Volume 36 — Connecticut Reports

Assumpsit, brought to the Superior Court in Hartford County, against the defendant, as executor of Horace K. Seymour, deceased, on the following instrument:— “ $500, Hartford, Dec. 28, 1865. On demand for value received we promise to pay Chauneey Rhodes or order five hundred dollars with interest. Deming & Seymour.” (Endorsed,) Horace K. Seymour. George W. Seymour. . The declaration contained four counts.

Replevin for property attached, brought to the Superior Court in Hartford County, and tried on the general issue, closed to the court, before Pardee, J. The plaintiff sued as trustee for Louisa B. Jackson, his wife.- They were married in 1860.

Bill in Equity, brought to the Superior Court in Hartford County and reserved on facts found for the advice of this court. The case is fully stated in the opinion.

Motion in error from -a judgment of the Superior Court in Hartford County, (Pardee, J.,) affirming on appeal a decree of a probate court, appointing a trustee in insolvency upon the estate of the appellant, on insolvent proceedings against him by his creditors under the insolvent law of the state. The case is sufficiently stated in the opinion.

Assumpsit, brought to the Superior Court in Hartford County, upon the following instrument:— “We the undersigned promise to pay to the Treasurer of the North Ecclesiastical Society in Hartford the sums annexed to our respective names (within thirty days after notification by the building committee that may hereafter be appointed by said society that payment of the same is required,) for the purpose of purchasing the lot or lots on the corner of Asylum and High streets, in…

Assumpsit, on the defendants’ endorsement of a promissory note; brought to the Superior Court in New London county and tried to the jury before Minor, J. The note was as follows:—“ Oswego, N. Y.,Nov. 25,1865. Two months after date we promise to pay to the order of Chesebrough and Leavens Two Hundred Dollars, at the First National Bank, value received.

<p>T in 1855 conveyed to L apiece of land adjoining the grist mill of the latter, reserving the right to draw water from the ditch of L’s mill for his factory below on the same stream when L was not letting off water through his mill sufficient for the factory, L to keep a. ten inch spout at the bottom of the ditch for 2”s uso and to which he should have access at all times. 21had no previous interest in the ditch or the land through which it ran. In 1866 T conveyed his factory, with all his rights under the above provision, to the petitioners, who in 1868 brought a bill in equity to compel L to put in the spout, which he had never done. Held,</p> <p>1. That the respondent, by accepting the deed of T, .assumed the duty to put in and keep up the spout.</p> <p>2. That the right to the water from the respondent’s ditch was not a mere license to T to use the water so long as he owned the factory below, but an easement permanently attached to the factory and which passed to his grantee.</p> <p>S. That the right to the spout was not barred by a non-user for any length of time that would not have been sufficient to bar the right to the entire easement.</p> <p>4. That the agreement of the respondent to put in the spout, though standing upon an implication from his accepting the deed of 2', might perhaps reasonably be regarded as an agreement in writing by reason of the statement of the undertaking in the deed.</p> <p>5. But that, however this mightbe, the agreement if originally within the statute of frauds was taken out of it by perfor manee on-the part of T in conveying his land to the respondent.</p> <p>6. That it should be shown that the spout was needed to supply sufficient water for the factory.</p> <p>7. That, this being shown, a court of equity would compel the respondent to put in the spout.</p>

Trespass on the case, for a malicious prosecution; brought to the Superior Court in New London county and tried to the jury on the general issue before Minor, J. On the trial it appeared in evidence that a grandjuror’s complaint against the plaintiff had been obtained by the defendants, and a warrant had been procured by them for his arrest, and that he had been arrested by virtue thereof and brought before the police court of the city of Norwich, for trial.

