Volume 38 — Wisconsin Reports

Action against A. Hyatt Smith, Ann M. G. Smith, bis wife, and Charles D. Mead, trustee of .the ■ separate estate of Mrs. Smith, for flowage of plaintiffs’ land by a dam on Rock river. The action was commenced April 12, 1869, in Rock county, and was removed to Walworth county.

Action for damages to plaintiff’s land, alleged to have been caused by defendants’ dam. The dam in question was tbe same mentioned in the foregoing case of Ooib and another v. Smith and others. The only question raised by the record herein, not considered and determined in that cause, is sufficiently stated in the opinion. The defendants appealed from a judgment in fayor of the plaintiff.

Court for Winnebago County. Foreclosure of a mortgage executed by the defendants Reuben J. Tucker and wife, under date June 25, 1857, to secure a note of the former, of the same date, running to the Ripon & Wolf River Railroad Company, for $1,000, payable ten years from January 1, 1857, with interest payable annually. The mortgagors answered, in substance, that there bad never been a valid delivery of the note or mortgage.

This action is on an instrument purporting to be a promissory note made by the defendant, payable to the Milwaukee & Horicon Railroad Company or order, and (as seems to be conceded, although the record fails fully to show the fact) indorsed to the plaintiff by the payee.- The plaintiff received the note in due course of business, before due, for value, and without notice of any defense thereto.

This is an action to foreclose four mortgages on real estate, purporting to have been executed by the defendants Wood and wife to the Milwaukee & Horicon Railroad Company to secure the payment of a like number of promissory notes of even date therewith, purporting to have been made by said Wood, and payable by the terms thereof to said railroad company or order. Four parcels of land are included in these mortgages, one parcel in each of them.

<p> Cause not ready for final judgment. Effect of changes in the statutes regulating rates of toll on railways. </p> <p>Upon an information filed in August, 1874, to restrain the defendant from charging in excess of the maximum rates of toll fixed hy eh. 273 of 1874, a temporary injunction, in accordance with the prayer, was granted in September, 1874 (35 Wis., 425). The cause coming on at this term for final judgment on the original pleadings and proofs, and such final judgment being asked by both parties, and it appearing that the classification of railroads and (he maximum rates of toll have been materially changed by chaps. 113 and 334 of 1875, the court holds that the cause is not ripe for judgment, and (being about to close the term) orders its continuance until the next term.</p>

*' ACTIONS of Quo Warranto for the offices of County Clerk and Register of Deeds of Wood County. The case of The State ex rel. Wood v. Baker was commenced in this court, by summons and complaint, upon leave granted, January 12, 1875.

On the 20th of April, 1875, the relator applied to this court for an alternative writ of mandamus directed to Peter Doyle, as secretary of state.

Action commenced in justice’s court. Complaint, that the defendant is indebted to the plaintiff in the sum of one hundred dollars “for services of Agnes Monaghan, a qualified teacher, his daughter, and a minor.” Answer, a general denial.

The JEina Insurance Company, in August, 1858, obtained a judgment in the superior court of Buffalo, New York, against William Aldrich and others composing the firm of Aldrich, Smith & Co. This judgment was affirmed by the court of appeals of. New York, in December, 1862. See 26 N. Y, 92. In 1863, the cause was removed by writ of error to the supreme court of the United States, but no supersedeas bond was given.

This was an action to recover the amount of a judgment which had been rendered in said county court in 1865, in favor of The TEina Insurance Company against William Aldrich and others (constituting the firm of Aldrich, Smith & Co.), and had been paid by the present plaintiffs. The essential facts alleged in the complaint are stated in the preceding case of The IEtna, Insurance Company v. Aldrich and others, ante, 'p. 107.

The plaintiff having commenced an action against the defendant in the Milwaukee county court, by the service of a Summons for relief without complaint, presented to the judge of that court the affidavit of its agent, one Matteson, and procured from said judge an order for the arrest and holding to bail of the defendant, by virtue of which order the defendant was arrested. The latter thereupon moved the county court, on his own affidavit, to vacate the order of arrest.

The purposes and situation of this action are stated in the report of the foregoing decision, ante, p. 119.

