Volume 37 — Connecticut Reports

Bill in equity to compel the conveyance of certain real estate, brought to the Superior Court in New London county and tried before Minor, J. The court made the following finding of facts: On the 10th day of September, 1866, the legal title to one of two tracts of land described in the petition was in the respondent Kinne, and an undivided haíf of the equitable title, and the other half of the equitable title was in Coon, the other respondent; and at the same time Kinne and…

Bill in equity for the specific performance of an agreement to convey a piece oi land; brought to the Superior-Court in New London county, and heard, upon the bill and. answer, before Minor, J. The court made the following special finding of facts: On the 20th day of March, 1868, the petitioner and respondent entered into the following written contract, and on the-same day the petitioner paid to the respondent one dollar,, which was receipted upon it. - “ I, Edmund D. Roath,…

Trespass for an assault and false imprisonment; brought to the Superior Court in Windham County and tried on the general issue, with notice, closed to the court, before Carpenter, J. The court found the following facts : On the 20th day of November, 1868, the plaintiff was arrested by the defendant Smith, upon a complaint and warrant charging him with the offence of disturbing a public school in the town of Putnam.

Action on the statute (Gen. Statutes, tit. 7, see. 200,) for the rescue of an animal of the defendant trespassing on the premises of the plaintiff and taken into his custody by the latter under Gen. Statutes, tit. 7, sec. 193 ; appealed to the Superior Court in New London County from the judgment of a justice of the peace, and tried, on a general denial closed to the court, before Carpenter, J. ' The declaration averred “ that on the 25th The court found the following facts:…

<p>A town voted to give a certain bounty to volunteers enlisting in tlie military service of the United States on the quota of the town, and authorized the selectmen to pay the bounty after the volunteers were mustered into the service. B enlisted and was accepted and went into camp, but was taken sick and left the service before his regiment was mustered in, and was never accredited to the town. After he enlisted, but before the regiment was mustered in, the selectmen at his request gave him a note for a part of his bounty, payable to him or hearer at a future day with interest, the consideration being expressed to be “ value received in volunteer militia service.” Held that there could bo no recovery upon the note by a purchaser of it in good faith for full value before due.</p> <p>The selectmen exceeded their authority in giving the note. That authority was special and limited. They had no power to act in the matter as general agents of the town.</p> <p>Persons dealing with a special agent do so at their own risk and aro hound to inform themselves as to the extent of his authority.</p> <p>This doctrine is especially reasonable and pertinent where the power is given by a public vote of a town, readily accessible, and where the claimant is a resident of the town.</p> <p>The terms of the note here showed that it could have been given only under a special authority, which special authority could have been conferred only by a vote of the town.</p> <p>If the giving of the note was to be regarded as an admission that B had been mustered into the service of the United States, yet the selectmen had no power to hind the town by such an admission.</p> <p>A vote authorizing selectmen to pay money, means to pay in the ordinary way, by an order on the treasurer, and gives no authority to make a note.</p> <p>A special agent cannot, without express authority from his principal, bind him by a negotiable promissory note.</p> <p>The party purchasing the note was a resident of the town, with access to its records, and was also a brother-in-law of B, and cognizant of the general facts with regard to his military service, and had heard that the selectmen had questioned the liability of the town, to pay the note. Whether upon these facts the law would not regard him as taking the note in had faith: Qucere.</p>

