 54-
56d compels a court to order a competency examination
‘‘any time a reasonable doubt is raised regarding the
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State v. McFarland
defendant’s competency. . . . To establish such reasonable doubt, the defendant must present substantial
evidence, not merely allegations, that he is incompetent.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Ross, 269 Conn. 213, 272,
849 A.2d 648
(2004). Given the trial court’s superior ability to observe
the defendant’s conduct, we review the trial court’s
decision whether to order a competency examination
for abuse of discretion. See, e.g., State v. Campbell,
supra, 486; State v.
Ross, supra, 270.
On this record, we conclude that the trial court did
not abuse its discretion in denying defense counsel’s
request that it order a fifth competency evaluation. The
court already had ordered four such evaluations, the
last of which delayed jury selection. Although the defendant chose not to cooperate with the fourth evaluation,
the hearing provided defense counsel with the opportunity to present further evidence in support of the
request. The primary evidence defense counsel offered
was Zonana’s testimony, which the trial court found to
be unpersuasive. The court also carefully considered,
and did not find compelling, defense counsel’s claim
that the defendant was unable to assist in his defense
as a result of his delusions. The trial court instead relied
on its own observations and credited expert testimony
from the evaluators who had met and interacted with
the defendant that the defendant was intentionally
uncooperative. The court found that the defendant had
the ability to interact with others when he chose to do
so and that his actions constituted a strategic choice
in order to delay the trial.
In the absence of a substantial change in circumstances raising a reasonable doubt as to the defendant’s
competency, the trial court properly declined to order
a fifth competency evaluation. See, e.g., State v. Ross,
supra,269 Conn. 273 (trial court properly declined to
order competency evaluation because defendant failed
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State v. McFarland
to present substantial evidence to establish reasonable
doubt as to his competency); State v. Norris, 213 Conn.
App. 253, 275–76,
277 A.3d 839 (trial court properly
declined to order new competency evaluation because
defendant failed to present evidence that his condition
had changed since prior competency evaluation), cert.
denied, 345 Conn. 910,
283 A.3d 980 (2022).
We are not persuaded by the defendant’s argument
that the trial court erred in considering the July, 2020
competency evaluation in connection with its decision
to deny the request for an evaluation in October, 2022.
The court’s inquiry was properly focused on whether
the defendant was competent at the later time, and it
was not error for the court to consider the defendant’s
prior mental health history. See, e.g., State v. Campbell,
supra,328 Conn. 493 (upholding trial court’s competency finding that rejected Zonana’s testimony and considered other competency reports and supporting
testimony from evaluators); State v. Edwards, 158
Conn. App. 119, 137,
118 A.3d 615 (court did not abuse
its discretion in relying on observations, input, and previous competency evaluation as bases for not ordering
additional competency evaluation), cert. denied, 318
Conn. 906,
122 A.3d 634 (2015). In fact, defense counsel
asked the court to rely on the January, 2020 and May,
2021 evaluations finding the defendant incompetent to
stand trial and to represent himself, and to credit Zonana’s testimony that was founded on those reports.
We also are not persuaded by the defendant’s argument that the trial court improperly relied on its own
observations of the defendant’s behavior. A trial court
is uniquely situated to observe and assess a defendant’s
competency. It is not improper for a trial court to rely
on those observations as part of the competency determination. See, e.g., State v. Glen S., 207 Conn. App. 56,
76,
261 A.3d 805 (defendant’s failure to cooperate with
competency evaluators was relevant to trial court’s
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State v. McFarland
assessment of defendant’s competency), cert. denied,
340 Conn. 909,
264 A.3d 577 (2021), cert. denied,
U.S. , 142 S. Ct. 2685,
212 L. Ed. 2d 768 (2022); State
v. Hines, 165 Conn. App. 1, 16–17,
138 A.3d 994 (trial
court properly considered defendant’s behavior during
competency hearing), cert. denied, 321 Conn. 920,
137
A.3d 764 (2016); State v. Jordan,
151 Conn. App. 1,
35–36, 92 A.3d 1032 (trial court properly considered its
own observation of defendant’s behavior, including his
voluntarily leaving courtroom), cert. denied, 314 Conn.
909,
100 A.3d 402 (2014). Accordingly, we conclude that
the trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining
to order another competency evaluation.
