In re Halttunen

                                      360

Submitted on the briefs May 19, applicant conditionally admitted to practice of
                          law December 24, 2020


       In the Matter of the Application for Admission of:
               NEIL PATRICK HALTTUNEN,
                           Applicant.
                (BBX A172051) (SC S067161)
                                   

     Applicant admitted that, from 2009 to 2012, he inappropriately had used
the position of trust and authority that he possessed as a police officer to pursue
romantic and sexual relationships with vulnerable women whom he encountered
while performing his official duties. He also admitted that he was dishonest
with his employer about that conduct during an internal investigation. After his
departure from the police department, applicant underwent therapy, through
which he gained insight into his past behaviors and their impact on others and
developed the tools and support network to maintain a successful reformation.
None of the psychological experts who treated or evaluated applicant believed
that he suffers from the kind of fundamental and pervasive personality challenge
that might prevent a successful rehabilitation of his behavior and character. His
application to the Bar was supported by numerous character references, including many members of the Bar. Held: (1) Applicant’s misconduct was not so egregious to preclude applicant from admission to the Bar without considering the
steps that he has taken since 2012 to rehabilitate his character; and (2) applicant
demonstrated genuine self-improvement and rehabilitation since his misconduct
to justify conditional admission to the Bar.
    Applicant is conditionally admitted to the practice of law.



  On review of the recommendation of the Board of Bar
Examiners.
    David J. Elkanich, Holland & Knight LLP, Portland,
filed the briefs for applicant. Also on the briefs was Nellie
Q. Barnard.
   Theodore W. Reuter, Assistant Disciplinary Counsel,
Tigard, filed the answering brief on behalf of the Oregon
State Bar. Susan R. Cournoyer, Assistant Disciplinary
Counsel, filed the supplemental brief.
    PER CURIAM
    Applicant is conditionally admitted to the practice of law.
Cite as 

 (2020)                                   361

         PER CURIAM
          In this contested lawyer admission proceeding, the
issue is whether applicant Neil Halttunen has proved by clear
and convincing evidence that he possesses the good moral
character necessary for admission to the Oregon State Bar.
A majority of the Board of Bar Examiners (board) issued
an opinion recommending that the court deny admission;
a minority opinion recommended conditional admission.
There is no dispute that, from 2009 to 2012, while working as
a police officer, applicant engaged in inappropriate, unethical, and dishonest conduct that raises significant questions
about his moral character. Applicant admits that he inappropriately used the position of trust and authority that he
possessed as a police officer to pursue romantic and sexual
relationships with vulnerable women whom he encountered
while performing his official duties. He also admits that he
was dishonest with his employer about that conduct during
an internal investigation. Applicant contends, however, that
he has demonstrated sufficient reformation since leaving
the police department to establish his current fitness to
practice law. We are persuaded, and we conditionally admit
applicant to the practice of law in Oregon.
     I. INTRODUCTION AND LEGAL STANDARD
          To be admitted to practice law in this state, an applicant must prove “by clear and convincing evidence that he or
she is of good moral character and is fit to practice law.” In re
Zielinski, 

, 

 (2006) (stating standard); see ORS 9.220(2)(a) (establishing “good moral character and fit to practice law” standard); Rule for Admission
of Attorneys (RFA) 9.45(6) (in character review proceeding,
applicant must establish by clear and convincing evidence
the requisite character and fitness to practice law). “Stated
differently, applicant must show that it is ‘highly probable’
that [applicant] has the good moral character and fitness to
practice law.” In re Covington, 

, 

(2002).
        An applicant may be unable to establish “good
moral character” if the applicant has engaged in “acts or conduct that reflect moral turpitude or … [that] would cause
a reasonable person to have substantial doubts about the
362                                            In re Halttunen

individual’s honesty, fairness and respect for the rights of
others and for the laws of the state and the nation,” if those
acts or conduct are “rationally connected to the applicant’s
fitness to practice law.” ORS 9.220(2)(b); see also In re Carter,

, 

 (2002) (describing the statutory
standard). But it is not impossible for such an applicant to
demonstrate sufficient reformation of character to establish
that he or she presently has the good moral character and
fitness to practice law. See, e.g., 

 (when considering the character of an applicant who had engaged in “misconduct involving moral turpitude,” describing the “crucial
inquiry” as whether the applicant had demonstrated that
his “character has reformed sufficiently in the interim to
permit his admission to the Bar”).
         This court has charged the board with investigating and evaluating an applicant’s character and fitness. See
RFA 2.10(2) (board shall investigate and evaluate moral
character and fitness to practice law of each applicant); RFA
6.05 (board has authority to conduct investigations, convene
evidentiary hearings, and issue subpoenas). The board did
that in this case by reviewing an extensive documentary
record, interviewing applicant, appointing a special investigator, and conducting an evidentiary hearing that included
the examination of 25 witnesses. Although the board has
recommended a disposition, this court reviews the record
de novo to determine whether applicant has shown that he
is a person of good moral character. See ORS 9.536(2); ORS
9.539; Bar Rule of Procedure (BR) 10.6; RFA 9.60(5).
        II. THE CHARACTER-REVIEW RECORD
A.    Prior Misconduct
        After graduating from high school and serving for a
few years in the Army as a military police officer, applicant
moved to Oregon in 1993 to begin a career in law enforcement. He worked first as a corrections officer in Lane County
and then as a police officer in Roseburg, finally taking a job
as a police officer with the Springfield Police Department,
where he worked from 1996 to 2012. During his time at the
Springfield Police Department, applicant was twice married
and divorced.
Cite as 