<p>Case, against the defendants as common carriers, for negligence in the transportation of goods sent by the plaintiffs ; brought to the Superior Court in New London county, and tried to the jury on the general issue, before Minor, J.</p> <p>On the trial it appeared that on the 28th and 29th days of December, 1865, and for several years preceding, the Boston & Providence Railroad Company were common carriers of freight and passengers by railroad between Boston and Providence, that the defendants, the New York, Providence & Boston Railroad Company, were common carriers of freight and passengers, by railroad between Providence and Groton, and that the owners of certain steamboats were common carriers of freight and passengers by water between Groton and the city of New York; and that for several years before they had been, and were at this time, associated upon terms agreed upon between them, to make a through line, daily, (Sundays excepted) for the transportation of passengers and freight by their respective routes, between Boston and New York, the line being known as tue Stonington line.</p> <p>It further appeared that for several years prior to and until the 29th of December, 1865, the steamboats making up the steamboat part of this line were the “Commonwealth” and “ Plymouth Rock,” boats of sufficient capacity for all the purposes for which’the line was established, and the “Commodore,” a much smaller and older boat and inferior to the other two ; that the two larger boats were the boats running regularly in the line, and the Commodore a spare boat, which in case of accident to either of the others took her place; and further, that it was necessary and usual, as often as once a year, to take off temporarily the larger boats, one at a time, for overhauling and repairs, during which withdrawal the Commodore took the place of the boat withdrawn; that this occurred usually in the fall or winter; that on the evening of the 28th of December, 1865, the Plymouth Rock would, if running, have been the regular boat to leave Groton for New York in the line, but had been, during all the month of December, taken off for necessary and usual overhauling and repairs as above, and the Commodore was running in her place in the line, and frequently was unable, from her smaller size, to take all the freight coming by the line from Boston for New York, as had at other times been the case, part of which was consequently left over, and went on, as on other similar occasions, the next evening by the other boat. It also appeared that the parties composing the line had at some time in the spring or summer of 1865 caused the following advertisement to be inserted in the Boston Daily Advertiser, a daily newspaper published in Boston, which was continued iu that paper until the 29th of December, 1865, without change.</p> <p>“ Merchants’ Navigation and Transportation Company. Stonington Line, Bummer Arrangement. Cars leave the depot of the Boston and Providence Railroad, Pleasant Street, daily, Sundays excepted, at 5.30 o’clock P. M., for the Commonwealth, Capt. J. W. Williams, on Mondays, Wednesdays and Fridays, and the Steamer Plymouth Rock, Capt. J. W. Geer, on Tuesdays, Thursdays and Saturdays. Jftgp- Through Tickets furnished and Baggage checked through to Philadelphia, Baltimore and Washington. Tickets, Berths and State Rooms at this office, and at the Boston and Providence Railroad Depot. J. W. Richardson, Agent, 76 Washington Street.”</p> <p>It also appeared that the defendants, by placards and handbills posted and published by them from some time in the summer until the 29th of December, 1865, advertised the two boats named as the boats which were then running from Groton to New York in connection with their railroad. In former years this line had been advertised in the newspapers as composed of the above three boats.</p> <p>The plaintiffs did business in Boston, and during all the month of December, 1865, were, and for several years previous had been, sending their goods from Boston to New York over this line almost daily. It appeared that if the Plymouth Rock had been running on the 28th of December, 1865, instead of the Commodore, the plaintiffs’ goods, for which they sue, would have gone forward safely to New York, and not have been destroyed as hereinafter stated.</p> <p>No advertisement was ever published, or notice given to the public, or to the plaintiffs, of an intention to withdraw the Plymouth Rock and substitute the Commodore in her place in the line during the month of December, 1865, or of the fact of such withdrawal or substitution, and any knowledge on the part of the plaintiffs as to what boats were then, or had ever been, running in the line, was such only as is to be inferred from the facts here stated.</p> <p>■ The goods for which the plaintiffs sue consisted of thirty-three packages, a part of and included among the merchandise in three bills of lading, delivered by the agent of the defendants to the plaintiffs, one of which was as follows:— the others being similar.</p> <p>“ Boston & Providence Railroad Co. New York, Providence & Boston Railroad Co. Owners of Steamboats running between New York and Groton, in connection with New York, Providence & Boston Railroad Co.</p> <p>[2 cts. stamp.] Boston, Dec. 27,1865.</p> <p>Received prom Lawrence & Co.,</p> <p>[Marks and Numbers.]</p> <p>Twenty-six (26) Cases ) MerchanTwenty-three (23) Bales j dise.</p> <p>Marked and numbered as above, to be transported by the Boston and Providence Railroad Company to Providence; and thence by the New York, Providence and Boston Railroad Company to Groton ; and thence to New York by the Owners of Steamboats running between New York and Groton, in connection with the New York, Providence and Boston Railroad Company.</p> <p>“ To be delivered to said Companies in manner following, to wit: By the said Boston and Providence Railroad Company, at Providence, to the Agent for said New York, Providence and Boston Railroad Company; by the said New York, Providence and Boston Railroad Company, at Groton, to the Agents of the said Owners of Steamboats running between New York and Groton in connection with the New York, Providence and Boston Railroad Company; and by the said owners of Steamboats running between New York and Groton in connection with the New York, Providence and Boston Railroad Company, at the city of New York, to L. B ■ Bacon, on payment of freight therefor; in like good order and condition as when received by them respectively, dangers of the seas, of fire, water, breakage, leakage, and all other accidents excepted, and no package whatever, if lost, injured or stolen^ to be deemed of greater value than $200, unless specifically receipted for at a greater valuation.</p> <p>“ And in case of any loss, detriment or damage done to or sustained by any of the property herein receipted for, during such transportation, whereby any legal liability or responsi bility shall or may be incurred, that company shall alone be held answerable therefor in whose actual custody the same may be at the time of the happening of such loss, detriment or damage.</p> <p>“It is understood and agreed that the property herein receipted for, or any part thereof, may be carried on the decks of the steamboats from Groton to New York.</p> <p>Wm. H. Morbell,</p> <p>Agent for the above named Companies and Owners, severally, and not jointly.”</p> <p>On the back of each bill of lading was the following:—</p> <p>“ The following Rules and Regulations have been adopted by the several Railroad Corporations, in regard to Freight. H@“All articles of freight must be plainly and distinctly marked, or they will not be received by the Company; and when designed to be forwarded, after transportation on the Railroad, a written order must be given, with the particular line of boats or teams marked on the goods, if any such be preferred or desired. * * * * No responsibility will be admitted, under any circumstances, to a greater amount upon any single article of -freight than $200, unless upon notice given of such amount, and a special agreement thereof. * * * * The Company will not hold themselves liable at all, for any injury to any articles of freight, during the course of transportation, arising from the weather or accidental delays. Nor will they guarantee any special despatch in the transportation of such articles, unless made the subject of express stipulation. Nor will they hold themselves liable, as common carriers, for such articles, after their arrival at their place of destination and unlading in the Company’s warehouses, or depots.”</p> <p>The merchandise mentioned in these bills of lading was all delivered at Boston by the plaintiffs, to the agent of the line for transportation from Boston to New York, where the goods were to be delivered. The plaintiffs brought the bills of lading, ready filled up by themselves for the signature of the agent of the line, and the same were then handed to and signed by the agent, and the day the goods were forwarded from Boston, “December 28tli, 1865,” was stamped by the agent on each bill of lading, and an internal revenue stamp of two cents was placed on each, and they were then delivered again, on the same day, to the plaintiffs, according to the usage. On the 28th of December, 1865, all the merchandise in the bills of lading was forwarded safely by the regular through freight train, according to the usual course, and on time, by the Boston & Providence Railroad Co. to Providence, and thence by the defendants to Groton. Immediately on its arrival at Groton the discharge of the freight in the train from the cars into the steamer Commodore was commenced, and continued until the boat was full and could not take any more. Part of the plaintiffs’ merchandise was so discharged into the boat and was safely transported that night and delivered the next day to the consignee in New York. The remainder of the plaintiffs’ goods were in cars that were partly discharged into the boat, and were, as usual in such cases, discharged at once into the depot of the defendants at Groton, to go by the next evening’s boat to New York. About 2 o’clock the next morning, December 29th, 1865, the depot, with most of its contents, including the goods for which the plaintiffs sue, amounting to thirty-three different packages, was totally destroyed by fire.</p> <p>In the train which brought these goods to Groton there were several cars full of freight which had not been at all discharged at the time the boat ceased to receive, and these cars with their contents were, as usual, hauled out of the way, a distance of six or seven hundred feet from the depot, on a side track, and were not injured in the fire. The plaintiffs’ goods destroyed were at the time in the actual custody of the defendants.</p> <p>It further appeared that the parties composing said line had been conducting their through business for several years, and were at the time in question so conducting it, under similar bills of lading, and that it was the regulation of the line, and their practice, not to receive goods at Boston to transport to New York without a bill of lading for them; that the plaintiffs had for several years been in the practice of sending goods almost daily from Boston to New York by this line, upon bills of lading of the same form, which were, as in this instance, printed by the plaintiffs, (with their firm name printed in,) from blanks furnished by the Boston & Providence Railroad Company, and that the plaintiffs were in the habit, as in this case, of filling these bills in themselves, and bringing them, with the goods to be transported, to the agent of the line to be signed and delivered again to the plaintiffs when forwarded, stamped with the date of the forwarding as in the present case.</p> <p>Upon this evidence the plaintiffs claimed that the defendants were liable, as common carriers, for the loss of the goods destroyed, unaffected by the provisions in the bills of lading ; first, because the plaintiffs never assented to these provisions ; and second, because, if they assented to them, they did so without consideration and under an unlawful compulsion and threat on. the part of the defendants not to take their goods on any other terms than under these bills of lading. The defendants claimed that they received and transported the goods specially under the bills of lading, and subject to the limitations of responsibility contained therein.</p> <p>On this part of the case the court charged the jury that, in the absence of special contracts, the defendants as common carriers would be liable for all losses not occasioned by the act of God or the public enemy, but that they might by special contract limit their liability ; and that the bills of lading, if the terms thereof were assented to by the plaintiffs, were special contracts between the parties, and limited the liability of the defendants to the extent therein stated ; but that such ■ contracts, to be binding on the plaintiffs, must not have been made by them, or their assent thereto obtained, under unlawful threats or compulsion. The court further informed the jury that the acts of the plaintiffs in printing the bills, taking them to the agent of the line and obtaining his signature, and receiving them back from him so signed, furnished evidence from which a voluntary assent of the plaintiffs to the terms of the bills might be inferred.</p> <p>The plaintiffs further claimed, that if the bills of lading were special contracts, limiting the liability of the defendants, they nevertheless imposed upon the defendants the duty of seeing that sufficient accommodations were provided at Groton for forwarding the goods from that point to New York on the night of the 28th of December, 1865 ; and that the withdrawal of the Plymouth Rock and putting the Commodore in her place, under the circumstances constituted a breach of that duty and rendered the defendants liable to the plaintiffs for the loss of which they complained. This construction of the bills the defendants denied, and also claimed that if such were the construction the plaintiffs could not recover in this action. The court, in this part of the case, left it for the jury to say, and charged them that they might find, whether there was a contract or undertaking by the defendants to carry the goods of the plaintiffs through to New York or not; yet, if they were satisfied that there was such a contract or undertaking, the plaintiffs could not for that reason recover in this action, because in their declaration there was no count adapted to such a state of facts. And the court further charged that, as the biffs of lading did not indicate the boat that was to run in the line on the night in question, they might inquire, and on this point they would take into consideration contemporaneous acts and declarations of the parties, and particularly the Boston advertisement, whether there was an understanding and agreement of the parties that the Plymouth Rock was the boat to run on the night in question; and if they were satisfied that such an understanding and agreement existed, and that the substitution of the Commodore for the Plymouth Rock, and the consequent detention of the goods at Groton, contributed to their loss by fire, then the defendants were liable, unless, as claimed by the defendants, there was a known and established usage to substitute, without notice, the Commodore for one of the regular boats of the line when such regular boat was taken off for necessary overhauling and repairs, and if there was such an usage thh defendants were not liable.</p> <p>The plaintiffs claimed, and introduced evidence to prove, that the destruction of their goods by fire was occasioned by the negligence and want of ordinary care of the defendants. This the defendants denied. The plaintiffs thereupon requested the court to charge the jury, that if they should find that the goods were destroyed by fire while in the actual custody of- the defendants, and that their destruction was occasionéd by the negligence and want of ordinary care of the defendants, the plaintiffs were entitled to recover, even if the bills of lading were special contracts between the parties, and were binding upon the plaintiffs to the fullest extent. On this point the court charged the jury that the defendants, though transporting the goods under special contracts, and subject to the limitations of liability contained in the receipts, were bound to take such care of them, while in their custody, as a man of ordinary prudence takes of his own properly, and if they neglected so to do, and the destruction of the goods was occasioned by such neglect, or by any act of the defendants, such as the want of a proper boat to take the goods on the night in question, which contributed to the loss by fire, it would be their duty to hold the defendants responsible.</p> <p>The plaintiffs proved the value of the thirty-three packages of their goods lost by the fire to be §11,029.51, and claimed to recover that sum, with interest from December 29th, 1865, although it should be found that the defendants transported the goods under the special contracts and subject to the limitations in the bills of lading, if their destruction was occasioned by negligence and want of ordinary care on the part of the defendants. The defendants denied their liability under the bills of lading for a greater sum than $200 a package for the thirty-three packages lost, amounting in the whole to $6,600, with interest from. December 29th, 1865, in case the jury should find the loss occasioned by negligence and want of ordinary care on the part of the defendants. The court, iu this part of the case, charged the jury in accordance with the claim of the plaintiffs.</p> <p>The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiffs for $12,943.13, being the whole value of the goods, $11,029.51, and interest thereon from December 29th, 1865.</p> <p>The defendants moved for a new trial for errors in the charge of the court.</p>

<p>Information for keeping a disorderly house, under the 137th section of the “ act concerning crimes and punishments,” brought to the Superior Court in New London county and tried to the jury before Loomis, J.</p> <p>On the trial the attorney for the state offered evidence to prove that the defendant kept certain rooms on the first floor of a two story building, in the town of Stonington, for the sale of liquors, groceries and confectionery, and that lewd, dissolute and drunken persons were accustomed to resort to the rooms with his knowledge and consent, and that carousing and fighting were permitted there by him to the disturbance of the neighbors, and it appeared that the rooms in the building over the rooms kept by the defendant were, during all the time in question, occupied by one George Bagg and family as a dwelling house, but that no family resided in the rooms kept by the defendant, and that the defendant and his family resided in a separate building near by. No evidence was offered in behalf of the defendant. The defendant claimed, and asked the court to instruct the jury, that if the jury should find these facts, the place so kept by him was simply a shop and not a house, and that it was their duty to return a verdict of not guilty. The court did not comply with the request of the defendant, but instructed the jury that if these facts were found by them, the place so kept by the defendant, to which such lewd, dissolute and drunken persous resorted, and where such carousing and fighting were permitted by the defendant, to the disturbance of the neighbors, was a disorderly house, within the meaning of the statute.</p> <p>The jury returned a verdict of guilty, and the defendant moved for a new trial.</p>

Information for an assault with intent to commit a rape ; brought to the Superior Court in New London county, and tried to the jury before Loomis, J. On the trial the attorney for the state offered evidence to show that, on the 29th day of November, 1868, the defendant, on his return from his father’s house in the town of Sprague, to the house of James C. Smith in the town of Norwich, met Joanna Murphy, the woman named in the information, on the road leading from Sprague to…

<p>Under the statute which provides that the warnings of town meetings shall “ specify the objects ” for which the meetings are to he holden, no technical nicety is necessary in drawing the notice or in specifying the object of a meeting, and the inhabitants when assembled can not be controlled in their action by the form or phraseology of the notice if the essential elements of the object are embraced in it.</p> <p>A town meeting was warned “for the purpose of acting on a proposition to pay such moneyas might be deemed expedient to such citizens of the town" as should volunteer and. be mustered into the military service of the United States, and be applied on the quota of the town. Held that a vote offering a bounty to any volunteers who should be mustered into the service and applied on the quota of the town, without limiting it to citizens of the town, was valid under the notice.</p>

<p>Trover, reserved by the Superior Court on facts found for the advice of tbis court. The case is sufficiently stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>A delivery to a donee of a savings bank book, containing entries of deposits to the credit of the donor, with the intention to give to the donee the deposits represented by the book, is a good delivery to constitute a complete gift of such deposits. i</p> <p>A delivery of a chose in action that would be sufficient to tjsgt an equitable title in a purchaser, is a sufficient delivery to constitute a valid gift of such chose in action, without a transfer of the legal title.</p> <p>And it seems that under the statute, (Gen. Statutes, tit. 1, sec. 64,) which provides that the assignee of any chose in action may sue upon it in his own name, a delivery of such a chose in action would vest in the donee a legal title.</p>

Assumpsit, on a note of $8000, dated December 28th, 1866, executed by “ J. J. Conklin, treasurer of the town of New Milford,” payable to the plaintiffs or their order on demand? and held by them ; tried in the Superior Court on the general issue closed to the court. The following facts were found by the court.

