Volume 353 — Connecticut Reports

The acquittee, who had been found not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect of first degree burglary, risk of injury to a child, third degree assault, and possession of a weapon on school grounds, was committed to the jurisdiction of the Psychiatric Security Review Board in 2003, for a period not to exceed ten years. The acquittee's commitment was extended multiple times by agreement of the parties, but, in 2018, he was granted conditional release and began living in the community, subject to his compli- ance with certain conditions relating to his ongoing mental health treatment. Thereafter, in 2019, the state filed a petition for an order to extend the acquittee's commitment pursuant to the statute (§ 17a-593 (c)) that permits recommitment when there is reasonable cause to believe that the acquittee ''remains a person with psychiatric disabilities . . . to the extent that his discharge at the expiration of his maximum term of commitment would constitute a danger to himself or others . . . .'' The acquittee moved to dismiss the state's petition on the ground that the recommitment procedure set forth in § 17a-593 (c) violated his right to equal protection under the United States constitution, but the trial court denied the acquittee's motion to dismiss, granted the state's petition, and extended the acquittee's commit- ment. In affirming the trial court's order extending commitment, the Appel- late Court rejected the acquittee's claim that the recommitment procedure set forth in § 17a-593 (c) violated his right to equal protection and upheld the trial court's finding that the state had proven by clear and convincing evidence that the acquittee suffered from a mental illness that resulted in his being a danger to himself or others. On the granting of certification, the acquittee appealed to this court. Held: The Appellate Court correctly concluded that the recommitment scheme contemplated by § 17a-593 (c) did not violate the acquittee's right to equal protection under the federal constitution. The acquittee's equal protection claim was premised on the argument that, even though he is similarly situated to convicted inmates who, while already incarcerated, develop psychiatric conditions and are subsequently commit- ted to mental health facilities pursuant to the statutes (§§ 17a-498 (c) and 17a-515) governing civil commitment, the recommitment procedure set forth in § 17a-593 (c) is applied more conservatively than the nominally identical procedure that applies to civilly committed inmates and that such disparate treatment did not withstand intermediate scrutiny. 353 Conn. 1 AUGUST, 2025 3 State v. Foster The acquittee's equal protection claim failed because individuals, such as the acquittee, who are found not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect (insanity acquittees) and who have reached the end of their initial, maximum terms of commitment, are not similarly situated to civilly committed inmates for purposes of commitment. Specifically, an insanity acquittee's commitment is the product of a judicial determination that the criminal acts that resulted in his commitment were the result of his mental illness, whereas a civilly committed inmate has not acknowledged that he suffers from a mental illness that caused him to engage in criminal conduct, and there is no connection between the civilly committed inmate's criminal behavior and his civil commitment, insofar as the inmate's mental illness and the associated danger to himself or others may develop years after the commencement of the inmate's sentence for his prior criminal behavior. The Appellate Court properly upheld the trial court's finding under § 17a- 593 (c) that there was reasonable cause to believe that the acquittee's discharge would constitute a danger to himself or others, as that finding was not clearly erroneous. The offenses that led to the acquittee's prosecution, which involved the physical assault of two schoolchildren while the acquittee was experiencing auditory hallucinations, were violent in nature and indicated that his psy- chotic disorder could seriously endanger the safety of other people, it was appropriate for the trial court to consider the acquittee's offenses in making its determination of dangerousness, even though they occurred more than eighteen years before the state filed its petition for continued commitment in 2019, and, during his nearly two decades of commitment, the acquittee experienced numerous difficulties and forfeited various privileges as a result of engaging in inappropriate and impulsive behavior. In light of the length of the acquittee's commitment, this court placed particu- lar emphasis on the acquittee's mental health status at or around the time that the state filed the 2019 petition, and, although the acquittee had demon- strated some progress toward recovery and had been granted conditional release during that time period, various medical professionals had expressed concern with the acquittee's discharge, given the short period of time during which he had demonstrated compliance while under supervised release, and the trial court properly credited the testimony of those professionals. Moreover, the Psychiatric Security Review Board had noted that the acquittee continued to require substantial supervision while on conditional release, and it was appropriate for the trial court, in determining whether the acquittee posed a risk of danger, to consider the degree to which the acquittee's progress was the product of the services, structure, and support that he was receiving and what could potentially happen when the acquittee is no longer required to take medication, to attend counseling, or to have other restrictions in place that may remove potential stressors or triggers. 4 AUGUST, 2025 353 Conn. 1 State v. Foster (One justice concurring separately) Argued December 4, 2024—officially released August 19, 2025

The acquittee, who had been found not guilty of certain crimes by reason of mental disease or defect, was committed to the jurisdiction of the Psychiatric Security Review Board in 1999, for a period not to exceed twenty years. The acquittee's commitment was extended multiple times since the expiration of his initial term of commitment. In 2022, the state filed a petition to extend the acquittee's commitment pursuant to statute (§ 17a-593 (c)). The acquittee moved to dismiss the state's 2022 petition on the ground that the commitment procedure set forth in § 17a-593 (c) violated his right to equal protection under the United States constitution, but the trial court denied the acquittee's motion to dismiss and, in 2023, granted the state's petition, extending the acquittee's commitment for two more years, until 2025. The acquittee then appealed from the trial court's 2023 order extending his commitment until 2025. In 2024, prior to oral argument before this court, the state filed another petition with the trial court, which, if granted, would have extended the acquittee's commitment beyond 2025. In response to that petition, the board filed a report recommending that the trial court deny the state's 2024 petition because the acquittee was no longer a danger to himself or others. The state ultimately withdrew its 2024 petition, which resulted in the acquittee's discharge from the jurisdiction of the board while this appeal was pending, in March, 2025. Held: Because the acquittee was discharged from the custody of the board during the pendency of this appeal, the appeal was rendered moot. Contrary to the acquittee's claim, the collateral consequences doctrine did not save the acquittee's appeal from being dismissed as moot, as the 2023 commitment order constituted an extension of several, prior commitments beyond the acquittee's initial twenty year term that all stemmed from one acquittal, and this court did not see how the 2023 order materially increased the stigma associated with his commitment or gave rise to a reasonable possibility that it would cause him to suffer adverse collateral consequences in the future. Moreover, the acquittee could not prevail on his claim that this court should not dismiss the appeal because it presented issues that were capable of repetition, yet evading review, as there was no strong likelihood that a substantial majority of cases challenging an extension of commitment would become moot before appellate litigation could be concluded. 0 Conn. 76 ,0 3 State v. Guild Nevertheless, because the acquittee was precluded from fully litigating the correctness of the 2023 commitment order through no fault of his own, insofar as such a challenge was rendered moot by virtue of the state's withdrawal of its 2024 petition to extend his commitment, this court vacated the trial court's 2023 order to avoid the possibility of any lingering or remote consequences from that order. Argued December 4, 2024—officially released August 19, 2025

Pursuant to statute (§ 52-212a), ''[u]nless otherwise provided by law . . . a civil judgment . . . rendered in the Superior Court may not be opened . . . unless a motion to open . . . is filed within four months following the date on which the notice of judgment . . . was sent.'' The petitioner filed a habeas petition in 2018, challenging an earlier convic- tion. In 2020, the petitioner was deported. Subsequently, the petitioner's habeas counsel unsuccessfully attempted to contact both the petitioner and certain of the petitioner's family members. In 2021, after a hearing, the habeas petition was dismissed on the ground that the petitioner had failed to appear and prosecute the petition with due diligence. In 2022, approximately fifteen months later, the petitioner filed a motion to open the judgment dismissing his habeas petition, claiming, inter alia, that he had not received notice of the hearing that led to the dismissal and that his counsel had failed to make reasonable efforts to notify him and to communicate with him effectively. The habeas court denied the petitioner's motion to open, conclud- ing that the petitioner had failed to establish a recognized basis for opening the judgment of dismissal beyond the four month period prescribed by § 52- 212a. On appeal from the denial of the motion to open, the Appellate Court reversed, holding that a claim of ineffective assistance of habeas counsel was sufficient to invoke the habeas court's common-law authority to grant a late motion to open a judgment. On the granting of certification, the respondent, the Commissioner of Correction, appealed to this court. Held: The Appellate Court incorrectly concluded that ineffective assistance of habeas counsel could provide a common-law basis for a habeas court to open a judgment beyond the four month period prescribed by § 52-212a, and, accordingly, this court reversed the Appellate Court's judgment and remanded the case with direction to affirm the habeas court's denial of the motion to open. This court concluded that the phrase ''[u]nless otherwise provided by law'' in § 52-212a could not be construed so broadly as to include a new judicially created common-law exception for the ineffective assistance of habeas counsel. Moreover, allowing the opening of a habeas judgment outside the four month deadline on the basis of the ineffective assistance of habeas counsel would undermine the statutory scheme governing habeas corpus, including the legislature's goal of ensuring expedient resolution of habeas cases. Furthermore, permitting the opening of a habeas judgment beyond the four month deadline on the basis of ineffective assistance of habeas counsel would, in many cases, and in the present case, bypass the legislative require- ment that a petitioner be in custody when he files a habeas petition. (One justice dissenting) Argued April 10—officially released August 26, 2025

