Volume 354 — Connecticut Reports

Convicted of numerous crimes, including home invasion and assault in the first degree by means of the discharge of a firearm, in connection with an incident in which the defendant entered a home and shot one of its occupants, the defendant appealed to this court. In the operative information, the state alleged in one of the counts that the defendant had violated the statute (§ 53a-100aa) proscribing home invasion by unlawfully entering the home of another, while other persons were present, and committing the felony of assault in the first degree against one of those persons. Although the state did not specify in the information that the defendant's conduct had violated a particular subsection of or subdivision within § 53a-100aa, the allegations in the home invasion count tracked the language set forth in subdivision (1) of § 53a-100aa (a), which requires proof that the defendant, in the course of committing the home invasion, committed a felony against the person of another. The trial court, however, instructed the jury in accordance with subdivision (2) of § 53a-100aa (a), which requires proof that the defendant, in the course of committing the home invasion, was armed with a deadly weapon. On appeal, the defendant claimed, inter alia, that the trial court had committed plain error when it instructed the jury on a theory of liability that was not charged in the information, in violation of his sixth amendment right to be informed of the nature and cause of the charges against him. Held: The trial court did not commit plain error when it instructed the jury on the elements of home invasion in accordance with subdivision (2), rather than subdivision (1), of § 53a-100aa (a), the operative information having provided the defendant with adequate notice that he could be convicted under either of those subdivisions so as to enable him to prepare a defense and to avoid prejudicial surprise. Although the home invasion count in the information tracked the language in § 53a-100aa (a) (1), it was not possible for the defendant to have committed home invasion in the manner described in that count without satisfying the elements of both subdivisions (1) and (2) of § 53a-100aa (a), insofar as the state was required to prove that the defendant was armed with a deadly weapon in order to show that he had committed first degree assault in the manner described in the home invasion count, and, accordingly, the defendant was In accordance with federal law; see 18 U.S.C. § 2265 (d) (3) (2024); we decline to identify any person protected or sought to be protected under a protection order, protective order, or a restraining order that was issued or applied for, or others through whom that person's identity may be ascertained. State v. Christon M. on notice that he was subject to criminal liability under both subdivisions of § 53a-100aa (a). Moreover, the state provided the defendant with constitutionally adequate notice of the home invasion offense, even though the information charged him with violating § 53a-100aa generally, as it was not necessary for the information to specify that the defendant's conduct violated a particular subsection or subdivision of the statute, and, if the defendant had any doubt as to whether the state's theory of liability encompassed either subdivision (1) or (2) of § 53a-100aa (a), or both subdivisions, it was incumbent on him to file a motion for a bill of particulars, which he failed to do. Furthermore, to the extent that the allegations in the home invasion count were ambiguous as to whether the defendant was subject to criminal liability under either subdivision of § 53a-100aa (a), each remaining count in the information was predicated on the defendant's alleged possession and use of a deadly weapon inside of the home in which the invasion occurred, making it clear that the defendant would have to defend against that allegation at trial. In addition, any error in the trial court's jury instructions due to the vari- ance between the information and those instructions did not prejudice the defendant's defense to the home invasion charge, as there was nothing to suggest that his third-party culpability defense would have been different, or would have gained probative force, if the count of the information charg- ing the defendant with home invasion had specifically alleged a violation of § 53a-100aa (a) (2). The defendant could not prevail on his unpreserved claim that his convic- tions of home invasion in violation of § 53a-100aa (a) (2) and assault in the first degree by means of the discharge of a firearm in violation of the first degree assault statute (§ 53a-59 (a) (5)) violated the constitutional prohibi- tion against double jeopardy, the defendant having failed to demonstrate the existence of a constitutional violation under the third prong of State v. Golding (213 Conn. 233), as modified by In re Yasiel R. (317 Conn. 773). Home invasion and first degree assault with a firearm did not constitute the same offense for purposes of the double jeopardy clause under the test set forth in Blockburger v. United States (284 U.S. 299), as each offense requires proof of an essential element that the other does not. Moreover, assault in the first degree was not a predicate offense for home invasion, and, accordingly, there was no possibility that the defendant was punished twice for first degree assault and home invasion. Argued October 29, 2025—officially released January 13, 2026