<p>To an action of debt on a judgment the defendants pleaded a judgment in their own favor in a former action of the plaintiffs for fraud in relation to the same debt, the declaration in such former action having in one count set up the original debt and the frand of the defendants in incurring it, and in another the judgment and the fraud of the defendants in evading the payment of it, under Gen. Statutes, tit. 2, sec. 370. Held that as the failure of the plaintiffs to recover in that action might have been owing wholly to their failure to prove the fraud, the judgment for the defendants was no bar to a suit on the original judgment.</p> <p>In the former suit the defendants had pleaded a general denial, with notice that they should prove a discharge in insolvency, but there was no proof in the present suit that any evidence of the discharge was introduced on that trial. Held that the judgment for the defendants in that case could not be held to be conclusive in their favor on the question of their discharge.</p> <p>The defendants made an assignment in insolvency in February, 1856. The plaintiffs had a suit against them then pending for a debt, and recovered judgment in the suit in September, 1856. In February, 1857, the defendants obtained a discharge, under the law then existing, from debts existing against them at the time of their assignment. Held that the discharge did not cover the judgment.</p>

Trover for a horse and a quantity of hay, described in the declaration as “ the plaintiff’s own proper estate.” Plea that defendant as an officer levied upon and sold them upon an execution against the plaintiff. Replication that they were held by the plaintiff in right of his wife and as trustee for her under the statute. Demurrer to the replication and reservation for advice.

<p>Assumpsit, for money had and received; tried in the Superior Court on the general issue, with notice, closed to the court, before Phelps, J. The court found the following facts.</p> <p>The plaintiff and his wife, in the year 1863, and prior to their intermarriage, commenced together the millinery business in Fair Haven in this state, the plaintiff owning the entire stock of goods. They soon afterwards married, and after prosecuting for a while longer the business in Fair Haven, removed to Plymouth, taking with them the stock of goods on hand. After carrying on for some time the business there in the name of the plaintiff, he gave the personal charge and supei’intendence of it wholly to his wife, who conducted it after the spring of 1866, buying and selling, and making accounts and bills in her own name, as if she were a feme sole, until about the first of December, 1866, when, at her request, the plaintiff resumed the personal management of the business, and immediately disposed of the entire stock to the defendant, who was either to return the goods to the plaintiff or account to him for them at prices agreed upon between them. Mrs. Smith was embarrassed at the time she requested the plaintiff to resume the personal management of the business, and requested him to discharge from the proceeds of the stock, so far as he should be able, the liabilities which had been incurred and were then existing on account of the business. He never authorized her to act as a feme sole, or knew she so acted or claimed to act, and never authorized her to buy goods on credit in either his or her own name, and until October, 1866, had no knowledge that she was indebted.</p> <p>On the 7th of December, 1866, the plaintiff disposed of the remaining stock to the defendant as his own property, and she paid and accounted for it to him under their contract; with the exception of the sum of $96.98, which, on the 30th of May, 1867, against the consent and contrary to the direction of the plaintiff, she paid to Case & Prentice of Hartford, on an order in their favor given by Mrs. Smith in payment of a balance due them for goods purchased by her of them on credit in her own name, and without the plaintiff’s knowledge or authority, in 1866. The defendant, at the time of the payment of the order, took a bond of indemnity from Case & Prentice, who are the real defendants in the action. The order was as follows :—“ Miss M. L. Thompson, Plymouth, Conn: Please pay to Messrs. Case & Prentice the sum of $96.98, and charge the same to account of goods belonging to me in your hands. Hartford, May 31st, 1867. Mrs. J. E. Smith.”</p> <p>At the time of the delivery of the goods by the plaintiff to the defendant, a portion of them, of the value of the amount of the order or more, were articles which Mrs. Smith had purchased as aforesaid of Case & Prentice, who at the time they gave credit and delivered the articles to her made no inquiry and took no measures to ascertain whether Mrs. Smith was in fact a feme sole, and acting as such, or whether she had a husband for whom she was acting as agent. The plaintiff and his wife since their marriage have lived together as husband and wife without abandonment or emancipation of her by him.</p> <p>On the foregoing facts the court rendered judgment for the plaintiff to recover the sum of $106.92, being the sum of $96.98 with interest, and the defendant brought the record before this court by a motion' in error.</p>

Replevin for three billiard tables in the possession of the defendants; tried in the Superior Court, on the general issue closed to the court, with a claim by tlie defendants for damages for the talcing of the property on the writ, before Cfranger, J. Tlie court found the following facts.

Assumpsit for money paid, to recover the amount of certain taxes paid under compulsion and claimed to have been illegally laid. The Superior Court found the following facts.

Amicable submission to the Superior Court in Hartford county, on the following agreed statement of facts: On the 20th of January, 1848, Sarah W. Chapin, of the city of New York, wife of Humiston Chapin, made a written application to the Connecticut Mutual Life Insurance Company, of Hartford, Connecticut, for a policy of insurance upon the life of her husband, then about thirty-five years of age, in the sum of $8,000, for the whole term of his life.

Assumpsit, to recover a commission for the sale of real estate, claimed to be due to the plaintiff as a real estate broker ; brought,to the Superior Court in Hartford county. The following facts were found by an auditor' to whom the case was referred. On the 14th of March, 1866, the defendant left with the plaintiff, a real estate broker in the city of Hartford, up°on sale, a certain piece of real estate, with house and buildings, upon Canton street, in Hartford.

Debt on a replevin bond; brought to the Superior Court in Hartford county, and tried to the jury, on a general denial, before Pardee, J. The action of replevin, in which the bond was given, was brought for a horse claimed by the plaintiff in that suit. On the trial of the present case the defendants, for the purpose of reducing the damages, offered evidence that the horse was the property of the plaintiff in the replevin suit.

Trespass on the case for the diversion of water ; brought to the Superior Court in Hartford county. The defendant pleaded a general denial and the jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff for six cents damages.

Action on the 544th section of the statute with regard to corporations, (Gen. Statutes, page 202,) which provides that in case the life of any passenger on a railroad or person crossing the same upon a public highway, who is in the exercise of reasonable care, shall be lost by the negligence of the railroad company, the company shall be liable to pay damages not exceeding five thousand dollars and not less than one thousand dollars, to be recovered by the executor or…

<p>The act of 1854 with regard to spirituous liquors (Gen. Statutes, p. 696) provides for proceedings before a justice of the peace for the seizure and confisca, tion of liquors and for an appeal by the owner to the Superior Court; such proceedings to be held to be proceedings in rem and not criminal proceedings and to be proceeded with as civil actions. An act passed in 1867, “in addition to the act regulating civil actions,” provides that no appeal from a justice of the peace by a defendant shall be allowed except upon oath, and repeals all acts inconsistent therewith. Held that the latter act does not apply to an appeal taken from proceedings of the character above stated under the act with regard to spirituous liquors.</p> <p>Held also that the case should be p.ut on the docket of civil causes in the Superior Court.</p>

Amicable Submission upon an agreed statement of facts,. brought to the Superior Court in Hartford county and reserved for the advice of this court. The question related to the pei'sonal property left by Mary R. Mason, deceased, the plaintiff being her husband, tlie defendant Fuller administrator of her estate, and the other defendants her next of kin. The facts are sufficiently stated in the opinion.

Writ of Error brought to the Superior Court in New Haven, county to reverse the judgment of a justice of the peace in an action of trespass qu. cl. fr. brought by the defendant in error against the plaintiff in error.

Assumpsit by the plaintiff as trustee of his wife, for services rendered by the wife, brought to the Superior Court in Middlesex county. The facts were found by auditors and on the facts the court ( Granger, J.) rendered judgment for the defendant. The plaintiff brought the record before this court by motion in error. The facts are sufficiently stated in the opinion.

Ejectment, brought to the Superior Court in New Haven county, by the plaintiffs, who Avere minors and sued by a next friend. The defendant pleaded the general issue with notice, which was closed to the court, and the case referred to a committee to report the facts. The following facts were found. The demanded premises have been in the possession of the defendant since the 17th of May, 1865.

Trespass for an assault and wounding with a pistol ball; brought to the Superior Court in New Haveii county and heard in damages, on a default, before Minor, J. On the hearing the court found that the plaintiff was injured by a bullet from a pistol fired by the defendant, as alleged in tlie declaration; that the injury was unintentional, but was the result of gross and culpable carelessness and negligence on the part of the defendant; and that the range of the pistol from…

Wilcox as trustee under the will of Anson R. Sellew; brought to the Superior Court in New Haven county, and heard before Sanford, J. Tire decrees appealed from w.ere made on the 8tli day of September, 1864, the 1st day of September, 1865, and the 1st day of October, 1865. The reasons of appeal which were filed will sufficiently appear from the following finding of the facts made by the court, and are also stated in the opinion.

Application to the Superior Court in New Haven county for the dissolution of a temporary injunction granted by the court against the respondents. The court found the facts, «and at the request of both parties reserved the case for the advice of this court. The facts are complicated and difficult of statement without the map used upon the trial,, and it is believed that all the points decided by the court will be sufficiently understood from the opinion.