<p>Debt on a bail-bond executed to the plaintiff as sheriff, brought to the Superior Court in Fairfield County, and tried to the jury before Sanford, J.</p> <p>The declaration, after describing a judgment obtained by one Charles Albin against the defendant Curtis Finch and others, and averring that the body of the said Curtis Finch was on the 17th day of January, 1867, taken by the officer on the execution issued on the judgment and committed to jail, proceeded as follows:</p> <p>“ And that the said Curtis Finch was afterwards, to wit, on the 29th day of January, 1867, by reason of his arrest and commitment as aforesaid, lawfully confined in said jail and in the custody of the plaintiff, who was then sheriff of said Fairfield County and the keeper of said jail, and lawfully in the custody of the plaintiff as such sheriff; and being so in the custody of the plaintiff as such sheriff, and confined in said jail as aforesaid, the defendants, on the day last aforesaid, in and by a certain bond or writing obligatory by them well executed, and delivered to the plaintiff, dated the 29th day of January, 1867, acknowledged themselves holden and firmly bound unto the plaintiff in the sum of three hundred and twenty dollars, to be paid to him, the plaintiff, his attorney, executors, administrators or assigns, in a reasonable time when thereto requested, as by said bond or writing obligatory, ready in court to be shown, appears: which said writing obligatory was and is subject to a certain condition, to wit, that whereas the said Curtis Finch had been committed before that time, to wit, on the 24th day of January, 1867, by Harvey Fitch, deputy sheriff of said county, to the keeper of the jail in Bridgeport, in said county, within the said jail, by virtue of an execution issued from the Superior Court for Fairfield County, by the clerk of said court, at the December term thereof, in the year 1866, in favor of Charles Albin, of said New Canaan, against Joseph Moore, Samuel Smith, Henry Finch and Charles Finch, all of said Norwalk, and the said Curtis Finch, for the sum of one hundred and twenty-five dollars damages, and eighty dollars and forty-five cents costs of suit, said execution bearing date the 19th day of January, 1867, and the said Curtis Finch is now held in close confinement in said prison, and whereas the said Curtis Finch is desirous of having and enjoying the liberties of said jail, which have been refused by the authorities appointed by law for that purpose; and whereas the said sheriff deems it necessary to take from the said Curtis Finch a bond, with one sufficient surety, that he, the said Curtis Finch, will remain a faithful prisoner within the limits of said liberties until he shall be lawfully discharged; now therefore, if the said Curtis Finch, when admitted to said liberties, shall remain a faithful prisoner within the liberties of the jail aforesaid until he shall be lawfully discharged from said jail and the liberties thereof, then the above obligation shall be void, otherwise to remain in full force; as by said bond or writing obligatory ready in court to be shown, appears. And the plaintiff says that afterwards, and by reason of the execution of said bond, to wit, on the same day, he, as sheriff of said county, allowed the said Curtis Finch the liberties of said jail, and that the said Curtis Finch was thereafter admitted to, and had and enjoyed, the liberties of said limits without any hindrance by the plaintiff or any other person, yet the plaintiff says that the said Curtis Finch did not thereafter remain a faithful prisoner within the liberties of said jail until he was discharged by law therefrom, but did afterwards, to wit, on or about the 30th day of March, 1867, escape from and leave the said jail, and the liberties thereof, contrary to law, and has ever since neglected to return to said jail, or the said liberties thereof, but has ever since remained at large and out of the custody of the plaintiff, as such sheriff, and keeper of said jail, and cannot now be found. By means whereof the plaintiff became liable to pay the said Charles Albin said damages and costs, with the costs of keeping the said Curtis Finch in said jail during all the time aforesaid, amounting in all to the sum of three hundred dollars, or thereabouts, (and being so liable the plaintiff afterwards, to wit, on the same day, paid the same to the said Charles Albin,) whereby an action has accrued to the plaintiff to demand and recover of the defendants the said sum of three hundred and twenty dollars; yet the defendants have never paid the same, or any part thereof, though often thereto requested, but have hitherto wholly neg-r lected and refused, and still do neglect and refuse, to pay the same or any part thereof, to the plaintiff; to the damage of the plaintiff the sum of five hundred dollars, to recover which, with just costs, the plaintiff brings this suit.”</p> <p>The defendants pleaded the general issue, and also specially, first, performance of the condition of the bond, and secondly, a voluntary escape.</p> <p>On the trial the plaintiff offered in evidence the execution described in the declaration, with the officer’s return of service endorsed thereon» The return was as follows: “Fairfield County ss. Norwalk, January 24th, 1867. Then by virtue hereof, on the 20th day of said January, I made demand of Joseph Moore, Charles Finch, and Samuel Smith, and on the 22d day of said January I made demand of Henry Finch, and on the 24th day of said January I made demand of Curtis Finch, of each and all of the several sums due hereon, and I called on all and each to turn out property, but each one and all of them neglected and refused to turn out any property to satisfy this execution. And I arrested the body of Curtis Finch, one of the defendants herein, and conveyed him to the gaol in Bridgeport, and delivered him into the custody of the keeper thereof, and left with the keeper a true and attested copy of this execution, and of my endorsement made thereon. Attest, Harvey Fitch, Sheriff’s Deputy.” This return was the only evidence offered of what was done by the officer until the delivery of the debtor to the gaoler in prison. It did not appear that the officer knew of any property belonging to Curtis Finch, or that he was the owner of any property whatever. The defendants, therefore, requested the court to charge the jury, that if they did not find from the evidence that the officer made some effort to find personal estate with which to satisfy the execution, besides merely demanding payment of the execution, and demanding of the debtors property whereon to levy the same, then the arrest of Curtis Finch was illegal, his commitment to prison and detention there wrongful, and the bond given by the defendants void, and that the plaintiff was not entitled to recover. The court did not so charge the jury, but did charge in this part of the case, that the return of the officer endorsed on the execution was primé facie evidence of what he did with the execution ; and that if the officer made demand upon the debtors of payment of the execution, and payment was refused, and he then made demand of property whereon to levy to satisfy the execution, and none was shown him by the debtors, and the officer knew of none whereon to levy, he might arrest the body of the debtor.</p> <p>The plaintiff also offered evidence tending to prove that Curtis Finch was, on the 26th of January, 1867, committed to and received within the common goal in Bridgeport by the plaintiff, and confined therein by him, until permitted to go out of the same as hereinafter mentioned; that while so confined in the goal he applied to the plaintiff to be permitted to enjoy the liberties of the goal upon executing to the plaintiff a bond with a sufficient surety conditioned to remain a faithful prisoner within the limits of the liberties till lawfully discharged therefrom, which permission the plaintiff then promised to give him upon the delivery of such a bond ; that the defendants thereupon executed and delivered to the plaintiff the bond described in the declaration, and which was accepted by the plaintiff; that thereupon the plaintiff, on the 29th of January, 1867, permitted Finch to go out of the gaol, and enjoy the liberties thereof,until the 8d of March, 1867, when he departed from the liberties, and returned to his house beyond the liberties, where he remained till the commencement of the present suit. And the' plaintiff upon these’ facts claimed to recover the damages and costs mentioned in the execution, with interest thereon.</p> <p>The defendants offered^ evidence- tending to prove, and claimed they had proved, ■ that after the commitment of Finch to the goal, and while confined therein, and before the execution of the bond, the goaler, Wakeman Wells, appointed by the plaintiff, let him come to the court house in Bridgeport, at his, Finch’s request, from the gaol, for the purpose of filing a motion to open the original case, he, Wells, accompanying him to the court house, and remaining with him and returning with him to the gaol. The only evidence that Finch went to the court house, as above stated, before the execution of the bond, was that of Finch himself, who testified that it was one week, more or less, after his commitment to the jail, but before the bond was executed. Wells was unable to fix upon the time, and the plaintiff claimed to have impeached the character of Finch. The defendants thereupon claimed, and requested the court to charge the jury, that if the jury should find that the gaoler Wells, while Finch was confined within the gaol, and before he was admitted to the liberties of the gaol, permitted him to leave the gaol and go to the court house, although the goaler accompanied him there, that act constituted a voluntary escape 'on the part of the plaintiff, and that the bond given by the defendants after that time to procure his liberty was void, and that the plaintiff was not entitled to recover. The court did not so charge the jury, but charged them that allowing Finch, at his request, to go to the court house, in the custody of the goaler, to enable him to file his motion, as above stated, would not be a voluntary escape.</p> <p>No evidence was offered on the trial conducing to prove any demand or request made of the defendants, or either of them, before the commencement of the present suit, to pay the money which was payable by the bond. On this part of the case the defendants requested the court to charge the jury that, to entitle the plaintiff to recover, it was necessary that the plaintiff should have proved all the material allegations in his declaration; and that the allegation that the money was “ to bo paid in a reasonable time when thereto requested” was a material allegation; and that if the jury did not find that a request was made of the defendants, or at least of one of them, to pay the money mentioned in the bond, before the service of the writ, and that a reasonable time thereafter had elapsed for payment, the plaintiff could not recover. The court did not so charge the jury, but charged them that it was necessary that all the material allegations in the declaration should bo proved, but that it was not necessary to aver a demand or request made, nor if averred was it necessary to prove it.</p> <p>The defendants farther requested the court to charge the • jury that the reasonable time mentioned in the declaration did not begin to run till a demand was made on one or both of the defendants. The court did not so charge the jury. They further requested the court to inform the jury what constituted a reasonable time in this case. The court did not instruct the jury upon the point.</p> <p>The defendants introduced evidence to prove, and it was not denied by the plaintiff, that after the delivery of the bond to the plaintiff and his acceptance thereof, and the release of Finch from the gaol, the gaoler Wells required, and he considered it to be his duty to require, Finch to return to the goal every night at 8 o’clock, and to be locked in the gaol until morning, and did so confine him every night from the 29th of January, 1867, to the 3d day of March, 1867j excepting one night, when he did not return until 11 o’clock, and that Finch would not have so returned to and submitted to such confinement in the prison if he had not been requested so to do by the gaoler. There was no evidence that the plaintiff was dissatisfied with the bond, or required additional security, or that the debtor had at any time departed beyond the liberties after the bond was given, before the 30th of March. The defendants thereupon requested the court to charge the jury that such confinement by the gaoler was illegal, and that on tins ground the plaintiff could not recover. The court declined so to charge.</p> <p>The jury having returned a verdict for the plaintiff the defendants moved for a new trial for errors in the rulings and charge of the court and in the refusal to instruct the jury as requested. They also filed a motion in arrest of judgment, which being overruled, they filed a motion in error. The errors assigned in the latter motion sufficiently appear from the brief of the defendants’ counsel.</p>