 (2020)                               363

         Applicant’s pattern of misconduct began in 2009,
while he was still a police officer at the Springfield Police
Department and was married to his second wife. Applicant
first pursued a woman whom he had originally encountered
when he arrested her on a warrant in 2008. He encountered
the woman again in 2009 when investigating a police report
that she had made, and he used the woman’s interest in
the status of that investigation to initiate a personal relationship. Applicant began calling the woman, texting with
her, and dropping by her house in his patrol car to chat. He
made it known to the woman that he was unhappy in his
marriage and wished to have a relationship with her. Those
contacts ultimately led to a sexual relationship that began
in approximately 2010.
         Between that 2009 incident and the end of 2012,
applicant pursued numerous other women that he met
in the course of his duties, many of whom had criminal
records. According to applicant, that conduct resulted in
several other sexual relationships and contributed to the
end of his second marriage. In addition, applicant estimated
that there were eight to 12 other women, whom he also met
while performing his official duties, with whom he engaged
in inappropriate sexual communications—usually through
text messages.
         The record is not clear as to the manner in which
applicant met and pursued each of those women, but the
circumstances for some are similar to those under which he
met and pursued the first woman. For example, applicant
met one woman when he responded to a car accident and
gave her a ride home. He met her again when he responded
to a disorderly conduct report at her apartment complex and
then showed up at her apartment a week or two later, supposedly to check if she had experienced additional problems
but then shifting the discussion to personal matters. The
two began a relationship over text messages that eventually became sexual. Applicant met another woman when
he responded to a disorderly person complaint near the bar
where she worked and then met her again when he responded
to a theft that occurred at the bar. After obtaining the woman’s personal information for purposes of completing his
report, applicant called the woman on her personal phone,
364                                          In re Halttunen

and the two began a relationship that included texting and
conversation—while applicant was on duty—and at least
some sexual contact while he was not on duty.
          Although those women described their relationships
with applicant as consensual, applicant has admitted that
he knew at the time the relationships were unethical, and
he has acknowledged that his conduct undermined the credibility of the police department and reflects poor moral character. Moreover, the record makes plain that applicant inappropriately pursued other women who felt that applicant
was taking advantage of their vulnerability and the power
that he wielded over them as a police officer. For example,
applicant twice attempted to pursue an intimate relationship with women whom he met in the course of arresting
their boyfriend or husband. He called one of the women from
his personal phone less than an hour after advising her that
her boyfriend would be spending the night in jail and pressured her into accepting a ride from him, began caressing
her arm, and suggested that they find a dark place to park.
Both women let applicant know that the contact was unwelcome, and he did not persist, but the women reported that
they had felt vulnerable to and intimidated by applicant’s
inappropriate contact.
         Another woman was the manager of an exotic dance
club that applicant regularly patrolled when he worked in
the evenings. Applicant frequently tried to engage her in
conversation when he saw her in the parking lot. Applicant
texted her on numerous occasions when the woman understood him to be on duty, sending and asking for sexually
suggestive photos as well as sending at least one sexually
explicit video. The woman testified that applicant’s advances
were unwelcome and felt “stalker-ish” but that applicant
was “the man in charge” (as a police officer), so the woman
responded enough “to keep him happy a little bit.”
         Applicant’s unwelcome contacts led to a complaint
to the Springfield Police Department in November 2012.
That complaint triggered an internal investigation led by
Sgt. Rappe, who interviewed applicant and several witnesses. Although applicant now admits to all of the inappropriate contact described above, he displayed a lack of candor
Cite as 

 (2020)                                365

during the 2012 investigation. He acknowledged pursuing
or engaging in sexual contact with several women, including two of whom the department had not yet been aware, but
he admittedly did not disclose other inappropriate sexual
encounters with women whom he met through his official
duties.
         Applicant resigned from the police department
before Rappe completed his investigation, and the department closed its investigation. Soon after applicant’s resignation, the Oregon Department of Public Safety Standards
and Training (DPSST), which trains and certifies public
safety officers, opened its own investigation into applicant.
DPSST staff reviewed materials provided by the Springfield
Police Department, concluded that applicant’s conduct violated the moral fitness standards, and referred the case for
further administrative review to decide whether to revoke
applicant’s DPSST certifications. However, applicant agreed
to bring an end to the inquiry by stipulating that he would
voluntarily relinquish his DPSST certifications and that the
revocation would be permanent, thus precluding applicant
from future work as a public safety officer in Oregon.
         Applicant admits all of the above misconduct. The
only allegations that he denies were made by JF, who had
been an exotic dancer at a club in Springfield when applicant arrested her for driving under the influence of intoxicants (DUII) in 2009. Because JF’s allegations—and
applicant’s denial of them—were critical to the board’s conclusion, we discuss those allegations in detail. It is undisputed that applicant was dispatched to the club where JF
worked to investigate a report of erratic driving made by a
citizen who followed JF’s car to the club. At the club, applicant first spoke with the bartender, who described JF as
intoxicated when she arrived, and then asked JF to perform
field sobriety tests before arresting her. At the police station, JF submitted to a breathalyzer test that revealed a
0.18 blood alcohol content. She claimed—at least later—that
she began drinking only after she had arrived at the club.
        JF was not a witness at the hearing, but her statements to other witnesses are part of the record. JF’s concerns about applicant were first reported in detail to the
366                                                          In re Halttunen

Springfield Police Department when Rappe interviewed her
in 2012 in the presence of her attorney.1 JF told Rappe that,
during the 2009 arrest, applicant had been overly friendly
with her at the jail and had insisted that she needed to
remove all of her jewelry in his presence, even after she
explained that her jewelry included a genital piercing. She
explained that she had been “creeped” out by applicant’s
behavior and insisted on the presence of a female deputy
before she removed the piercing.
         JF also complained to Rappe that applicant seemingly pursued her after the arrest. JF reported learning
that, shortly after her arrest, applicant had encountered
JF’s older sister at one of his son’s baseball games and had
told the sister that he was keeping an eye on JF and that
she was being a “good girl.” She also reported that applicant
began showing up at the club while he was on duty, mostly
just driving though the parking lot but sometimes walking
inside, and that he appeared to be staring at her or attempting to talk to her. JF described that attention as continuing even after she started working at a different club. She
explained that applicant’s attention made her feel uneasy
and frightened because “cops are powerful.”
         JF was interviewed about applicant again in
2017, this time over the phone by another Springfield officer. JF largely repeated what she had told Rappe,2 but she
also described more extensive misconduct, including that
applicant had visited her club on a daily basis, often trying to talk with her, beginning months prior to her 2009

