¶1dissenting.
¶2I dissent from the majority. It is apparent from the record that the defendant in this case is determined not to abide by the separation agreement he has made. I do not believe the courts are powerless to enforce the contract. I would hold that the plaintiff has shown that she does not have an adequate remedy at law and the superior court should enter such equitable remedy as will give her relief. The cases cited by the majority are different on the facts from this case. In Riddle v. Riddle, 32 N.C. App. 83, 230 S.E. 2d 809 (1977), a judgment was reversed which ordered the defendant not to breach a separation agreement as he was *703threatening to do. In Stanley v. Stanley, 226 N.C. 129, 37 S.E. 2d 118 (1946), a judgment was reversed which held the defendant in contempt for failure to pay a judgment for accrued support. In Bunn v. Bunn, 262 N.C. 67, 136 S.E. 2d 240 (1964), a judgment was affirmed which denied the plaintiff’s motion to strike a previous order of the court reducing alimony payments. In Mitchell v. Mitchell, 270 N.C. 253, 154 S.E. 2d 71 (1967) and Stancil v. Stancil, 255 N.C. 507, 121 S.E. 2d 882 (1961), it was held that contempt proceedings are appropriate where the court has awarded alimony as a part of the judgment.
¶3There are cases in which contracts may be enforced by specific performance. 71 Am. Jur. 2d, Specific Performance, § 5, p. 14. I believe this is one of them. The record shows the defendant entered into a separation agreement; he is able to make his payments; he refuses to do so; and when the plaintiff reduces the accrued alimony to judgment, he handles his affairs in such a manner that execution cannot be had against his assets. I believe this is a sufficient showing that the plaintiff does not have an adequate remedy at law and equitable relief is appropriate.