<p>Teespass for injuries done by the defendant’s dog to the plaintiff, a minor who sued by his father and natural guardian ; brought to the Superior Court in Fairfield county, and tried to the jury on the general issue before Sanford, J.</p> <p>On the trial the plaintiff claimed to have proved by the testimony of himself and one Wielbacker, that while passing along a public street in Bridgeport, on his way to his father’s house, being then a child of eight years of age, he saw a large dog belonging to the defendant loose in the street, and a number of boys' engaged in throwing stones before the dog for the purpose of having him run after them and bring them back ; that while the dog was waiting and watching for the stones to be thrown, the plaintiff, playfully and without apprehending any danger, put his arms around the neck of the dog to hold him back; that the dog instantly turned, seized the plaintiff and bit his face severely; that the dog, at the time, was kept for the defendant by one Mitskey, a keeper of a saloon near by, who some time before the trial went to Europe, and in whose hands, several months before, the defendant had left the dog for the purpose of having him kept for him. The plaintiff offered his father to testify that immediately after the plaintiff was bitten the father applied to Mitskey, who, it was admitted, was then in possession of the dog, to learn of him who was the owner of the dog, and that Mitskey made answer tliat he did not own him. The plaintiff then enquired of the witness what induced him to go and see Fredericks the defendant. He jmswered that Mitskey told him that Fredericks owned the dog when the mischief was done. To both of these answers the defendant objected, and the court excluded them.</p> <p>On the cross-examination of Wielbacker the defendant enquired of him whether lie had not said that the dog was not to blame. To this the plaintiff objected, but the court overruled the objection; and the witness, answered, that he had not said that the dog was not to blame.</p> <p>The plaintiff introduced his mother, Sarah Burns, to testify to his condition after the injury. On cross-examination the defendant asked her whether Wielbacker told her on the night following the accident that the dog was dot to blame ; also whether the plaintiff did not tell her that the dog was not to blame. To both of these questions the plaintiff objected; but “the court overruled the objections and allowed the enquiries.</p> <p>The defendant, for the purpose of contradicting the testimony of Wielbacker, offered evidence that the latter, on the night following the accident, said that the dog was not to blame. To this the plaintiff objected, on the ground that it only contradicted the witness in a matter of judgment, and that it was irrelevant; but the court admitted it. The defendant also offered evidence that Sarah Burns said that she knew that the dog was not to blame for what he had done; to which the plaintiff objected, but the court admitted it.</p> <p>The defendant, having offered evidence to prove that the dog was the property of Mitskey, also testified that on the morning after the injury Mitskey told him that he knew that he had bought the dog of the defendant, but that he would not have him now, and would kick him out of doors on account of the occurrence. To the admission of this evidence the plaintiff objected, but the court admitted it. But the defendant offered the evidence, and the court admitted it, solely to explain the fact, which the defendant did not deny, that he took the dog away with him on the morning after the accident, and immediately after the last mentioned conversation with Mitskey, and had never thereafter collected or attempted to collect any pay for him of Mitskey.</p> <p>The jury having returned a verdict for the defendant, the plaintiff moved for a new trial for error in the rulings and charge of the court. The part of the charge objected to was stated by the plaintiff in his motion only as follows: — “ The court charged the jury, among other things, that the statute provided that any dog should be presumed to be owned by the owner or occupier of the premises on which such dog should be kept or harbored.”</p>

<p>The act of 1866 (Ch. 74, sec. 4,) which gives a right of appeal from any judgment rendered by a justice of the peace for more than five dollars, except upon the verdict of a jury, is repealed by implication by the act of 1868, (Ch. 99, sec. 2,) which provided that such appeals shall bo allowed where the matter in demand exceeds fifteen dollars.</p>