Convicted of five counts of sexual assault in the first degree, among other crimes, in connection with the sexual abuse of two children, the defendant appealed to this court. Each count of sexual assault in the state's informa- tion was premised on multiple, separate instances of a specific sexual act committed by the defendant against one of the victims while that victim was attending a day care located in the defendant's home. Prior to delibera- tions, the trial court gave the jury a specific unanimity charge for each count of sexual assault, which instructed the jurors that they were required to unanimously agree on the defendant's guilt with respect to at least one of the instances of conduct alleged in each count in order to find the defendant guilty in connection with any particular count. Held: The defendant could not prevail on his unpreserved claim that his right under the federal constitution to a unanimous jury verdict was violated when the trial court, having provided the jury with proper specific unanim- ity instructions, nevertheless failed to require the jurors to answer special interrogatories on the subject of unanimity with respect to each alleged instance of conduct in the sexual assault counts. The defendant failed to demonstrate that the United States constitution requires the use of such interrogatories in addition to specific unanimity instructions when the state has charged a defendant in a single count with violating a single statute in multiple, separate instances. Argued October 30, 2025—officially released January 20, 2026

The petitioner, who had been convicted of conspiracy to commit robbery in the first degree, attempt to commit robbery in the first degree, and assault in the first degree in connection with the shooting of a pizza delivery driver, sought a writ of habeas corpus, claiming, inter alia, that his trial counsel, C, had rendered ineffective assistance. At the petitioner's criminal trial, the defense theory was that another individual, D, with whom the petitioner was visiting on the night of the shooting, had committed the charged offenses, but D testified that it was the petitioner who had made plans to rob a delivery driver and who had used D's cell phone to call and case various businesses, including the pizza restaurant that employed the victim. The habeas court denied the habeas petition, and the petitioner, on the granting of certifica- tion, appealed to the Appellate Court, which affirmed the habeas court's judgment. Although the Appellate Court agreed with the petitioner's claim that C had rendered ineffective assistance by failing to adequately investigate D's cell phone records, a majority of that court ultimately concluded that the petitioner had failed to establish that he was prejudiced by C's deficient performance. On the granting of certification, the petitioner appealed to this court, challenging the Appellate Court's determination on the issue of prejudice. Held: The Appellate Court incorrectly concluded that the petitioner had failed to establish prejudice stemming from C's failure to investigate D's cell phone records, as there was a reasonable probability that, but for C's failure to undertake such an investigation and to introduce some or all of the records at trial, the jury would have had a reasonable doubt with respect to the peti- tioner's guilt, and, accordingly, this court reversed the Appellate Court's judgment and remanded the case with direction that the habeas court grant the habeas petition, vacate his convictions, and order a new trial. The state's case at the petitioner's criminal trial rested in significant part on D's account of the events leading up to and following the shooting, D's testimony that the petitioner had used D's cell phone to order the pizza was central to the state's theory connecting the petitioner to the victim, and, if D's phone records had been admitted into evidence, the jury would have learned that D's phone had not been used on the night in question to call the pizza restaurant that employed the victim, or any other business, and this evidence would have served to significantly discredit D's account of what had transpired and, in turn, D's credibility. Moreover, the introduction into evidence of D's cell phone records showing that no call was made from D's phone to the pizza restaurant that employed Grant v. Commissioner of Correction the victim on the night in question would have undermined the corroborating testimony of S, a detective who testified that D's cell phone had been used that night to call the pizza restaurant, thereby further weakening the state's case. Furthermore, D's cell phone records also revealed that his cell phone was not in use at the time of the incident, thereby supporting the reasonable inferences that D was one of the assailants and had stopped using his phone during that period, which, in turn, would have bolstered the petitioner's third-party culpability defense. There was no merit to the claims of the respondent, the Commissioner of Correction, that prejudice could not adequately be assessed due to the peti- tioner's failure to call D and S to testify at the habeas trial, and that the evidence the petitioner produced at the habeas trial did not establish that no calls were placed from D's cell phone to any business on the night of the incident in question. Argued October 31, 2025—officially released January 20, 2026

The plaintiffs brought an action in Connecticut to recover damages from the defendants, D Co., a Connecticut limited liability company and two of its officers, for, inter alia, the wrongful death of certain individuals who died in a building fire in the Philippines. The trial court granted the defen- dants' motion to dismiss the plaintiffs' action on the ground of forum non conveniens, concluding that the Philippine courts served as an adequate alternative forum for the plaintiffs' action. The trial court rendered judg- ment dismissing the plaintiffs' action but conditioned its dismissal on the plaintiffs being allowed to restore their action in Connecticut if the Philip- pine courts ultimately dismissed the action for lack of jurisdiction. The plaintiffs thereafter appealed to the Appellate Court, which affirmed the trial court's judgment of dismissal. On the granting of certification, the plaintiffs appealed to this court, claiming, inter alia, that