<p>Writ oe Error, to reverso a judgment of a justice of the peace in an action of summary process to recover possession of leased premises; brought to the Superior Court in New Haven county and tried before Himnan, O. J. The court affirmed the judgment of the justice and the plaintiff in error (defendant in the original suit) brought the record before this court by a motion in error. The case is fully stated in the opinion.</p>

Petition for an injunction against the use of certain labels and numbers claimed to be a violation of the petitioners’ trade-mark, being the same case heard by this court on a reservation for advice and reported 35 Conn. R., 402.

<p>Appeal from a decree of a probate court accepting the report of commissioners on the insolvent estate of Lydia Riggs, taken to the Superior Court in New Haven county. The court (Sanford, J.,~) dismissed the appeal, and the appellants brought the record before this court by a motion in error. The case is sufficiently stated in the opinion.</p>

Petition for an injunction against tlie prosecution of an action at law by the respondent as administrator of the effects of one George Andrews; brought to the Superior Court in New Haven county. The said George Andrews, who was an inhabitant of the state of Maine, was fatally injured while traveling as a passenger in the cars of the petitioners in this state, and died at New Haven.

Information by the city attorney of the city of Meriden to the police court of that city, charging the defendant with keeping open, within the city, a saloon where intoxicating liquors were kept and sold, between the hours of ten and a half o’clock at night and five o’clock in the morning, in violation of a by-law of the city forbidding the same and imposing a penalty of $25 therefor.

Assumpsit against the defendant as an endorser of a promissory note; brought to the Superior Court in New Haven county and referred to an auditor. The plea was the general issue, with notice that the defendant denied the genuineness of the endorsement of his name upon the note. The auditor found the issue for the defendant and the plaintiffs remonstrated against the acceptance of the report.

Writ of Error to reverse a decree of tlie Superior Court for New Haven county, {Phelps, J.,~) upon a petition to redeem certain mortgaged premises, brought by the plaintiff in error against the defendant in error, in which the court dismissed the petition and granted the prayer of the cross-bill of the respondent.

Petition for an injunction against tlie mayor of the city of New Haven, to prevent the execution by him of guarantees in the name of the city of certain bonds of the New Haven and Derby Railroad Company; brought to the Superior Court iu New Haven County. The. act of incorporation of the railroad company, which was approved and took effect on the 9th day of July, 1864, contained the following provision: “ Sec. 9th.

Debt on a recognizance entered into by the defendants for the appearance of one McGuire, who was in custody on a charge of theft, before the Superior Court next thereafter to be liolden in-Fairfield County. The present suit was brought to the Superior Court in that county. The defendants were McGuire, the principal in the recognizance, and William E. Taylor and Barnabas Allen, sureties. No service was made on McGuire, who was out of the state.

Amicable submission . to the Superior Court upon the following agreed statement of facts: The common council of the city of Bridgeport, by resolution adopted in the year 1868, determined to lay out an extension of Water Street from South Avenue, southerly and westerly along the north side of the track of the Now York and New Haven Railroad, as far as Division Street.

Assumpsit on a promissory note ; brought to the Superior Court and tried to the jury before Sanford, J. The note was dated March 4th, 1858, and was executed by the defendants, who were at that time partners, in their partnership name of Hall & Beardsley. The suit was brought February 6th, 1867. The defendants pleaded the general issue, with notice of the statute of limitations, and of a discharge of the defendant Beardsley under the United States bankrupt act.

Appeal to the Superior Court from the probate of' the will of David Brown; heard before Minor, J., upon issues on sundry reasons of appeal closed to the court. The court found the issues for the appellees and rendered a judgment establishing the will. The appellants moved for a now trial. The case is sufficiently stated in the opinion.

<p>A committee of a school district has power to make a contract with a school teacher for a period beyond its term of office.</p> <p>The statute (Gen. Statutes, tit. 16, sec. 109,) provides that no teacher shall he employed in any public school until he has received a certificate of examination and approbation signed by a majority of the board of visitors; but that no new certificate shall be necessary where the teacher is continued in the same school more than one term unless the visitors shall require it. Held that a certificate of general competency to teach, signed by the school visitors of a town, and which had been used by such teacher in one of the school districts of the town, was sufficient for his use afterwards in any other school district of the same town.</p> <p>Held also that the provision with regard to a new certificate where the visitors should require it, was intended to apply to cases of certificates limited as to time or qualifications, and not to certificates of general competency to teach.</p> <p>Held also that a school district which had contracted with a teacher holding such a certificate, without requiring any re-examination or new certificate, could not he allowed to repudiate the contract on the ground that the teacher had not a new certificate.</p>

Amicable Submission, fo tlie Superior Court, upon the fol-. lowing agreed statement of facts: The American Waterproof Cloth Company, a corporation organized and established under the laws of the state of New York, and located and having its principal office and manufactories in that state, where also its stockholders principally resided, also owned and occupied certain real estate in the town of Bridgeport, with factories and machinery thereon situated.

Amicable submission to the Superior Court upon tho following agreed statement of facts: The plaintiff on and for some time before the 18th day of May, 1869, was the owner, by purchase from the defendants at the usual price, of a commutation ticket, which by its terms expired September 80th, 1869, and which was as follows : “ New York & New Haven R. R. Co. Commutation Ticket. Theodore W. Downs. Between New York and New Haven. Expires Sept. 80th, 1869. No. 3199.

Debt on a probate bond, brought to the Superior Court, and tried, on an issue closed to the court, before .Minor, J. The following facts were found by the court: The defendants were the executors of the will of Darius Mead, and as such executed the bond in question on the 20th day of February, 1864.

Assumpsit, brought to the Superior Court in New London county and tried on the general issue closed to the court. The following facts were found by the court. On the 30tli day of August, T864, one Amasa L. EEyde, who was then the owner of a tract of land in the town of Norwich, conveyed to the defendants, then known as the Elting Woolen Company, the right to flow the land in question by raising a mill-dam belonging to them to a designated height.

The first case is a petition for the laying out of a highway, and the second an application of the respondent town for the appointment of appraisers to assess the benefits and damages resulting from the laying out of the same. The cases were brought to the Superior Court in New London county.

Petition Tinder the floivage act, brought to the Superior Court in New London county.

Action on the statute concerning highways and bridges, for an injury to the horses of the plaintiff through a defect in a bridge of the defendants ; brought to the Superior Court and tried to the jury before Minor, J. The plaintiff obtained a verdict and the defendants moved for a new trial for errors in the charge of the court. The case will be sufficiently understood from the opinion.

Assumpsit upon the common counts for money had and received by the defendants and on an account stated ; brought to the Superior Court, and tried on the general issue, with notice, closed to the court. The court found the following facts : The plaintiffs and defendants were corporations organized as banking associations under the laws of the United States, the former having a capital of $250,000 and the latter a capital of $60,000.

Bill in Equity ; brought to the Superior Court and. heard before Minor, J. The petition alleged that the respondent Waterman, on the 4th of April, 1866, mortgaged to James Jennings', another of the respondents, a piece of land in the town of Danbury of which he was the owner in fee, containing half an acre with buildings thereon, to secure a debt of $250; that the petitioner on the 29th of August, 1868, levied an execution which lie held against Waterman on the equity of…

Bill to redeem mortgaged premises; brought to the Superior Court and tried before Minor, J. Decree fpr the petitioner, and motions in error and for a new trial by the respondents. The case is sufficiently stated in the opinion.

Assumpsit, brought to the Superior Court in Fairfield county at' the August term, 186T. • At the December term, 1869, the defendant filed the following motion. “ The defendant, before pleading to the declaration of the plaintiff, makes this his motion in writing to the court that said case be stricken from the docket and dismissed, for that the said Thomas James is now deceased and has been for a long time, to wit, since May, 1868, and no appearance was entered at the next…

Bill in equity by the petitioners as trustees in insolvency of one Eli Denison, against the respondent who had received from the insolvent a conveyance of an interest in a vessel and an assignment of a claim against the United States government as security for certain liabilities for the insolvent, the conveyance and assignment being claimed to be void under the insolvent law.

Writ op error from a judgment of the Superior Court in Middlesex county, {Loomis, J.) striking from the docket a case brought by the defendant in error against the plaintiff in error before a justice of the peace and appealed by the latter to the Superior Court; the case being stricken from the docket in the Superior Court on the ground that no affidavit had been filed by the appellant with the justice as required by the act of 1867.

Assumpsit, on an award of arbitrators; brought to the Superior Court in New Haven county and tried on the general issue, closed to the court, before Sanford, J. The submission was as follows : “ Whereas various differences and controversies exist between Phineas B. Averill and John H. Buckingham, and a suit is now pending between the parties in the Superior Court for New Haven county; therefore, for the amicable determination of the same, we, the said Averill and Buckingham,…

Bill in chancery for advice as to the construction of a will; brought to the Superior Court in New Haven county. The case was reserved upon a finding of facts for the-advice of this court. The facts are fully stated in the opinion.

Bill in equity, brought to the Superior Court in New Haven county. The case was referred to a committee, who made a report, against the acceptance of which the respondent remonstrated, the petitioners answering to the remonstrance and the respondent replying to the petitioners’ answer.

Petition for a foreclosure of an assessment lien upon the property of the respondents; brought to the Superior Court in New Haven county, and reserved upon a finding of the facts for the advice of this court. The case is fully stated in the opinion.

Assumpsit for use and occupation of leased premises and for money liad and received, brought to the court of common pleas for the county of New Haven and tried before Bronson, J. The defendants were described as “ Robert C. Naramore, Joseph Tomlinson, and others associated with them under the name of Co. G, Second Regiment, Connecticut National Guard, an association duly organized under the statute of this state entitled an act for forming and conducting the military force.”…

Trover for a piano, brought by the plaintiff as trustee for his wife ; tried to the jury in the court of common pleas for New Haven county, on the general issue, before Bronson, J. On the trial the plaintiff offered evidence to prove that his wife purchased the piano and paid for it with her own money, earned by her personal services.