<p>Assumpsit, to recover a reward offered by the defendant for the recovery of stolen property, with the common counts; appealed by the defendant from a justice of the peace to the Superior Court, and tried to the jury on the general issue, with notice of an accord and satisfaction, before Sanford, J.</p> <p>The evidence introduced by the plaintiff, (omitting some immaterial parts,) was as follows:</p> <p>Robert S. Marvin. Am the plaintiff. Reside in Bridge-' port, and did in 1867. I received there the following despatch, May 6,1867, between nine and half-past nine in the morning: “ To Chief of Police: Horse and carriage stolen. Horse sis years old, bright bay, left hind foot white ; interferes ; top bos buggy, side curtains, patent hubs. Merritt Treat.” Envelope was directed to chief of police. I had orders to open despatches that came while I was on duty. I went to the west side of the depot and asked the hackmen if they had heard of any such horse and carriage, and they said they had not. I went to the Atlantic stables and enquired. The hostler did not know. I went back to the depot. Soon after I saw Mr. Edwards. He said he believed there was such a horse and carriage over in East Bridgeport. I asked him to hitch up his team and drive me over there. He did so and took me to John White’s place. I asked White if he had a horse and carriage in his stable which did not belong to him. He said lie liad. I told him I would like to see it. He went with me to the stable and Edwards with us. .He opened the door and vre w'ent in and saw the horse and carriage. I took out the despatch and read it to them. Horse and carriage < answered the description. I told White it was stolen property and I wanted it. I asked him where he found it. He said he found it hitched to a tree near his place, and that he-supposed it was some doctor’s team and after letting it stand' there some little time he thought he would put it into his; barn. I asked him how much his bill would be for what he - had done. He said ho thought about $5. I told him I would see before it left my possession that he should have it. Told-him we would hitch up and I would take it over to town. We-did so. I got in and drove into the street. Had driven a-few rods when White called to me. I ’stopped. He said “ I-am going over to town; I’ll ride with you.” I said “AH' right, get in.” He got in and we drove to Edwards’s stable.White got out and went away. I asked the hostler to take-care of the horse. I jumped out of the carriage. Don’t know whether White was there or not. I did not see him-. I said to the hostler, “ It is stolen property, keep it till I call for it. Let no man take it without my order.” I then telegraphed to Treat that I had his horse and carriage and to come down on the train. I saw Edwards half an hour after- and told him I had put the horse in his stable, and not to-let any one have it till I called for it. Edwards was proprietor* of the stable. I went about my business. In the afternoom at 3 o’clock I met Treat, the defendant, and his brother-in-law, near the Atlantic Hotel. Treat said, “Have you a horse and carriage which belongs to me?” I told him I had, and if he would come to the stable I would show it to him. We went into the carriage house and showed him the carriage. He said it was his. Then into the stable; and he said the horse was his. He told how the horse was stolen; talked half an hour. Missed his lap robe. Edwards’s driver had the lap robe. Treat said he would give me $25 if I would catch the thief and he was convicted. I told him to leave the robe and I would do what I could towards catching him. I said any time you are ready for your horse- and carriage I’ll have it hitched up for you. He said that he was ready. I told the hostler to hitch it up. I asked Mr. Edwards if his bill was settled. He said yes. I then said to Treat, “ Here is Mr. White, he has a claim for $5. He put him in his barn, and I told him he should have his money before the horse went away.” White said, “ Mr. Treat has already settled with me.” I then said, “ Your claim is satisfied is it ?” He said, “Yes.” Treat turned away and handed me some money rolled up. 1 did not know how much was in the roll when he handed it to me. The amount was $2.00. He said, “ Mr. Marvin, here is something towards what you have done, ■and if you will catch the thief I will give you $25.” ' I told diim I should do all I could. They drove away. I had never seen the published handbill at that time. I didn’t see it that day. I heard, of it that evening, not far from five o’clock. That was the first I had heard of the $50 reward. Treat had been gone two hours when I heard of it. This is the handbill: “ $75 REWARD. Stolen on the evening of May 5th, from the subscriber, a horse, top buggy, robe and blanket. The .horse is six years old, bright bay, black mane and tail, small star in the forehead, left hind foot white, a spot on the inside of left hind leg with hair off, weight about 1,000 pounds; top buggy, square body, patent hubs, side curtains. $50 will be paid for the recovery of tjie property, and $25 for the detection of the thief. Orange, Ct., May 6th, 1867. Merritt JS. Treat.” I afterwards demanded the $50 reward of Treat. It was that same week I recovered the property. Payment was refused. The $25 for the detection and conviction of the thief was afterwards paid, ^he value of the horse and carriage was $500. I rendered the service in expectation of a reward.</p> <p>Gross-examined. I was on duty as policeman on that day. I commenced not far from seven o’clock A. M. I stopped at quarter to six at night. Was on duty at the time I received the despatch and continued so during the day. My duty was to look out for disturbances, arrest thieves, &c. Continued on duty as policeman during the day and was paid therefor by the city. I got the despatch between nine and half-past nine. "White told me he had been over into town. Don’t know as he told me for what. After I came to town, he told me he had advertised. Don’t know whether he did before or not. Don’t know as he said he had been to the livery stables to give notice. Think he did tell me so at some time. Don’t know but he said he had to pay something to the newspapers, when he said he wanted $5. White did not object to giving up the horse and carriage. He said he thought it could remain there as well as to be taken to town. I told him I could take it to town, and he should receive his money.. He was satisfied. He rode over with me. Didn’t see Treat pay White. Treat offered $25 for the thief and I afterwards got it. I did not find the robe with the carriage. Never found it until Treat came there. I can’t say as I found it then. Treat left it with me to enable me to catch the thief. The telegram was paid which I opened. I probably didn’t pay the one I sent. Can’t say who paid Edwards for carrying me to East Bridgeport. Didn’t tell me he would pay any more. He said here is something for what you have done. Didn’t intimate to him that I wanted any more. I didn’t ask Treat if any reward had been offered. Don’t think White or I talked about a reward.</p> <p>Horatio N. Sherman. Lived in Derby in 1867. Was constable of the town. I saw a handbill like this on the 6th day of May, 1867, about nine o’clock in the morning. Treat gave me the handbill.</p> <p>Edwin Edwards. Keep the Atlantic stables, Bridgeport. -Saw Marvin, May 6th, 1867, at my place with a despatch from Derby stating that a horse and buggy had been stolen. Told him 1 thought I knew where they were; that White had been to my place that morning aiid said he had taken up a horse and buggy; that he wished to know if I knew of any one who had lost one, and was going to the papers to advertise. I told Marvin I thought this was the team he was • looking for, and that we would go over and see. We went over and found the horse and buggy in White’s barn. Marvin stated to White in substance that he had a despatch from Derby that a horse and buggy had been stolen there, and that he wished to get it. We looked at it and. concluded it was the one the despatch called for. White wished to know why it would not be as well to leave it in his barn as to take it away. Marvin said they had telegraphed him to secure the property. There was some talk; finally White told Marvin as he was a policeman he should let him take it. They took him out, hitched up, and Marvin got in and drove away. White hailed him and said he was going to town and would ride with him. He stopped; White got in and they went off together. Marvin had the reins. In the barn White said, I don’t know but there is some reward offered for this. Marvin said lie thought not; you can read the despatch for yourself; there is nothing said about it'in that. Marvin asked White what his bill would be, and he said $5. He said he would see that he had it. I wasn’t at my stable when they got there. I got there in a short time. Marvin put the horse in my charge and told me to let no one have it without orders from him. Treat, the defendant, came to my stable with another gentleman. Marvin gave orders to. have the horse hitched up, and asked me if Treat had paid me. I said, “ Yes.” I charged $1.50.</p> <p>The plaintiff here rested his case, and the defendant moved for a non-suit, which the court granted. The plaintiff then filed a motion to set aside the 11011-suit, which being denied he brought the record before this court by motion i-n error.</p>

The court granted a peremptory mandamus, and the respondent moved for a new trial and also filed a motion in error. The facts are sufficiently stated in the opinion. Sundry facts were found, and points made in the argument, that become unimportant in the view of the case taken by the court.

Petition for an injunction, brought to tlie Superior Court in Fairfield County.

<p>Trespass qu. el. fr., appealed from a justice of the peace, and tried to the jury, in the Court of Common Pleas in New Haven county, on the general issue with notice, before Bronson, J.</p> <p>The trespass was committed by three horses of the defendant in a close of the plaintiff, into which they escaped from a contiguous close of the defendant. It was proved that the horses got in over a part of the division fence which it was the duty of the plaintiff to maintain; and the defendant claimed that this part of the fence was less in height than a lawful fence of four and a half feet!</p> <p>The plaintiff offered evidence to prove that when he found the horses in his close he drove out two of them and put up the fence; that the other horse followed after and jumped over the divisional fence into the defendant’s close; and that the fence, where the horse jumped over, was four feet six and one half inches high, and that the horse in making the leap jumped at least eighteen inches above the fence. To this evidence the defendant objected, on the ground that proof that the horse was unruly at that time was inadmissible, as the trespass had already been committed; but the court admitted it.</p> <p>The plaintiff further offered evidence to prove that the horses of the defendant were accustomed to jump over common rail fences, less in height than lawful fences. To this evidence the defendant objected, and claimed that the term “ ordinary fences” as used in the statute (Gen. Statutes, page 446, sec. 12,) means the different kinds of lawful fences; but the court did not so rule, but permitted the plaintiff to prove that the horses were accustomed to get over ordinary fences, which he ruled might be less in height than lawful fences, and that the word “ ordinary,” as used in the statute referred to, does not mean the different kinds of lawful fences, but is to be taken in its usual sense.</p> <p>The defendant requested the judge to charge the jury, — 1. That the law was so that in order to prove that the horses were unruly at the time of the alleged trespass, it must be proved that they were accustomed, of their own free will, to jump over ordinary lawful fences. 2. That the burden of proof was on the plaintiff to show that at the time they committed this trespass they were unruly, and that the word “ unruly,” as used in the statute, as applicable to cattle, means those that will not be restrained by ordinary lawful fences. 3. That the word “ ordinary,” in qualification of the word “ fences” in the statute, means the different kinds of lawful fences.</p> <p>The court refused to charge the jury as requested, except that the burden of proof was upon the plaintiff to prove the horses unruly.</p> <p>The jury rendered a verdict for the plaintiff; and the defendant moved for a new trial, for error in the rulings and charge of the court.</p>

