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37 Me. 556

Means v. Williamson

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine

Decided July 1, 1854

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine · decided 1854-07-01

On Report from Nisi Prins, Rice, J., presiding1. Assumpsit. This action was commenced on Nov. 20, 1850, on the following account: — Oct. 6, 1849. Eor 1 chaise and harness, $30,00. It appeared in evidence, that the defendant wished to buy a second hand chaise which was owned by the plaintiff. It was in the stable attached to the plaintiff’s house.

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1854-07-01

How this case has been cited

Cited by 3 later decisions — most recently July 1904

3 state decisions

10185418601870188018901900decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

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Shepley, C. J.

¶1— The suit has been commenced to recover an agreed price for the sale of a chaise and harness. The testimony shows, that a bargain was completed for the sale at an agreed price, to be paid at a future time in wood at the market price. There having been no payment in part, or written contract, the question is, whether the sale was completed by a delivery.

¶2When the bargain was made the chaise was in the plaintiff’s stable, where it had been examined by the parties and the defendant had spoken of having no proper place to keep it, and that he should have to build a shed. The witness appears to have stated without objection, “ the substance of the conversation was, that the chaise was to remain where *558it was, úntil the defendant should build his shed.” It was so to remain not as security for payment, but at the pleasure of the defendant, and for his accommodation. Nothing further remaining to be done; the sale was completed, if there was a legal delivery. For that purpose it is not necessary, that the property should pass into the actual possession of the vendee.

¶3When it was so situated, that he is entitled to, and can rightfully take possession of it at his pleasure, he is considered as having actually received it, as the statute requires, although it may by his request have continued in the custody of. the vendor. Houdlette v. Tallman, 14 Maine, 400; Chapman v. Searle, 3 Pick. 38; Riddle v. Varnum, 20 Pick. 280; Barrett v. Goddard, 3 Mason, 107. In the latter case, the cases bearing upon the question bf such a delivery were examined, and Mr. Justice Story stated, as his conclusion, “that a continuance of the possession of the vendor does not prevent the delivery being completed, if nothing further remains to be done on either side, and the possession is by mutual consent.”

¶4The sale should not be regarded as defeated by a favor granted by the vendor to the vendee upon request.

¶5Defendant defaulted.

Tenney, Rice, Appleton and Cutting, J. J., concurred.
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