Action for slander. It is alleged in the complaint that the parties had been partners in business, and had agreed to terminate that relation, but were unable to settle their partnership affairs, and that thereupon they submitted the matters of difference arising on their final accounting, to the decision of three arbitrators, who made an award in writing, wherein and whereby, among other things, it is found and determined as follows: “ H. Katz claims that it was wrong to…

Plaintiffs having recovered judgment against one Bloom in the circuit court for Green county, docketed the judgment in Milwaukee county, and placed an execution in the hands of the sheriff of the latter county, process of garnishment was served on defendants.

This action was brought before a justice of the peace to re* cover the possession of a pair of bob sleds, of the alleged value of twenty-five dollars.

The defendant town issued its bonds, dated November 1, 1872, payable to the treasurer of the Green Bay and Lake Pepin Railway Co. or bearer, for $10,000, and received therefor full paid certificates'for a like amount of the capital stock of such company. Attached to the bonds were coupons or interest warrants in the usual form; and this action is to recover the amount due on one hundred of these coupons.

Replevin, commenced before a justice of the peace. Judgment for defendant, from which plaintiff appealed to the municipal court. That court dismissed the appeal, on defendant’s motion; and plaintiff appealed from- the judgment of dismissal. The facts are fully stated in the op'nion. contended that the justice’s judgment, although irregular, was not void.

The original complaint alleged that defendant was obstructing, to plaintiffs injury, the flow of a stream upon which the latter had a flouring mill, alleging a prescriptive right in plaintiff to have the water flow to her mill as it had flowed for more than twenty years past. On demurrer, the complaint was held by this court to be insufficient. See 35 Wis., 229.

Action to recover certain lands in the city of Ripon, part and parcel of the W. 1-2 of the N. E. 1-4 of sec. 21, town 16 N., range 14 E. Complaint in the usual form; answer, a general denial On the trial the following stipulation of facts, signed by the parties, was read in evidence; 111.

This action was brought by the Board of Supervisors of Douglas County against Horace S. Walbridge and others, constituting the firm of Walbridge Bros. & Sargcant, the Superior & St. Croix Railroad Company, the Northern Pacific Railroad Company and the First National Bank- of Madison.

Tbe complaint in tbis action alleges that tbe plaintiff went aboard one of tbe defendant’s'trains on tbe 16tbof May’, 1874, and stated to tbe conductor bis desire to be carried to a certain station on tbe line of tbe road, at tbe same time tendering bim money sufficient to pay his fare to that place at the rate of three cents per mile ; that the conductor accepted the money, and conveyed tbe plaintiff to a station several miles short of the one named by bim, when be informed…

Action brought in tbe police court for tbe city of Chippewa Palls. The defendant, on tbe return day of the summons, appeared specially for the purpose of moving for a change of venue, and filed an affidavit of 'the prejudice of the police justice, in accordance with the general statute relating to justices’ courts, at the same time tendering the justice a five-dollar bill from which to take his fees.

The complaint (omitting certain introductory averments) is as follows: “ That at the times hereinafter mentioned the plaintiff was and is still acting sheriff of the county of Chippewa, in the state of Wisconsin, and. as such sheriff, by virtue of one certain writ of attachment in an action then pending in the circuit court of said county, wherein Eranlc Bautin was plaintiff and Frank Blair was defendant, and duly issued by the clerk of said court, to the plaintiff directed…

This is an action brought in the police court' of the city of Chippewa Palis to recover possession of certain articles of personal property described in the complaint. The answer is a general denial. The plaintiff recovered judgment for the property claimed, and the defendant appealed to the circuit court.

The complaint originally contained two counts; but when the cause was called for trial, the plaintiffs abandoned the first count, leaving only the second, the material portion of which is as follows: “ And for a further and second cause of action, the plaintiffs allege that they are husband and wife, and were so on the 21st day of June, 1873, when the slanderous words hereinafter mentioned were spoken by the defendant, and had been husband and wife for more than three years…

This is an action of replevin brought before a police justice of the village of New London, to recover the possession of a horse alleged to have been unlawfully detained by the defendant from the plaintiff. The complaint is in the statutory form, and states the value of the horse at one hundred and fifty dollars. The answer consists of a general denial, and an averment that the defendant is the owner of the horse described in the complaint.