<p>Assumpsit, on a bank check given to the plaintiff by the defendants, brought originally before a justice of the peace, and appealed to the Court of Common Pleas of New Haven county, and tried on the general issue with notice, closed to the court, before Bronson, J. The court found the following facts.</p> <p>The check was given by the defendants to the plaintiff for forty-seven barrels of potatoes and four barrels of onions, sold by the plaintiff to the defendants, and bought and received by them after an examination and inspection of them to their satisfaction. The potatoes were sold on a warranty of their soundness and quality by the plaintiff, which warranty was broken ; but there was no fraud on the part of the plaintiff, and no agreement that the goods might be returned in case the warranty proved untrue.</p> <p>The plaintiff used the check in his business, but when it came to the bank the defendants stopped the payment of it.</p> <p>The potatoes were delivered in warm weather, and on the day after the purchase were found to be inferior in quality and decaying; and the defendants thereupon notified the plaintiff of their .condition, and that they should not receive them, and offered to return them, which offer he declined. The potatoes continued to decay rapidly down to the time when they were disposed of by the defendants, the whole amount realized by them from the sale of the potatoes and the onions being $36.</p> <p>The plaintiff claimed that the defendants, having bought and received the goods on a warranty, had no right to tender them back, and could rely upon the warranty only for the deficiency in the value of the same at the time of the purchase. The defendants claimed that if the potatoes did not answer the warranty they were not bound to keep or pay for any of them, but might tender them back to the plaintiff, and that after notice of such refusal to keep them they were at the risk of the vendor. The court ruled that the defendants had no right to return the potatoes,'and that during the time they were kept by them they were at their risk, and gave judgment for the plaintiff.</p> <p>The defendants brought the record before this court by a motion in error.</p>

<p>Trespass on the case, for the obstruction of a way claimed by the plaintiffs over the land of the defendant; brought to the Court of Common Pleas of New Haven county and tried to the jury, on the general issue with notice, before Bronson, J.</p> <p>On the trial the plaintiffs claimed, and offered evidence to prove, that they were a voluntary association, located in Madison, and owning a fish house, fish place, seine and reel, and other fishing apparatus, at Bradley’s fish place, on Madison harbor, and had been engaged in the fishing business there for sixty years, and had been accustomed to use the way described in their declaration, in the manner therein alleged, since the year 1825, and, to ■ some extent, since they first engaged in business, and from a time beyond the memory of the oldest witness present; and that they had a right to use the way perpetually, by prescription, or local custom, or both.</p> <p>It was conceded that the company had, during all the time of its existence, been made up of a succession of persons, without corporate powers, as from time to time the interest of the members changed by sale, transfer or distribution, the interests being treated as personal estate; that the interests of the owners varied from time to time in amount, as some went out and others came in, and sales of different fractional interests were made, some members owning at certain times as high as a quarter interest, and others as low as a sixteenth interest; that five persons started the business, all of whom were now dead, and whose interests wore now owned by seven different parties ; that at first Ambrose Dudley, of Madison, had an interest in the company, and continued to hold that interest up to the time of his decease in 1835, and during the whole period of his ownership was an active member of the company; that during all that period and until his death he owned and occupied the land on which the right of way is claimed by the plaintiffs, and used the way to cart fish on to his own land ; that Gilbert B. Dudley, the son of Ambrose Dudley, upon the death of Ambrose, inherited his father’s interest in the company, as well as his father’s interest in the land over which the right of way is claimed, and became, immediately upon his father’s death, an active member of the company, and went immediately into the occupation of the land, and continued his occupation and ownership of the land, and of his interest in the company, until his own death, in 1865, and used the way, as his father did, to cart fish upon the land over which the way passed; that upon the death of Gilbert B. Dudley, the present defendant, his brother, became the owner in fee and the occupant of the land, and has so continued to the present time; that the defendant has never been an owner or a member of the company, and from the time that he came into the possession and ownership of the land has forbidden any travel by the plaintiffs over the land; and that if the plaintiffs have used the way over the land since his ownership thereof, it has been done contrary to his will and against his remonstrances.</p> <p>The defendant claimed, and offered evidence to prove, that for many years after the company commenced business, their travel for fish was not over any part of the Dudley land, but over another and different route, diverging, when it came to the Dudley land, over and through the Meigs land, so called, to the highway, (called the Meigs route,) and that no fish were carried over the Dudley land prior to the year 1825, and that about that time, owing to some change in the Meigs route, the fish and the travel of the company came over the Dudley land, to a considerable extent to the highway, and that that route had. been since used, as the defendant claimed to have proved, by the license and permission of Ambrose Dudley, while he was both the owner of the land and an active member of the company, and after him by Gilbert B. Dudley, while he was owner of the land and member of the company, for carting the greater part of the fish to the highway, until the use was stopped and all license to use the land as a fish route revoked by the defendant, immediately after he came into possession of the land.</p> <p>The plaintiffs, in support of their declaration, offered Taleott Bradley as a witness, and proposed to prove by him “ a general use of the Dudley route by all parties, at all times and for all purposes, by the public.” To the admission of this evidence the defendant objected, and the court excluded the same*</p> <p>The defendant offered evidence to prove that Gilbert B. Dudley owned, for from twelve to fifteen years, mostly during the same time that he owned in the Bradley Eisli Company, an interest in another fish company called the “ Divers Fish Company,” whose place of fishing was adjacent to Bradley’s fishing place, and that during the period of his ownership in the Divers company, he permitted the fish caught by that company to be carted over other lands of his, to a point in the way in question where the same strikes the land in question, and thence over that part of the way which passes over the Dudley land to the highway ; and that upon his ceasing to be a member of the Divers company he prohibited that company from the fui'ther use of the way from the Divers fishing place to the highway, but continued to permit and license Bradley’s Fish Company to use the way in question, as they theretofore had done. To this evidence the plaintiffs objected, but the court admitted it.</p> <p>The plaintiffs asked the court to charge the jury “ that a continuous and open use of a way for fifteen years, unexplained, is presumed to be under a claim of right and adverse.” The court refused to give the instruction requested, but told the jury that “ the doctrine of adverse possession is to be taken strictly; that such a possession is not to be made out by inference, but by clear and positive proof; and that every presumption is in favor of possession and use in subordination to the title of the true owner.”</p> <p>The court further charged the jury, that if they should find that Ambrose Dudley owned the land over which the way was claimed, from the earliest commencement of Bradley’s Fish Company to the time of his death in 1885, and that he was also dui'ing the same period an owner in and an active member of the fish company; and if they should also find that Gilbert B. Dudley, his son, succeeded him in ownership both of the land and of the share of the fish company, then that, as matter of law, the use of the plaintiffs could not be adverse, and that they should return a verdict accordingly.</p> <p>The jury having returned a verdict for the defendant, the plaintiffs moved for a new trial.</p>

Replevin for a back attached by the defendants in the hands of the plaintiff as the property of one Barrows; brought to the Superior Court in New Haven County, and tried on an avowry of the defendants, the issue being closed to the court, before Sanford, J. The court found the following facts :— . The hack mentioned in the plaintiff’s writ was, in February 1867, the property of Sherman A. Barrows, who at that time was the owner and keeper of a livery stable in New Haven.

