Jackson v. Millstone’s Empirical Analysis
2002
Citation profile
40 state decisions
Relationships
Applies 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (§ 1900 of the Social Security Act of 1935) · 42 U.S.C. § 1396A (§ 1902 of the Social Security Act of 1935) · 42 U.S.C. § 1396B (§ 1903 of the Social Security Act of 1935) · 42 U.S.C. § 1396D (§ 1905 of the Social Security Act of 1935) · 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Civil Rights Act of 1871 / Section 1983 (Ku Klux Klan Act))
Relies on Ex Parte: Edward T Young · Harris v. McRae · Wilder v. Virginia Hospital Assn. · Secretary of State of Maryland v. Joseph H Munson Company Inc · Associated Grocers, Inc. v. Washington
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 40 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“[W]hen a declaratory judgment action is brought and the controversy is appropriate for resolution by declaratory judgment, the court must enter a declaratory judgment and that judgment, defining the rights and obligations of the parties or the status of the thing in controversy, must be in writing. It is not permissible for the court to issue an oral declaration. The text of the judgment must be in writing. No[t] since the 1997 amendment to Maryland Rule 2-601(a), is it permissible for the declaratory judgment to be part of a memorandum. That rule requires that “[e]ach judgment shall be set forth on a separate document.” When entering a declaratory judgment, the court must, in a separate document, state in uniting its declaration of the rights of the parties, along with any other order that is intended to be part of the judgment. Although the judgment may recite that it is based on the reasons set forth in an accompanying memorandum, the terms of the declaratory judgment itself must be set forth separately. Incorporating by reference an earlier oral ruling is not sufficient, as no one would be able to discern the actual declaration of rights from the document posing as the judgment. This is not just a matter of complying with a hyper-technical rule. The requirement that the court enter its declaration in writing is for the purpose of giving the parties and the public fair notice of what the court has determined.”
6 later decisions quote this exact passage““As Judge Delaplaine explained for the Court in Davis v. State, supra, 183 Md. [385] at 389, 37 A.2d [880] at 883, ‘if a person is directly affected by a statute, there is no reason why he should not be permitted to obtain a judicial declaration that the statute is unconstitutional.’ The Court in Davis went on to point out that, in addition, ‘a court of equity has power to restrain the enforcement of a void statute or ordinance at the suit of a person injuriously affected.’ Ibid. Specifically with regard to sovereign immunity, the Davis opinion held (183 Md. at 393, 37 A.2d at 885): ‘Although a State may not be sued without its consent, an officer of the State acting under color of his official authority may be enjoined from enforcing a State law claimed to be repugnant to the State or Federal Constitution, even though such injunction may cause the State law to remain inoperative until the constitutional question is judicially determined.’”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage“categorically needy” and "medically needy” persons. See § § 15-201.1, 15-103 of the Health-General Article; COMAR 10.09.06.01B(21). See also 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(A), (C) (listing those who qualify as "categorically” and “medically” needy, respectively). Under the Maryland Medicaid Plan, "categorically needy”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.