Assumpsit upon a promissory note, with the common counts in general assumpsit; brought to the court of common pleas of New Haven county, and tried on the general issue, with notice of a set-off, closed to. the court, before Bronson, J. The plaintiff filed the following bill of particulars:— February 2d, 1866, One note for three hundred and ■ fifty dollars with interest, $350.00 “ “ “ By cash to S. Paine, for said Lawrence Hoey, ... 100.00 “ “ “ “ By cash to Lawrence Hoey,…

Assumpsit, for goods sold to the defendants by William A. Willard, by whom the claim had been assigned to the plaintiff ; brought to the Superior Court in New Haven county. The defendants were trustees for the holders of mortgage bonds of the New Haven, New London & Stonington Railroad Company and were operating the road as such trustees.

Bill in equity against the respondents, Alexander N. Niles, Henry M. Dunham and Charles L. Strong, former selectmen of the plaintiff town, for an account of moneys received while in office and for a disclosure with regard to the same; brought to the Superior Court in Middlesex county.

Replevin for certain household furniture taken by the defendant out of the possession of the plaintiff and claimed to be unlawfully detained by him; brought to the Superior Court in Tolland county, and tried before Minor, J. The defendant pleaded the general issue, with notice that he should prove that the property belonged to him as trustee of his wife.

Debt on a recognizance entered into by the defendant before the police court of the city of Hartford, brought by the plaintiff as treasurer of the city of Hartford. The suit was brought to the Superior Court in Hartford county.

Debt on a judgment rendered by the Superior Court in Hartford county, in the year 1842; brought to the court of common pleas for the county of Hartford and tried to the jury, on the general issue, before Briscoe, J. The writ was served May 6th, 1868. The jury having rendered a verdict for the plaintiff the defendant moved for a new trial. The case is sufficiently stated in the opinion.

Assumpsit on a check of the defendant payable to hearer and held by the plaintiff; brought to the court of common pleas for the county of Hartford, and tried to the jury upon the general issue with notice, before Briscoe, J. The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff, and the defendant moved for a new trial on the ground that the verdict was against the evidence. The case is sufficiently stated in the opinion.

Assumpsit on a receipt given to tlie plaintiff as deputy sheriff, for personal property attached; brought to the Superior Court in Hartford county and tried to the jury on the general issue, with notice, before Pardee, J. Yerdict for the plaintiff and motion for a new trial by the defendant for error in the charge of the court. The case is sufficiently stated in the opinion.

Assumpsit, on a promissory note of $4,000, -with a count for money had and received; brought to the Superior Court in Hartford county. The plaintiff sued as administrator of the estate of Francis Rood, deceased. The bill of particulars set forth sundry items of money of the intestate received by the defendant, the principal of which were two items of $4000 and 1,900, in March and July, 1864, with interest thereon.