This action was tried at the December general term of the circuit court, and a verdict rendered for tbe plaintiff by direction of the court. Yarious exceptions were taken by the defendant upon tbe trial to tbe rulings of tbe court, and to the direction of the verdict, all of which were incorporated in a bill of exceptions; and a motion was made upon the latter for a new trial, at a subsequent special -term of said court held in another county.

The note is dated June 23d, 1871, and is for $200 payable in ñve years, with interest payable annually. The breach of condition alleged is the nonpayment of interest for three years.

This action was brought in justice’s court, and judgment rendered against the defendant company.

Action to avoid certain taxes, tax sales and certificates of sale, on lands in the county of Waupaca.

Action to restrain the issue of tax deeds, and to set aside the sale of the lands described in the complaint for the taxes assessed-thereon in 1871, and to set aside'and cancel the certificates of such sale, because of -certain alleged irregularities in the assessment and other proceedings preliminary to such sale.

The complaint in this action is substantially a creditor’s bill. It alleges the recovery of a judgment by the plaintiffs against the defendant company, the issuing of an execution thereon, and the return thereof by the proper officer unsatisfied for want of property on which to levy the same.

Ejectment, for lands in the city of Milwaukee. The plaintiff claimed under a tax deed in the ordinary form, which recited, among other things, that the premises were, on the 30th of January, 1860, sold to the city of Milwaukee for a certain sum, being the amount of taxes and charges against it at the time of sale, the whole of which sum had been “ paid by the aforesaid purchaser.” A former trial of the action will be found reported in 33 Wis., 212.

The complaint alleges that on the 15th of Octobér, 1873, the plaintiff sold and delivered to the defendant 340^-$~& tons of Straightsville nut coal, of the value, and at the agreed price, including freight and trimmings thereon, of $1,625.39; and that no part of such sum has been paid to the plaintiff. Judgment is demanded for the aforesaid sum, with interest thereon from the aforesaid date, together with the costs of the action.

<p>'Slander. (1) Words charging plaintiff with hurning up his own hop-house. (8) Willful hurning of insured building, a felony. (2, 4) Innuendo: colloquium. (5) Knowledge of defendant: nonsuit.</p> <p>1. Words merely charging a person with setting fire to and hurning up his hop-house do not naturally and per se impute to him a, felonious burning.</p> <p>2. Words not in themselves actionable cannot be rendered so by a mere innuendo, without a prefatory averment of facts which made them slanderous.</p> <p>8. The willful burning of an insured building, with intent to injure the insurer, is a felony, by sec. 8, ch. 185, K. S.</p> <p>4. The complaint avers, in substance, that plaintiff's hop-house, and his hops stored therein, at the lime when they were accidentally destroyed by fire, were insured by and for the benefit of the plaintiff, and that the female defendant, knowing these facts, and in the presence and hearing of persons who knew them, maliciously spoke the words set forth, which were to the effect that plaintiff had “ set his hop-house on fire and burned it up,” meaning that plaintiff had willfully and maliciously set fire to and burned up his hop-liouse, and had committed the crime of arson. There is no colloquium alleging that said defendant, when she spoke the words recited, referred to the fact that the hop-house was insured, and intended to charge that plaintiff burned it with intent to injure thd insurer. Qucere, whether, without some such colloquium, tt e complaint shows the -words to be actionable.</p> <p>5. Plaintiff', having introduced no evidence to show that said defendant, when she spoke the words charged, knew that his hop-house or its contents were insured, was properly nonsuited.</p>

•APPEAL from the Circuit Court for Dodge County. This is an action brought in the name of the county judge of Dodge county for the use and benefit of numerous creditors, upon an admintstratrix’s bond executed by Julia L. Prescott as principal, and T. L. Newton as surety.

It is alleged in the complaint, that on the 23d of April, 1873, the plaintiff as party of the first part, and the defendants as parties of the second part, executed- an agreement in writing, a copy of which is inserted in the complaint, in and by which the plaintiff, on the terms and conditions therein mentioned, agreed to sell and convey to the defendants certain lands and water power in the city of Appleton.

Action to set aside a general tax, and five special assessments, levied upon plaintiff’s lots in 1871, and to restrain a sale of the lots for nonpayment thereof.