Convicted, after a second trial, of murder in connection with the stabbing death of the victim, the defendant appealed to this court. The defendant was convicted of murder after his first trial, but this court reversed his conviction and remanded the case for a new trial on the ground that certain illegally obtained evidence had been improperly admitted. Prior to the defen- dant's second trial, defense counsel requested a second probable cause hearing, but the trial court denied that request. The trial court also denied the defendant's pretrial motion to exclude the testimony of a jailhouse informant, V, after making a threshold determination that V's purported testimony was reliable. At the defendant's second trial, the trial court permit- ted the state to introduce, as a prior inconsistent statement, the written statement of the defendant's former cellmate, J, which J had given to the police and which recounted certain inculpatory statements of the defendant. J had testified at the defendant's probable cause hearing and at his first trial but later suffered a stroke prior to the defendant's second trial that allegedly resulted in memory loss. Although J testified at the defendant's second trial, the defense claimed that his alleged memory loss rendered him functionally unavailable as a witness at the second trial. On appeal to this court, the defendant challenged the trial court's rulings on the request for a second probable cause hearing and the admission of J's statement to the police and V's testimony. Held: The trial court did not violate the defendant's state constitutional right to a probable cause hearing by declining counsel's request for a second probable cause hearing after this court reversed the defendant's conviction and remanded the case for a second trial. Neither the state constitution nor the statute (§ 54-46a) governing probable cause hearings requires a second probable cause hearing when an appellate This case was originally argued before a panel of this court consisting of Chief Justice Robinson and Justices McDonald, D'Auria, Mullins, Ecker, Alexander and Dannehy. Thereafter, Chief Justice Robinson retired from this court and did not participate in the consideration of this case. In addition, Justice Bright was added to the panel and has read the briefs and appendices and listened to a recording of oral argument prior to participating in this decision. The listing of justices reflects their seniority status on this court as of the date of oral argument. court reverses a criminal conviction but does not dismiss the charge or charges that resulted in that conviction, the fact that a reviewing court determines that illegally obtained evidence should have been excluded at the defendant's trial has no impact on the earlier probable cause determina- tion, and the defendant failed to demonstrate a jurisdictional defect that would render the first probable cause hearing invalid and entitle him to a second one. The trial court did not violate the defendant's federal constitutional right to confrontation by admitting J's written statement to the police, that court having correctly determined that, despite J's alleged memory loss, J was available at the defendant's second trial for purposes of the defendant's right to confrontation. After reviewing federal and Connecticut case law, this court concluded that J was available for cross-examination for purposes of any claimed violation of the defendant's right to confrontation because J appeared at the defen- dant's second trial, took an oath to testify truthfully, testified that he under- stood the oath, and answered all questions asked of him during cross- examination, during which defense counsel had the opportunity to ask J questions about his prior testimony, during the probable cause hearing and the first trial, regarding his written statement to the police. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting J's written statement to the police as a prior inconsistent statement under State v. Whelan (200 Conn. 743) and the corresponding provision (§ 8-5 (1)) of the Connecticut Code of Evidence. J was available as a witness at the defendant's second trial, it was of no consequence that J could not explain the discrepancies between his written statement to the police and his testimony, insofar as a denial of recollection or a claim of memory loss can serve as the basis for a finding of inconsistency, and defense counsel effectively had conceded that a police officer had typed J's statement and that J had signed it, which satisfied the other elements for the admissibility of a prior inconsistent statement under Whelan and § 8-5 (1) of the Code of Evidence. This court declined the defendant's requests to adopt a prophylactic rule under the state constitution, pursuant to which a witness would not be considered available for cross-examination if, due to a valid medical condi- tion, the witness has no memory of the incident at issue or of making an out-of-court statement about the incident, and to exercise its supervisory authority to modify § 8-5 (1) of the Code of Evidence to preclude the admis- sion of a prior inconsistent statement when a witness who made the prior statement has a medical condition that causes total memory loss. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in making a prima facie determina- tion that V's purported testimony was reliable and therefore admissible at the defendant's second trial. The trial court considered the statutory (§§ 54-86o (a) and 54-86p (a)) factors that may be considered when making a prima facie determination that a jailhouse informant's testimony is reliable, and that court reasonably con- cluded that independent evidence corroborated specific details of V's testi- mony, there was no evidence establishing that those details were publicly available or that V had access to them while he was incarcerated, and the circumstances under which V initially provided information about the defendant to the police supported a finding of reliability. Argued May 1, 2024—officially released August 26, 2025

Convicted of two counts of murder, the defendant appealed to this court. Although the murders occurred in 1987, the case remained unresolved until scientific advancements in DNA testing led to new findings that resulted in the defendant's arrest in 2019. In a pretrial motion to dismiss the murder charges, which the trial court denied, the defendant claimed that the thirty- two year delay between the murders and his arrest violated his rights under the due process clauses of the federal and state constitutions. On appeal, the defendant renewed his constitutional claims and also challenged the trial court's decision not to order a new competency hearing as well as an evidentiary ruling. Held: The trial court properly rejected the defendant's federal and state due pro- cess claims arising from the prearrest delay, as the defendant failed to establish that his conviction offended the community's sense of fair play and decency. With respect to its rejection of the defendant's claim under the federal constitution, this court unanimously adhered to existing precedent applying a two-pronged test to prearrest delay claims pursuant to which a defendant, to establish a due process violation, must demonstrate that actual and substantial prejudice resulted from the delay and that the state delayed the defendant's arrest to obtain an unfair tactical advantage or for other improper purposes. With respect to this court's rejection of the defendant's claim under the state constitution, a majority of this court adopted a balancing test similar to that endorsed by the trial court, pursuant to which the defendant must make a threshold showing of actual and substantial prejudice, the state then must establish the reasons for the delay, and, finally, the trial court balances the prejudice to the defendant against the state's reasons for the delay. The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it declined to order a new competency evaluation of the defendant after finding him competent to stand trial. The trial court had already ordered four competency evaluations, and, in the absence of a substantial change in circumstances raising a reasonable doubt as to the defendant's competency, the trial court properly declined to order a fifth competency evaluation. State v. McFarland Moreover, contrary to the defendant's claims, it was not improper for the trial court to rely on its own observations of the defendant's behavior or to consider a prior competency report in denying the defendant's request for another competency evaluation. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to admit certain out- of-court statements by a deceased witness, S, under the residual exception to the hearsay rule because, although there was a reasonable necessity for their admission, the statements were disjointed, inconsistent, implausible and unreliable, S was never subject to cross-examination regarding the numerous inconsistencies in her statements, the statements contained multi- ple layers of hearsay, and the fact that S signed two of the statements under penalty of law and made handwritten edits to one of them did not otherwise render the statements trustworthy and reliable. (Six justices concurring separately in three opinions) Argued October 31, 2024—officially released September 2, 2025

The plaintiffs purchased a homeowners insurance policy with a term of one year that was underwritten by an insurance company, N. Co. The plaintiffs procured the policy with the assistance of the defendant insurance brokers, T and his insurance brokerage firm, T Co. Shortly after the policy was issued, a representative of N Co. inspected the plaintiffs' home and found a defect in the exterior siding. N Co. then sent an email to T Co. informing T Co. of this finding and indicating that the plaintiffs were required to repair the defect and to provide notice of the repair no later than three months before the policy was to renew. The parties disputed whether T Co. conveyed this information to the plaintiffs. After not receiving notice of repair by the deadline, N Co. sent another email to T Co., informing it that N Co. had not received notice of repair and that the plaintiffs' policy would not be renewed if notice of repair was not received by the policy expiration date. Approxi- mately four weeks later, and two months before the policy expiration date, N Co. sent a nonrenewal notice to the plaintiffs by certified mail, which the plaintiffs claimed they never received. Ultimately, N Co. never received notice of repair, and the policy did not renew. Shortly after expiration of the policy, the plaintiffs' home was destroyed as a result of an accidental fire. Subsequently, the plaintiffs sought damages from, among others, the defendants, claiming, inter alia, that the defendants had a duty to notify the plaintiffs of communications from N Co., including a nonrenewal notifica- tion, but negligently failed to do so. The trial court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment and rendered judgment thereon, and the plaintiffs appealed to the Appellate Court, which affirmed the trial court's judgment. On the granting of certification, the plaintiffs appealed to this court. Held: The Appellate Court correctly concluded that the defendants did not owe the plaintiffs a duty to provide them with notice of N Co.'s impending nonrenewal of their homeowners insurance policy under the circumstances of this case, and, accordingly, this court affirmed the Appellate Court's judgment. The general rule is that an insurance broker owes no legal duty to the insured after the broker has successfully procured the requested insurance policy, and a broker is entitled to rely on the insurer to adhere to its statutory and contractual obligations to provide notice of nonrenewal to the insured. An exception to the general rule arises, however, when a broker agrees or gives some affirmative assurance that it will assist in the renewal of an insurance policy for the insured. In the present case, the agency relationship between the plaintiffs and the defendants terminated after the defendants procured the plaintiffs' policy, as there was no evidence that the defendants had agreed or represented that they would assist in maintaining or renewing the plaintiffs' insurance coverage after the issuance of the policy, and there was no evidence that the defendants had continued to act on the plaintiffs' behalf or affirmatively sought to extend the plaintiffs' coverage by collecting the necessary informa- tion to secure a renewal of the plaintiffs' policy. Moreover, the plaintiffs could not prevail on their claim that a duty should be imposed on the defendants in view of the long-standing, continued, and ongoing relationship between the plaintiffs and the defendants because, although the plaintiffs did have a long-standing relationship with the defen- dants for many years, that relationship was interrupted for two years prior to the procurement of the policy at issue, as the plaintiffs had utilized another insurance broker during that timeframe, and, in any event, such a long-standing relationship, by itself, is insufficient to create a duty in the absence of evidence that the defendants, through their conduct or communi- cations, had undertaken an additional duty to assist the plaintiffs with their renewals. (Two justices dissenting in one opinion) Argued April 14—officially released September 9, 2025