the Appellate Court incorrectly concluded that the trial court had applied the correct legal standard in concluding that the Philippines was an adequate alternative forum for the plaintiffs' action. Held: The Appellate Court correctly concluded that the trial court had applied the correct legal standard set forth in Picketts v. International Playtex, Inc. (215 Conn. 490) in determining whether the Philippines was an adequate alternative forum for the plaintiffs' action. Moreover, there was no merit to the plaintiffs' claim that the trial court had dismissed their action solely on the basis of the defendants' consent to submit to the jurisdiction of the Philippine courts, as the trial court prop- erly undertook a meaningful assessment of whether the Philippines was an adequate alternative forum by weighing the parties' competing affidavits submitted in connection with the defendants' motion to dismiss. Furthermore, the trial court properly made its dismissal contingent on the defendants' stipulation that they would agree to defend the action that the plaintiffs bring in the Philippines and that they would not oppose the plain- tiffs' reinstatement of the Connecticut action should it become necessary in the event of a dismissal of the case by a Philippine court. Argued November 5, 2025—officially released January 27, 2026 DeCicco v. Dynata, LLC

The plaintiff, the municipal tax collector for the city of Torrington, com- menced a bank execution action against the defendant in 2021, seeking to levy funds from the defendant's bank accounts and to apply those funds toward the tax debt of a business in which she previously had been involved. The trial court in the 2021 action, however, granted the defendant's motion for exemption, concluding that the plaintiff's bank execution action was "of no effect" because the defendant, who had moved to California at least ten years earlier, had not received notice of or an opportunity to challenge the tax debt at issue, and also because the plaintiff had failed to comply with the statutory (§ 12-155 (a)) requirement that it make written demand of the plaintiff at her usual place of abode or last known place of residence. The plaintiff appealed from the court's decision to grant the motion but later withdrew its appeal. The plaintiff then sent written demand to the defendant at her California address and commenced the present bank execution action, but it never provided the defendant with a new tax bill or an opportunity to challenge that bill. The defendant again moved for exemption, which the trial court granted and rendered judgment for the defendant, reasoning that the present action was a collateral attack on the court's previous decision in the 2021 action and was therefore barred by, inter alia, the doctrine of col- lateral estoppel. The Appellate Court affirmed the trial court's judgment, concluding that the doctrine of collateral estoppel barred the plaintiff from relitigating the issue of whether it could execute on the defendant's funds without first providing adequate notice and an opportunity to challenge because that issue was actually litigated and necessarily determined in the 2021 action. On the granting of certification, the plaintiff appealed to this court, claiming, inter alia, that the doctrine of collateral estoppel did not bar the present action because the issue of whether the defendant's funds were exempt from execution due to the lack of notice and opportunity to challenge was not necessary to the judgment in the 2021 action in light of the trial court's independent, alternative ground for granting the motion for exemption, namely, the plaintiff's failure to comply with § 12-155 (a). Held: The Appellate Court correctly concluded that the plaintiff's present bank execution action was barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel, and, accordingly, this court affirmed the Appellate Court's judgment. Torrington Tax Collector, LLC v. Riley The issue of whether the defendant's funds were exempt from execution due to her lack of notice and opportunity to challenge the underlying tax debt was actually litigated in the 2021 action, insofar as the defendant raised a due process claim in her pleadings and that issue was addressed at an evi- dentiary hearing and adjudicated by the trial court in its memorandum of decision in the 2021 action. There was no merit to the plaintiff's claim that the due process issue was not actually litigated in the 2021 action on the ground that a trial court in a bank execution action does not possess jurisdiction to consider the underlying assessment or validity of the tax, as the Superior Court, as a court of general jurisdiction, has subject matter jurisdiction to grant a taxpayer relief from the collection of a municipal tax that violates due process of law. The issue of whether the defendant's funds were exempt from execution due to her lack of notice and opportunity to challenge was necessarily determined in the 2021 action, even though there was an additional independent, alterna- tive ground for the court's judgment in the 2021 action. This court continued to follow the approach espoused in comment (n) to § 68 of the Restatement (First) of Judgments, pursuant to which all independent, alternative grounds supporting a judgment are deemed to be necessary to that judgment and are precluded from being litigated in a subsequent action for purposes of the doctrine of collateral estoppel. Because independent, alternative grounds are entitled to preclusive effect in a subsequent action, the issue of the defendant's notice and opportunity to challenge the underlying tax debt, which was actually litigated by the parties and adjudicated by the trial court in the 2021 action, was necessarily decided for purposes of the doctrine of collateral estoppel and could not be relitigated in the present action, despite the court's independent, alternative ground for its judgment, namely, the plaintiff's failure to comply with the written demand requirement of § 12-155 (a). This court declined the plaintiff's invitation to adopt, as a matter of public policy, an exception to the application of the doctrine of collateral estoppel in bank execution actions involving municipal tax collections. Argued September 19, 2025—officially released February 3, 2026