The first of these cases was an application by the State Attorney for New Haven County for a mandamus to compel the respondents, a railroad company, to stop their trains at a certain station on the road, and the other an application by sundry citizens, under a statute of the state, to a judge of the Supreme Court, for an order to the same effect.

General assumpsit, for money paid; brought to the Superior Court in New Haven County.

Replevin, brought to the Superior Court in Litchfield. County.

Coe, assigning debtor, before the payment of other claims allowed by the commissioners; taken to the Superior Court in Litchfield county and tried before Minor, J. The decree was passed upon the petition of David W. Coe and others, who had presented claims to the commissioners on the insolvent estate mentioned, and whose claims had been allowed and reported by the commissioners with other claims against the estate as general claims, no facts being reported by the…

Action on the statute concerning highways and bridges, to recover damages for the loss of the plaintiff’s horse and injury to lier wagon, by reason of the negligence of the defendants in not maintaining a railing upon a bridge and the highway adjacent to it, which were a part of a public highway of the town. The case is sufficiently stated in the opinion.

Assumpsit -upon a promissory note of tlie defendant, by the plaintiff as indorsee ; brought to the Superior Court in Litchfield county. The following facts were found by an auditor to whom the case was referred.

Assumpsit, tried to the jury in the Superior Court in Litchfield County, before Phelps, J. On the trial the defendant offered the deposition of one Polly A. Cox, to the admission of which the plaintiff objected on the ground that it was taken before and drawn by William Burke, a justice of the peace, and then the law partner of Mr. Knapp, who was at that time the attorney for the defendant in the present cause and acting counsel for him on the trial; which was conceded to be…

Assumpsit for -work and labor, brought to the Superior Court in Litchfield County. The case was referred to an auditor, who found the issue for the defendant. The plaintiff remonstrated against the acceptance of the report. The defendant demurred to the remonstrance, and the court reserved the case for the advice of this court. The facts are sufficiently stated in the opinion.

Assumpsit, brought to the Superior Court in Litchfield County, and tried on the general issue, closed to the court, before Granger, J. The court found the following facts:— At a town meeting of the defendant town, legally holden on the 5th day of October, 1863, the following vote was passed: “ Voted. — That all those persons that have been drafted and accepted, and either go to the war or furnish a substitute to go, shall receive from the town $300, or. less, according to…

Bill in equity, praying for tlie setting aside of an injunction issued by tlie Superior Court against tlie payment by the respondent town of certain bounties voted to drafted men, and that the respondents be ordered to pay a certain bounty to which the petitioner claimed to be entitled; brought to the Superior Court in Litchfield county.

Petition for an injunction against the cutting down of a tree by the respondent on land claimed by the petitioner; brought to the Superior Court, and tried before Minor, J. The court found the facts and granted a perpetual injunction, and the respondent brought the record before this court by a motion in error. The case is fully stated in the opinion.

Trover for sundry articles of machinery; brought to ihe Superior Court in Hartford County, and tried on the general issue closed to the court, before Sanford, J. The court found the following facts: In the summer of 1863 the defendants were building a gristmill in the town of Wethersfield.

Petition in equity by trustees under the will of John G. Mix, for advice as to the proper construction of the will; brought to the Superior Court in Hartford County. The provisions of the will important to the case were as follows: “ First.

Bill in equity for an injunction; - brought to the Superior Court in Hartford County, and reserved, on facts found, for the advice of this court. The case is sufficiently stated in the opinion.

Assumpsit against the defendants, as partners under the name of H. O. Andrews, upon sundry notes executed in that name, with the common counts; brought to the Superior Court in New Haven County. The following facts were found by a committee. The defendants were Henry O. Andrews, Jared H. Can-field and Hiram Hutchinson. Hutchinson resided out of the state and no service was made upon him. Canfield alone appeared and made defence.

Assumpsit against the defendants, in one count as common carriers and in another as warehousemen, for two bales of cotton ; brought to the Superior Court in Middlesex County, and tried on the general issue, with notice, closed to the court, before Phelps, J. The following facts were found hy the court.

Bill in equity for an injunction against tlie use of a name by the respondents, both parties being joint stock corporations ; brought to the Superior Court in New Haven County. The court found the following facts. The petitioners were organized under the joint stock laws of this state, by the name of “ Holmes, Booth & Haydens,” in the year 1858, for the purpose of manufacturing and dealing in brass and other metal goods.

Action on the statute concerning highways and bridges, to recover for damages sustained through a defect in the highway of the defendant town; brought to the Court of Common Pleas for New Haven county, and tried to the jury, on the general issue, before Bronson, J. The declaration contained two counts, the second of which was as follows :— That heretofore, to wit on the first day of March, 1869, there was existing in the town of Derby a certain highway running from the…

Petition for a new trial, brought to the City Court of the city of New Haven. The petition was dismissed by the court, and the petitioner filed a motion in error and also moved for a new trial. The principles of law decided&by the court will be sufficiently understood without a statement of the facts of the case.

Bill in equity to charge the separate property of the respondent Leonora Thorman, the wife of the other respondent, with the payment of a bill for work upon a store of which she was lessee and occupant; brought to the Superior Court in New Haven County. The following facts were found by a committee.

Writ op error to tlie Superior Court in New Haven county, from tlie judgment of two justices of the peace, upon proceedings for the seizure, condemnation and confiscation of a vessel taking oysters in violation of the act concerning fisheries; reserved for the advice of this court. The case is sufficiently stated in the opinion.

Bill in equity to set aside a decree, and for an account and an injunction; brought to the Superior Court in New Haven county. The petitioners were Joseph Sheldon, administrator of the estate of William E. Bradley, and Maria L. Bradley, widow of the intestate; the respondents were Stephen P. Bradley, James Baldwin, Clark R. Shelton, and Elizabeth B. Shelton, his wife.

Assumpsit, brought to the Superior Court in New Haven county, at its May Term, 1865. At the May Term 1869 the defendant pleaded a discharge in bankruptcy obtained upon proceedings instituted by him on the 26th day of February, 1868.

Bill in equity, brought to the Superior Court in Fairfield County, and reserved on facts found for the advice of this court. The case is sufficiently stated in the opinion.

Assumpsit, brought to the Superior Court in Fairfield County, and tried on the general issue with notice, closed to the court, before Minor, J. The plaintiffs sued as executors of Aaron Turner. Judgment was rendered for the defendant ■ and the plaintiffs moved for a new trial. The case is sufficiently stated in the opinion.