<p>Bills in Equity ; brought to the Superior Court in Hartford • county. The first case is a petition of the Agawam Canal Company, a corporation of the state of Massachusetts, and of Theron Rockwell of Southwick in that state, against Arnold Edwards, Edwin P. Stevens, Luther Griffin, Erastus Owen, and Hector Case, of Suffield and Granby in the state of Connecticut, praying that the respondents be enjoined from diverting the water of Southwick Ponds, and of the streams flowing into the same, from the channels by which they flowed to the mills of the petitioners. The second case is a petition of Arnold Edwards, one of the respondents in the first case, against Theron Rockwell, one of the petitioners in the first case, Edwin Gilbert and John Boyle, praying that the respondents be enjoined from making a dam across a brook known as Strap Brook, by means of which the land of the petitioner was overflowed. The two cases involve the same general facts and were referred together to a committee and argued together before this court. To save the constant repetition of names the term petitioners will be applied exclusively to the petitioners in the first case, and the term respondents to the respondents in the first case, without reference to their change of place in the second case. The committee to whom the cases were referred reported the following, facts :—</p> <p>The Agawam Oanal Company is a corporation established by authority of the state of Massachusetts, and doing business in the town of West Springfield, in Hampden county in that state, and is, and from before the bringing of the petition has been, the proprietor and occupant of certain valuable factories in that town, and on Westfield river, and propelled by and wholly dependent on the water power thereof, and of great value to the company. The other petitioner, Theron Rockwell, is the owner of a mill in the town of Southwick, Massachusetts, on Southwick brook, hereinafter mentioned, and wholly dependent for its propelling power upon the waters of that brook.</p> <p>Arnold Edwards, one of the respondents, on the 1st day of April, 1865, was, and ever since has been, seized in fee and possessed of a tract of land situate in the town of Suffield, in the state of Connecticut, containing about one hundred acres, bounded north on the state line, west on the New Haven and Northampton Railroad, east on land of heirs of Samuel Griffin and others, and south on the Suffield turnpike.</p> <p>Adjoining the town of Suffield, and near the dividing line between the states of Massachusetts and Connecticut, there are, and have ever been, two large bodies of water, fed partly by springs and partly by brooks, which bodies of water, distinguished as north and south ponds, are connected with each other, and are known as the Southwick Ponds.</p> <p>The natural outlet of these ponds is, and has ever been, within the state of Massachusetts, and into and through Southwick Brook, and thence into Westfield River, and a large amount of water from the ponds now flows, and until the construction of the Farmington canal, as hereinafter stated, ever flowed, and but for the canal would have uninterruptedly flowed, into and through said brook into said river, materially increasing the volume of water in both, and the water power thereof, and the value of the mill sites thereon, which are, and are owned and occupied, as follows: The first site is owned and occupied by Edwin Gilbert and John Boyle, for a saw-mill and grist-mill, and is on the Southwick brook about two miles below the outlet of the pond. The second is just below the first and on said brook, and is the mill of the petitioner, Rockwell, and used as a powder mill. The third is the site of the Agawam Canal Company mill, on Westfield River, below the mouth of Southwick Brook, and occupied by the company with extensive cotton mills, and by the Agawam and Southwick Paper Companies, with extensive paper mills, and all requiring abundant water power. There is a fourth site also on the river and below the Agawam Company’s site, occupied by a large grist and flouring mill.</p> <p>The site occupied by the Agawam Canal, the Agawam Paper, and the Southwick Paper Companies, was first taken up and used as a mill-site in 1886. This was done by the Agawam Canal Company, and while the Farmington canal was in operation, and the water in said ponds all withheld from Southwick Brook and turned south into said canal as hereinafter stated. The three other sites were used and occupied for mill purposes before the construction of the Farmington canal. The damage done to the Gilbert and Boyle and the Rockwell mill-sites by withholding and diverting from said brook the waters of said ponds by said canal, was duly and regularly appraised, assessed to the owners of said sites against the canal company and under its charter in the year 1836, but that the same was paid was not admitted by the petitioners, and it is not found by the committee, there being no evidence offered on that subject except the assessments only. The mills on the Gilbert and Boyle site were swept away in a freshet about the time the canal was dug, and were not rebuilt for several years, as the sites were and must be nearly worthless for mill purposes without the waters of the ponds.</p> <p>The Rockwell mill was before the canal, as now, a powder mill, and after the diversion of the waters by the canal was occasionally run, but the water of the ponds is essential to its use as a mill, and the privilege substantially worthless without it. With these waters flowing into Southwick Brook, as now, and as before the canal diverted them, the mill and privilege are valuable. Edwin Gilbert and Thaddeus Foot built the present saw mill at the Gilbert and Boyle privilege in 1846, and Gilbert built the present grist mill there in 1860, after the canal was discontinued and abandoned, which was in December, 1848. The petitioner Rockwell bought into and became interested in his mill and mill-site in the spring of 1848, and a little before the canal was discontinued.</p> <p>Strap Brook was originally, and until diverted by the canal company as hereinafter stated, a principal tributary of said ponds, flowing in a crooked but generally northerly direction and emptying into said ponds, materially increasing the waters therein, and so in Southwick Brook and Westfield River, and the diversion of the waters of Strap Brook from those ponds, and so from Southwick Brook and Westfield River, has ever been, and must be, a material damage to the mill privileges upon the Southwick Brook and said river, and to the value of the same.</p> <p>In the year 1822 the General Assembly of Connecticut incorporated “ The President, Directors and Company of the Farmington Canal,” with power to take all necessary lands and streams and to construct a canal through this part of the state, and with the usual powers of such corporations. The canal company was duly organized, and constructed their canal under their charter, and in the course of this construction entered upon certain lands in the town of Suffield belonging to Verannus Stevens, and certain lands lying next north of the Stevens land and near the state line, and on both sides of the Suffield turnpike, belonging to Jonathan Edwards, the father of the respondent Edwards, and in the course of the years 1825 and 1826 took possession of part of the same by their canal, excavating the same through these lands. The company at the same time took possession under their charter and excavated their canal through some land south of the respondent Edwards’s land, and claimed in the answer to the petition of the latter as standing now in the name of Theron Rockwell. This land was then the property of the said Jonathan Edwards. The canal company took and appropriated these lands by and for their canal in virtue of a written agreement entered into with them by said Stevens and Edwards and others, with reference to their respective lands, and with no other title. The following is the agreement:</p> <p>“ We the subscribers, living on or near the route of the Farmington canal, do hereby covenant and agree with the President, Directors and Company of the Farmington Canal, that in case said canal shall, by the commissioners appointed for the location of the same, be laid on or across any land owned by us, in consideration of the benefits to be derived from said canal we will give in and release to them all our right and title to all such land as may be deemed necessary, and may be taken for said canal, to be used by the said president, directors and company, for the purpose of making and constructing said canal, to be their property for the use aforesaid so long as said canal shall continue; and we do hereby agree that we will at their request and expense make, execute and deliver to the President, Directors and Company of the Farmington Canal, all such proper deeds as may be necessary in law to convey to them all our right and title to the land which may be thus taken for the purpose aforesaid, reserving however to ourselves the wood and timber on the same, giving said company the right of taking down said wood and timber in such manner as they may think proper. Witness our hands this 28th day of June, A. D. 1825.</p> <p>Yerannus Stevens, Isaac Griffin, Thomas Hawley, Jonathan Edwards, Harvey Holworth, Zophar Griffin, Oliver Griffin, Charles Holworth, Oliver Owen, Samuel Griffin, Pliny Hillyer, Riley Dibble, Theodore Hillyer, Joel Holcomb, Alexander Miller, Jr., Isaac Phelps, Alexander Miller, Daniel B. Holworth, Daniel Holworth, Jr.”</p> <p>“ I will give my land of suitable width for the canal, they building suitable bridges to get to my land.</p> <p>Daniel Hayes.”</p> <p>The canal company went forward and took said Jonathan Edwards’s land, and land hereinafter mentioned of Yerannus Stevens, under this agreement, and without more.</p> <p>In excavating their canal through the first piece of land above mentioned, near the land of the respondent Arnold Edwards, the company came upon Strap Brook, and diverted its waters from their old channel directly into their canal, the water running south therein at a distance of a mile or more from the natural entrance of the same into the ponds, and at a point south of the state line.</p> <p>In connection with another canal company, known as the Hampshire & Hampden Canal Company, incorporated by the state of Massachusetts, and connecting with the Farmington canal, the canal was constructed and continued north from the state line, into and through said ponds, to the town of Northampton in Massachusetts. Said companies built a dam at the outlet oí the ponds into Southwick Brook, for the purpose of keeping the waters in the ponds at a certain height for the use and benefit of the canal. They also constructed a guard lock across their canal south of the ponds, and north of but near the state line, to keep the waters in the ponds at a somewhat higher level than the water, in the canal south of said locks, where it passes through said Edwards’s land, and as a reservoir to feed their canal to the south. The outlet into Southwick Brook was stopped, as above, in 1830, and thereafter the waters ot the ponds were wholly diverted and flowed south in the canal, until, in the spring of 1848, the petitioner Rockwell took out the canal dam at the outlet of the ponds into Southwick Brook, but whether bo as entirely to clear the channel as it was before the canal dam was put in did not appear. There is now an artificial obstruction to the natural channel at this place, in a beam across the stream, the origin oi which was not accounted for, although it does not seem to have been put in by the canal company when making their dam. By. removing this outlet dam, Rockwell drew the waters oí the ponds, in part, back into their old channel into Southwick Brook and Westfield River.</p> <p>Strap brook, when the canal was built, ran through the respondent Edwards’s land, north of the Suffield turnpike, in its course to the ponds, and when excavating the canal through .these lands in 1826 the canal company, at a point on said Edwards’s land, towards the north part thereof, though south of the guard lock, and of the state line, diverted the brook into this canal, to feed the same, and the waters of the brook henceforth flowed south in the canal, with slight interruptions, to be hereinafter noted, until stopped, in 1861, by a dam in the canal under the railroad bridge, as hereinafter stated; and when that was removed, by the obstruction or dam placed in the canal by the petitioners in 1865, as hereinafter stated.</p> <p>Before the building of the canal there were on said Edwards’s land, south of the Suffield turnpike, and south of the. place where the surface water ceased to run north and began to run south, and a little westerly of the land taken for the canal,.one or two springs of water, from which water flowed into the head of a small pond, also west of the canal, two-thirds of which pond were north of the dam put by the petitioners in the canal'in 1865, and the lower and southern third lay south of the dam. This pond was formed in part from these springs, and in part by a water-shed from Manetic' mountain, at whose eastern base it lay. The water flowed from the lower end of this pond in a southerly direction towards Manetic Brook, and more or less of it found its way into that brook, and so into Salmon Brook and Farmington River. The evidence did not satisfy the committee that this flow was without interruption, depending on the greater or less dryness of the seasons; and much of the time it must have been small.</p> <p>The canal company, when digging their canal at this point, buried these springs completely, and filled up the larger part of this pond with the materials "taken out of the canal. A part of the pond, however, still exists, both above and below the dam erected in 1865. Water has appeared in the west bank of the canal, and in springs on and at the foot of the bank, since the original springs and the pond were buried and filled; which water flows south in the canal and is dammed by the dam erected in 1865; but the committee does not know, and does not find, that it is water from the original springs or from the pond.</p> <p>At a point southerly of the dam erected in 1865, the canal company, early in the use of their canal, made a waste weir whereby the surplus waters from the canal, including those of Strap Brook and the South-wick Ponds, were emptied into Manetic brook, and so passed to the mill-sites of two of the respondents, Erastus Owen and Hector Case, and thence into Salmon Brook and Farmington River; and said waters have ever since continued so to run until and except as interrupted by the various dams and obstructions placed in the canal, as hereinafter mentioned.</p> <p>It was agreed by the parties, and is found by the committee, that the survey, laying out, location, and use of their canal, by the canal companies, were legal, and that their diversion and appropriation of the waters of the ponds and of Strap Brook, and of the springs and little pond, so far as taken, were legal so far as the same were authorized by their charter ; only, as before stated, the petitioners do not admit, and the committee does not find, that the damages were paid which were assessed as aforesaid to the owners of the Gilbert and Boyle and the Theron Rockwell mill-sites.</p> <p>Besides the original charter of the Farmington Canal Company, the committee, by agreement of the parties, finds as part of the facts of the case, the resolve of the General Assembly of Connecticut, incorporating the “ New Haven and Northampton Company,” (1 Private Acts, 308); also the incorporation oí said company by the state of Massachusetts, and the conveyances to said company in accordance with its chartered privileges, by the Farmington Canal Company and the Hampshire & Hampden Canal Company, of all such franchises, and privileges belonging to the last named companies as the various acts ol Connecticut and Massachusetts respecting the New Haven & Northampton Company authorized to be made, and so far as the same could legally be made under said charter and acts; and also the acceptance and taking possession by said New Haven & Northampton Company of said franchises and privileges; also the various acts of the state of Connecticut relating to said New Haven & Northampton Company and its construction and operation of a railroad under the power granted it, from New Haven to a point in the town of Granby, Connecticut; also the incorporation by the state of Connecticut of the Farmington Valley Railroad under its charter in said private acts, its organization under the same, and that its road is now built and in actual use frpm some point at or near the north terminus of the New Haven & Northampton Company’s road in Granby to the north line of Connecticut, at a point within one hundred rods west of the point where the old canal crosses the state line into Massachusetts ; also that the Hampden Railroad Company is a corporation duly incorporated under its charter granted in the state of Massachusetts.</p> <p>Before the construction of the Farmington Yalley railroad there was and ever had been a natural pond of several acres extent, but varying in size with the seasons, situated in the town of Suffield, about one and a half miles east of the old canal. This pond, called sometimes Duck Pond, sometimes Seven-Acre Pond, seems to have been made by an accumulation of surface water from higher grounds around it, and what ran in above a certain level ran off in a southerly direction, and often in considerable quantity, and found its way to a greater or less extent into Manetic Brook, east of the canal. Manetic Brook when the railroad was built crossed and still crosses the canal a few rods south of the state line, and south of the dams of the petitioners erected in 1854 and 1865, and its waters, after uniting with the waters flowing through and from the canal as aforesaid-, flowed to the mill-sites of the respondents Case and Owen, and thence into Salmon Brook and Farmington River.</p> <p>The Farmington Yalley Railroad Company when building their road made a deep excavation near to and northerly from Duck Pond in such manner as almost entirely to drain the same, and through this excavation the waters which before formed this pond are now mostly carried northerly into Strap Brook, and thence through the same and the land of the respondent Edwards, into the canal, and, until and except as the waters were dammed in the canal by the railroad company and the petitioners, through the canal to Manetic Brook, and so to the mills of the respondents, Owen and Case, and to Salmon Brook and Farmington River.</p> <p>Subsequently, and before 1865, the Farmington Yalley Railroad Company, by sale or lease, transferred the use, possession, and occupation of their road to the New Haven & Northampton Company, who now possess, control, and operate the same. The canal when first built, and ever after, crossed Manetic Brook at the same place where the waters now join.</p> <p>The respondent Hector Case owns the first mill seat on Manetic Brook, below where its waters are joined by those in the canal. His is a saw and shingle-mill, and used also in the manufacture of powder kegs. He bought it' of Zophar, Henry, and Horatio Griffin, in the year 1859, and when the waters of Southwick Ponds- and the waters of Strap Brook and other waters in the canal were .flowing freely in the canal without obstruction south to their junction with Manetic Brook, and through said brook to this mill, and so to the mills and streams below. This mill was built before the canal was made, and was then owned by the said Zophar Griffin, who was one (as was also the said Henry Griffin another,) signer of the agreement with the canal company of the date of June 28th, 1825, hereinbefore given, and a part of his land was taken by the company for their canal under that agreement. The respondents proved by parol, subject to objection by the petitioners, that when the said Zophar signed the agreement, it was agreed with him by those then acting in obtaining the agreement for the canal company, that as one benefit for signing the same, and giving his' land, he was to have for his mill the waste water from the canal in time of navigation, and when the canal was not navigable in winter he was to have all the water, instead of its being let off into the locks below; and the mill, while the canal was operated, had the waste water during the season of navigation, and in general all the waters in the canal below the guard-locks at other times; and since the canal was abandoned in 1848, until and as obstructed by the dam in the canal put in by the railroad company and the petitioners, the waters of Strap Brook, and all the waters in the canal north to Southwick Ponds, and the waters from said ponds, have flowed freely through and from the canal into Manetic Brook and to this mill, and thence to the mills helow upon said brook, and Salmon Brook, and Farmington River, and the said Case, and Erastus Owen, another respondent, have claimed the same as their right.