The plaintiffs, H Co. and its insurer, brought an action for contribution against the defendant physician, W, pursuant to the comparative responsibil- ity provisions (§ 52-572o) of the Connecticut Product Liability Act (§ 52- 572m et seq.). The plaintiffs filed their contribution action in May, 2022, after they paid in full damages awarded pursuant to a judgment rendered in the underlying action brought by K, who had been injured when a heat lamp manufactured by H Co. made contact with her foot during an acupunc- ture session performed by W. In the underlying action, K originally sought to recover damages from W for his alleged medical malpractice. Thereafter, W filed a third-party complaint against H Co. sounding in product liability, and K then filed a complaint directly against H Co., also sounding in product liability. In response to W's and K's complaints, H Co. raised several special defenses, including that K and W each bore comparative responsibility for K's injuries and that, if H Co. were to be found liable for K's damages, it was entitled to contribution from W pursuant to § 52-572o. Before the case was submitted to the jury, W withdrew his third-party complaint against H Co. The jury subsequently returned a verdict for K, finding that H Co. was 80 percent responsible and W was 20 percent responsible for K's damages. In accordance with the verdict, judgment was rendered in the underlying action in January, 2019. Thereafter, the Appellate Court reversed that judg- ment in part, concluding that the medical malpractice claim against W should have been dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction, but affirmed the portion of the judgment relating to K's product liability claim. This court subsequently denied H Co.'s petition for certification to appeal in November, 2021. In their contribution action, the plaintiffs sought to recover 20 percent of the amount paid to K in satisfaction of the underlying judgment. The trial court granted the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment and rendered judgment in their favor, and W appealed. W claimed that the plaintiffs were barred from bringing a contribution action against him because he was not a ''party'' to the underlying action for purposes of § 52-572o and that the plaintiffs' contribution action was untimely because it was brought more than one year after the judgment in the underlying action became final. Held: There was no merit to W's claim that the plaintiffs were barred from bringing a contribution action against him because he was not a party to the underly- ing action who was subject to the comparative responsibility provisions of § 52-572o. 0 Conn. 296 ,0 3 Health Body World Supply, Inc. v. Wang Contrary to W's argument that the references in § 52-572o (b) through (d), providing for the apportionment of damages between each ''party'' according to each party's respective degree of responsibility, include only those named as defendants in connection with a product liability claim, the only reason- able construction of the statutory language was that the term ''party'' includes all defendants in an action involving a product liability claim, regardless of whether those persons or entities are product sellers named as defendants to the product liability claim. Accordingly, in a hybrid action involving both claims arising out of the Connecticut Product Liability Act and other claims not sounding in product liability, in which the harm is indivisible, an adjudication of comparative responsibility is proper with respect to every party to the action, and the assessment of comparative responsibility in the underlying action in the present case was proper because K asserted a product liability claim against H Co. and a medical malpractice claim against W for the same indivisible harm. Contrary to W's claim, the fact that the Appellate Court reversed the judg- ment in the underlying action with respect to K's medical malpractice claim against W did not mean that W was not a party subject to the comparative responsibility provisions of § 52-572o. Although the Appellate Court reversed the portion of the underlying judg- ment determining W's liability with respect to the medical malpractice claim, it affirmed the judgment in all other respects, including with respect to the jury's determination that W was 20 percent responsible for K's total damages, made in connection with the comparative responsibility claim that H Co. raised in its special defense to K's product liability claim. Accordingly, the court in the underlying action had jurisdiction over W to determine his comparative responsibility when judgment was rendered, both W and H Co. were subject to the adjudication of comparative responsibility, and they both were bound by that portion of the judgment that was not reversed on appeal. The plaintiffs' contribution action was timely, as it was filed action within one year of all appellate proceedings in the underlying action becoming final. Pursuant to § 52-572o (e), ''[i]f a judgment has been rendered'' in an underly- ing action, any independent action for contribution ''must be brought within one year after the judgment becomes final,'' and the only plausible construc- tion of that language was that a ''judgment becomes final'' for purposes of triggering the statute of limitations upon the termination of all appellate proceedings, such that the liability of the parties is absolutely certain. The judgment in the underlying action became final in November, 2021, ten days after this court denied H Co.'s petition for certification to appeal, and, 4 ,0 0 Conn. 296 Health Body World Supply, Inc. v. Wang because the plaintiffs filed their contribution action against W in May, 2022, that action was timely. Argued January 31—officially released September 9, 2025

Convicted of murder with special circumstances, home invasion, arson in the second degree, and robbery in the first degree in connection with the planned invasion and robbery of the home of the murder victims, M, K and J, the defendant appealed to this court. Shortly before the crimes occurred, the defendant texted with M, K and J's son, in order to plan a robbery whereby M would help the defendant steal K's gun safe and guns, which were located in the family home, in exchange for drugs and money. When the defendant and his sister, R, arrived in the area of the victims' home, they met with M and killed him in a nearby wooded area. Subsequently, the defendant and R entered the victims' home, where the defendant killed K and J. The defendant and R remained in the home and stole various items and then set the home on fire. Prior to the defendant's arrest, the police interviewed the defendant, immediately after which they seized his cell phone without a warrant. The police later obtained a warrant to search and seize ''all data'' from the defendant's cell phone, ''including, but not limited to, all call logs . . . [t]ext messaging, telephone numbers stored, address book, calendar, email, video files, and graphic files.'' The warrant did not identify any temporal parameters within which to limit the search. An extrac- tion of the data from the cell phone yielded, among other information, global positioning system (GPS) data, text message communications the defendant had with, among others, R and T, the defendant's girlfriend, and certain photographs and Internet searches suggesting that the defendant had researched how to break into a gun safe. Before trial, the defendant moved to suppress all evidence obtained from his cell phone, contending that the police had illegally seized his cell phone and that the warrant was unconstitutional because it permitted the police to search and seize ''all data'' from his cell phone without temporal limitations. In a pretrial ruling on the motion to suppress, the trial court concluded that the seizure of the cell phone was proper, and, applying the doctrine of severance, the court also concluded that the police had probable cause to search the defendant's cell phone for data created or received during the approximately two week period leading up to the date of the crimes. Accordingly, the court concluded that these data were admissible but suppressed any data created or received outside of the two week period. On appeal, the defendant claimed, inter alia, that the warrant to search and seize ''all data'' from his cell phone violated his rights under the fourth amendment to the United States constitu- tion. Held: This court assumed, without deciding, that the warrantless seizure of the defendant's cell phone was constitutional, determined that the warrant to search the cell phone violated the fourth amendment because the warrant lacked particularity and that the trial court erred in applying the severance doctrine under the circumstances of this case, but concluded that any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt and, therefore, affirmed the judg- ment of conviction. Although the warrant properly identified the offenses for which the police had established probable cause by incorporating by reference the warrant application and the accompanying affidavit, which listed those specific offenses, the warrant's failure to limit what could be searched or seized by content and by time ran afoul of the fourth amendment's particularity requirement. Specifically, the warrant's authorization to search and seize ''all data'' from the defendant's cell phone failed to identify, and therefore limit, the specific data to be searched and seized or to explain how that data related to the alleged offenses, and the state could not prevail on its claim that the phrase ''including, but not limited to,'' placed a meaningful limit on the authorization to search and seize ''all'' of the cell phone's data. Moreover, the state could not prevail on its claim that the warrant was sufficiently particular given that the technology to conduct a targeted extrac- tion of the defendant's cell phone's data was not available when authorities conducted the extraction, as certain investigators testified that they had the technological capability to limit by content type and time the human-readable report generated from the extraction procedure. The trial court improperly applied the severance doctrine in seeking to cure the warrant's deficiencies, as there was no constitutional portion of the warrant that could remain after severing the constitutionally infirm portion, and, although the court purported to apply the severance doctrine when it added to the warrant a temporal limitation that did not previously exist, the severance doctrine authorizes a court only to salvage the constitutional portion of a warrant, not to make an insufficiently particular warrant suffi- ciently particular. Nevertheless, the trial court's error in admitting the data extracted from the defendant's cell phone, pursuant to an unconstitutional warrant, was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The state's case against the defendant, independent of the cell phone evi- dence, was strong, the cell phone evidence was largely cumulative of prop- erly introduced evidence, the cell phone evidence was neither critical to the state's case nor greatly emphasized relative to the other evidence, and, accordingly, this court was not persuaded that the improper admission of the cell phone evidence contributed to or substantially affected the jury's verdict. Argued March 5—officially released September 16, 2025