■ Two informations by the attorney for the state in Eairfielcl County, one for theft and the other for breaking jail; brought to the Superior Court in Fairfield county, and tried to the jury upon pleas of not guilty before Minor, J. On the trial the counsel for the prisoner claimed that if the jury entertained a reasonable doubt of the guilt of the prisoner it was their duty to acquit him, and requested the court so to charge.

. Appeal from a decree of a court of probate dismissing a petition for the appointment of a conservator over the person and estate of one Rebecca Weeks ; taken to the Superior Court in Fairfield county, and heard before Sanford, J. The court affirmed the decree, and the appellant brought the record before this court by a motion in error. The case is sufficiently stated in the opinion.

A new trial having been granted in this case (35 Conn., 437,) it was tried again to the jury in the Superior Court, upon the general issue with notice, before Sanford, J. The defendant in his notice claimed that he was a duly appointed Superintendent of Wharves in the city of Bridgeport, and as such had authority to do the acts complained of in the plaintiff’s declaration.

Assumpsit for rent of leased premises; brought to the Superior Court in Eairfield county, and tried to the jury, on the general issue, before Granger, J. The plaintiff sued as assignee of one Glover, the lessor of the premises, which were situated in the city of New York.

Petition for a foreclosure, brought to the Superior Court in Fairfield county, and reserved, upon facts found by a committee, for the advice of this court. The case is sufficiently stated in the opinion.

Bill in equity, brought to the Superior Court in Fairfield county, and heard before Granger, J. The facts were found by a committee and a decree passed for the petitioners. The respondents brought the record before this court by a motion in error. The principles of law decided will be sufficiently understood without a statement of the facts.

Petition for an injunction against the removal by the respondents of certain structures erected by the petitioner upon certain mud flats which had been reclaimed, which structures were claimed by the respondents to be an obstruction of their right of way; brought to the Superior Court in Fairfield County. The shore land adjacent to the reclaimed flats was formerly owned by Birdsey G-.

Complaint by a grandjuror to a justice of the peace, charging the defendant with maintaining a common nuisance upon a public highway in the town of Stamford by placing a building thereon by which the highway was obstructed; appealed by the defendant to the Superior Court, and tried to the jury, on the plea of not guilty, before Minor, J. Upon the trial the attorney for the state, to prove the existence of the highway in question, offered in evidence a copy of the town…

Amicable submission to the Superior Court in Fairfield county upon an agreed statement of facts. Certain real estate in controversy in the suit belonged in fee in the year 1825 to Samuel Burr, who died in that year leaving all his estate to his three daughters, Lucretia Weeks, Clarissa Ells, and Abigail Nichols.

Trespass qu. cl.fr., brought to the Superior Court in Fair-field County, and tried to the jury, upon the plea of right of way, before Loomis, J. Verdict for the plaintiff, and motion for a new trial by the defendant for error in the admission of evidence.' The case is sufficiently stated in the opinion.

Bill in equity to compel a conveyance of certain -real estate; brought to the Superior Court in Fairfield county. The facts were found hy a committee.

Actions of assumpsit against tlie defendant town to recover bounties voted by the town to volunteers enlisting in the military service of the United States and credited to the quota of the town; brought to the Superior Court in Fairfield County and reserved on facts found by the court for the advice of this court. The case is sufficiently stated in the opinion.

Action on the statute concerning highways and bridges, for an injury sustained by the plaintiff through the alleged defective condition of a sidewalk in the city of Norwich; brought to the Superior… Held: as matter of law, that the highway was not defective within the meaning of the statute, and that the law upon the facts found imported negligence in the plaintiff.

Grandjuror’s complaint to a justice of the peace, for keeping for sale intoxicating and adulterated liquors in violation of the act concerning spirituous liquors, (Gen. Stat., tit. 63, sec. 46 ;) appealed by the defendant to the Superior Court in New London County, and tried to the jury upon the plea of not guilty before Parle, J. The complaint was as follows: “ That on the 7th day of February, 1870, at said town of Stonington, Henry C. Stanton, of said Stonington, did keep…

Complaint under the 22d section of the act relating to spirituous liquors, made to a justice of the peace by three citizens of the town of Groton in New London County, charging that the liquors were kept by one S. W. Burrows for the purpose of selling them in violation of the act.

Action of account, with the common counts in assumpsit, brought to the Superior Court in Windham County. The ease was referred to auditors, who reported in favor of the plaintiffs, and the defendant remonstrated against the acceptance of the report. The court (Foster, J.,~) over-ruled the remonstrance, accepted the report,.and rendered judgment in accordance with it for the plaintiffs, and the defendant moved for a new trial. The case is sufficiently stated in the opinion,

Ejectment, brought to the Superior Court in Windham County, and tried on the general issue, closed to the court, before Carpenter, J. Judgment for the defendants, and motion for a new trial by the plaintiff. The case is sufficiently stated in the opinion.

Bill for a foreclosure, brought to the Superior Court in New London County, and reserved on facts found for the advice of this court. The case is sufficiently stated in the opinion.

Assumpsit for work and labor performed for the defendant by the minor son of the plaintiff; brought before a justice of the peace and appealed by the defendant to the Superior Court in New London County, and tried on the general issue closed to the court before Park, J. Judgment for the plaintiff and motion for a new trial by the defendant. The case is sufficiently stated in the opinion.

Assumpsit on a promissory note, brought to the Superior Court in New London County. The following facts were found by the court. The defendant was convicted on the 15th day of March, 1859, before a justice of the peace of the town of Stonington, upon a grandjuror’s complaint charging him in seven counts with selling intoxicating liquors contrary to law.

Bill in equity for tlie opening of a decree and for an injunction ; brought to the Superior Court in New London County. The respondents were the Norwich Savings Society, Thomas J. Yail, Charles Storrs, and Augustus Storrs. The following facts- were found by the court: On the 28th day of June, 1860, the Curtisville.

Trespass for entering upon tlie plaintiff’s land and removing a fence; brought to the Superior Court in Fairfield County, and tried on the general issue, with notice closed to the court, before Loomis, J. The defendant’s notice set up a right of way by prescription over the land in question, at all times of the year and for all purposes at his pleasure, to and from a tract of land described in the notice, containing about twenty-sis acres.

Action on the statute for the protection of sheep, brought to the Superior Court in Fairfield County, and tried, on the general issue closed to the court, before Pardee, J. Judgment for the plaintiff; motion for a new trial by the defendant. The case is fully stated in the opinion.

Covenant for rent of demised premises, with a count in assumpsit for use and occupation.; brought to the court of Common Pleas of Fairfield County, and tried to the court, upon the general issue with notice, before Brewster, J. The lease was an indenture under seal executed by the plaintiff and defendant, dated April 21st, 1870, by which the plaintiff leased to the defendant a dwelling house in the borough of Stamford for one year from May 1st, 1870, for the yearly rent of…

Trespass on the case, for an injury to the plaintiff’s intestate, resulting in his death, by the neglect of the defendants to remove a nuisance in the public highway ; brought to the Superior Court in Fairfield County.

