¶1(on motion for rehearing). While we deny rehearing on the merits, the brief of the defendant raises several points that we deem merit clarification in that they are relevant generally to disbarment and disciplinary proceedings in this court.
¶2The defendant’s brief is premised upon the misconception that this court reviews the findings of the referee and applies an evidentiary test to determine whether the referee’s findings are supported by the proper quantum of evidence. This is not correct.
¶3A disciplinary proceeding is brought as an original action in this court, and the function of the referee is that of a special master appointed to conduct a hearing under the jurisdiction of this court. While the recommendations of the referee are given consideration, we look to the record and transcript to determine whether the facts apparent therein warrant some form of discipline. To evidence revealed in the record, we apply what this court has referred to (Madison v. Geier (1965), 27 Wis. 2d 687, 135 N. W. 2d 761) as the middle burden of proof.
¶4As long ago as 1882 in In re Orton, 54 Wis. 379, 386, 11 N. W. 584, we stated that disciplinary action arising out of conduct related to a transgression of the criminal law “should be established by clear and satisfactory evidence, and cannot rest in doubtful and uncertain inferences.”
¶5The same rule was followed in In re O (1889), 73 Wis. 602, 42 N. W. 221. The burden of proof required was more recently set forth in State v. Treis (1944), 245 Wis. 479, 489, 15 N. W. 2d 309, wherein we said, “While this is a civil action, triable without a jury .... Proof of the allegations must be by clear and satisfactory evidence.”
¶6While the language used by the referee in the instant case indicated that he relied upon a preponderance of the evidence in making his findings, each of his findings was *588scrutinized by this court on the basis of the evidence of record, and the conclusions of this court are those based upon proof of the allegations by clear, satisfactory, and convincing evidence. Any statement appearing in the body of the opinion giving the impression that a lesser burden of proof was required by this court in making its own determination is erroneous and is hereby modified.
¶7The defendant on rehearing also complains that the referee, by concluding that the determination in Frick v. Howard (1964), 23 Wis. 2d 86, 126 N. W. 2d 619, was res judicata, deprived the defendant of his constitutional right of due process, since he was not a party to that case. However, the defendant overlooks his stipulation that the record in Frick v. Howard was available to the referee as evidence in the instant proceedings.
¶8The defendant was given every opportunity to refute any of the inferences that might have arisen from the record in that case. The referee’s statement also makes it clear that he did not rely on the judgment in Frick to make his finding. He stated that his conclusion was based on his own study of the factual and legal situation after nine days of hearing. He merely said that his own independent study resulted in conclusions that were not contrary to those reached by this court in Frick v. Howard. Moreover, as stated above, this court in considering a disciplinary matter, looks to the evidence ah initio and makes its independent conclusions, which in this case resulted in findings identical with those made by the referee.
¶9Nor do we find merit in the contention of the defendant that the charges against him should have been limited to those that come within the purview of sec. 256.29 (2), Stats. While certain types of professional misconduct warranting disciplinary action are included therein, the statute does not limit the power of this court to inquire into other proper charges relative to the misconduct of a lawyer. The defendant’s contention was disposed of in State v. Roggensack (1963), 19 Wis. 2d 38, 119 N. W. 2d *588412; State v. Horan (1963), 21 Wis. 2d 66, 123 N. W. 2d 488; State v. Cannon (1928), 196 Wis. 534, 221 N. W. 603.
¶10The defendant also urges that this court is authorized to impose costs only if the proceeding results in a temporary suspension of license under sec. 256.28 (13) (b), Stats. He correctly states that sec. 256.28 (13) (a), referring to the absolute revocation of a license, is silent on the question of costs. We consider, however, that the section specifically relating to costs and fees, sec. 256.28 (14), authorizes that, “The supreme court shall tax the costs including the witnesses’, reporter’s, clerk’s, sheriff’s, referee’s and other officers’ fees.” In addition, sec. 256.28 (15) provides:
“The reasonable costs of disbarment proceedings conducted under the usual practice, other than that specially provided for in this section, shall be taxed, paid, adjudged and collected in the same manner as herein prescribed.”
¶11We are satisfied that these two subsections are ample authority for the taxation of costs against the defendant. These subsections, however, do not authorize the taxing of the attorney’s fees. The mandate herein is modified to eliminate therefrom the phrase, “attorney for the plaintiff.” Inasmuch as this court previously determined that a proper assessment of the costs against the defendant would be the sum of $5,000, and the costs exclusive of attorney’s fees are substantially in excess of that figure, we reaffirm that portion of the mandate assessing costs in the sum of $5,000.
¶12The rehearing is denied.