Convicted of manslaughter in the first degree with a firearm, the defendant appealed to this court. The defendant's conviction stemmed from an incident in which he and two friends encountered the victim and his friend, G, whom the defendant had previously assaulted. G witnessed the defendant pull a gun from his waistband, and, as G and the victim fled, a shot was fired, which ultimately struck and killed the victim. On appeal, the defendant claimed, inter alia, that the trial court improperly allowed C, one of the state's witnesses, to testify as an expert about neighborhoods, neighborhood divisions, and the dynamics between neighborhoods in Stamford, the city in which the victim's killing occurred. Held: The defendant could not prevail on his claim that his right to due process was violated insofar as C implicitly invoked racial stereotypes when he characterized the Black residents in certain Stamford neighborhoods as being engaged in firearms and drug trafficking, and in violent criminal activ- ity, as C never testified before the jury regarding the demographics of the various Stamford neighborhoods, or regarding race in general, and, even though C did testify about firearms and drug trafficking in Stamford, he did not connect those activities to specific neighborhoods or the Black residents in those neighborhoods. The trial court abused its discretion when it permitted C to offer expert testimony about various Stamford neighborhoods, neighborhood divisions, and the dynamics between them. C's ''neighborhood'' testimony amounted to testimony about gang activity in various Stamford neighborhoods, and, because the state conceded that there was no evidence that the defendant was a member of a gang, such testimony had limited probative value, and any probative value was out- weighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Moreover, C's testimony was not the proper subject of expert testimony simply because it may have been related to the defendant's motive, as the state was able to present evidence through fact witnesses to establish a possible motive for the shooting, and there was no indication that C had any peculiar knowledge or experience that would have aided the jury in determining motive. Nevertheless, the court's error in admitting C's testimony was harmless because that testimony was not the only evidence admitted that established a possible motive for the shooting, the testimony was not particularly rele- vant to establishing the elements of manslaughter in the first degree with a firearm, the state's case was otherwise relatively strong, and the court instructed the jury on the limited use of C's testimony. The trial court correctly determined that there was not sufficient evidence to warrant the third-party culpability jury instruction that the defense requested because, contrary to the defendant's claim, there was not enough evidence to raise more than a bare suspicion that G, rather than the defendant, was the shooter. The defendant was not entitled to a jury instruction on the adequacy of the police investigation into the victim's killing, as the evidence was not sufficiently compelling to mandate such an instruction, and defense counsel was afforded the opportunity to present evidence, to cross-examine the witnesses, and to argue to the jury about any deficiencies in the investigation. In connection with the defendant's claim that the jury's finding of not guilty with respect to the charge of criminal possession of a firearm was inconsis- tent with its finding of guilty with respect to the charge of first degree manslaughter with a firearm, this court declined the defendant's request to modify its holding in State v. Arroyo (292 Conn. 558) to permit review of legally inconsistent verdicts, as this court continued to find the analysis in Arroyo persuasive, especially in light of its recent adherence to Arroyo in State v. Henderson (348 Conn. 648). There was no merit to the defendant's claim that the evidence was insuffi- cient to support his conviction of first degree manslaughter with a firearm, as the jury reasonably could have concluded that the cumulative force of the evidence established the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The jury reasonably could have inferred that the defendant's flight, in combi- nation with other evidence, established consciousness of guilt, which, in turn, established the defendant's identity as the shooter, surveillance video footage placed the defendant at the scene of the shooting, G testified that the defendant had previously assaulted and robbed him, and G also testified that he saw the defendant with a gun moments before the victim was shot and that the gun was the same one the defendant was seen holding in a video that was created a few hours before the shooting. (Three justices concurring separately in one opinion) Argued February 6—officially released September 16, 2025

Convicted of murder and risk of injury to a child in connection with the stabbing death of the victim, the defendant's former girlfriend, in the pres- ence of the victim's twelve year old son, the defendant appealed to this court. Prior to the murder, the victim had been attempting to end her long- term relationship with the defendant allegedly because of the defendant's drug and alcohol abuse and his refusal or inability to contribute financially. She also had been attempting to force him to leave the home that they had been sharing. The defendant claimed that he was entitled to a new trial because the trial court improperly had denied his request for a jury instruc- tion on the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance. Held: The trial court properly declined to instruct the jury on the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance, as that court correctly concluded that a rational juror could not find by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant was suffering from an extreme emotional disturbance at the time of the murder. Although the evidence suggested that the defendant was exposed to an extremely unusual and overwhelming state that did not constitute mere annoyance or unhappiness, the evidence, even when viewed in the light most favorable to the defendant, did not demonstrate that the defendant lost self-control or that his ability to reason was overborne by extreme, intense feelings at the time of the murder, especially in view of his actions prior to the murder, his efforts to evade the police after the murder, and certain other conduct demonstrating consciousness of guilt and self-control. (One justice dissenting) Argued March 7—officially released September 23, 2025

Pursuant to state regulation (§ 14-63-36c (c)), ''[a] licensed wrecker service may charge additional fees for exceptional services, and for services not included in the tow charge or hourly rate, which are reasonable and neces- sary for the nonconsensual towing . . . of a motor vehicle. Any such addi- tional fees shall be itemized in accordance with the hourly charge for labor posted by the licensed towing service, as required by the provisions of section 14-65j-3 of the [state regulations].'' The plaintiffs, wrecker services licensed in Connecticut, appealed to the trial court from the decision of a Department of Motor Vehicles hearing officer, who determined that the plaintiffs had overcharged the owner of a tractor trailer for certain nonconsensual towing services, and who ordered that the plaintiffs pay restitution and imposed a civil penalty. The plaintiffs were summoned by the state police to provide towing services after the tractor trailer, which was insured by the defendant insurance company S Co., became disabled during a highway accident. The plaintiffs used special equipment to remove the tractor trailer from the highway and to tow it to the plaintiffs' storage facilities. The plaintiffs sent S Co. an itemized invoice for the work performed, including fees associated with the use of the special equipment, which S Co. paid under protest. S Co. subsequently filed a complaint with the named defendant, the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, claiming, inter alia, that the plaintiffs' charges were unfair and unreasonable. In determining that the plaintiffs overcharged for their services, the hearing officer concluded that the plaintiffs had established their own rate schedule for nonconsensual towing services that was based on the special equipment they used, rather than on the hourly rate for labor set by the commissioner. The hearing officer ultimately disallowed most of the plaintiffs' charges, including any charge that was deemed to be an equipment charge and not an hourly labor charge. After the trial court rendered judgment dismissing the plaintiffs' administrative appeal, the plaintiffs appealed to the Appellate Court, which affirmed the trial court's judgment. On the granting of certifica- tion, the plaintiffs appealed to this court. Held: The Appellate Court incorrectly determined that fees for exceptional ser- vices, as contemplated by § 14-63-36c (c), exclude costs associated with the procurement and maintenance of special equipment used to provide those exceptional services and that such fees must instead be based on the hourly labor rate for nonconsensual towing determined by the commissioner. Contrary to the Appellate Court's conclusion, the relevant text of § 14-63- 36c (c) was not clear and unambiguous, as that text was subject to more than one plausible interpretation, and this court concluded that the more reasonable interpretation of the text of § 14-63-36c (c) was that it permits a wrecker service to charge additional fees for exceptional services that are reasonable and necessary for nonconsensual towing provided that those additional fees are itemized and posted on a sign, in conformance with how the hourly charge for labor must be posted pursuant to § 14-65j-3, and provided that such additional fees are itemized separately in the invoice submitted to the owner of the vehicle that has been towed. This court reasoned that, if it were to construe § 14-63-36c (c) to prohibit wrecker services from charging additional fees for the costs associated with the use of the special equipment needed to perform the exceptional services sometimes required for nonconsensual towing, they would be unable to recoup the costs of such equipment and would therefore likely not engage in the provision of such exceptional services. Moreover, there was no merit to the commissioner's claim that wrecker services could recoup the costs of special equipment through the hourly rate for nonconsensual towing determined by the commissioner, as the regulations exclude exceptional services from the definition of ''hourly rate,'' and, in any event, if the commissioner were to base the hourly rate for all nonconsensual towing, at least in part, on the cost to procure and maintain the special equipment needed for exceptional services, vehicle owners whose tow does not require exceptional services would effectively subsidize the cost of towing for those owners who do require exceptional services. Accordingly, this court reversed in part the Appellate Court's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings before a Department of Motor Vehicles hearing officer concerning S Co.'s challenge to the plaintiffs' charges in light of this court's interpretation of § 14-63-36c (c). Argued May 15—officially released September 23, 2025