Convicted of murder, burglary in the first degree, conspiracy to commit bur- glary in the first degree, and tampering with physical evidence, the defendant appealed to this court. Shortly after the discovery of the decomposed body of the victim, with whom the defendant previously had an intimate relationship, the police conducted a series of three interviews with the defendant. Prior to the second interview, the police read the defendant his rights under Miranda v. Arizona (384 U.S. 436), and the defendant agreed to waive those rights. Thereafter, during that interview, the defendant made certain incriminat- ing statements after which he told the police that he was "done talking . . . ." At that point, the interview ended, and the defendant was placed under arrest. The next morning, while the defendant was awaiting transport to court for his arraignment, he indicated to B, a detective, his desire to speak again. During this third interview, in response to the defendant's equivo- cal request for counsel, B advised the defendant of his Miranda rights, and the defendant again agreed to a waiver of those rights. During this third interview, the defendant admitted to killing the victim. The trial court denied the defendant's pretrial motion to suppress his statements from the third interview, in which he claimed that B had not clarified his equivocal invocation of his right to counsel, in violation of the state constitution, as articulated in State v. Purcell (331 Conn. 318). On appeal, the defendant claimed, inter alia, that the trial court had improperly denied his motion to suppress. Held: The defendant could not prevail on his unpreserved claim that the trial court had improperly admitted into evidence the video recording of his second interview with the police on the ground that he did not validly waive his Miranda rights prior to making incriminating statements during that interview, as defense counsel affirmatively waived the defendant's Miranda- based claim at trial. Defense counsel waived any Miranda-based claims arising from the second interview, insofar as he challenged only the admission of statements made during the third interview in the motion to suppress, and it was apparent that defense counsel made an affirmative decision not to challenge at trial the statements made during the second interview on the ground that the admission of those statements violated the defendant's Miranda rights. There was no merit to the defendant's claim that the trial court had improperly admitted into evidence the video recording of the third interview with B on the ground that B had failed to clarify the defendant's equivocal request for State v. Johnson counsel, in violation of his rights under the state constitution, as articulated in Purcell. Given that the defendant initiated the third interview after previously invoking his Miranda rights just hours beforehand and that the defendant then made an equivocal invocation of his right to counsel, B's provision of Miranda warnings at that point was a reasonable and sufficient response, as B sought to ensure that the defendant understood all of his rights, including the right to counsel, before any interrogation commenced. Moreover, the defendant's express waiver of his Miranda rights, following B's advisement of those rights, for a second time, within less than twelve hours between the second and third interviews, manifested the defendant's clear and unequivocal desire to proceed with the third interview without counsel, and, under the circumstances, that readvisement sufficiently clarified the defendant's equivocal request for counsel. Furthermore, there was no merit to the defendant's claim that certain unprompted comments that B made after the defendant's waiver of his Miranda rights during the third interview constituted an impermissible attempt to persuade the defendant to waive his rights in order to continue with that interview, as B merely attempted to explain that, as a practical matter, it was improbable that the defendant could obtain an attorney to be present for questioning at the police station prior to his arraignment, which was scheduled for that same morning. The trial court properly denied the defendant's motion to suppress his cell phone records and all of the evidence derived therefrom, including location data, as the warrant authorizing the search and seizure of the defendant's cell phone satisfied the constitutional requirements of probable cause and particularity. The warrant was supported by probable cause, as the facts contained in the affidavit in support of that warrant, together with the reasonable infer- ences that could be drawn therefrom, established a fair probability that the defendant had been involved in the victim's murder. Moreover, the warrant satisfied the particularity requirement insofar as it sought a list of specific records, over a relevant time period, that was suf- ficiently limited and connected to the factual circumstances surrounding the victim's murder. Contrary to the defendant's claim, the warrant did not authorize an imper- missible general search of all of his cell phone records in view of the warrant's use of the phrase "including, but not limited to," as the warrant authorized a search of only the defendant's cell phone records that were in the possession of his cell phone carrier and that were created within a limited time period. (Three justices dissenting in part in one opinion) Argued September 24, 2025—officially released February 3, 2026 State v. Johnson