    1
       Shortly after her DUII arrest, JF made at least one informal complaint to
another officer about an unwanted contact by applicant following that arrest, and
she reported in later interviews that she had fully described applicant’s arrest
behavior to the lawyer who had represented her on the DUII charge in 2009,
whom she thought had used that information to obtain what she understood to
be a favorable disposition of the charge.
    2
       The board describes JF as stating in the 2017 interview that, at the time
of her arrest, applicant had taken her to a room at the station “where Applicant
forced her to undress.” But that understanding of the record appears to be incorrect. JF did not report in either interview that applicant had forced her to undress
in his presence. To the contrary, she told the interviewer in 2017 that she “did not
recall that she actually removed the jewelry,” and Rappe recorded JF as stating
only that applicant had been “overly pushy” but that “[s]he demanded to have a
female deputy present because she wasn’t going to take [her piercing] out unless
one was present.”
Cite as 

 (2020)                                    367

DUII arrest. First, JF suggested to the interviewing officer that her DUII arrest had been improper. She claimed
that she had failed the field sobriety tests because applicant had required her to perform the test in the eight-inch
heels that she wore for dancing; further claimed that she
had consumed a significant amount of alcohol after arriving
at the club; and “implied,” according to the interviewer, that
she had not consumed any alcohol prior to driving, although
“she acknowledged her driving may have been poor.” JF also
added in that 2017 interview that applicant had behaved
inappropriately before taking her into the police station, following her arrest. She reported that applicant had picked
her up and sat her on the trunk of his car to let her smoke,
in what the interviewer’s report characterized as an “awkward, sexually-oriented, and inappropriate” maneuver, and
JF reported that applicant had been “attempting to imply
there was some way out of her predicament by favor.”
         Applicant denies JF’s allegations of inappropriate
conduct. He contends that he had no contact with JF before
he arrested her in 2009 and that the arrest was entirely
proper. He points out that he was following up on the citizen’s
report of erratic driving and that the bartender at the club
had described JF as intoxicated when she arrived. Applicant
denies the allegation that he required JF to perform field
sobriety tests in heels and emphasizes both that the arrest
report showed that she performed the tests in boots and that
the chief of police had observed the tests after stopping by to
serve as backup. He also pointed to inconsistencies between
JF’s timeline of events and contemporaneous records that
were either automatically time-stamped or not created by
applicant—at least one of which is also noted in the 2017
investigative report. Applicant emphatically denies that he
asked JF to remove a genital piercing in front of him or that
he had any inappropriate contact with her prior to taking
her into the police station.
         With respect to the allegation that he pursued JF
after the arrest, applicant testified that he “certainly was driving through the parking lot [of the club] several times a week,
if not daily” during his patrols—the club was nearly across
the street from the police station—but he denied intentionally targeting JF and testified that he could only remember
368                                           In re Halttunen

two occasions when he interacted with JF after the arrest.
He explained his conversation with JF’s sister at their children’s baseball game as an effort to mitigate any awkwardness resulting from the fact that he had recently arrested
JF. In his briefing to this court, applicant suggests that JF’s
description of applicant’s conduct in the 2012 interview with
Rappe may have been influenced by a recent charge of felony
resisting arrest in relation to a 2012 DUII. As a defense to
the resisting arrest charge, JF had asserted that her conduct was “something of a post-traumatic stress reaction to
the police,” resulting from applicant’s alleged misconduct.
B.    Efforts at Reformation
         Applicant reports that the months following his resignation were a low point in his life. In August 2013, applicant began psychotherapy with Dr. McDonald. At the time,
applicant felt that he had been treated unfairly because he
believed that others in the police department engaged in
misconduct that went unpunished. But applicant’s therapy
sessions forced him to confront the fact that his life circumstances were a result of his own selfish and immature conduct. According to Dr. McDonald, applicant “demonstrated
both the willingness and the ability to engage in critical self-analysis and insight into his behavior and its impact on others.” Dr. McDonald saw applicant for about 10 months and
concluded that he “took his therapy seriously and displayed
the courage to examine his choices, thinking patterns, and
behavior.”
        Those thinking patterns had included chauvinistic views and objectification of women. As a police officer,
he was known to make crude comments about sex, and he
admits that, at the time, he viewed sex as an opportunity
to prove himself. Further, applicant was unfaithful in both
marriages during his time as a police officer.
         Those thinking patterns had also included an
unwillingness to admit vulnerability. Although applicant
initially had found work in law enforcement rewarding, it
took a toll on him emotionally. Specifically, applicant struggled handling his encounters with death while on the job,
which had increased after he began work as a drug recognition expert and after he began being regularly dispatched to
Cite as 

 (2020)                                369

fatal car accidents. Despite feeling worn down by the work,
applicant did not seek help while he worked at the department, even though mental health services were available to
officers in need, because he did not want to be perceived as
weak.
         According to applicant, his own harmful patterns of
thinking were prevalent and promoted at the department.
His therapy following the resignation allowed him to view
his misconduct as a combination of his unhealthy views
about sex and his emotional stress. As he testified during
the hearing, “I was more worried about making myself feel
good and not paying attention to the rules or to their emotions. And so I sought that out to kind of feel good about
myself[.]”
         During his treatment with Dr. McDonald, applicant developed new personal and professional goals. He
knew another former officer from the Springfield Police
Department who had started law school and turned his
life around after being similarly worn down by work as a
police officer. Applicant applied to, and was accepted into,
Willamette University College of Law to start in the fall of
2014.
         Applicant moved to Salem to begin classes at
Willamette. He did well in law school and developed an
interest in criminal law. He also began dating a woman
whom he would later marry. Following his first year of law
school, applicant worked in the financial fraud section of the
Oregon Department of Justice and, in his second year, began
working as a law student at Vidrio Park & Jarvis, LLC, with
a focus on criminal defense. Applicant volunteered as a mentor to new students and won a pro bono award for his work
on behalf of a disabled veteran through the Willamette Law
Pro Bono Honors program. In his third year of law school,
applicant continued to work at Vidrio Park & Jarvis, LLC,
now as a certified law student, which allowed him to represent indigent clients facing criminal misdemeanor charges.
That work included trying eight cases to a jury. The members of the firm were impressed with his work and indicated
a desire to hire him to a full-time position when he became
a member of the Bar.
370                                          In re Halttunen