Action to recover damages for injuries received by tbe plaintiff while in tbe service of tbe defendant as abrakeman on one of its trains, and when coupling cars at Clinton Junction, in tbe line of bis duty in sucb employment, The plaintiff’s hand was crushed and mutilated and permanently disabled by the sudden coming together of tbe cars which lie was engaged in coupling.

The plaintiff, a boy about seven years old, was attacked and bitten in the leg by defendant’s dog on the 7th of February, 1874, at the village of Waterloo in Jefferson county; and afterwards, during the same year, he brought this action, by his guardian ad litem, for the injuries thus sustained.

The plaintiffs are copartners in the nursery business, and brought this action to recover the price of a quantity of trees alleged to have been sold and delivered by them to the defendant upon his written order therefor, as follows : “ Dec. 23d, 1874. This certifies that I have purchased of Orawford Bros. & Go., through their agent 8. 0. Lamb, the following trees and plants at the prices annexed.

Charles McIntyre presented to the Columbia county court a writing purporting to be the last will and testament of Patrick McIntyre, deceased, and prayed that the same be admitted to probate as such. After a hearing, the county court denied the application, and the proponent appealed from such determination to the circuit court. The circuit court thereupon submitted to a jury certain questions of fact, which, with the findings of the jury thereon, are as follows: 1.

Action under sec. 29, ch. 141, E. S., to remove a cloud from plaintiff’s title.

The complaint states, in substance, that the plaintiff company, by its agent, one Thomas, agreed to furnish defendant Walther (who was about to enter upon the business of buying and selling sewing machines), with machines manufactured b,y it, for the purposes of his business ; that thereupon Walther as principal, and the other defendants as sureties, executed a bond in the penal sum of one thousand dollars, in which Thomas was named as obligee and described as the agent of…

the Circuit Court for Winnebago County. The plaintiff entered into two contracts with R. S. Dale, to furnish the latter with sewing machines to sell as a sub-agent, and H. B. Dale executed a guaranty (attached to these contracts) that R. S. Dale would “ perform his part of the contract in each and every particular.” This action was brought against JET. B. Dale, as guarantor, to recover a balance claimed to be clue from R. S. Dale for machines furnished under the contracts.

Action under ch. 56, R. S., entitled “Of mills and mill-dams.” The complaint alleges that the plaintiff is the Owner in fee of certain lands therein described, situated in the county of Jefferson, and that said lands are flowed and injured by means of a certain mill dam across Rock river below said lands, maintained by the defendants without any authority therefor, except what is conferred by an act of the legislature of the territory of Wisconsin, entitled “ An act to…

Action upon a policy of insurance against fire. The policy, a copy of which was annexed to the complaint, contained the following pi-ovision: “ The generating, or evaporating, or using within any building where this policy may apply, or contiguous thereto, of gasoline, benzine, naphtha, or of any substance for burning gas or vapor for lighting, other than the ordinary street gas or kerosene, is prohibited, unless permitted in writing hereon.” The following clause was…

The complaint in this action sets out a contract of warranty by the defendant of a certain reaping and mowing machine sold by it to the 'plaintiff, and claims damages for alleged breaches thereof. The answer admits the making of the contract substantially as stated in the complaint, but sets out additional stipulations therein contained, which it is claimed are fatal to the plaintiff’s right to recover.

The action was brought in 1860, by Curtis Seed, as a shareholder of the Manitowoc & Mississippi Railroad Company, to set aside as fraudulent a foreclosure sale, and deed thereunder to Leups, of the road, property and franchises of said company. An amended complaint was filed in 1873. The facts appear in the opinion.

The plaintiff moved the court for an affirmance of the judgment of the circuit court in this cause, with damages and costs.

The board of supervisors of Marathon county, at a meeting thereof held March 15, 1878, by resolution duly adopted, directed its chairman and clerk to execute a contract on behalf of such county with the Wisconsin Valley Railroad Company, in and by which the county should agree, on certain conditions (one of which was, that the company should construct its railroad from Centraba in Wood county to Wausau in Marathon county, by a day therein specified), to subscribe for 250…

The plaintiff having paid a judgment recovered against himself, as a surety, and his principal on a guardian’s bond, brought this action against his cosurety, for contribution. Held: in an action against the surety upon a guardian’s bond, for default of the principal, that the record of a recovery against the guardian was not admissible as evidence for any purpose. 2. The facts offered to be proved were a de-l'ense to the action.