The plaintiffs, current or former employees of the defendants, filed a class action in the Superior Court seeking to recover for the defendants' alleged violation of Connecticut's wage laws. The plaintiffs claimed, inter alia, that the defendants had failed to compensate them and other similarly situ- ated employees for time spent undergoing mandatory security screenings before leaving the defendants' premises at the end of their shifts. After the case was removed to federal court, the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment and rendered judgment in their favor, concluding that, because Connecticut's wage laws were intended to be coextensive with the federal Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq.), as amended by the Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947 (29 U.S.C. § 251 et seq.), and because the time employees spend undergoing mandatory security screenings has been deemed to be noncompensable under federal law, the plaintiffs were not entitled to compensation under Connecticut law for the time spent under- going the defendants' security screenings. The plaintiffs appealed from the District Court's judgment to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, which, pursuant to statute (§ 51-199b (d)), certified to this court two questions of law concerning the scope of Connecticut law. Held: Connecticut's wage laws are more protective than federal wage laws insofar as Connecticut law requires an employer to compensate its employees for time spent undergoing mandatory security screenings on the employer's premises. Under Connecticut law, an employer must compensate its employers for all "hours worked," and the plain and unambiguous language of the statute (§ 31-76b (2) (A)) defining that phrase requires an employer to compensate its employees for any period of time during which the employer requires its employee to be on its premises, even if the employee is not required to work during that time period. Because it was undisputed that the defendants required the plaintiffs to undergo mandatory security screenings on the defendants' premises before the plaintiffs were permitted to leave those premises at the end of their shifts, that time was compensable under the plain language of § 31-76b (2) (A). Moreover, there was no merit to the defendants' claim that interpreting § 31-76b (2) (A) to require employers to compensate their employees for time spent undergoing mandatory security screenings would lead to absurd or unworkable results, as the defendants failed to demonstrate that the legis- lature's policy choice was bizarre, absurd or contrary to common sense, and this court could not conclude that it would be impractical or infeasible for employers to keep track of that time. Del Rio v. Amazon.com Services, Inc. This court clarified that, in contrast to federal law, Connecticut's wage laws do not incorporate, either by statute, regulation or judicial precedent, a de minimis exception to compensability that would allow an employer, in record- ing an employee's time at work, to disregard insubstantial or insignificant periods of time beyond an employee's scheduled working hours when those periods of time cannot, as a practical administrative matter, be precisely recorded for payroll purposes. Argued November 3, 2025—officially released February 10, 2026

The petitioner, who had been convicted of felony murder, robbery in the first degree, and conspiracy to commit robbery in the first degree in connec- tion with the shooting death of the victim, sought a writ of habeas corpus, claiming, inter alia, that newly discovered evidence established that he was actually innocent of those crimes. At his habeas trial, the petitioner intro- duced evidence that, after he was convicted, M, his alleged coconspirator, was separately tried and found not guilty of conspiracy to commit first degree robbery, among other offenses, under the statute (§ 53a-13 (a)) governing the affirmative defense of lack of capacity due to mental disease or defect. The petitioner claimed that M's acquittal under § 53a-13 (a) established that M necessarily lacked the requisite intent to enter into a conspiracy with the petitioner and that M's inability to form an intent to commit any crime at the time of the shooting established the petitioner's actual innocence of each crime of which he was convicted. Relying on State v. Colon (257 Conn. 587), in which this court held that separately tried coconspirators are not entitled to consistent verdicts, the habeas court rejected the petitioner's actual innocence claim, reasoning that M's acquittal was, as a matter of law, irrelevant to whether the petitioner was actually innocent. Accordingly, the habeas court rendered judgment denying the petitioner's habeas petition. The petitioner then appealed to the Appellate Court, which affirmed the habeas court's judgment. The Appellate Court concluded that the habeas court had misapplied Colon and failed to evaluate the aggregate evidence from the petitioner's and M's separate criminal trials. After conducting its own independent review of that evidence, the Appellate Court also concluded that M's acquittal demonstrated that M was incapable of forming the neces- sary criminal intent to enter into the conspiracy, and M's inability to form a criminal intent necessarily meant that the petitioner was actually innocent of conspiring with M to commit the robbery. Nevertheless, the Appellate Court determined that the evidence permitted a reasonable fact finder to find that a conspiracy to commit the robbery existed between the petitioner and a third individual, which served as the alternative basis for affirmance of the habeas court's judgment. On the granting of certification, the petitioner appealed to this court. Held: Although the Appellate Court applied the correct legal standard in evaluat- ing the petitioner's actual innocence claim, it incorrectly concluded that M's acquittal under § 53a-13 (a) demonstrated that M could not have possessed the specific intent required to form a conspiratorial agreement with the petitioner. This court agreed with the Appellate Court that this court's holding in Colon permitting inconsistent verdicts between separately tried alleged coconspirators is not applicable in the context of a habeas petition asserting Moon v. Commissioner of Correction an actual innocence claim, and that applying Colon to an actual innocence claim deprives a petitioner of the opportunity to prove his claim of innocence. In support of an actual innocence claim, a petitioner may rely on evidence from his alleged coconspirator's separate criminal trial, including evidence that the alleged coconspirator lacked the requisite intent to enter into the conspiracy, if that evidence was not available to the petitioner at his own criminal trial, and the habeas court in the present case should have considered all of the evidence presented by the petitioner at his habeas trial to determine whether, in the aggregate, it established his actual innocence. Nevertheless, neither the judgment of not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect in M's criminal case, nor the evidence from M's criminal trial that was submitted at the petitioner's habeas trial, supported the Appellate Court's conclusion that M's acquittal had demonstrated that M was incapable of form- ing the specific intent to conspire with the petitioner to commit the robbery. The trial court in M's criminal case found that M had proven by a preponder- ance of the evidence that he lacked the capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct and to conform his behavior to the requirements of the law, but it was the petitioner's burden in the present habeas proceeding to establish his actual innocence by clear and convincing evidence, and the trial court's finding in M's criminal case, which was reached under the less burdensome standard of preponderance of the evidence, could not be treated as clear and convincing proof in the petitioner's habeas proceeding that M lacked the specific intent necessary to conspire with the petitioner. Moreover, a finding of not guilty under § 53a-13 (a) means only that, at the time of an acquittee's conduct, the acquittee lacked substantial capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to control his conduct within the requirements of the law, and such a finding does not necessarily address whether the acquittee intended that conduct or necessarily equate with a finding that the acquittee lacked the specific intent to engage in the conduct. Whether a finding under § 53a-13 (a) that an acquittee lacked the capac- ity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct bears on the acquittee's capacity to form a specific intent is a fact dependent inquiry that turns on the evidence of the nature and extent of the acquittee's particular mental disease or defect, because, in some cases, the acquittee may fully intend the criminal conduct but, due to his mental disease or defect, lack the capacity to appreciate its wrongfulness, such that the mental impairment alters only the acquittee's moral or evaluative understanding of his conduct but not his ability to form a specific criminal intent, whereas, in other cases, the acquittee's mental impairment may so distort his perception of reality that it may negate the formulation of criminal intent. During M's criminal trial, the expert testimony established only that, as a result of his impairment, M lacked the substantial capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the law, not that M was unable to form the specific intent to commit the charged offenses. Moreover, M's symptoms, including hallucinations and paranoid and per- secutory delusions, could indicate either an impairment that excuses an intentional act or one that may undermine the formation of intent. Moon v. Commissioner of Correction Accordingly, the evidence in the aggregate was insufficient for this court to determine whether M's mental impairment altered only his moral or evaluative understanding of his conduct or whether it negated his ability to formulate specific criminal intent. Because the newly discovered evidence of M's acquittal under § 53a-13 (a) did not clearly and convincingly establish that M's impairment negated the specific intent required for conspiracy to commit robbery, the petitioner's actual innocence claim failed, and this court affirmed the Appellate Court's judgment on that alternative ground. Argued October 27, 2025—officially released February 17, 2026

Convicted of intentional manslaughter in the first degree with a firearm, among other crimes, in connection with the shooting death of the victim, the defendant appealed to this court. After following the victim in his vehicle for a short distance, the defendant approached the driver's side of the victim's parked vehicle, exchanged insults with the victim, and then reached into the vehicle to grab a BB gun that the victim had with him. After a struggle dur- ing which the victim regained possession of the BB gun, the defendant drew his own gun and shot the victim. At trial, the defendant asserted a claim of self-defense. In response, the state argued, inter alia, that the defendant's self-defense claim failed because he did not reasonably believe that he faced the imminent use of physical force and because, under the circumstances of this case, the defendant was disqualified by statute (§ 53a-19 (b) and (c)) from claiming that self-defense justified his actions insofar as he had a duty to retreat, had provoked the victim, and had been the initial aggressor. On appeal, the defendant claimed, inter alia, that the trial court had erred when it failed to instruct the jurors that they must agree unanimously as to which specific statutory disqualification to self-defense the state established under § 53a-19 (b) or (c). Held: The defendant