         Applicant knew that, in light of his history with the
Springfield Police Department, his character and fitness to
practice law would be scrutinized by the board. As a result,
when entering his third year of law school, applicant contacted a counselor from the Oregon Attorney Assistance
Program, who recommended that applicant participate in
additional psychotherapy. Applicant followed that recommendation and saw Dr. Miller-Moe from September 2016
through April 2017. According to Dr. Miller-Moe, applicant
had “used the psychotherapy to explore the impact of work
culture and the extraordinary stress related to work in law
enforcement,” and had “developed a variety of tools to maintain physical and mental health.” In Dr. Miller-Moe’s opinion, applicant did “not present with any mental or emotional
barriers which would impair his ability to practice within
the ethical guidelines of his chosen profession.”
         Applicant submitted his application to the Bar in
March 2017. Applicant then graduated from law school in
May 2017 and passed the July 2017 Bar exam. At about the
same time, he participated in a psychosexual evaluation conducted by Dr. Linn, hoping to establish that he had no personality traits that posed a risk of repeating his misconduct
while a police officer. Dr. Linn reviewed all of the reports
about applicant from the Springfield Police Department, the
DPSST investigations, and a recording of applicant’s interview with the three-member board panel. Dr. Linn opined
that applicant’s “psychiatric history, attitudes, and psychological testing do not reflect the existence of a personality
disorder” and rejected a suggestion that applicant suffered
from a “narcissistic personality disorder.” Rather, according to Dr. Linn, applicant “appears capable of empathy and
insight into his deficits.”
         Dr. Linn’s report described applicant’s sense of
shame and guilt for his misconduct. In the report, applicant
is quoted as acknowledging the power imbalance between
himself and the women he met in the course of his duties:
“ ‘I was working as a police officer and they see me as an
authority figure. I didn’t factor that power differential in or
how they may be perceiving the situation.’ ” When Dr. Linn
asked applicant whether he believes that he had been taking advantage of the women he met, applicant stated, “ ‘Yes,
Cite as 

 (2020)                                 371

but at the time, I didn’t see it that way. I just saw it as
consensual. With benefit of hindsight [these women] have
been more vulnerable. I should have paused to see that.’ ”
Similarly, applicant stated, “ ‘I thought it was mutual attraction. I didn’t pause long enough to think that they weren’t
talking to Neil but possibly a police officer.’ ” In his interview with Dr. Linn, applicant acknowledged that there are
also power differentials between a lawyer and client. But he
said, “Having gone through that experience of letting people
down and shaming myself, I looked in the mirror[,] how I
was, and I don’t want to be that person anymore. I don’t view
women or sex in the same way that I used to.”
         Dr. Linn concluded that applicant’s prior misconduct “appear[s] related to a complicated variety of environmental factors, untreated trauma, alcohol abuse, marital
stress, and unhealthy messages regarding women and sexuality through his experience as a soldier and police officer.”
And Dr. Linn noted that applicant’s various experiences
with counseling and psychotherapy “suggest a well above
average level of commitment to personal growth and relapse
prevention.” Nevertheless, based on applicant’s previous
“pattern of acting-out behavior,” Dr. Linn recommended a
conditional admission for a term, during which applicant
would continue psychotherapy to further “develop relapse
prevention strategies and healthy boundaries in his future
work with potentially vulnerable clients.”
         As part of that evaluation, Dr. Linn referred applicant for sessions of professional boundary counseling with
Dr. Shallcross, which applicant attended in 2017. According
to Dr. Shallcross, applicant “had gained tremendous insight
into his behavior,” and his current life circumstances created a “much different environment” than that out of which
his misconduct arose. Dr. Shallcross had no concerns about
applicant’s ability to conduct himself “professionally” in the
practice of law.
C. Conduct During Application Process
          As described above applicant submitted his application to the Bar in March 2017. In the application, he acknowledged that he had resigned from the Springfield Police
Department while under investigation for his relationships
372                                          In re Halttunen

with women whom he met while on duty. He also acknowledged that, while under investigation by the department,
he had not fully disclosed the extent of those relationships.
He stated, however, that “[t]hese relationships were consensual and they did not affect any enforcement or investigative decisions I made as part of my duties.” The application
went on to describe the steps that applicant had taken since
leaving the police force to improve himself and avoid similar
conduct in the future, including his therapy and new life
circumstances, and highlighted his work at Vidrio Park &
Jarvis, LLC.
         A panel of three board members scheduled an interview with applicant at the end of October 2017. Before the
interview, applicant provided the board with personal and
professional letters of recommendation and documentation
from mental health professionals, attesting to applicant’s fitness to practice law. That included Dr. Linn’s report and letters from Dr. McDonald, Dr. Miller-Moe, and Dr. Shallcross,
all of whom supported applicant’s admission to the Bar.
         During the interview, applicant repeated many of
the themes that appeared in Dr. Linn’s report—namely, that
he “didn’t pause to really think about the power dynamic”
between him and the women he met while a police officer;
that he knew that his behavior was wrong at the time, but
rationalized it because it made him feel better; that therapy
helped him reflect on his actions and how they affected others, including the women he met and his family; and that he
deeply regretted his conduct.
         However, one aspect of applicant’s responses during
the interview caused the board to doubt applicant’s veracity. During the panel interview, applicant was asked
whether he had sexual contact with any other women he
met in the course of his duties beyond those identified in
the reports that were prepared by Rappe during the course
of the Springfield Police Department’s 2012 investigation.
Applicant replied that there were other women with whom
he had had “sexual communications,” but that the reports
identified all the women with whom he had had sexual contact. A few days after the interview, however, applicant sent
an email to the panel acknowledging that he actually had
Cite as 