Convicted of murder in connection with the shooting death of the victim inside the stairwell of a housing complex, the defendant appealed to this court. The police had identified the defendant from video surveillance foot- age, which depicted the defendant leading the victim into a building through a basement door and then exiting the building alone through the front entrance minutes later. The police subsequently obtained a warrant to search the home of the defendant, who was seventeen years old at the time and living with G, his great-grandmother and legal guardian. During the search, officers seized a pistol and bullets from the defendant's bedroom. While the police were at the defendant's residence, they read the defendant his rights under Miranda v. Arizona (384 U.S. 436), and both the defendant and G signed a card acknowledging that the defendant had been advised of his rights and that he had agreed to speak with the police. Nineteen minutes into the police interview, which occurred in G's presence, the defendant indicated that he did not wish to answer any more questions, but the inter- view nevertheless continued. The trial court denied the defendant's request to suppress any statements made during the first nineteen minutes of the interview, concluding that, under the totality of the circumstances, the state demonstrated that the defendant had knowingly, voluntarily, and intelli- gently waived his Miranda rights. On appeal, the defendant claimed, inter alia, that the state had failed to demonstrate a knowing and voluntary waiver of his Miranda rights. Held: The trial court correctly concluded that, under the totality of the circum- stances, the state demonstrated, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the defendant's waiver of his Miranda rights was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. The record supported the trial court's factual determinations that, at the time of the interview, the defendant was nearly eighteen years old, was in the tenth or eleventh grade, and displayed no indication of a mental or intellectual deficiency; that he was seated in his bedroom, in G's presence, and was not handcuffed or under the influence of drugs or alcohol; and that the tone of the interview between the defendant and the police was conversational; and all of these facts supported a finding of a voluntary and knowing waiver. There was no merit to the defendant's arguments that his level of education and the allegedly coercive manner in which the police sought the defendant's waiver of his rights weighed against a finding of a knowing and voluntary waiver. In considering the totality of the circumstances, it was appropriate to take into account the defendant's prior encounters with the criminal justice system, including thirteen prior arrests and at least eleven separate instances in which he received Miranda warnings, and the defendant's invocation of his rights nineteen minutes into the interview also demonstrated that his initial waiver of those rights was knowing and voluntary. The trial court gave adequate weight to the defendant's age in considering whether his waiver was knowing and voluntary, as it recognized that the defendant was seventeen years old when he was interviewed, but the court concluded that his youth was outweighed by numerous other factors. Even if this court had assumed that the first nineteen minutes of the police interview should have been suppressed, any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt in light of the strength of the state's case and the nature of the statements that the defendant made during that portion of the interview. This court declined the defendant's request to adopt, under the state constitu- tion, a prophylactic rule pursuant to which a statement made by a juvenile during a custodial interrogation must be suppressed if the juvenile had not been afforded a meaningful opportunity to consult with an interested adult before the juvenile waived his rights. After considering the relevant factors set forth in State v. Geisler (222 Conn. 672) for construing the parameters of the Connecticut constitution, this court concluded, like the United States Supreme Court and the majority of other states, that the totality of the circumstances approach, in conjunction with the various statutory requirements concerning the interrogation of juveniles, was sufficient to ensure that any waiver of Miranda rights by a juvenile is knowing and voluntary. The defendant could not prevail on his claim that prosecutorial impropriety during closing and rebuttal arguments deprived him of his constitutional right to a fair trial. The prosecutor did not improperly mischaracterize the testimony of R, the state's firearm and toolmark examiner, when the prosecutor observed that R had testified ''to a certain degree of scientific certainty,'' ''to a scientific certainty,'' or ''to a degree of scientific certainty,'' as the prosecutor's com- ments were consistent with the trial court's pretrial order requiring that R's opinions about whether the casings and bullets recovered from the scene of the crime matched those of the firearm found in the defendant's bedroom be phrased in terms of a reasonable degree of certainty or a practical cer- tainty. Moreover, the prosecutor did not improperly argue facts not in evidence when discussing R's testimony, and the prosecutor's references to R's qualifi- cations did not, as the defendant claimed, amount to improper vouching for R's credibility but, instead, constituted fair comment on the evidence pre- sented. The prosecutor did not improperly express her personal opinion, or suggest that she had secret knowledge, about R's testimony when she expressed her disagreement with defense counsel's description of that testimony, as the prosecutor merely summarized R's testimony and invited the jury to conclude that defense counsel's assessment of that testimony was wrong. With respect to the prosecutor's comments that the victim was ''on his hands and knees'' and ''begging for his life'' when he was shot, that the victim had been ''forced at gunpoint to strip'' naked in order to humiliate him, and that the defendant had ''lured'' the victim into a stairwell and ''set a trap'' for him, the prosecutor did not argue facts not in evidence or improperly appeal to the emotions and passions of the jurors, as those comments were based on the evidence presented at trial and the reasonable inferences that could be drawn therefrom, and they were relevant to the issue of whether the defendant had intended to cause the victim's death. Furthermore, the prosecutor did not improperly appeal to the emotions and passions of the jurors by making frequent references to the victim's nudity at the time of the murder or by emphasizing how the victim, after being shot, dragged himself seventy-five feet across a floor while he was bleeding to death, as the victim's nudity was probative of the defendant's intent to cause the victim's death, and the victim's movements after being shot were relevant to demonstrate that the defendant was the shooter. Even if the trial court had improperly instructed the jury on the defendant's consciousness of guilt, which stemmed from evidence that the defendant covered his face with a mask when he exited the building in which he shot the victim and that he fled to Florida after he was interviewed by the police, any instructional error was harmless. This court was not persuaded that the jury likely was misled by the trial court's consciousness of guilt instruction because the state's case against the defendant was strong even without the consciousness of guilt evidence, that case having been based primarily on the testimony of various witnesses, surveillance footage depicting the defendant's conduct before and after the shooting, and evidence recovered from the crime scene and during the execution of the search warrant at the defendant's residence. Argued May 14—officially released September 30, 2025

Convicted of multiple counts of kidnapping in the first degree in connection with four separate incidents that occurred in 1984, the defendant appealed to this court. During each incident, an unknown assailant robbed and sexually assaulted a woman in her home. The cases remained unresolved until 2020, when law enforcement received information tending to implicate the defen- dant. Thereafter, the police lawfully collected the defendant's trash from in front of his residence, which included a belt. The police then, acting without a search warrant, submitted the belt to the state forensic laboratory for testing. Analysts used DNA extracted from the belt to conduct a short tandem repeat analysis and determined that that DNA was a contributor to an unknown DNA profile that had been generated from certain items recov- ered from the four crime scenes. The police then obtained a search warrant to collect a confirmatory sample of the defendant's DNA, which established that the defendant was the likely source of the crime scene DNA. After the presentation of evidence at the defendant's trial, the court instructed the jury on the elements of the kidnapping charges in accordance with this court's decision in State v. Salamon (287 Conn. 509), including the six factors that the jury should consider in determining whether the defendant had intended to restrain the victims beyond the degree necessary to commit the underlying crimes. The following day, the court provided the jury with a flowchart outlining the elements of the kidnapping charges as a visual guide to its previous instructions, but the flowchart omitted any reference to the Salamon factors. On appeal, the defendant claimed that the warrantless extraction and testing of the DNA from his discarded belt constituted an unreasonable search and seizure in violation of his rights under the fourth amendment to the United States constitution and article first, § 7, of the Connecticut constitution, and that the omission of the Salamon factors from the flowchart misled the jury. Held: The defendant could not prevail on his claim that either the warrantless collection or the warrantless analysis of his DNA from the discarded belt violated his rights under the fourth amendment. The warrantless collection of the defendant's DNA from the discarded belt did not constitute a search under the fourth amendment because, even if the defendant had a subjective expectation of privacy in the biological materials that he inadvertently or involuntarily shed onto the belt, society would not recognize that expectation as reasonable. It was undisputed that the defendant lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy in the belt itself because he had discarded it into the trash, and, because it is well known that humans cannot completely prevent the shed- ding of biological materials containing DNA, it is no secret that, when an individual discards an article of clothing or a clothing accessory, DNA may be present on that article or accessory, and may be available for collection. Moreover, the warrantless analysis of the DNA extracted from the defen- dant's discarded belt, for identification purposes only, did not constitute a search under the fourth amendment. Even if this court assumed that the defendant had a subjective expectation of privacy in the identifying characteristics encoded in his DNA, the analysis of DNA extracted from a discarded object that is in the lawful possession of the police, for identification purposes only, does not constitute a search for purposes of the fourth amendment because a defendant does not maintain an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in the identifying character- istics encoded therein under those circumstances. In the present case, the defendant did not claim that the state tested his DNA for any purpose other than for identification, and the short tandem repeat analysis employed by the state forensic laboratory was not capable of revealing anything more than the defendant's identity. After considering the relevant factors set forth in State v. Geisler (222 Conn. 672) for construing the parameters of the Connecticut constitution, this court concluded that, under the circumstances of this case, article first, § 7, of the Connecticut constitution did not afford greater protection than the fourth amendment and that the warrantless extraction and testing of the defendant's DNA from the discarded belt for identification purposes only did not violate the defendant's rights under the state constitution. The trial court did not mislead the jury by providing it with a flowchart that outlined the elements of kidnapping in the first degree but that omitted any reference to the Salamon factors. The defendant conceded that the trial court provided a full description of the Salamon factors in its instructions, and it was of no consequence that the court submitted the flowchart to the jury one day after it read its instructions. Moreover, when the court gave the jury the flowchart, it clearly and expressly instructed that the flowchart was to be used only as a guide to its prior instructions and that the flowchart did not replace those prior instructions, and, because the defendant failed to establish that the jury did not follow the court's instruction regarding the purpose of the flowchart, this court presumed that the jury heeded that instruction and was not misled by the flowchart's omission of the Salamon factors. (Two justices concurring in part and dissenting in part in one opinion) Argued January 30—officially released October 7, 2025