III
The defendant’s final claim is that the trial court
abused its discretion by excluding Saars-Doyle’s statements implicating Copeland in the murders.4 He argues
that the trial court should have admitted those statements under the residual exception to the hearsay rule
and challenges the court’s finding that Saars-Doyle’s
multilayered hearsay statements were unreliable and
untrustworthy. We conclude that the trial court did not
abuse its discretion by excluding Saars-Doyle’s statements.
A
During the state’s case-in-chief, defense counsel
cross-examined Sean Dolan, a detective employed by
4
The defendant frames this evidentiary claim as having a constitutional
dimension because the trial court’s exclusion of Saars-Doyle’s statements
violated (1) his due process rights, causing him to suffer prejudice as a
result of the prearrest delay, and (2) his constitutional right to present a
defense. We address the claim as a purely evidentiary matter because of our
conclusion that the court correctly determined that Saars-Doyle’s statements
were not admissible under the residual exception to the hearsay rule. See,
e.g., State v. Bennett, 324 Conn. 744, 764,
155 A.3d 188 (2017) (‘‘[b]ecause
the trial court’s evidentiary ruling was not improper, the defendant’s claim
of an infringement on his constitutional right to present a defense on this
basis must fail’’).
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State v. McFarland
the Hamden Police Department since 1995. When
defense counsel inquired about Dolan’s review of Saars-Doyle’s statements, the prosecutor objected. The trial
court excused the jury, and defense counsel made an
extensive proffer seeking to introduce several police
reports containing Saars-Doyle’s statements, as well as
Dolan’s related testimony. Some of those police reports
contain verbatim transcriptions of Saars-Doyle’s recorded
statements. Others are narrative summaries of her statements to the police and of informal conversations with
her, only some of which were recorded fully or in part.
In addition to Saars-Doyle’s own observations, the police
reports contain numerous statements that she claimed
were made by third parties. Defense counsel contended
that Saars-Doyle’s statements were relevant to establish
Copeland’s third-party culpability and were admissible
under the residual exception to the hearsay rule. See
Conn. Code Evid. § 8-9.
The proffered police reports reveal that, between
1987 and 1990, the Hamden police obtained a series of
statements from Saars-Doyle. These statements described
her relationships with Copeland and the victims, and
provided increasing amounts of detail relevant to the
murders. Her audio-recorded and transcribed July 23,
1990 statement asserted that her prior statements were
inaccurate as a result of medical problems and substance abuse. In that statement, she implicated Copeland, Hankins, and a third person named ‘‘Gus’’ in the
murders; she asserted that they committed the murders
while she waited in a car. When Saars-Doyle met with
the police the next day to sign the transcription of this
statement, the police questioned her about some of the
details, and she then provided a significantly different
version of the events of the murders, which she then
claimed to have witnessed from inside of the apartment.
During the defendant’s proffer, Dolan testified that,
although he had reviewed the reports, other officers
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State v. McFarland
had interviewed Saars-Doyle and transcribed her statements. The prosecutor elicited testimony from Dolan
about the various inconsistencies in Saars-Doyle’s statements, as well as the indications in the reports that she
suffered from memory issues and had been drinking
heavily on the night of the murders.
The trial court excluded Saars-Doyle’s statements on
the ground that they were too unreliable and untrustworthy to satisfy the residual exception to the hearsay
rule. The court found that the statements lacked sufficient indicia of reliability because, among other things,
they were ‘‘disjointed [and] largely incoherent,’’ and
they ‘‘strain[ed] credulity’’ because they included various inconsistencies, had notable omissions, and contradicted the crime scene evidence. The court also noted
that Saars-Doyle had never been subject to formal cross-examination and that the statements contained many
instances of hearsay within hearsay.
B
It is undisputed that Saars-Doyle’s statements to the
police, which were offered at trial for the truth of the
matters asserted therein, constituted hearsay. See
Conn. Code Evid. § 8-1 (3). The statements also contained double hearsay in the form of statements attributed by Saars-Doyle to Copeland, among others,
requiring ‘‘each part of the combined statements [to be]
independently admissible under a hearsay exception.’’
Conn. Code Evid. § 8-7. As such, the statements in their
entirety were inadmissible unless all or part of their
contents fell within an exception to the hearsay rule,
as set forth in §§ 8-3 through 8-10 of the Connecticut
Code of Evidence.