 (2020)                                     373

had sexual contact with two additional women whom he had
met through his official duties and who were not identified
in Rappe’s reports. Applicant provided the women’s names
and basic details of those encounters.
        Following the panel interview, the board voted to
deny applicant admission to the Bar, and he requested a
formal hearing. At the hearing, applicant again testified
along the same lines as his earlier interviews with Dr. Linn
and the board panel. He added that his time representing
criminal defendants as a certified law student had deepened
his understanding of the vulnerable position of many of the
women whom he had met:
   “I represented a lot of clients, including women. And I can
   remember having conversations with them, preparing for
   their defense. And they were the kind of conversations I
   never would have had as a police officer and they were telling me some of the background that led up to why they
   were being represented. And I remember thinking these
   are the same kind of issues that the women I had affairs
   with were probably experiencing. … I did not feel good
   about myself when I, when it dawned on me like that.”
He then tied that vulnerability to understanding how his
conduct was an abuse of power:
   “I feel like it took advantage of the situation that I was
   in because … I didn’t stop and think at the time about
   what was going on in their lives, what their emotional
   needs were, what they were thinking. I was thinking about
   myself. And that abused the power because I was in a position of trust that they relied on and then I took advantage
   of it and wound up in relationships with them.”
        One incident following the evidentiary hearing had
a significant influence on the board’s ultimate decision.
The board had left the record open for limited purposes,
which included allowing its special investigator to contact
relevant individuals named in the proceedings and allowing applicant to submit declarations from character references who had been unable to testify. Before the record
closed, applicant spoke with a Springfield police officer,
Detective Weaver, who had testified at the hearing for applicant. The two discussed hearing testimony given by Rappe,
374                                                    In re Halttunen

in particular the effort by applicant’s counsel to impeach
Rappe by asking about complaints of sexual and other misconduct against Rappe over the years.3 Rappe maintained
that the only recent complaint was no longer being pursued
against him, and Weaver thought that Rappe’s statement
was inaccurate. Applicant provided Weaver with a video
recording of the hearing, from which Weaver extracted only
Rappe’s testimony and shared it with the Springfield Police
Association, in order to determine whether Rappe had testified falsely. The police association showed the video clip to
the Springfield chief of police, who advised that Rappe had
accurately described the status of the complaint about his
conduct. The board viewed applicant’s actions as an effort
to retaliate against Rappe by giving the police association
ammunition for an ongoing battle with Rappe.
                         III.   DISCUSSION
         Based on that record, a majority of the board recommended against admission, concluding that applicant
had failed to accept responsibility for his misconduct as a
police officer and lacked candor throughout the application
process. Three dissenting board members, however, recommended conditional admission. They concluded that applicant had accepted responsibility for his actions, that his
misconduct was not the product of a “fundamental, enduring, and pervasive aspect of his personality,” that his character references demonstrated that he has made significant
behavioral and attitudinal change, and that applicant was
genuine in describing his understanding of, and remorse for,
how his conduct harmed the women he pursued.
         As noted above, we review the record de novo to
determine whether applicant has shown that he is a person
of good moral character. See ORS 9.536(2); ORS 9.539; BR
10.6; RFA 9.60(5). There is no doubt that applicant’s conduct
while working as a police officer provides a basis for questioning whether he possesses the good moral character that
is required to practice law. As applicant acknowledges, his

    3
      During his hearing testimony, Rappe had disagreed with applicant’s testimony that harmful patterns of thinking were prevalent and promoted at the
department, so evidence that Rappe himself was the subject of misconduct complaints could have undermined that testimony.
Cite as 

 (2020)                                                375

conduct was inappropriate, unethical, and even potentially
criminal.4 There also is no question that applicant’s abuse of
his power and position as a law enforcement officer caused
emotional harm to some of the vulnerable women whom he
pursued. Moreover, applicant admittedly responded dishonestly during the 2012 investigation into his misconduct.
The crucial inquiry in this case is whether applicant has
demonstrated that, despite his history, he now possesses
the character and fitness to permit his admission to the
bar because his “character has reformed sufficiently in the
interim.” Carter, 

; 

 (so describing the “crucial inquiry” when considering the character of
applicant who had engaged in “misconduct involving moral
turpitude”).
         Applicant urges this court to adopt the recommendation of the board minority and conditionally admit him to
practice law. He argues that he “has completely and totally
overhauled his life” and that he has demonstrated by clear
and convincing evidence that he has been successful in his
efforts at reformation and presently possesses the good
moral character and fitness that is required for admission
to the Bar. He emphasizes in particular that 20 members
of the Bar, including a retired former chief justice of this
court, have attested to his present character and fitness to
practice law. The board, on the other hand, urges this court
to adopt the carefully considered reasoning of the majority
and to deny applicant admission to the Bar, either because
his prior misconduct is so significant that his evidence of
reformation is irrelevant or because petitioner’s words and
conduct throughout the course of the admission process
undermine his evidence of reformation.
          As the split decision of the board reflects, this is a
close question. This court has repeatedly emphasized that
“ ‘[r]eformation is a very difficult matter for a petitioner to
prove and for [this court] to judge.’ ” In re Jaffee, 

, 

 (1994) (insertions in original; quoting
In re Bernard Jolles, 

, 

 (1963)).
    4
      There was testimony at the hearing that applicant’s conduct satisfied the
elements of Official Misconduct, which is a Class A misdemeanor. ORS 162.415.
And applicant does not dispute the characterization of his conduct as criminal.
376                                           In re Halttunen

Nevertheless, “reformation can be proved to this court’s satisfaction, as this court’s past decisions attest.” 