Convicted of sexual assault in the first degree and risk of injury to a child in connection with the sexual abuse of the five year old victim, the defendant appealed to this court. He claimed, inter alia, that the trial court improperly denied his motion to suppress certain statements that he had made to two detectives during an interview at the police station, contending that he was in custody at the time and, therefore, that the police were required to advise him of his rights pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona (384 U.S. 436). Held: The trial court properly denied the defendant's motion to suppress the statements he had made during the interview, that court having correctly determined that the defendant was not in custody for purposes of Miranda. Any coercive elements of the station house interview were outweighed by other factors that led this court to conclude that a reasonable person in the defendant's position would not have believed that he was restrained to the degree associated with a formal arrest. Specifically, the tone and tenor of the interrogation was cordial and non- threatening, the interrogation was not prolonged or hostile, the detectives did not make accusations, confront the defendant with incriminating evi- dence, or subject him to trickery or tactics aimed at inducing a confession, the detectives asked open-ended and nonleading questions, and the defen- dant went to the police station voluntarily and without police escort. Miranda warnings are not required simply because an interview takes place at a police station, and the failure of the police to advise a suspect that he is free to terminate an interview does not require a finding that the suspect is in custody when the objective circumstances surrounding the interview indicate that a reasonable person in the suspect's position would understand that the meeting with the detectives is consensual. In accordance with our policy of protecting the privacy interests of the victims of sexual abuse and the crime of risk of injury to a child, we decline to identify the victim or others through whom the victim's identity may be ascertained. See General Statutes § 54-86e. Moreover, in accordance with federal law; see 18 U.S.C. § 2265 (d) (3) (2024), we decline to identify any person protected or sought to be protected under a protection order, protective order, or a restraining order that was issued or applied for, or others through whom that person's identity may be ascertained. The trial court abused its discretion in admitting into evidence certain statements about the sexual assault that the victim had made to her mother, A, under the spontaneous utterance exception to the rule against hearsay, as the state failed to establish that the victim had made the statements under the continuing influence or stress of the sexual assault, which had occurred five to six hours prior to the statements at issue. Nevertheless, the erroneous admission of the victim's statements did not likely affect the outcome of the trial and was therefore harmless, as the statements were consistent with other overwhelming evidence that the defendant had sexually assaulted the victim, including the defendant's admis- sions to A and his video-recorded confession to the police that he had engaged in inappropriate sexual conduct with the victim. The defendant was not deprived of his due process right to present a defense when the trial court imposed certain limitations on the testimony that his expert witness, an immigration attorney, could provide concerning the fed- eral government's U visa program, which allows eligible, undocumented immigrants who are the victims of certain crimes, as well as the guardians of minor victims, to remain lawfully in the United States if they assist law enforcement in the investigation and prosecution of such crimes. The trial court allowed defense counsel to cross-examine A at length about her application for a U visa and whether her testimony was motivated by a desire to secure a U visa and to obtain legal residency in the United States, and the permitted scope of the expert witness' testimony, which included the benefits U visas provide to applicants and the requirement that U visa applicants cooperate with law enforcement, sufficed to convey to the jury any biases or motives that might have affected A's testimony. Moreover, given the significant latitude the court afforded the expert witness to describe the U visa process, along with the substantial other inculpatory evidence presented at trial, this court could not conclude that any additional expert testimony regarding the specific process for verifying a U visa appli- cant's cooperation with law enforcement would have sufficiently under- mined A's credibility such that the lack of such testimony served to substantially sway the jury's verdict. This court, upon independently reviewing certain nondisclosed, confidential documents in the personnel file of one of the detectives who was present during the defendant's police station interview, agreed with the trial court that those documents were not relevant to the detective's involvement in the defendant's case and did not require disclosure to the defense. Argued September 24—officially released December 9, 2025

Convicted of murder and criminal possession of a firearm in connection with the shooting death of the victim, the defendant appealed to this court. He claimed, inter alia, that his constitutional right to confrontation was violated when the trial court allowed G, the state's gunshot residue expert, to base her testimony on the data and notes of K, the analyst who performed the gunshot residue test but who did not testify at trial, and when the prosecutor, while cross-examining the defendant, elicited certain testimonial hearsay statements. Held: The defendant's unpreserved claim that his right to confrontation was vio- lated when the trial court allowed G to base her testimony on the data and notes of K failed under the first prong of State v. Golding (213 Conn. 233), as the record was inadequate to determine whether K's data and notes were testimonial in nature. This court declined to adopt the state's proposed blanket rule, which was based on its assertion that the confrontation clause is not self-executing, that all confrontation claims that are not preserved at trial are forfeited and thus not reviewable under Golding. The state's proposed rule ran the risk of undermining the purpose of Golding review, which is to save unpreserved but meritorious constitutional claims that implicate fundamental rights when the record is adequate for appellate review, by eliminating a narrow class of unpreserved but not affirmatively waived confrontation clause claims, even when a constitutional violation is apparent from an adequate record. The confrontation clause's prohibition against the admission of an unavail- able witness' out-of-court statements applies only to testimonial hearsay, and a determination of whether hearsay is testimonial is dependent in part on whether the declarant had a reasonable expectation, under the circum- stances, that his or her words subsequently could be used for purposes of prosecution. In the present case, because no written report pertaining to gunshot residue testing was admitted into evidence, and because G offered no specificity when referring to K's data and notes, the nature, contents, and information contained in that material were not clear, and without that information, this court could not identify the substance of K's out-of-court statements or 0 Conn. 720 ,0 3 State v. Bester determine the principal reason they were made; accordingly, the record was inadequate for review. The defendant could not prevail on his unpreserved claim that his right to confrontation was violated when the prosecutor elicited from him on cross- examination certain testimonial hearsay statements that had been made by the defendant's girlfriend and his cousin. Neither the defendant's girlfriend nor his cousin testified at trial, the prosecu- tor's questions did not introduce the girlfriend's or the cousin's statements into evidence, and the prosecutor's questions themselves did not consti- tute testimony. Moreover, the prosecutor, in posing the questions at issue, sought to impeach certain testimony that the defendant had given on direct examination, and, because statements introduced solely to impeach a witness are not offered for their truth and therefore are not hearsay, the defendant failed to demon- strate a confrontation clause violation. There was no merit to the defendant's unpreserved claim that his right to a fair trial was violated on the ground that the prosecutor had introduced into evidence facts outside of the record when he questioned the defendant about the weather at the time of the murder and about certain statements made by his girlfriend and his cousin. No prosecutorial impropriety occurred, as defense counsel did not object to the challenged questions or claim that the prosecutor lacked a good faith basis to ask those questions, and the information sought in response to the questions was not inflammatory, inadmissible, unduly prejudicial, or in violation of a court order. Argued September 17—officially released December 9, 2025