could not prevail on his unpreserved claim that the trial court had violated his constitutional right to a unanimous verdict by failing to instruct the jury that, in order to reject the defendant's claim of self-defense, it must unanimously agree as to which specific disqualification under § 53a- 19 (b) or (c) the state had established. Relying on its reasoning in State v. Mekoshvili (344 Conn. 673), in which the court held that there is generally no constitutional requirement that a jury be unanimous as to which of the specific components of a defendant's self-defense claim the state has disproven in order for the state to overcome that self-defense claim, this court held in the present case that, in general, so long as the jurors unanimously agree that the state has established a statu- tory disqualification to the assertion of a claim of self-defense, the federal constitution does not require them to be unanimous as to the particular statutory disqualification or disqualifications the state has established. Contrary to the defendant's claim, the trial court did not lead the jury to believe that only the defendant, and not the victim, could be the initial aggressor when it instructed the jury on the law of self-defense, as the court's instructions, as a whole, made abundantly clear that the victim could have been the initial aggressor. State v. Matheney The defendant could not prevail on his unpreserved claim that the trial court's charge failed to inform the jury that it could not find him to be the initial aggressor on the basis of his words alone and that this omission caused the jury to believe that the defendant was the initial aggressor simply because the defendant had initiated a verbal confrontation with the victim, as there was no suggestion by the court in its instructions, or by the state during the trial, that the person who was the initial aggressor had threatened the other person on the basis of words alone. There was no merit to the defendant's unpreserved claim that the trial court had misled the jury as to the state of mind required to find him guilty of certain recklessness-based lesser included offenses of murder because of the trial court's instructional summary document, which informed the jury in what sequence it should "deliberate" with respect to the recklessness-based lesser included offenses, as there was no reasonable possibility that the jury misconstrued the verb "deliberate" in that document as an adjective mean- ing "intentional," especially in light of the trial court's clear, concise, and complete verbal instructions on the recklessness-based offenses. The state presented sufficient evidence to satisfy its burden of disproving the defendant's claim of self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt, as the jury reasonably could have found, on the basis of the evidence presented, that the defendant did not actually or reasonably believe that the victim was using or was about to use deadly physical force against him, or was inflicting or about to inflict great bodily harm, or that deadly physical force was neces- sary to defend himself. The evidence was sufficient to establish that the defendant had acted with the specific intent necessary to support his conviction of intentional man- slaughter in the first degree with a firearm, as the jury reasonably could have found that he had intended to cause serious physical injury to the victim in view of the eyewitness testimony and the fact that the defendant had shot the victim at close range. Argued October 30, 2025—officially released February 17, 2026

The plaintiff, a candidate for town council in the November, 2025 South Windsor municipal election, appealed from the trial court's judgment dis- missing his action brought pursuant to the statutes (§§ 9-328 and 9-371b) affording a candidate who is aggrieved by any ruling of any election official in connection with a municipal election or referendum, respectively, expe- dited judicial review of his or her claims. In the November, 2025 municipal election, South Windsor electors approved, by way of referendum, several revisions to the South Windsor charter, one of which changed the maxi- mum number of individuals affiliated with a particular political party who could serve on the nine member town council from six individuals to a bare majority of five. During that election, electors also voted for town council candidates, with six Democratic Party candidates receiving more votes than any Republican Party candidate. The plaintiff received the sixth highest vote total of the Democratic candidates, and B received the fourth highest vote total of the Republican candidates. Following the election, the defendant, the South Windsor town clerk, determined that the bare majority charter revision, as approved in the referendum, applied to the 2025 town council election, even though the minutes from a meeting of the South Windsor Charter Revision Commission at which the commission proposed the bare majority charter revision indicated that the revision, if approved, would not take effect until the November, 2027 South Windsor municipal election. The town clerk thereupon issued a preliminary list of election winners, declaring that B, rather than the plaintiff, had won the final seat on the town council. The plaintiff claimed in the trial court that he was aggrieved by the town clerk's decision to apply the bare majority charter revision in determining which candidates had won the November, 2025 town council election. The trial court rendered judgment dismissing the plaintiff's action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, concluding that the town clerk's decision was not a ruling of an election official within the meaning of §§ 9-328 and 9-371b. On appeal from the trial court's judgment of dismissal, the plaintiff claimed that the trial court incorrectly had concluded that the town clerk's application of the bare