The plaintiff, Maclora A. Barney, alleged by her complaint that she and one other sister were the only heirs of Martha Seeley, who died March 7, 1859, seized of one-half of the S. W. 1-4 of the N. E. 1-4 of sec. 1, T. 10, R. 19, Washington county, and that said Martha was a daughter of the defendants John W. Seeley and Lavina, his wife; that Martha in her lifetime-owned an undivided half of Said forty acres, under a deed from the defendants Seeley to said Martha and Sarah…

Action to recover for breach of a contract to buy a promissory note.

This action was commenced in 1878, by Orpha B. Hackett, with her husband as coplaintiff; and the relief sought was, 1. That a certain deed executed by Mrs. Hackett to the defendant, conveying land in Jackson county in this-state, might be cancelled, or that defendant might be compelled to recon-vey said land to Mrs. Hackett. 2.

The defendants compose five firms engaged in manufacturing lumber at the city of Eau Claire, in the county of the same name; and most of them reside in that city. The plaintiffs reside in Chippewa county, and are engaged in rafting lumber on the Chippewa river.

'Foreclosure of a mortgage executed by James Hiclcox, in 1868, to secure payment of a note for $2,000, and interest, the same being a part of the purchase money of the mortgaged premises. The defendant, Ada Hiclcox did not join in the mortgage.

In July, 1874, Isaac G. Mann and others recovered a judgment in the county court of Milwaukee county, against William Brunquest, for $1,787.24. Held: that the accused can be convicted on such ex parte affidavits, when he denies the contempt. On the other hand it is held that when an officer of court appears and under oath denies the contempt, or asserts that his acts were in good faith, the proceedings must be discharged.

The plaintiff in error was prosecuted and convicted in the municipal court of Madison for a violation of ch. 72, Laws of 1870, concerning hawkers and peddlers.

Action to restrain the sale of a house and lot belonging to the plaintiffs, in the city of La Crosse, upon execution to satisfy a judgment rendered against the plaintiff Nicholas Jarvais in July, 1873; plaintiffs claiming that the house has been held and occupied by them as a homestead since 1870, and that, as such homestead, it is exempt from sale on the execution. The sheriff and his deputy, and the judgment plaintiffs, were made defendants.

Over this creek, at a point in the defendant town about five rods east of the line between it and the town of Lincoln, was built, in December, 1869, by private persons residing in the latter town, a bridge known as “ Murphy’s bridge.” A road runs in a general easterly direction, from the city of Eau Claire to the pineries situated higher up the Eau Claire river.

On the 26th of November, 1872, in the evening, while the plaintiff was traveling in a wagon drawn by one horse across defendant’s track where the same crosses a highway in the city of Janesville, one or more cars belonging to defendant were thrown off from the switch engine and backed down upon the track, and struck and broke the plaintiff’s wagon, throwing him out and inflicting upon him certain personal injuries.

The complaint alleges that on the first day of January, 1874, and from thence hitherto, the plaintiffs were and are the owners in fee of a certain lot therein described, situated on the corner of Forest and Macy streets in the defendant city ; that Forest street, between Main street and the east branch of the Fond du Lac river (which includes the portion thereof in front of plaintiffs’ lot and across Macy street adjacent thereto), was graded and paved with a wooden block…

<p>CebtiORARI : (1) Does not lie to bring up judgments of courts of record proceeding according to common law. (2) Jurisdiction of supreme court over the writ.</p> <p>1. If a court of record proceeding according to the course of the common law (such as the county court of Milwaukee county) lias rendered a judgment in a cause in which it never acquired jurisdiction of the defendant, the remedy is by appeal or writ of error; and certi-orari will not lie to such a court to bring up its judgment for review.</p> <p>2. The jurisdiction of the writ of certiorari■ granted to this court by the state constitution, is limited to cases in which such a writ would have been an available and appropriate remedy at the time when the constitution was adopted.</p>

The plaintiff in error was prosecuted to conviction before a justice of the peace for an assault and battery. He appealed to the circuit court, where he was again tried and found guilty by the jury. The return of the justice fails to show that he pleaded or refused to plead to the complaint in the justice’s court; and the record shows that he did not plead or refuse to plead thereto in the circuit court.

The plaintiff is a corporation of this state, engaged in publishing a newspaper and conducting a job printing office in the city of Milwaukee.