Convicted of sexual assault in the first degree, risk of injury to a child, and aggravated sexual assault of a minor in connection with the sexual abuse of the victim, J, the defendant appealed to this court. The defendant claimed, inter alia, that the trial court had abused its discretion in admitting into evidence certain statements that J had made during a forensic interview concerning the sexual abuse at issue under the exception to the hearsay rule for statements made for the purpose of obtaining medical diagnosis or treatment set forth in § 8-3 (5) of the Connecticut Code of Evidence (medical treatment exception). Held: This court clarified that hearsay statements can be admitted under the medical treatment exception only when the declarant was motivated, at least in part, by a desire to obtain medical diagnosis or treatment and the declarant's statements were reasonably pertinent to achieving that end. The trial court abused its discretion in admitting, under the medical treat- ment exception, certain statements that J had made during the forensic interview through the testimony of A, who conducted the interview, as the state failed to demonstrate that the circumstances surrounding the forensic interview would have allowed an objective observer to infer that J under- stood the medical purpose of the forensic interview. The forensic interview occurred at a child advocacy center rather than a medical facility, there was no indication that the interview setting would have alerted J to the medical nature of the interview, the record was silent as to any representations that A had made to J regarding the nature of the interview and was limited as to the specific questions that A asked J, the record also was silent as to whether J discussed any physical or mental health concerns during the interview, and the timing of the interview, at least ten months after the last instance of abuse and five months after J's In accordance with our policy of protecting the privacy interests of the victims of sexual abuse and the crime of risk of injury to a child, we decline to use the defendant's full name or to identify the victim or others through whom the victim's identity may be ascertained. See General Statutes § 54-86e. Moreover, in accordance with federal law; see 18 U.S.C. § 2265 (d) (3) (2024); we decline to identify any person protected or sought to be protected under a protection order, protective order, or a restraining order that was issued or applied for, or others through whom that person's identity may be ascertained. initial disclosure of the abuse, weighed against an inference that J understood that the purpose of the forensic interview was medical in nature. This court nevertheless concluded that the trial court's error in admitting J's statements through A's testimony was harmless because this court had a fair assurance that, under the circumstances of this case, this evidence did not substantially affect the jury's verdict. Specifically, the challenged evidence did not present any new material to the jury regarding the specific instances of abuse, and the prosecutor did not emphasize A's testimony during closing argument but, rather, relied on a limited portion of it that was not challenged on appeal. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the defendant's request to provide the jury with a special child credibility instruction concerning J's testimony. J was twelve years old at the time of the trial, which is an age that, in itself, does not generally warrant a special credibility instruction, and the defendant conceded that J was a competent witness and that she understood the concept of truthfulness. Moreover, this court declined the defendant's request to exercise its supervi- sory authority over the administration of justice and to modify its approach to special child credibility instructions as set forth in State v. James (211 Conn. 555). Argued September 18—officially released December 9, 2025

The defendant appealed, on the granting of certification, from the judgment of the Appellate Court, which had affirmed his conviction of evasion of responsibility in the operation of a motor vehicle and tampering with physical evidence. The defendant's conviction stemmed from an incident in which he struck and killed a pedestrian with the sport utility vehicle (SUV) he was driving, fled the scene, and, when the SUV broke down shortly thereafter, left the SUV in the driveway of a private residence. On appeal, the defendant claimed that the Appellate Court had incorrectly concluded that there was sufficient evidence to sustain his conviction of tampering with physical evidence. Held: The Appellate Court incorrectly concluded that there was sufficient evidence to sustain the defendant's conviction of tampering with physical evidence, as the facts did not establish that the defendant's conduct constituted con- cealment under the applicable criminal statute (§ 53a-155 (a)). Whatever the defendant's intention or plan may have been when he fled the scene and left the SUV backed into a private driveway in front of other vehicles that were parked there, the defendant did not conceal any part of SUV, as an SUV sitting uncovered at the end of a driveway with its damaged front end facing a public roadway is not concealed in any sense of that term. Accordingly, this court reversed in part the Appellate Court's judgment, the trial court was directed on remand to render a judgment of acquittal on the charge of tampering with physical evidence, and this court left it to the discretion of the trial court whether to resentence the defendant on remand. Argued November 5—officially released December 16, 2025

Convicted of murder in connection with the shooting death of the victim after unsuccessfully asserting a self-defense claim at trial, the defendant appealed to this court. The defendant, who had testified at trial, claimed that the trial court committed plain error by permitting the prosecutor to cross-examine him regarding his prearrest silence, specifically, his failure to report to the police after the murder but before being arrested that he allegedly had shot the victim in self-defense. Held: The trial court did not commit plain error in permitting the prosecutor to cross-examine the defendant regarding his prearrest silence, as the relevant case law did not support the defendant's claim that the trial court's admission of his prearrest silence constituted an obvious and readily discernable error. Argued November 3—officially released December 23, 2025

Pursuant to the rules of practice (§ 2-47 (d) (1)), if a respondent attorney has been disciplined at least three times in a five year period preceding the date of the filing of a grievance complaint that gives rise to a finding of current misconduct, the Statewide Grievance Committee or a reviewing committee ''shall direct the disciplinary counsel to file a presentment against the respondent in the Superior Court,'' and ''[t]he sole issue to be determined by the court upon the presentment shall be the appropriate action to take'' as a result of the nature of the respondent's current misconduct ''and the cumulative discipline issued concerning the respondent within such five year period.'' Pursuant further to the rules of practice (§ 2-47 (d) (2)), ''[i]f the respondent has appealed the issuance of a finding of misconduct made by the Statewide Grievance Committee or the reviewing committee, the court shall first adjudi- cate and decide that appeal in accordance with the procedures set forth in subsections (d) through (f) of [§] 2-38 [of the Practice Book].'' The respondent attorney appealed, on the granting of certification, from the judgment of the Appellate Court, which had affirmed the trial court's judg- ment suspending him from the practice of law for ninety days. A 2018 grievance complaint alleging certain professional misconduct by the respon- dent was referred to a reviewing committee of the Statewide Grievance Committee, but hearings on the matter were postponed for nearly three years. The respondent ultimately moved to dismiss the complaint, claiming that he had been denied his right to due process and prejudiced by the delay in its adjudication. Following a hearing in 2021, the reviewing commit- tee denied the respondent's motion to dismiss and found that he had engaged in certain misconduct. The reviewing committee ultimately concluded that the respondent's misconduct warranted a reprimand but that it was required by Practice Book § 2-47 (d) (1) to direct the petitioner, the Office of Chief Disciplinary Counsel, to file a presentment in the Superior Court because the respondent had been disciplined at least three other times in the five years preceding the filing of the 2018 complaint. The respondent filed a request for review with the Statewide Grievance Committee, which upheld the reviewing committee's decision. The respondent, however, did not appeal from either the decision of the reviewing committee or the Statewide Griev- ance Committee. After the petitioner filed the presentment, the trial court declined the respondent's request to consider his due process claim and, pursuant to § 2-47 (d) (1), instead limited its inquiry to the appropriate discipline to impose. In affirming the trial court's judgment, the Appellate Court concluded that the respondent's failure to appeal from the decision of the Statewide Grievance Committee or the reviewing committee pursuant to the rule of practice (§ 2-38) governing appeals from grievance decisions ''imposing sanctions or conditions'' precluded him from raising his due process claim during the presentment proceedings before the trial court. The respondent claimed, inter alia, that the Appellate Court had incorrectly concluded that he waived his due process claim by virtue of his failure to pursue a timely appeal pursuant to § 2-38. Held: This court agreed with the Appellate Court that, in cases in which the Statewide Grievance Committee or a reviewing committee designates a case for presentment pursuant to § 2-47 (d) (1), a respondent who seeks to challenge the committee's ultimate finding of misconduct or any subsidiary ruling made in connection with a misconduct finding must do so through an appeal to the Superior Court authorized by § 2-38, and § 2-47 (d) (2) requires the Superior Court to adjudicate that appeal before turning to the issue of what discipline, if any, is appropriate. Moreover, once the appeal period under § 2-38 lapses without action, the committee's decision, including its interlocutory rulings, is final, and the Superior Court's authority at presentment is confined under § 2-47 (d) (1) to determining ''the appropriate [disciplinary] action'' to be taken as a result of the respondent's current misconduct and cumulative disciplinary history. Nevertheless, the language and organization of §§ 2-38 and 2-47 (d) created a lack of clarity regarding the proper procedure for challenging findings of misconduct and for obtaining appellate review of constitutional claims in cases in which presentment to the Superior Court is directed pursuant to § 2-47 (d) (1), and that lack of clarity, coupled with concerns of fundamental fairness, required that this case be remanded to the trial court so that the respondent could litigate the merits of his due process claim as though he had filed a timely appeal pursuant to § 2-38 (a). Specifically, this court could not rule out the possibility that the lack of clarity in the rules of practice may have led the respondent to believe that he did not need to appeal from the decision of the Statewide Grievance Committee or the reviewing committee, and the respondent's claim impli- cated his fundamental due process rights concerning a protected prop- erty interest. There was no merit to the respondent's claim that the Appellate Court's interpretation of § 2-47 (d) (1) improperly curtailed the inherent authority of the Superior Court in disciplinary matters, as the rules of practice preserve that court's inherent authority in disciplinary matters while establishing the procedural sequence in which that authority must be exercised. Argued September 18—officially released December 23, 2025