Amicable submission to the Superior Court upon an agreed statement of facts, rev -¡rved for the advice of this court/ The case is fully sta>' . the opinion.

Assumpsit, brought to the City Court of the city of Bridgeport, and appealed by the defendant, after judgment rendered for the plaintiff, to the Court of Common Pleas for the county of Fairfield. Motion by the plaintiff in that court to erase from the docket, on the ground that an appeal does not lie from the City Court to the Court of Common Pleas. Reserved for the advice of this court.

Assumpsit for goods sold, brought to the Court of Common Pleas of Fairfield County, and tried on the general issue with notice, closed to the court, before Brewster, J. The defense set up in the notice was, that the defendant was, and during all the time covered by the declaration had been, a married woman, one Augustus Rolland being her husband, and that she had hot transacted business of any kind for herself since her marriage.

Trover, for a quantity of manure ; brought before a justice of the peace and appealed by the defendant to the Court of Common Pleas for the county of Fairfield, and tried in that court, on the general issue closed to the court, before Brewster, J. On the trial it was proved that the plaintiff employed two men to gather into heaps, on the evening of April 6th, 1869, some manure that lay scattered along the side of a public-highway, for several rods, in the borough of…

Trover for a quantity of machinery and manufacturing implements; brought to the Superior Court in Fairfield County. The plaintiff sued as trustee in insolvency of the Mill River Woolen Manufacturing Company; the defendants were partners under the name of Harding Brothers & Company and claimed the property under a mortgage of the insolvents made prior to their insolvency.

Assumpsit for the breach of a contract of the defendants to employ the plaintiff in their service, and for services rendered under the contract, with a general count for work and labor; brought to the Superior Court in Fairfield county, and tried on the general issue with notice, closed to the court, before Minor, J. The court found the following facts: The defendants were a legally incorporated company under the laws of the state of New York, with a capital of f300,000, and…

Trover, for a quantity of cloths; brought to the Superior Court in Fairfield County. The plaintiff claimed under a purchase from the Mill River Woolen Manufacturing Company, a corporation; the defendant had taken possession of and claimed the property as trustee in insolvency of the same company. ■ The facts, which were found by a committee, are sufficiently stated in the opinion. The case was reserved upon the facts for the advice of this court.

Assumpsit for goods sold; brought to the Superior Court in Fairfield County, and tried to the jury, on the general issue, before Granger, J. Yerdict for the plaintiffs, and motion for a new trial for error in the rulings and charge of the court. The case is sufficiently stated in the opinion.

<p>The defendant purchased a yoke of oxen of the plaintiff, and soon after delivered to him a negotiable note of a third party, payable at bank to the order of the defendant, not then due. The defendant testified that the plaintiff took it in payment; the plaintiff testified that he took it only to present at the bank and get payment; and there was no other evidence. Both parties were ignorant of the nature of such a note, and it was not endorsed by the defendant and nothing was said about an endorsement. In an action of assumpsit for the price of the oxen, to which the defendant pleaded the general issue with notice of the delivery of the note in payment, the court held that, as matter of law, the burden of proof with regard to the note was on the defendant, and, regarding the evidence as equally balanced, decided that the plaintiff was entitled to recover. Held to be correct.</p> <p>The mere fact that the plaintiff had received the note from the defendant did not make a primd facie case of payment, that fact being consistent with either purpose claimed by the parties.</p> <p>And the non-indorsement of the note by the defendant was not to be regarded as showing that ho did not intend to be holden for its goodness. This, with all the other circumstances attending the transaction, was proper to be considered, but the law would attach no special significance to it.</p> <p>It appeared that when the note became due the maker had property and the note-was collectible, but that the plaintiff took a new note from the maker without the defendant’s knowledge, and that the maker became insolvent before the now note became due. Held that this conduct on the part of the plaintiff was sufficient to discharge the defendant from further liability, even if the first note was not received as payment.</p> <p>Bnt it appeared that the defendant in the court below set up in his notice only that the note was delivered in payment, and did not claim that this conduct of the plaintiff was in itself a defense, but that it changed the burden of proof in respect to the purpose for which the note was received. Held that, while this evidence had some bearing on this question and as such had been considered by the court below, yet that the law gave no special force to it.</p>

<p>Petition for a new trial, brought to the Court of Common Pleas in Fairfield county, and heard before Brewster, J. Petition dismissed and motion in error by the petitioner.* The principles of law decided by the court will be sufficiently understood without a statement of the facts of the case, which would occupy much space.</p>

Assumpsit for money had and received, brought to the Court of Common Pleas of the county of Fairfield, and tried on the general issue, closed to the court, before Brewster, J. Judgment for the plaintiff, and motion for a new trial by the defendant. The case is sufficiently stated in the opinion.

Assumpsit, brought by appeal from a justice to the Court of Common Pleas in Fairfield county, and tried on tlio general issue, with notice closed to the court, before Brewster, J. The… Held: as matter of law, that the plaintiff was entitled to recover under the common counts for the work actually done, and rendered judgment for the plaintiff to recover the sum of $78.60, and his costs. , The defendant moved for a new trial for error in the rulings and judgment of the court.

Petition for an injunction ; brought to the Superior Court in Fairfield County. The following facts were found by a committee.

Trespass de bonis asportatis and trover; brought to the Superior Court for the county of Fairfield and tried to the jury on the general issue, with notice, before Pardee, J. Yerdict for the plaintiff and motion for a new trial by the defendants for error in the rulings and charge of the court, and also on the ground that the verdict was against the evidence. The case is sufficiently stated in the opinion.

<p>Whether, where noxious odors, generated by the defendant in a manufactory car. ried on by him outside of the jurisdiction of this court, are transmitted through the air to the residence of the plaintiff situated within such jurisdiction, and there inflict injury, this court has jurisdiction to arrest the evil, the parties being properly before it: Qucere.</p> <p>Under the patent of Connecticut of March 19th, 1631, known as the Warwick Patent, and the charter of Connecticut of April 23d, 1662, granted by Charles II, and the patent of Charles II to the Duke of York, of March 12th, 1664 upon which three documents the territorial limits and jurisdiction of the col onies of Connecticut and New York rested, the islands lying easterly of the land boundary between the two, and adjacent to the Connecticut shore, are within the jurisdiction of Connecticut.</p> <p>The possession of Connecticut has always been consistent with this view of the documentary title.</p> <p>Although New York has claimed jurisdiction over three islands, called Captain's Islands, lying some ten miles to the westward of Goose Island, a small island v lying about a mile from the shore off Norwalk, Connecticut, yet Connecticut has never conceded such claim, and New York has never claimed jurisdiction over Goose Island.</p> <p>Goose Island is within the territorial limits of Connecticut</p>

Case, for an injury to the plaintiff from falling on ice upon a sidewalk of the defendant city. Tried in the Superior Court for New London'County at its December term, 1871, liolden at Norwich, upon the general issue, closed to the court, before Seymour, J. The case is sufficiently stated in the opinion.