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384 S.W.2d 332

Sipple v. Commonwealth

Court of Appeals of Kentucky

Decided November 25, 1964

Court of Appeals of Kentucky · decided 1964-11-25

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

““* * * However, RCr 11.42 does not provide, expressly or by implication, for the review of any judgment other than the one or ones pursuant to which the movant is being held in custody.””

quoted by 1 later decision, including Wilson v. Commonwealth

Relies on Moore v. Commonwealth

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1964-11-25

How this case has been cited

Cited by 4 later decisions — most recently April 2009

4 state decisions

2019641970198019902000decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

PATMORE, Judge.

¶1The appellant, William E. Sipple, a prisoner at the Kentucky State Reformatory, filed in the Kenton Circuit Court an RCr 11.42 motion to vacate the judgments pursuant to which he was committed. He appeals from an order overruling the motion on the record and without a hearing.

¶2The first two paragraphs of the motion allege matters relating to several previous convictions on which the appellant’s sentences have been completed. The apparent purpose of attacking the executed sentences is to clear his record as a prospective parolee.1 However, RCr 11.42 does, not provide, expressly or by implication, for the review of any judgment other than the one or ones pursuant to which the movant is being held in custody.

¶3The third paragraph of the motion states that the movant is now serving on sentences totalling six years imposed pursuant to two felony convictions; that in response to each of the two indictments he appeared without counsel and was financially unable to employ counsel; that the trial court did not appoint counsel for him; and that in ignorance of his rights he pleaded guilty.

¶4The Commonwealth’s response* was to the effect, that by reason of the guilty *333pleas “there was no necessity for the appointment of counsel to represent the interests of the defendant.” That proposition is not correct. He was entitled to counsel, and unless he was advised or knew of that right and voluntarily waived it the convictions were void. Cf. Moore v. Commonwealth, Ky., 380 S.W.2d 76 (1964).

¶5The third paragraph of the motion stated grounds for relief entitling appellant to counsel and a hearing.

¶6The cause is reversed for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

¶7. Whether, as a practical matter, such a result would be accomplished seems questionable. Invalidation of the former eon-victions would, of course, open the charges for new trial.

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