 (emphasis
in original). And we are satisfied in this case that applicant
has demonstrated reformation sufficiently to qualify for conditional admission to the Oregon State Bar.
A.    Whether Applicant Should Be Categorically Barred from
      Admission
          Before turning to the evidence of reformation, we
briefly address the board’s argument that applicant’s conduct should categorically bar him from admission, regardless of his evidence of reformation. In support of that argument, the board first urges this court to conclude that the
permanent revocation of applicant’s DPSST certification
is, itself, enough to preclude his admission to the Bar.
As the board points out, DPSST certification—like bar
admission—requires that a person have “moral fitness.”
OAR 259-008-0010(6) (2013). The board does not exactly
suggest that the DPSST action reflects a finding that should
give rise to a form of issue preclusion. It could not, because
the DPSST did not revoke applicant’s license based on a
determination that he lacked moral fitness. Instead, DPSST
revoked applicant’s license because he relinquished his
license while an investigation was in progress. OAR 259-
008-0070(9)(k) (2013). Although the board asks this court
to view that relinquishment as equivalent to a “Form B”
resignation of bar membership, which permanently disqualifies the lawyer from being reinstated, BR 9.4, the board
has offered no reason that this court—or applicant in this
court—should be bound by the DPSST’s revocation decision.
Regardless of any similarity between the standards for
DPSST certification and membership in the Oregon State
Bar, this court has an independent obligation to determine
whether an applicant is presently qualified for membership
in the Oregon Bar. See generally In re Sanai, 

, 

 (2016) (“[I]n reciprocal discipline cases, we
have an independent obligation to determine an appropriate
sanction based upon this state’s disciplinary rules.”).
        The board also argues that applicant’s conduct was
so egregious that it would result in automatic disbarment if
engaged in by a current bar member and, likewise, should
Cite as 

 (2020)                                 377

categorically preclude bar membership when engaged in
prior to an application for Bar membership. The board first
points to RFA 3.10, which provides that “[a]n applicant shall
not be eligible for admission to the Bar after having been
convicted of a crime, the commission of which would have
led to disbarment in all the circumstances present, had
the person been an Oregon attorney at the time of conviction.” That rule does not directly control this case, however,
as the board seemingly recognizes; regardless of whether
applicant’s conduct could have been prosecuted as a criminal offense, it was not. As a result, applicant has not been
convicted of a crime, and RFA 3.10 does not control.
         Nor is an analogy to conduct that might result in
disbarment dispositive in this case. The nature, extent, and
severity of an applicant’s prior misconduct is relevant to
assessing whether the applicant has the good moral character necessary to practice law. Indeed, “some prior criminal actions may be so severe that they would disqualify an
applicant from admission.” In re Beers, 

, 

 (2005). But the misconduct at issue in this case,
which was confined to a limited period of applicant’s career
as a police officer, is not so egregious that we can assess
applicant’s character without considering the steps that he
has taken since 2012 to rehabilitate his character.
B.   Whether Applicant Has Established His Moral Character
         We therefore proceed to the question of whether
applicant has sufficiently reformed his character to warrant admission to the Bar. When an applicant’s prior conduct demonstrates a lack of good moral character, the
“[a]pplicant bears the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that he has [reformed his character], and
any significant doubt about an applicant’s character and fitness should be resolved in favor of protecting the public.”

 (internal citation omitted). This court has previously considered, “as evidence of reformation, character testimony from those who know and have had an opportunity
to observe the applicant, participation in activities that benefit society, and an applicant’s forthright acknowledgment
of the wrongfulness of his or her past actions.” Carter, 

.
378                                           In re Halttunen

         In Carter, this court agreed with the board’s concern
that an applicant who had previously committed theft—“an
act of misconduct involving moral turpitude”—had failed to
prove reformation, in part because he had failed to produce
“any current personal or professional character evidence”
and had failed to follow a psychologist’s recommendations
for addressing “the underlying psychological reasons for
his behavior.” 

. As we emphasized in that case,
the applicant’s claim that his actions since the time of the
theft showed “good moral character” reduced to “remaining crime-free and pursuing his academic goals of, among
other things, completing law school, passing the Oregon
Bar Examination, and pursuing an electrical engineering
degree,” which we concluded was not “any evidence from
which this court could conclude that applicant’s character
has reformed sufficiently to permit his admission to the
Bar.” 

.
         But we reached a different conclusion in Beers. The
applicant in that case had a long history of using and selling drugs and other associated criminal activity, including
weapons offenses and driving under the influence. During
that period of his life, he had failed to appear for court hearings on multiple occasions, twice provided police officers
with a false name, and once hired someone to impersonate
him at a court-ordered drug treatment program. 

. By his mid-twenties, the applicant was a mid-level
drug dealer, buying and selling large quantities of cocaine.
He was arrested, and he served almost three years in prison.

.
         While serving that prison sentence, the applicant
“began to turn his life around.” 

 He had “stopped using
drugs, began taking college courses, and dealt with his unresolved criminal charges and warrants.” 

 He continued his
college education after his release from prison and quickly
found success in business. By the time that he started law
school, the applicant had been out of prison for four or five
years and was the Director of Operations for a division of
Columbia Sportswear. The applicant had attended law
school at night while working full time and raising three
children with his wife. During law school, the applicant
also had passed the Certified Public Accountant exam, had
Cite as 

 (2020)                                 379

received his accounting license, and had begun serving as
a member of the board of directors of the National Crime
Victims Law Institute. By the time that the applicant graduated from law school and applied for admission to the Bar,
he had been out of prison for eight years and drug-free for
10 years. Id. at 220.
         This court concluded that the applicant had sufficiently reformed to warrant admission to the Bar. Id. at 228.
The court first characterized the applicant’s earlier criminal
conduct by noting that it was related to his drug addiction
and that he was no longer addicted to drugs. As the court
explained, “[i]f the condition that gave rise to applicant’s
earlier criminal behavior is in ‘sustained full remission’ and
if applicant truly has turned his life around, what basis is
there for saying that he has not reformed?” Id. at 225.
         This court went on to consider the amount of time
that had passed since the applicant’s misconduct, his acceptance of responsibility for his misconduct, his success in
“achieving his personal, professional, and educational
goals,” his participation in “activities for the public good,”
and his impressive references, which included many “members of the Bar who are aware of applicant’s past and are
sensitive to the board’s considerations,” as well as people
who knew the applicant both before and after he turned his
life around. Id. at 228-29.
         In this case, as in Beers, applicant has demonstrated
a marked degree of self-improvement and rehabilitation
since his misconduct. None of the psychological experts who
evaluated applicant believed that he suffers from the kind
of fundamental and pervasive personality challenge that
might prevent a successful rehabilitation of his behavior
and character. They opined that he has gained insight into
his past behaviors and their impact on others and has developed the tools and support network to maintain a successful reformation. And, like the applicant in Beers, applicant
has a wide range of references attesting to the fact that he
has fundamentally changed his behaviors and reformed his
character.
       First, as the author of the dissenting board recommendation, Dr. Kolbell, emphasized, the record contains no
380                                          In re Halttunen