</p> <p>The said Erastus Owen owns a saw and shingle-mill on said Manetic Brook, below Case’s mill. This mill-site was taken up and built on first between 1831 and 1836, and while the canal was in full operation, and had all the advantages coming to the same from the waters in the canal then coming into Manetic Brook. The present owner, Owen, first became interested there in 1852, and while there were no obstructions to the free passage of the waters in the canal and thence into the brook. The waters of Manetic Brook alone are entirely insufficient by themselves to furnish steady power to either Case’s or Owen’s mill, and any diminution of the water in the brook increases the difficulty, such as the diversion of Duck Pond, and of the water coming np in springs out of the bed on the west bank of the canal north of the dam erected in 1865, although the committee finds that this alone would not materially affect the use and value of the Owen and Case mill-sites.</p> <p>The waters of Strap Brook, however, make a very material and valuable addition to the water power of the mills and mill-sites on Southwick Brodk and Westfield River, if going there, and to these mills of Owen and Case, and thence below them in Salmon Brook and Farmington River, if going there; and the like is true respecting the waters of Southwick Pond. Without obstructions put in the canal the waters of said ponds largely, and of Strap Brook entirely, have flowed through the canal into Manetic Brook, to the great advantage of" the Owen and Case mills and those below -them, and the deprivation of this water is a very serious disadvantage, and, if unlawful, injury to both these mills; and on the other hand, to be deprived of the flow of the waters of either Strap Brook or said Southwick Ponds must be a serious loss to the mill owners on Southwick Brook and Westfield River, to the former making their privileges nearly worthless, and, if unlawful, a great injury.</p> <p>There are below said Owen and Case mills, on Salmon Brook and Farmington River, other mills and manufacturing establishments, and some of them extensive, all of which have depended and do depend on the waters flowing in Manetic Brook, and which have been and will be materially affected for good by the large supply, and for evil by the less supply afforded thereby.</p> <p>Just south of the state line, and bordering on the canal, and through which Strap Brook now runs, (since the canal was made running into the canal, and before the canal was built always running to Southwick Ponds,) there is a tract of land of about a hundred acres now belonging to the respondent, Arnold Edwards, formerly part of the land before mentioned of Jonathan Edwards, the father of Arnold, and devised by him to the latter. There are from eight to twelve acres of this land which before the canal was made were somewhat wet but could be used as pasture. The effect of the diversion of Strap Brook into the canal was to drain and so improve this part of the land, and make it more valuable, and capable of cultivation, and the same was cultivated accordingly, and produced crops'of corn and other crops, and was valuable as mowing, and so continued from 1826 until the railroad dam in 1861 was put into the canal, as hereafter stated.</p> <p>• The canal was discontinued and abandoned for use as such in December, 1848, and has long ago become unnavigable; the guard locks were removed, and the canal left entirely open from ■ Southwick Ponds to below the crossing of Manetic brook ; and the waters of Strap Brook, and to a greater or less extent of Southwick Ponds, continued to flow south through the canal without interruption, passing into Manetic brook to the mills of Case and Owen, and thence to Salmon Brook and Farmington River, until in October and November, 1853, while the Farmington Valley Railroad Company was building its road; and to facilitate this the company, with the consent of the respondent Arnold Edwards, whose land would thus be flowed, filled in the canal at the point where the railroad crosses the same a little south,of the Suifield turnpike- and of the land of said Edwards. This obstruction for the time prevented the waters of Strap® Brook and of said ponds from flowing, south, as they had been flowing since the canal had first diverted them, and restored them to their old flow northerly towards and to a certain extent into Southwick Brook and Westfield River. The obstruction seems to have been retained a few days after the occasion for it on the part of the railroad company ceased, and it was somewhat strengthened and heightened by the petitioner Rockwell and the mill owners on Southwick Brook and Westfield Biver, but on complaint made to the railroad company the company removed it, and the waters resumed their flow south as before. This obstruction continued in all about six weeks.</p> <p>The next year, 1854, the Agawam Canal Company bought a piece of land a half mile or more south of the railroad crossing, and including the bed of the canal, and in concert with Rockwell and others of those concerned in the mills on Southwick Brook and Westfield River, filled up the bed of the canal at that place, and so again dammed the waters of Strap Brook and of said ponds, from flowing south. This obstruction, however, was of very brief continuance ; it was hardly put in before it was removed, although by whom was not in evidence, and the waters continued flowing south as before, until in 1861 the New Haven & Northampton Company, and Rockwell and his associates, put in a solid embankment at the railroad crossing, where in 1853 the railroad company had put in their temporary dam. This embankment dammed again the waters from flowing south and sent them north, and restored those of Strap Brook and the Southwick Ponds to a certain extent into Southwick Brook and Westfield River, and matters so continued, notwithstanding efforts on the part of the respondents to have the dam removed, until July, 1865.</p> <p>There was, however, in the year 1863, a petition brought to the General Assembly of the state of Connecticut for some action to bring about the removal of this dam, and in reference to this or. something like it expected, the legislature of Massachusetts, on the 29th of April, 1863, passed a resolve authorizing the attorney general of that state “to appear before the General Assembly of Connecticut to oppose any action of said Assembly having for its object the diversion of the waters of Southwick ponds and their tributaries from their natural outlet in Massachusetts into the Farmington River, in the state of Connecticut, and to protect the interests of Massachusetts and its inhabitants in said waters.”</p> <p>What was done with the petition to the General Assembly of Connecticut did not definitely appear, but the committee understood .that nothing came of it, and so finds ; but in July, 1865, the General Assembly of Connecticut passed the resolve “relating to the Farmington Valley Railroad Company and the New Haven & Northampton Company,” which appears in the printed private acts of that year, on pages 168, 169. Whether any or what notice was given to the state of Massachusetts or to any of the respondents did not appear; but one or more of the respondents, and also Mr. Gillette, the attorney of the state of Massachusetts for Hampden county, although it was not shown that he was there officially, were present at some stage of the proceedings before the legislative committee having this matter referred to them. After the passage of this resolve, and during the month of July, 1868, the New Haven & Northampton Company removed the embankment and obstruction from the canal, and left the waters to flow south again as before; but before the obstruction was so far removed as to let the water pass, the petitioners Rockwell and the Agawam''Canal Company, and others interested with them in said Southwick Brook and Westfield River mills, again interposed.</p> <p>On the 30th of June, 1865, Rockwell took a deed from Bmeline H. Hall, and her husband Daniel E. Hall, conveying a piece of land in Suffield, a short distance south of the railroad dam, but north and above the place of the dam of 1854, said land being bounded in the deed as follows: “ A certain piece of land- lying in Suffield near the junction of the old Farmington canal and the New Haven & Northampton railroad, south of the highway leading from North Granby to Suffield, on the east side of the Manetic Mountain, bounded on the west by the railroad company’s land, extending south so far as said company’s land to a pile of stones; easterly' on land formerly owned by Yerannus Stevens; north on land of Theron Rockwell and the railroad company, each in part; south on our own land ; containing four acres more or less.” The interest of said Daniel in this land was only as husband in the right of his wife, and her interest conveyed to said Rockwell was as follows:—Jonathan Edwards, the father of the respondent Edwards, owned the land at this point which lay next south of the Suffield turnpike, and where and through which the canal was excavated, in one continuous tract with his other land north of the turnpike, which latter is the same mentioned as above as now owned by the respondent Arnold Edwards, and through which also the canal company laid and excavated their canal, and all was so taken and appropriated by said company in virtue of and under the agreement hereinbefore set forth. When Jonathan Edwards died he devised all this land north and south of the turnpike to the respondent Arnold Edwards, but the latter shortly after conveyed to his brother Townsend all that lay south of the turnpike. A small part of these latter premises lay east of the canal, and the much larger part west. The premises next south were those of Yerannus Stevens, above mentioned, and through which, under the agreement, the canal company had also laid and excavated them canal in 1835. Townsend, after the conveyance to him, and while proprietor of his land, and Stevens, for their mutual convenience, exchanged lands, Townsend conveying all his land east of the canal to Stevens, and the latter conveying all his west of the canal to Townsend. The deed of Townsend to Stevens is dated March 17th, 1835, and bounds the lot conveyed “ west on said canal.” This was when the canal was in full operation. The canal thereafter served as a boundary and fence between the lands of Townsend on the west, and those of' Stevens on the east, and matters so continued until the canal was abandoned for use as such in 1848. The water still continued to run therein, but was much lower than before, so as not to serve as a fence against cattle, and in 1851 Townsend and Stevens built a fence between their lands the whole length of their junction, Stevens the north half and Townsend the south half, the north half being built on the east side of the canal at the water’s edge, and the south half on the west side of the canal at the water’s edge, and the north end of the south half and south end of the north half connected by timbers across the canal a short distance below the Rockwell dam of 1865. This was done under a parol agreement between Townsend and Stevens to that effect, 'and that the centre of the canal should be the dividing line between them. To this parol agreement, offered in evidence by the respondents, the petitioners objected as not evidence to vary their rights; but the respondents claimed it as showing that the fence was off from the true line, as they claimed the true line to be, the centre of the canal, by agreement, and that so an adverse possession was prevented. Townsend Edwards shortly after died, leaving four heirs, of whom the said Emeline H. Hall was one. The other three, her brothers and sister, conveyed to her by deed dated February 26th, 1856, their interest in said land of their father, otherwise than as its eastward limits are restricted by the description of the land conveyed, given in the deed, which description is as follows : “ The following piece of land lying in Suffield west of the mountain, and bounded as follows, viz: west on the ledge of Manetic Mountain, north on the highway, east on the west bank of the Farmington canal, south on Aristarchus Griffin’s land, and contains thirteen acres more or less.”</p> <p>Verannus Stevens conveyed to the Farmington Valley Railroad Company the land over which their road was built, east of and adjoining the canal where the road crosses the canal, by deed dated April 15th, 1853. The conveyance was in fee for the perpetual use of the land by the grantees as a railroad.</p> <p>Tn November, 1864, by a deed recorded in February, 1865, Luther Griffin, one of the respondents, had become the owner of the land conveyed by Townsend to Stevens, and of the other land of Stevens adjoining, subject to an interest therein reserved for life to Edwin P. Stevens, a son of Verannus Stevens, and his wife. About the middle of July, 1865, and while the New Haven & Northampton Company were proceeding in the removal of the embankment of 1861, but before it was so removed that the water could pass, Rockwell and his associates filled, up the canal at the point where Rockwell had, on the 30th of June preceding, bought of Daniel and Emeline Hall, carrying their filling, however, completely across the canal from the west side beyond the center to the east side of the canal, and thereby made a dam which effectually prevented the water from passing south when the railroad dam was taken away, and caused, and has ever since caused, the waters in the canal, north thereof, including those of Strap Brook, and of Southwick Ponds, to go to a certain extent and largely into Southwick Brook and Westfield River. In making said dam Rockwell and liis associates did not raise the level of the land above what it had been before the canal was excavated, and their purpose was only to prevent the waters of Strap Brook and Southwick Ponds from flowing south, and as far as they could make them pass off through Southwick Brook and Westfield River as they had done before the canal was made, for the use and benefit of the mills on these streams. Before the dam was sufficiently completed towards the east side of the canal to stop the water, Rockwell and his associates were notified by the respondents Luther Griffin and Edwin P. Stevens that they owned the land at that point on the east to the center of the canal, and were forbidden by them to proceed with the dam on them premises.</p> <p>The course of Strap Brook prior to the construction of the canal while passing through said Edwards’s land, and thence to Southwick Ponds through lands of other proprietors, was quite crooked, and on one part for quite a distance the committee finds its ancient bed has, in the course of cultivation, since the diversion into the canal, been dragged over and partially filled up.</p> <p>The canal company, in the course of their construction and use of their canal, at one time carried a solid embankment across the outlet of Southwick Ponds (but some distance above where it' enters Southwick Brook) as a tow-path, and about the time when Rockwell took away the canal dam at the outlet into Southwick Brook this embankment was broken through in two places, but not as low down as the natural bed of the ponds. When the Farmington Yalley Railroad Company built their road in 1853 and 1854, they built another solid embankment aqross • the outlet west of that of the canal company, and nearer, but still above, the entrance of Southwick Brook, and to enable the water to pass towards and into that brook the railroad company constructed a culvert near the outlet in the south, but on what had before been dry land. The bed of this culvert was, and ever has been, considerably higher than the bed of the outlet, and the railroad embankment thus acts as a dam, and obviously obstructs the passage of the water in Southwick Ponds towards and into Southwick Brook.</p> <p>By the erection of the railroad dam of 1861, and the one in 1865, now complained of by the respondents, the waters of. Strap Brook, including any waters therein coming from Duck Pond, were and are turned back in the canal through the land of the respondent Edwards, and made to flow north, and the waters of Southwick Ponds, which had been flowing south in the canal, and any waters in the canal north, are also dammed back.</p> <p>The effect of this dam on the land of the respondent Edwards hereinbefore stated to have been drained by the canal, is to raise the water of Strap Brook on the same to a higher point, and flow it more, and render it less valuable, than before the canal was made. From two to four acres on its banks which, before the canal was made, could be used as pasture, though not cultivated, and which, after the canal was excavated until the railroad dam of 1861 was drained by the canal, was cultivated, and but for this 1865 dam would, on the removal of that of 1861, have again been drained and been cultivable, is by this dam rendered wholly worthless even for pasture, and some six to eight acres more of the land is now injured by the water, and cannot be cultivated at all, and is poorer for pasture and of less value than it was before the canal was dug, and this damage will continue while the dam and flowing caused thereby continue. The petitioners requested the committee to find that the injury thus caused by the dam to said land is compensable to the owner in money, and the committee so finds. Other lands of other proprietors in the vicinity are similarly affected and injured, and the other respondents, Owen and Case, and the mill owners below them on Salmon Brook and Farmington River, are deprived of the use of the waters so dammed from their mills.</p> <p>Were the obstructions in the outlet of South wick Ponds put in' by the railroad and canal companies entirely removed so that the flow into Southwick Brook were as free as before the canal was built, the committee is of opinion, and finds, that the water would be as high, but not at an appreciably higher point, on the respondent Edwards’s land, and the land of other proprietors, by reason of the dam now complained of, except that in the bed of the canal itself the waters of Strap Brook would flow out of their natural course, unless the bed of the canal and the place through which Strap Brook was diverted into the same were filled up, and the old channel re-opened where it is now filled.</p> <p>The committee finds that the canal company while operating their canal had the canal itself as their object in the management thereof and of its waters, and any advantages accruing to the respondent Edwards and the mill owners on Manetic brook and below, were subordinate and incidental, and there was no proof that these were allowed as a right to any person concerned, other than the agreements before referred to.</p> <p>The canal company, at times while operating their canal, and before they abandoned the same, put up temporary dams in the canal near the southerly line of the Arnold Edwards land, to lay up the water for a while,* and this for the time served to flow the Arnold Edwards premises adjoining, and hold the water back from flowing south in the canal; but it was at such periods of the year as not to affect the substantial drainage of the land for cultivation and not to injure the same, and the water eventually flowed south in the canal and to the crossing of Manetic Brook, to pass by or into the same as at other times.</p> <p>There was no evidence to show that either of the respondents had threatened to remove the dam erected in 1865, but the petitioners had reason when they brought their petition to expect that they, or some of them, would so remove it.</p> <p>The Superior Court accepted the report of the committee and reserved both cases for the advice of this court.</p> <p>When the cases came up for argument in this court a question was made as to which party should go forward, both being petitioners and both respondents. The court decided that the only rule they could adopt in such a case, in the absence of anything in the nature of the cases entitling either party to precedence, was to take the cases as they stand on the docket, the first one being reached and entitled to a hearing, with the ordinary right of the petitioners to go forward, and the other being by agreement of the parties taken up with it before its turn, and therefore in subordination to it, except so far as the parties should have agreed otherwise.</p>