majority charter revision to determine the results of the November, 2025 town council election was not a ruling of an election official for purposes of §§ 9-328 and 9-371b. Held: The trial court improperly dismissed the plaintiff's action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and, accordingly, this court reversed the trial court's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. The town clerk's decision to apply the newly approved bare majority charter revision, rather than the provisions of the charter that purportedly were in effect on the day of the November, 2025 municipal election, to determine the composition of the town council from that same election constituted a ruling of an election official for purposes of §§ 9-328 and 9-371b. Amadasun v. Armstrong, Town Clerk of South Windsor The town clerk was required to determine the winners of the town council election pursuant to statute (§ 9-167a (c)) and to report those winners to the secretary of the state pursuant to statute (§ 9-320 (a)), and the fact that these two statutory directives are codified in title 9 of the General Statutes strongly suggested that they are electoral in nature. The town clerk, in deciding that the bare majority charter revision was applicable to the November, 2025 municipal election, necessarily interpreted the South Windsor charter in order to determine the effective date of that revision, which, in turn, directly affected the accuracy of the results that the town clerk determined under § 9-167a (c) and reported under § 9-320 (a). Moreover, the town clerk's resolution of a question about the applicability of a charter revision to the town council candidates elected simultaneously with the approval of that revision is within the purpose of the election con- test statutes, and the town clerk's decision to apply the newly approved bare majority charter revision ultimately dictated the answer to the question of who won the election. Argued January 13—officially released February 17, 2026

The state appealed to this court, on the granting of certification, from the judgment of the Appellate Court, which had reversed the defendant's con- viction of manslaughter in the first degree with a firearm. The defendant's conviction stemmed from an incident in which he shot the victim in the head with a revolver while she was sitting in a small bathroom in their residence. At trial, there was a factual dispute concerning the defendant's conduct leading up to the shooting. The prosecutor, relying on forensic evidence, argued that, while the victim was sitting in the bathroom, the defendant had forcefully pressed the muzzle of the fully-cocked, loaded revolver against her head before it discharged. In contrast, the defense advanced the theory that the revolver, which had a trigger that did not require much force to fire, had accidentally discharged when the defendant tripped on the doorframe of the bathroom. The trial court charged the jury on reckless manslaughter in the first degree with a firearm, along with lesser included offenses, but did not include any express reference to general intent in its charge. On appeal, the state claimed that the Appellate Court had incorrectly concluded that the trial court's failure to instruct the jury specifically on general intent con- stituted plain error requiring reversal of the defendant's conviction. Held: The Appellate Court incorrectly concluded that the trial court's omission of a specific general intent instruction in its jury charge was plain error, and, accordingly, this court reversed the Appellate Court's judgment and directed that court to affirm the defendant's conviction. The trial court's omission of a general intent instruction was not an error so obvious and indisputable as to warrant reversal, as the court's charge, when read as a whole, apprised the jury of the requisite element of general intent. Specifically, the trial court, in charging the jury on reckless manslaughter in the first degree, instructed it on the element of recklessness, the terms of which incorporated the concept of general intent to engage in volitional conduct. Moreover, the trial court's omission of a general intent instruction did not result in a manifest injustice because the defendant's course of conduct lead- ing up to the shooting involved many volitional acts that culminated in the creation of a grave risk of death under circumstances evincing an extreme indifference to human life, and the state carried its burden of proving that In accordance with our policy of protecting the privacy interests of the victims of family violence, we decline to use the defendant's full name or to identify the victim or others through whom the victim's identity may be ascertained. See General Statutes § 54-86e. State v. Anthony V. the defendant had the requisite general intent necessary for a conviction of reckless manslaughter in the first degree with a firearm. There was no merit to the defendant's contention that this court's rejection of the defendant's plain error claim violated the theory of the case doctrine insofar as the manslaughter charge was based on the prosecutor's allegation that the defendant had placed the revolver against the victim's head. The prosecutor not only relied on evidence establishing that the defendant had pressed the revolver against the victim's head prior to its discharge, but also focused on the dangerous nature of the revolver and a trigger that did not require much force to fire a bullet, the defendant's awareness of the safety deficiencies of this particular revolver, and the cramped nature of the bathroom in which the victim was killed, all of which served to clarify the prosecutor's position that the jury should consider the defendant's entire course of conduct in determining whether he was guilty of reckless manslaughter in the first degree with a firearm. Argued December 1, 2025—officially released March 3, 2026