¶1(dissenting). All members of the court agree that the provisions of the Eaulkner Act (L. 1950, c. 210, as amended; N. J. S. A. 40:69A-1 et seq.) relating to the very important matter of procedural conditions precedent for referendum elections on basic questions, sought by petition of the electorate, are confusing and ambiguous and greatly in need of legislative clarification. Until that happens, a court’s job is to reach an interpretative conclusion which it believes conforms to what the Legislature intended and would have said had it spoken fully and clearly.
¶2One should start, in a case like the one before us, with the common sense assumption that the Legislature intended to treat comparable situations in the same way procedurally, even though the varied language used be somewhat deficient or obscure, unless there appears some unmistakably clear *8verbiage or discernible reason absolutely compelling the conclusion that different treatment was contemplated.
¶3This act deals with only three situations in which the citizenry may start the machinery in motion by petition for consideration of a change in the form of local government. The first relates to an election on the question of whether a commission should be created to study a present charter and make recommendations as to change. (N. J. 8. A. 40:69A— 1); the second, to a referendum on the direct adoption of one of the governmental forms authorized by the act without the preliminary step of a charter commission (N. J. S. A. 40:69A-18, 19 and 20); and the third, here involved, to a referendum on reversion to the prior form of government after adoption and use of one of the Faulkner plans for a period of years (N. J. 8. A. 40:69A-25). Certainly all three situations relate to the same basic type of thing, i. e., the matter of adoption of a new form of government. All are of the same degree of public importance. Uo one has been able to suggest any sound reason why the Legislature would desire that the make-up of the petition and the method for processing it should, as matter of theory or practicality, be any different in the three cases, or why it would want to specify such matters in detail for one situation and make no provision at all in another. Therefore, there is every reason to infer in the present instance that the Legislature would fundamentally intend a common procedural pattern.
¶4Hone of the sections mentioned contains any detailed provision of its own as to the nature or composition of the petition, how, when or by whom its sufficiency shall be determined and certified, or whether and how it may be amended if insufficient. In section 25 the only procedural provision is a limited reference to sections 19 and 20. Section 19 likewise contains no specifications of requirements, but simply refers on this score to subdivision (b) of section 1. The latter in turn expressly rests as to procedural requirements on sections 186 to 188, which contain the only provisions *9in the act about the mechanics of voter petitions and their processing, apart from those relating to the non-comparable situations of nomination of candidates for office and the recall of elected officials.
¶5Sections 186, 187 and 188 are not merely of a general procedural nature, but create and define, both substantively and procedurally, the right of initiative and referendum on local legislation by petition. They go into great detail about the technical composition of petitions, examination and certification as to sufficiency by the municipal clerk, and method of amendment of defects. Included in section 186 with other provisions about the make-up of the petition are requirements that every petition contain a verification of the signatures on “each separate petition paper” by attached affidavit of the circulator thereof and a designation on each paper, by name and address, of five voters called “the Committee of the Petitioners.” This committee is expressly charged as “responsible for the circulation and filing of the petition and for its possible withdrawal as hereinafter provided.” And in the event the clerk rejects the petition or any amendment thereof, he must give notice of the rejection to at least two members of the Committee. There is nothing on the face of any of the detailed provisions, except in one particular to be mentioned, which would not be equally salutary and appropriate with respect to petitions under sections 1, 19 and 25.
¶6And so it seems to me there can be no doubt that the cross-reference language of section 1(b), and therefore also that of section 19, despite some inept verbiage, mean and are intended to have the effect of inserting in those sections, as the procedural provisions thereof, the appropriate language of sections 186 to 188, but with the necessary changes to adapt the same to an election about a charter commission or one relating to the adoption of a new form of government, as the case may be, instead of a referendum to propose approve or reject an ordinance.
¶7*10The only pi’ovision of the incorporated sections which is not appropriate to any petition under sections 1, 19 or 25, is, as the majority points out, the- language in section 186 referring to the responsibility of the Committee of the Petitioners for the withdrawal of the petition “as hereinafter provided” (in section 191). But the cross-reference language of section 1(b) recognizes this inappropriateness and excludes its incorporation thereof by its very language. After stating that a petition shall conform to the requirements of form in sections 186 to 188, it says: “and shall be subject to examination, certification and amendment as therein provided.” The absence of “withdrawal” is pointed and meaningful.
¶8The majority reaches its conclusion that “the Committee of the Petitioners” is not required in a section 1(b) petition (and so not in one under section 19) on the basis that it is not a “requirement of form” and 1(b) only specifies conformity with requirements of that category. In the first place, I must note that the 1(b) reference to the “requirements of form” in sections 186 to 188 is to my mind a reference generally descriptive of the content of those referred to sections rather than, as the majority is compelled to suggest, an indication that the Legislature intended to enact in those sections matters of substance and matters of form to be considered independent of each other. Other than the recital of the powers of the committee, everything in the three sections is matter of form.
¶9The majority reasons that the committee requirement is one of substance because it has power, by reason of the language of section 186, to withdraw a petition. But, as I have just said, the provision for this power is not carried over into section 1(b). And there is no other basis for saying that the requirement for the appearance of the names and addresses of the committee on each petition paper is not merely a matter of form. It is part of what must be on the paper the same as the heading and the signatures. Its designation as the proper recipient of notice of rejection *11is unmistakably procedural. Certainly it'. is at least as formal as the verifying affidavit of the circulator which the majority concedes to be a matter of form and not substance. The sponsors of this petition agree for otherwise they would not have attached circulators’ affidavits. Therefore the names and addresses of the committee must be set forth on each “paper” of a petition filed under sections 1(b) and 19 and must, for the reasons set forth in Lindquist v. Lee, 34 N. J. Super. 576 (Law Div. 1955), be placed thereon before any signatures are appended.
¶10The remaining question is whether a section 25 petition must meet the same requisites as one under sections 1(b) or 19. While it is true that the incorporation language in section 25 is not explicit to that effect as it is in the other two sections, there is a reference to section 19 to ascertain the minimum number of voters’. signatures required and to section 20 to determine the manner of submission of the question to the electorate. If section 25, containing no other procedural provisions, is read without the 1(b) requirements, there would result a mere right to petition for a referendum on a most important question comparable to those submittable under 1(b) and 19 without any mechanics to make it effective. Absent would be any specifications as to whether the signatures need all be appended to one paper; whether the place of residence of each signer must be set forth; whether the signatures must be verified at all and, if so, how and by whom; where the petition should be filed; who is to pass upon its sufficiency, and within what time; how such determination is to be evidenced and given notoriety; and whether, how and when defects can be corrected by amendment. This, of course, is the result that obtains on the view of those members of the majority who hold that section 25 is to operate without any reference to section 1(b) and so without reference to sections 186 to 188 also. It is absolutely inconceivable to me that the Legislature could possibly have intended any such odd result in this one instance. There is no compelling reason not to say that *12there was a legislative oversight in failing to include an explicit incorporation provision in section 25 and that this court must supply it to make the section practically workable and give effect to the legislative purpose.
¶11I would therefore conclude that the petition here is fatally defective for want of the appearance of the names and addresses of “the Committee of the Petitioners” on each petition paper, that the defect is not amendable, that the municipal clerk properly rejected the petition on this ground and that the judgment of the Law Division should accordingly be affirmed.
¶12For reversal and remcmdment—Chief Justice Weintraub, and Justices Jacobs, Prancis, Proctor, Schettino and Hanbman—6.
¶13For affirmance—Justice Hall—1.