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← 36 FSUPP2D 452 - Liu v. Striuli

Liu v. Striuli’s Empirical Analysis

1999

Citation profile

27
cited by 27 later decisions
2
states following
April 2020
most recently cited

3 federal appellate · 11 district · 3 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 27 later decisions — most recently April 2020 · most notably Douglas Schwenk v. James Hartford (2000), Rathbun v. Autozone, Inc. (2004)

3 federal appellate · 11 district · 3 state decisions

1701999200020102020decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Applies 18 U.S.C. § 16 · 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (§ 901 of the Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972) · 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972) · 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (Class Action Fairness Act of 2005) · 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (§ 40302 of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994) · 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (Civil Rights Act of 1866) · 42 U.S.C. § 1985

Relies on Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. · Celotex Corporation v. Catrett H · Faragher v. City of Boca Raton · Landgraf v. USI Film Products · United States v. Lopez

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 27 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “liability for the harmful acts of employees is not premised on the doctrine of respondeat superior, but on a separate affirmative duty owed by the employer ....”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage
  2. “Vicarious liability also cannot be foisted upon the College through D’Arey’s alleged inaction because he is not an official of the College “with authority to take corrective action to end the discrimination.” Gebser, 118 S.Ct. at 1999 . D’Arcy, as Director of Financial Aid, was not a supervisor of Striuli nor was he an official who had the authority to police relationships between faculty and doctoral students. D’Arcy had no power to discipline or even to question Stri-uli about the relationship. If, as Liu argues, D’Arcy had a duty under the College’s sexual harassment policy to report to the appropriate authority his knowledge of Striuli’s relationship with Liu because it may have violated the prohibition on amorous faculty-student liaisons, this duty was no more than that which every employee of the College had. Such a duty to report information to appropriate authorities is plainly not an “authority to take corrective action” because the report itself could not have ended the discrimination.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage
  3. “(a) All persons within the state, regardless of race, color, religion, sex, disability, age, or country of ancestral origin, shall have, except as is otherwise provided or permitted by law, the same rights to make and enforce contracts ... and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property.... * * * (b) For the purposes of this section, the right to make and enforce contracts ... includes the making, performance, modification and termination of contracts and rights concerning real or personal property, and the enjoyment of all benefits, terms, and conditions of the contractual and other relationships.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.