The defendant contends that the statements were
admissible under § 8-9 of the Connecticut Code of Evidence, known as the residual, or catchall, exception to
the hearsay rule. The residual exception ‘‘allows a trial
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State v. McFarland
court to admit hearsay evidence not admissible under
any of the established exceptions if: (1) there is a reasonable necessity for the admission of the statement,
and (2) the statement is supported by the equivalent
guarantees of reliability and trustworthiness essential
to other evidence admitted under the traditional hearsay exceptions. . . . We have [explained] that [t]he
residual hearsay exceptions [should be] applied in the
rarest of cases . . . .’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Bennett, 324 Conn. 744,
762,
155 A.3d 188 (2017). We review the trial court’s
decision to exclude hearsay evidence for abuse of discretion and make every reasonable presumption in
favor of upholding the ruling. See, e.g., id., 761–62.
C
The defendant met the first requirement of the residual exception to the hearsay rule, a reasonable necessity
for the admission of the statements, because Saars-Doyle was deceased at the time of trial. We conclude,
however, that the trial court did not abuse its discretion
in declining to admit Saars-Doyle’s hearsay statements
under the residual exception because her statements
were disjointed, inconsistent, implausible, and not reliable. We defer to the trial court’s factual findings that
there were serious impediments to Saars-Doyle’s ability
to accurately observe and recall the events in question.
The record supports the trial court’s findings that Saars-Doyle had hearing and vision problems, medical and
medication issues, heavy alcohol and drug use, and
self-reported memory loss and shock. In light of these
multiple reasons to doubt the trustworthiness and reliability of the statements, we also consider it significant
that Saars-Doyle was never subjected to cross-examination regarding the numerous inconsistencies in her
statements. Although the police did press her at times
during their questioning, they generally did not challenge her to explain these inconsistencies. See, e.g.,
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State v. McFarland
State v. Bennett, supra,324 Conn. 763 (‘‘[a] declarant’s
availability for cross-examination has been deemed particularly significant in determining whether hearsay evidence is supported by guarantees of trustworthiness
and reliability’’); State v. McClendon, 248 Conn. 572,
583–85, 730 A.2d 1107 (1999) (residual exception to hearsay rule was not satisfied when, among other things,
declarant was not available for cross-examination), overruled in part on other grounds by State v. Guilbert, 306
Conn. 218,
49 A.3d 705 (2012).
Although Saars-Doyle accurately reported certain
details of the crime scene, such as the location of the
victims’ bodies in an upstairs bedroom, the presence
of butter and work gloves, and the fact that the victims
had been bound with cord or wire, many of these facts
either had been publicized by the police or were
revealed to Saars-Doyle prior to or during the interviews. Moreover, various other details that she provided
were inconsistent with the crime scene or lacked specificity and suggested a wide range of possibilities, such
as the use of various materials to bind the victims. When
Saars-Doyle stated that she was prepared to tell the
police about the incident, she often appeared to be
changing or supplementing her account of the murders
in response to prompts by the police, or asking them
for more information. See, e.g., State v. McClendon,
supra,248 Conn. 584 (statement in police report was
properly excluded under residual exception as not reliable and trustworthy because it ‘‘was contradicted by
the evidence presented at the trial and was not corroborated by any other evidence’’); State v. Burton, 191
Conn. App. 808, 840–41,
216 A.3d 734 (video recording of
police interview was properly excluded under residual
exception to hearsay rule because declarant was not
subject to cross-examination as to critical factual uncertainties and evidence at trial failed to corroborate her
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State v. McFarland
statement), cert. denied, 333 Conn. 927,
217 A.3d 995
(2019).
We further agree with the trial court that the multiple
layers of hearsay rendered Saars-Doyle’s statements
less reliable. The narrative reports required the police
to recall, characterize, and summarize what she had
told them. Some statements in the various police
reports were insulated by additional levels of hearsay
because they derived from different declarants, including the police, Saars-Doyle’s mother, her sister, and
Copeland. See, e.g., State v. Bennett, supra,324 Conn.
764 (multiple levels of hearsay undermine reliability for
admissibility under residual exception to hearsay rule);
State v. Rivera, 181 Conn. App. 215, 225,
186 A.3d 70
(same), cert. denied, 329 Conn. 907,
184 A.3d 1216
(2018).
Finally, the fact that Saars-Doyle signed two of her
statements under penalty of law and made handwritten
edits to one does not render the statements trustworthy
and reliable. That each successive statement contradicted her prior statements in multiple, material respects
indicates either that Saars-Doyle was unable to accurately recall and to consistently recount the events of
August 21, 1987, or that she misrepresented those events
in violation of her oath. For these reasons, we conclude
that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by excluding Saars-Doyle’s statements.
The judgment is affirmed.