evidence that applicant’s behavior between 2009 and 2012
was attributable to a personality disorder, severe psychological condition, or other manifestation of an “enduring aspect
of his personality or character.” At the hearing, Dr. Linn
had opined that applicant’s “psychiatric history, attitudes,
and psychological testing do not reflect the existence of a
personality disorder” and that applicant “appears capable of
empathy and insight into his deficits.” Further, in Dr. Miller-Moe’s opinion, applicant had “developed a variety of tools to
maintain physical and mental health” and did “not present
with any mental or emotional barriers which would impair
his ability to practice within the ethical guidelines of his
chosen profession.” And, according to Dr. Shallcross, applicant “had gained tremendous insight into his behavior,” and
she had no concerns about his ability to conduct himself
“professionally” in the future. Finally, Dr. McDonald, who
treated applicant in 2013-14, reviewed the reports from all
of applicant’s subsequent mental health providers and wrote
a special report for the hearing. In Dr. McDonald’s opinion,
applicant “demonstrated both the willingness and the ability to engage in critical self-analysis and insight into his
behavior and its impact on others.” Dr. McDonald “enthusiastically” added his “voice to those who have expressed confidence in his fitness to practice law.”
         The board discounted the significance of those
expert opinions because they did not—indeed they could
not—offer an opinion on applicant’s “moral character.” But
the significance of the expert opinions lies not in their ability to address the ultimate question; rather, it lies in their
ability to address whether applicant suffers from a personality disorder, psychological condition, or other enduring or
pervasive aspect of his personality that would cast serious
doubt on his ability to evolve and reform his attitudes and
behavior. That is a question that few members of the board
and no members of this court are qualified to assess. And,
without that expert opinion, we would be less persuaded by
the overwhelming endorsement from applicant’s friends,
family, and co-workers regarding the outward evidence that
he has reformed and rehabilitated his character.
         Those supporters—a large and varied group—
attest to applicant’s present character and fitness to practice
Cite as 

 (2020)                                381

law, and all were given complete access to the underlying
records in this case. Those who have known applicant since
before his misconduct, including his first ex-wife, described
the positive changes that they have seen in applicant since
he left law enforcement. Those who met applicant after his
misconduct, including law school classmates, professional
acquaintances and colleagues, and applicant’s current wife,
all insisted that applicant’s past bears no resemblance to
the person that they know today. Not one reference, many of
whom are women, observed the abuse of power, dishonesty,
or objectification of women that applicant demonstrated in
his past misconduct. Applicant testified that the references
not only describe who he is today, but also serve as motivation for him to live up to the character that the references
describe.
         We place particular weight on the references provided by the attorneys and staff at Vidrio Park & Jarvis,
LLC. They are aware of the ethical and professional
demands on an attorney and have directly observed applicant doing the work of a lawyer as a certified law student,
including interacting with clients and representing them
at trial. Although applicant’s work for the firm appears to
have presented opportunities for him to abuse his position of
power or to exploit those who were less powerful, none of the
hearing witnesses from the firm—whether supervisor, colleague, or support staff—observed any concerning behavior.
And, despite being aware of applicant’s prior misconduct,
they have supported him throughout the application process
and want him to join the firm as a full attorney.
          The board was unpersuaded by the strength of
applicant’s character references, however, because it was not
convinced that applicant had sufficiently accepted responsibility for his misconduct, as illustrated by his characterizing his victimization of vulnerable women as “consensual”
contacts or mere “boundary violations.” According to the
board, the “record does not demonstrate Applicant’s genuine
remorse, or even understanding, that he used his position to
take advantage of and victimize vulnerable people.”
        Although we agree that applicant’s use of the word
“consensual” on his Bar admission application in March 2017
382                                                          In re Halttunen

appears legalistic and is not well chosen in this context, we
are persuaded that the record as a whole, including applicant’s subsequent descriptions of his behavior, demonstrates
that applicant understands and appreciates the harmful
nature of his misconduct. Applicant emphasized numerous
times that he now understands that the power differential between himself and the women whom he met while a
police officer at times affected their willingness to tolerate
his advances. Applicant repeatedly expressed remorse—the
“tremendous amount of shame and regret” that he feels—
for how his conduct affected others. Admittedly, it can be
difficult to distinguish between empty statements of regret
and true rehabilitation of character. But we do not question the genuineness of applicant’s remorse, which appears
to be the result of critical and extensive self-examination
that began when he started psychotherapy not long after
his resignation from the police department. It is significant
to our assessment that Dr. Kolbell—a public member of the
board and trained psychologist—had confidence in the genuineness of applicant’s remorse. Dr. Kolbell was the only
board member to have heard applicant describe his remorse
at both the small panel interview and the character review
hearing, and he authored the minority opinion recommending admission.
          It appears that a primary reason the board questioned applicant’s reformation was his denial of JF’s hearsay
statements, which the board expressly found to be “credible.”5
We have difficulty placing that much weight on applicant’s
denial, however, when there is so little basis for assessing
the accuracy of the JF allegations.6 Although JF’s lawyer,
who attended her 2012 interview with Rappe, may have
credibly described JF’s recounting as involving “indicia of
    5
      The final board opinion walks a fine line with respect to the JF allegations.
Although the board cited as evidence of applicant’s lack of candor his denial of
JF’s allegations, which it expressly “credit[ed] as true,” it also noted that “the
Board would still recommend denial of admission even if this event had not
occurred.”
    6
      We note that the state’s denial of a professional license on the basis of hearsay allegations can raise due process concerns. See Cole/Dinsmore v. DMV, 