Pursuant to statute (§ 53a-217 (a) (4) (A)), a person is guilty of criminal possession of a firearm or ammunition when that person possesses a firearm or ammunition and knows that he or she is subject to a restraining or protective order ''in a case involving the use, attempted use or threatened use of physical force against another person . . . .'' Convicted, on a conditional plea of nolo contendere, of criminal possession of a firearm or ammunition and criminal violation of a protective order, the defendant appealed. The defendant's conviction stemmed from two prior cases in which he had been charged with sexual assault in the fourth degree and risk of injury to a child in connection with his abuse of a minor family member. In each of those cases, the trial court issued a protective order requiring the defendant to surrender all of his firearms and ammunition. In the present case, the state alleged, inter alia, that the defendant had pos- sessed firearms or ammunition in violation of those protective orders. On appeal, the defendant claimed, inter alia, that the trial court had improperly denied his motion to dismiss the criminal possession of a firearm or ammuni- tion charge brought under § 53a-217 (a) (4) (A), contending that the protec- tive orders that formed the basis for that charge were not issued ''in a case involving the use, attempted use or threatened use of physical force'' because such use of force is not an element of the underlying offense of fourth degree sexual assault or risk of injury to a child. Held: The criminal possession of a firearm or ammunition charge brought under § 53a-217 (a) (4) (A) did not fail as a matter of law, this court having concluded that the underlying protective orders stemming from the prior fourth degree sexual assault and risk of injury to a child charges were issued ''in a case involving'' the use, attempted use or threatened use of physical force for purposes of that statute. In accordance with our policy of protecting the privacy interests of the victims of sexual abuse and the crime of risk of injury to a child, we decline to identify the victim or others through whom the victim's identity may be ascertained. See General Statutes § 54-86e. Moreover, in accordance with federal law; see 18 U.S.C. § 2265 (d) (3) (2024); we decline to identify any person protected or sought to be protected under a protection order, protective order, or a restraining order that was issued or applied for, or others through whom that person's identity may be ascertained. The plain and unambiguous meaning of the phrase ''a case involving,'' as used in § 53a-217 (a) (4) (A), is broadly inclusive of an entire proceeding, action, suit, or controversy, and does not, contrary to the defendant's con- tention, require that the protective order be issued in a case in which the actual, attempted, or threatened use of physical force is an essential element of a charged offense, or of a claim or defense. In the present case, because the protective orders were issued in cases involving the prosecution of a sex offense, this court looked to the statutory (§ 53a-65 (7) (B)) definition of ''use of force'' in the portion of the Penal Code setting forth the definitions applicable to sex offenses and concluded that the ''case involving'' element of § 53a-217 (a) (4) (A) can be satisfied when the defendant knows that he is subject to a protective order that was issued in a prior sex offense prosecution in which the actual, attempted, or threatened use of actual physical force or violence or superior physical strength against the victim was present within any aspect of the prosecution. The defendant could not prevail on his alternative, unpreserved claim that § 53a-217 (a) (4) (A) was unconstitutionally vague as applied to him, the defendant having failed to demonstrate the existence of a constitutional violation under the third prong of the test set forth in State v. Golding (213 Conn. 233), as modified by In re Yasiel R. (317 Conn. 773). Even if neither of the courts that issued the protective orders memorialized any factual findings regarding the defendant's actual, attempted, or threat- ened use of physical force, § 53a-217 (a) (4) (A) was not unconstitutionally vague as applied to the defendant because that statute generally provides sufficient guidance regarding how the state, in a prosecution for criminal possession of a firearm or ammunition, may prove that a prior criminal case involved such use of physical force, regardless of whether the court that issued the protective order created a robust record to facilitate proof of this element of § 53a-217 (a) (4) (A). The defendant's claim that the charges of criminal possession of a firearm or ammunition and criminal violation of a protective order failed as a matter of law insofar as the protective orders on which they were based violated the second amendment to the United States constitution was an impermissible collateral attack on the validity of the protective orders themselves, rather than a challenge to the constitutionality of any criminal statute, and, there- fore, the defendant's claim was precluded by the collateral bar rule. Moreover, to the extent the defendant claimed that he could not have chal- lenged the underlying protective orders on second amendment grounds when the orders were issued because those orders predated the release of certain relevant United States Supreme Court decisions, that claim was unavailing, as there had been case law since at least 2010 recognizing a defendant's second amendment right to keep and bear arms, and the more recent decisions on which the defendant relied did not announce any new rights. Argued September 15—officially released December 30, 2025

The plaintiff appealed, on the granting of certification, from the judgment of the Appellate Court, which had affirmed the trial court's partial judgment in favor of N Co., the plaintiff's automobile insurer. The plaintiff had brought an action against the defendant L, seeking damages for, inter alia, diminution of value and loss of use of his vehicle in connection with an automobile accident allegedly caused by L's negligence. Thereafter, L impleaded N Co. and alleged that his insurer, S Co., had tendered to N Co. $25,000, which was the full liability coverage limit for property damage under L's insurance policy, based on N Co.'s alleged misrepresentation that the plaintiff had been made whole. The plaintiff subsequently filed an amended complaint, alleging, inter alia, that N Co. was unjustly enriched when it prematurely accepted the $25,000 from S Co. and thereby reduced the amount of funds that otherwise would have been available to indemnify L in the plaintiff's negligence action, in violation of the make whole doctrine, which restricts an insurer's ability to enforce its right to subrogation until after the insured has been fully compensated, or made whole, for the insured's loss. The trial court ultimately dismissed the plaintiff's unjust enrichment claim against N Co. as not ripe for adjudication. In affirming the trial court's partial judgment of dismissal, the Appellate Court concluded that the unjust enrichment claim was not ripe until the plaintiff first obtained a judgment against L because that claim was otherwise contingent on whether and to what extent the plaintiff could recover from L and on L's ability to satisfy the hypothetical judgment. On appeal to this court, the plaintiff claimed, inter alia, that his unjust enrichment claim was ripe for adjudication. Held: The Appellate Court improperly upheld the trial court's dismissal of the plaintiff's unjust enrichment claim on ripeness grounds, and, accordingly, this court reversed the Appellate Court's judgment, directed that court to reverse the trial court's partial judgment in favor of N Co., and remanded the case for further proceedings. The Appellate Court incorrectly determined that the plaintiff must obtain a judgment against L and exhaust all collection efforts before his unjust enrichment claim against N Co. becomes ripe, as a cause of action premised on an insurer's premature subrogation in violation of the make whole doc- trine is ripe for adjudication before an insured obtains a judgment against the alleged tortfeasor. Under the circumstances of the present case, in which L's liability has already been accepted by his insurer, the diminution in value and loss of 353 Conn. 845 JANUARY, 2026 3 Orlando v. Liburd use damages claimed by the plaintiff have been recognized, and N Co. has exhausted all of the coverage that might have been available to compensate the plaintiff for those damages under L's insurance policy, the plaintiff's unjust enrichment claim was ripe for adjudication, and only the amount of the plaintiff's damages for loss of use and diminution in value of his vehicle was in question. Moreover, whether the plaintiff suffered a cognizable injury was not, con- trary to the Appellate Court's determination, contingent on whether and to what extent he could recover against L and L's ability to satisfy such a judgment because the precise nature of the injury that the plaintiff allegedly sustained was the violation of his priority right to L's insurance coverage, which, far from being either contingent or hypothetical, already had occurred. Furthermore, N Co.'s enforcement of its right to subrogation precluded the plaintiff from accessing the liability coverage available under L's insurance policy to compensate the plaintiff for losses not covered by his policy with N Co., and such enforcement improperly transferred the risk of not being made whole from N Co. to the plaintiff. To the extent the trial court determined that the plaintiff's unjust enrichment claim was not ripe because the plaintiff failed to allege the amount of his claimed damages, the amount subrogated by his insurer, or the limits of L's coverage, this court also rejected that reasoning. It was undisputed that the plaintiff's alleged damages were in excess of L's policy limits, insofar as N Co.'s recovery of $25,000 from S Co. had exhausted the coverage limit for property damage under L's insurance policy and the plaintiff alleged that he had suffered certain losses for which he had not yet been compensated, and those allegations, coupled with the reasonable inference that N Co.'s subrogation weakened the plaintiff's litigation position against L, were sufficient to establish a substantial risk that he would not be made whole. The Appellate Court's judgment could not be affirmed on the alternative ground that the plaintiff lacked standing to assert his unjust enrichment claim, as the plaintiff sufficiently alleged a specific, personal and legal interest in N Co.'s subrogation recovery under the make whole doctrine and that there was a possibility that N Co.'s enforcement of its subrogation right had adversely affected that interest. Argued September 22, 2025—officially released January 6, 2026