Joseph Groodrich of Milton, Rock county, in this state, died testate in 1867, leaving him surviving his wife, Susan H. Groodrich, his son Ezra Goodrich, and his daughter Jane G. Davis. At'the time of executing his will, and afterwards until his death, said testator resided on his farm in sections 25, 26 and 27 in said town of Milton.

This action was brought to recover the amount of certain expenses incurred by the appellants in relieving an indigent person, for which it is claimed the respondents are liable.

The complaint charges that the defendant owned and kept a large and ferocious dog, accustomed to attack travelers and teams passing along the highway, which the defendant well knew; and that on or about May 1, 1874, the plaintiff was peaceably and lawfully passing along the highway in Sauk county, near the residence of the defendant, in a wagon with a team of horses attached thereto, when such dog, without warning or provocation, suddenly made a fierce and violent attack on…

Replevin, for “ a pair or set of bay scales, or scales for tbe weighing of stock, heavy loads,” etc., which are further described in the complaint as “formerly owned by one Norton • Emmons;” but the ownership and right of possession are alleged to have been in the plaintiffs since January 1, 1872.

On tbe 9tb of February, 1869, the plaintiff and one Olsen entered into a contract under seal, for the sale and purchase of certain land of the plaintiff in Dane county, which is described in tbe contract by metes and bounds, and as “ containing in all about two hundred and five acres of land.” In consideration thereof, Olsen “ agrees to pay to the said De Forest the sum of fifty dollars per acre for said premises, in the manner and at the times hereinafter stated,” and, “ in…

Action against William Runkel and George Runkel, on a note made by them January 23,1866, under their firm name of Wrr. Runkel & Co., by which they promised to pay plaintiff or order $500 on the 1st of December, 1866, with interest at seven per cent, from the first of March of that year. The action was commenced in December 1872, and the amount claimed to be due and unpaid was the full face of .the note and interest from March 1,1866.

The defendant Gurnee, on the 8th of February, 1875, gave notice of an appeal to this court from so much of an order of the circuit court entered on the 30th of January, 1875, as overruled his demurrer to the complaint herein, and authorized judgment to be entered for tbe plaintiff, and also from the judgment entered on the same day in fávor of the plaintiff and against said defendant. The respondent moved to dismiss the appeal on the ground that it was double.

<p>Equity. Fraud in, conveyance of land: Evidence.</p> <p>This court, differing from the trial court, is of opinion that there is no sufficient evidence that the purchase price of land here sought to he subjected to the payment of plaintiff's judgment against A., was paid by A., and not by his codefendant, or that the conveyance of said land to such codefendant, instead of to A., was made in fraud of A.’s creditors.</p>

The case was thus stated in the opinion of Mr. Justice Cole, as originally prepared: “ This was a common-law certiorari issued by the circuit court to bring up for review a judgment rendered by a justice of the peace. In addition to the return proper to be made to such a writ, the justice sent up a certified copy of the minutes of the evidence given before him on the trial of the cause.

Action upon a policy of insurance issued by the defendant to the plaintiff on the life of «Hudson Archibald, late the husband of the plaintiff.

After judgment had been rendered against the defendant in each of these cases {ante, p. 71), the clerk of this court refused to tax attorney’s fees as costs against said defendants, upon application made to him for that purpose. Thereupon an appeal was taken to the court from such decision of the clerk.

The plaintiff in error, upon certain stipulated facts, under the direction of the court, was found guilty of selling intoxicating liquors within the limits of the village of Princeton, without a license. It appears from the facts stipulated, that he had never obtained a license from the trastees of the village, but that he held one granted by the supervisors of the town of Princeton.

An alternative writ of mandamus having issued from this court upon the petition of the relator in this case, the respondent moved to quash the writ.

In 1849, James Kneeland was the owner in fee simple of the whole of a certain lot in the city of Milwaukee, on the west side of East Water street, having a front of sixty feet on that street, and running back about' a hundred feet to the Milwaukee river.

This action was brought against Benjamin E. Sweet and Hannibal L. Sweet, as copartners, upon two promissory notes and the balance due on an account Judgment as upon default was obtained February 26, 1874, at a special term. At the July term following, a motion was made by Hannibal L. Sweet to set aside the judgment, execution and levy, on grounds which are fully stated in the opinion.