, 

 (2004) (“[W]hen important governmental decisions are
based on determinations of fact, due process usually requires an opportunity
to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses.”). But we resolve this case on
subconstitutional grounds.
Cite as 

 (2020)                                383

believability”—as the board emphasized—JF did not testify
at the hearing. As a result, she was not available to explain
the inconsistencies within the allegations themselves or to
clarify how closely her perception of events—particularly
years later—aligned with the actual events. Finally, JF’s
extremely serious suggestion that applicant falsely arrested
her by manipulating her failure of the field sobriety test and
then delayed taking her into the station so that he could
engage in sexually oriented and inappropriate conversation
“to imply there was some way out of her predicament by
favor” is contrary to the documentary record of the arrest.
Under the circumstances, applicant’s continuing denial of
JF’s hearsay allegations does not cause us to question his
reformation or candor.
          The board’s view that applicant lacked credibility
with regard to JF’s allegations seemingly influenced its view
of two other incidents to which it pointed as evidence that
applicant lacks candor, a view that we do not share. First,
the board highlighted the fact that applicant later corrected
a statement that he made during his panel interview. As
noted above, applicant initially told the interview panel that
Rappe’s reports, although incomplete in some respects, contained the complete list of the women with whom applicant
had engaged in sexual contact after meeting them in the
course of official duties. A few days later, applicant voluntarily corrected that statement and supplied the names of
two additional women that he had not disclosed to Rappe.
In light of all the circumstances, we are inclined to view
applicant’s statement during the interview as an inadvertent error that he promptly took steps to correct, which has
little effect on the overall analysis.
         The board also reasoned that applicant lacks candor because the board did not find credible applicant’s
explanation for sharing Rappe’s hearing testimony with
Weaver—namely, that applicant was investigating potential
impeachment evidence against Rappe. The board points out
that, at the time when applicant shared the video of Rappe’s
testimony with Weaver, the record remained open only for
limited purposes, which did not include additional impeachment evidence. The board suggests that applicant was more
likely seeking retaliation against Rappe for his testimony.
384                                           In re Halttunen

We do not share the board’s skepticism. The board retained
the discretion to open the record to other relevant evidence.
In fact, the board further opened the record to investigate
applicant’s conduct in sharing Rappe’s testimony with
Weaver. It is not implausible that, if Weaver had been able
to confirm his suspicion about Rappe’s veracity, the board
might have admitted that additional impeachment evidence. And, if Weaver’s suspicion about Rappe’s veracity had
proved accurate, that might have supplied impeachment
evidence.
         Thus, we are persuaded by the uniform opinion of
the psychiatric experts that applicant’s past misconduct was
not the product of a personality disorder or other enduring
psychological condition—in other words, that reformation is
possible. And we are persuaded by applicant’s many and varied character witnesses that he has accomplished the kind
of transformation of attitudes, mental health, and behavior
that make him an applicant who presently possesses the
good moral character and fitness to become a member of the
Oregon State Bar. Ultimately, although the board’s skepticism of reformation is understandable, we accept the sincerity of applicant’s statement to Dr. Linn:
   “Having gone through that experience of letting people
   down and shaming myself, I looked in the mirror[,] how
   I was, and I don’t want to be that person anymore. I don’t
   view women or sex in the same way that I used to.”
And we are persuaded that applicant presently possesses
the good moral character and fitness to practice law.
         Although we are convinced that applicant has genuinely reformed and has demonstrated that he presently possesses the good moral character necessary for admission to
the Oregon State Bar, we appreciate that applicant is not
asking that we admit him without conditions. Applicant
has managed to reform his destructive attitudes toward
women and has developed an awareness of the harm that
his abuses of power caused, but the public needs assurance
that applicant will be able to maintain those new patterns
of thinking and adhere to appropriate behavior through the
occupational stress that he will undoubtedly encounter as a
new lawyer. As suggested by Dr. Linn, those concerns can
Cite as 

 (2020)                                 385

and should be addressed through a conditional admission.
Applicant is therefore subject to the following terms of conditional admission:
    1.   The period of conditional admission shall continue for 48 months from the date of applicant’s
         admission.
    2.   Within 30 days of the date of admission, applicant shall establish an ongoing relationship with a
         mental health treatment provider with experience
         addressing boundary violations and power differentials. For a period of at least two years, applicant
         shall have at least monthly counseling sessions
         with that treatment provider, at his own cost, that
         are at least one hour in length and include supportive counseling focusing on boundary violations,
         power differentials, and relapse prevention strategies. After two years, applicant shall follow the
         recommendation of the treatment provider with
         respect to the need for any further counseling.
    3.   During the period of applicant’s conditional admission, he shall be monitored for compliance by the
         Oregon State Bar’s State Lawyers Assistance
         Committee (SLAC) and shall agree to the terms
         that SLAC considers to be appropriate for applicant’s monitoring agreement.
    4.   Applicant shall submit to SLAC an annual report
         from his mental health treatment provider for each
         of the first two years of admission and thereafter to
         the extent that the provider recommends ongoing
         treatment. The report shall summarize applicant’s
         progress with respect to boundary violations, power
         differentials and relapse prevention strategies, and
         it shall specify the provider’s recommendations for
         future counseling.
    5.   Applicant shall refrain from pursuing a sexual or
         romantic relationship with any current or former
         client.
    6.   SLAC shall submit quarterly reports to Disciplinary
         Counsel of the Oregon State Bar, confirming that
386                                           In re Halttunen

           applicant has complied with all conditions of his
           admission. The first of these reports shall be due
           90 days after the date of applicant’s admission.
      7.   In the event applicant fails to comply with any
           term or condition of this opinion, or Disciplinary
           Counsel has reason to believe that applicant has
           failed to comply with the conditions set out in this
           opinion in any regard, Disciplinary Counsel may
           petition this court to revoke the conditional admission in accordance with procedures set out in BR
           6.2(d).
      8.   If applicant complies with all terms and conditions
           set out in this opinion, the term of his conditional
           admission shall expire 48 months from the date
           of admission, and he shall be admitted to practice
           unconditionally thereafter without further order of
           this court.
           Applicant is conditionally admitted to the practice
of law.