Assumpsit upon a life ' insurance policy; brought to the Superior Court in Hartford county, and tried to the jury, on the general issue with notice, before Pardee, J.' The policy was upon the life of Seth P. Norton in the sum of $2,000, and was taken out in the name of the plaintiff, who was his wife, for her benefit if she should be living at his death, and for the benefit of her children if she should not then he living.

Action upon the statute of 1865 with regard to the taxation 'of corporations; brought to the Superior Court in Hartford county, and tried on the general issue, with notice, closed to tlio court.

Covenant against the defendant as surety for rent; brought to the Court of Common Pleas, for Hartford county and tried on the general issue, with notice, closed to the court, before Briscoe, J. Judgment for the plaintiff and motion for a new trial by the defendant. - The case is sufficiently stated in the opinion. • ■ .

<p>Where an insurance company has an agent in another state upon whom service of suit can he made as required by the law of such state, it canuot revoke the authority or representative character of such agent, (having no other such agent within the state,.) and- thus prevent the service, while it has contracts of insurance outstanding in such state.</p> <p>A state of war recognized as such by and between belligerent parties, suspends ' all contracts in existence between citizens of the respective belligerents at the. time war commences.</p> <p>At the termination of the war such contracts are revived, and the remedies for their enforcement are restored.</p> <p>The late war between the United States and the solealied Confederate States suspended all contracts between the citizens of the respective' parties thereto.</p> <p>A treaty of peace usually marks the time at which a war ceases and contracts . between the belligerents'are revived.</p> <p>B.ut the late war was not, and could not, be terminated by a treaty of pea.ee, as the so-called Confederate States were politically annihilated, only one party to the contest surviving.</p> <p>The question when a war begins or terminates is a political and not a judicial one, and courts must, in ascertaining whether a state of war exists, look to the action of those departments' of the government to which that subject is confided by the constitution. The action of those departments, when within the authority conferred by the constitution, is conclusive and binding on the courts as well as on the citizens.</p> <p>The proclamation of the President of the United States of June 13th, 1865, declaring, among other things, “ that all restrictions upon internal, domestic, and coastwise intercourse and trade heretofore imposed on the territory of the United States east of■ the Mississippi River, are annulled, and I do’hereby direct that they be forthwith removed,” was a valid exercise of executive power, the effect of which was to revive all contracts and remedies thereon between citizens of the rest of the United states-and those of the seceding states east of the Mississippi River, which had been suspended by the war.</p>

<p>A master of a vessel is presumed to continue such until some overt act or declaration of the owners displaces him from that station.</p> <p>The enrollment which describes him as master is evidence of the fact till the contrary is shown.</p> <p>A bill of lading signed by the master binds the vessel, although the word “ master” is not appended to his signature.</p> <p>A master talcing on board cargo for carriage binds his vessel to deliver it, whether he signs a bill of lading or not.</p> <p>The owners, and the master as their agent, have a lien on the cargo carried in their ships, for the freight money, and can retain the same until the freight is paid or the payment secured by the consignee.</p> <p>A master can bind his owners for necessary repairs and supplies furnished in a foreign port, or a port of another state, but such supplies must relate to the condition, or the use and employment of the ship.</p> <p>If the master is owner pro Me vtcé, he cannot bind the owners, but his contracts for necessaries may bind the ship and constitute a lien on her.</p> <p>In case of pressing necessity, where the master cannot conveniently and readily communicate with his owners, he may bind them and the ship in a home port.</p> <p>A master can in no case bind the ship or owners for his private debts, or for supplies furnished his family.</p> <p>A mortgagee of a ship, or the holder oí a conditional bill of sale, out of possession, is not liable for supplies and repairs.</p> <p>Where a consignee refuses to pay the freight on a cargo, or properly secure the payment, it is the duty of the master to store the same at the port of delivery in care of a third party in some convenient place, subject to the order of the owner or consignee on payment of the freight money.</p> <p>In case no one will receive the cargo on storage at the port of delivery, the master may leave it at the nearest convenient port.</p>

<p>The liens of attaching creditors, under the law of Connecticut regulating attachments on mesne process, take precedence in the order in which they are levied, and the first attaching creditor has sixty days in case of personal property, - and four months in case of real estate, after final judgment, within which to perfect his lien and sequester the property in payment of his judgment debt.</p> <p>And each subsequent attaching creditor has the same periods of time respectively within which to levy his execution after the encumbrance of the next preceding-attaching creditor is removed.</p> <p>A levy of an execution by a subsequent attaching creditor, -while the lien of a preceding attachment is pending on the property, is void.</p> <p>The levy of an execution on the property of a bankrupt within four months before the institution of proceedings in bankruptcy under the United States bankrupt act, is not vacated by such proceedings, although the judgment may have been rendered in a suit brought within the four months.</p> <p>An assignee in bankruptcy represents the creditors of the bankrupt as well as the bankrupt himself, and can take advantage of any remedy which would have been open to an attaching creditor.</p>