This action was brought to recover damages for personal injuries to the plaintiff, a lad eleven years of age, alleged to have been caused by a defective sidewalk in one of the public streets of the defendant city. It appears that the plaintiff on a certain evening was passing along such sidewalk; and that he stepped., into a hole therein and Hell, thereby injuring one of his arms..

The complaint alleged, in substance, that on August 9, 1858, the defendants Klaupuch and Menzel were partners doing business in the county of Oakland, Michigan; that the plaintiff, on that day, presented to Charles C. Waldo, a justice of the peace, an affidavit for attachment stating, among other things, that said Klaupuch and Menzel were indebted to him in the sum of $300 on contract, and were not residents of Michigan, but of Ohio; and that at the same time the plaintiff…

A pair of horses belonging to the plaintiffs, having been loaned to the defendants, became sick while in the possession of the latter, and subsequently died in consequence of that sickness. This action was brought to recover the damages thus accruing to the plaintiffs. The allegations of the original complaint are sufficiently stated in the opinion.

AP-PEAL from the Circuit Court for Manitowoc County. Action to recover certain land in Manitowoc county. The summons was served on the defendant Hilbert in the jail of that county by the sheriff, who certified in his return that the defendant was insane'and was confined in such jail for safekeeping.

Action under sections 12 and 18, ch. 185, R. S., by the plaintiff as administrator, to recover damages alleges to have been sustained by Mrs. Kittie McCall by the death of her son, an infant about nine years of age, caused by the negligence of the defendant in operating 'its railway in Milwaukee, on November 28, 1872. The answer was a general denial, and a charge of contributory negligence.

In January, 1871,. Scott commenced an action of ejectment against Reese. The latter answered a general denial, and claimed title to the land through a tax deed; and also alleged that he had made valuable improvements on the land in good faith, and claimed an assessment of the same as provided by law, if it should be adjudged that Scott was entitled to judgment for the possession of the premises.

Foreclosure of a mortgage. The answer alleged that the mortgage, and note secured thereby, were without consideration, and that defendants were infants at the time of making them, and had disavowed and revoked them. Reply, that defendants had confirmed the mortgage after majority, and that it was given to secure a part of the purchase price of the mortgaged premises, which, on or about the day of its date, were sold to the defendant Jeremiah M. Day.

The original complaint, served January 21, 1875, alleged,among other things, that on November 30, 1874, the defendant Nolan, being indebted- to the plaintiff, executed to him a note for $200, payable six months from date, and a chattel mortgage securing it; that nothing had been .paid on the debt; that the value of the mortgaged property was $400, but at forced sale it would not realize more than $300, which was not more than enough to satisfy plaintiff’s demand, with costs;…

Action to recover the sum due on a note of defendant, for $788, bearing date, St. Louis, Mo., March 14, 1874, payable at the McCulloch Bank, Stevens Point, Wis., to the order of J. H. Cronkhite. The note was indorsed to the plaintiff before maturity, and was duly protested, of which notice was duly given.

Judgment is demanded for the contract price of the-wood. Answer, a general denial. The question chiefly litigated on the trial was, whether any contract was made by the parties.

The writ of error in this case was taken to review a judgment of the circuit court affirming an order of a court commissioner, upon a writ of habeas corpus, directing the discharge of Margaret Fenelon from imprisonment.

Action on a policy of insurance against fire, issued May 16, 1873, to Plorian Mecliler, upon a building occupied by him as a brewery, etc., and upon the stock therein; the risk being $1,000 upon the building, and $1,000 upon its contents.

This .action was brought to foreclose a mortgage executed by the defendant Coyle to the plaintiff. The summons was personally served on all the defendants, and all of them made default. Judgment of foreclosure, etc., in the usual form was rendered by the court, and was followed by a sale of the mortgaged premises and by confirmation of the report of sale.

The action was brought before a justice of the peace. Issue was joined February 16, 1874, and the cause adjourned, on motion of defendant, to February 23, 1874 (which was Monday), on which day the cause was tried and j udgment rendered therein for the plaintiff. On the same day the defendant filed the requisite papers with the justice for an appeal to the circuit court; but a few days later he withdrew them, and removed the cause to the circuit court by certiorari.