¶1This appeal by the Commonwealth is from the order below granting appellee Darryl G. Owen’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus and dismissing the driving under the influence charges filed against him. The Commonwealth contends that the court below erred in determining that the Commonwealth failed to establish a prima facie case against appellee in that it did not demonstrate that the alleged offense occurred on a “highway” or “trafficway” as required by the Motor Vehicle Code. See 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 101 et seq. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.
¶2On February 3, 1989, a criminal complaint was filed against appellee, charging him with driving under the influence of alcohol. See 75 Pa. C.S.A. § 3731(a)(1), (a)(4). The charges arose in connection with Owen’s operation of a vehicle in the Nittany Silver Parking Lot in University Park, Centre County, Pennsylvania, on January 27, 1989. A preliminary hearing was held before a District Justice on March 8, 1989, and Owen was bound over on the charges. Owen then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging that the Commonwealth had failed to establish a prima facie case because it did not make a showing that the offense occurred on a “highway” or “trafficway” as required by 75 Pa. C.S.A. § 3101. On April 17, 1989, the Centre County Court of Common Pleas held a hearing on the habeas petition. Thereafter, on May 18, 1989, the court filed an order and opinion granting the writ of habeas corpus and dismissing the charges. This appeal by the Commonwealth followed.
¶3We have noted that, “[i]n the pre-trial setting, the focus of the habeas corpus hearing is to determine whether *509sufficient Commonwealth evidence exists to require a defendant to be held in government 'custody’ until he may be brought to trial.” Commonwealth v. Morman, 373 Pa.Super. 360, 367, 541 A.2d 356, 360 (1988). A pre-trial petition for a writ of habeas corpus thus is similar in purpose to a preliminary hearing. Id.,373 Pa.Superior Ct. at 365, 541 A.2d at 359. And, of course, “ ‘[t]he primary reason for the preliminary hearing is to protect an individual’s right against unlawful arrest and detention. It seeks to prevent a person from being imprisoned or required to enter bail for a crime which was never committed, or for a crime with which there is no evidence of his connection____’” Id.(citations omitted). The MormanCourt also made clear that, in making this pre-trial determination, the habeas court is not limited to reviewing the evidence presented at the preliminary hearing; instead, “the Commonwealth may present additional evidence at the habeas corpus stage in its effort to establish at least prima facie that a crime has been committed and that the accused is the person who committed it.” Id.,373 Pa.Superior Ct. at 365-66, 541 A.2d at 359.
¶4The Commonwealth contends that the court below erred in concluding that it had failed to make a prima facie showing that the offense in question occurred on a “highway” or “trafficway”. Owen was charged with driving under the influence, which is a “serious traffic offense” under the Code. See 75 Pa. C.S.A. § 3101(b). Section 3101(b) further states that the provisions of the Code relating to serious traffic offenses “shall apply upon highways and trafficways throughout this Commonwealth.” The definitional section of the Code defines a “highway” as:
The entire width between the boundary lines of every way publicly maintained when any part thereof is open to the use of the public for purposes of vehicular travel. The term includes a roadway open to the use of the public for vehicular travel on grounds of a college or university or public or private school or public or historical park.
¶5Id. § 102. A “trafficway”, in turn, is defined as:
The entire width between property lines or other boundary lines of every way or place of which any part is open *510to the public for purposes of vehicular travel as a matter of right or custom.
¶7The issue presented concerns the nature of the parking lot in which Owen was stopped. Specifically, the question is whether the Commonwealth demonstrated that the lot was “open to the use of the public for purposes of vehicular travel” (a highway) or was “open to the public for purposes of vehicular travel as a matter of right or custom” (a trafficway). After meticulously reviewing the record in this case, we must conclude that the Commonwealth did not make such a showing.
¶8With regard to the sufficiency of proof required to establish a prima facie case at a preliminary hearing, this Court has noted that:
The quantity and quality of evidence presented there “should be such that if presented at trial in court, and accepted as true, the judge would be warranted in allowing the case to go to the jury.” Commonwealth ex rel. Scolio v. Hess, 149 Pa.Super. 371, 27 A.2d 705 (1942). The Commonwealth’s burden at a preliminary hearing is to establish at least prima facie that a crime has been committed and that the accused is the one who committed it. Commonwealth v. Mullen, 460 Pa. 336, 333 A.2d 755 (1975). This means that at a preliminary hearing, the Commonwealth must show the presence of every element necessary to constitute each offense charged and the defendant’s complicity in each offense. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is not required, nor is the criterion to show that proof beyond a reasonable doubt is possible if the matter is returned for trial. However, proof, which would justify a trial judge submitting the case to the jury at the trial of the case, is required. Inferences reasonably drawn from the evidence of record which would support a verdict of guilty are to be given effect, Commonwealth v. Rodgers, 235 Pa.Super. 106, 340 A.2d 550 (1975), and the evidence must be read in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth’s case. Common*511wealth v. Zeringo, 214 Pa.Super. 300, 257 A.2d 692 (1969). Prosecutorial suspicion and conjecture are not evidence and are unacceptable as evidence.
Our function is to take the facts proven by the Commonwealth at the preliminary hearing and to determine whether the sum of those facts fits within the statutory definition of the types of conduct declared by the Pennsylvania legislature in the Crimes Code to be illegal conduct. If the proven facts fit the definition of the offenses with which the appellees are charged, then a prima facie case was made out as to such offense or offenses. If the facts do not fit the statutory definitions of the offenses charged against the [defendant], then the [defendant] [is] entitled to be discharged.
¶9Commonwealth v. Snyder, 335 Pa.Super. 19, 23-24, 483 A.2d 933, 935 (1984) (emphasis supplied) (quoting Commonwealth v. Lynch, 270 Pa.Super. 554, 581-82, 411 A.2d 1224, 1238-39 (1979) (plurality opinion), aff'd in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Commonwealth v. Wojdak, 502 Pa. 359, 466 A.2d 991 (1983) (plurality opinion)); see also Commonwealth v. Wojdak, supra(to prove prima facie case, Commonwealth must show existence of each material element of charge; “the absence of evidence as to the existence of a material element is fatal.”).
¶10The difficulty here is that the habeas court was presented with no competent evidence concerning the nature of the parking lot where appellee was stopped by police. As we have noted above, the preliminary hearing in this matter was held on March 8, 1989. The district justice’s return of transcript, filed pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 146, indicates that only one witness, Pennsylvania State University police officer Jeffrey Jones, was sworn and testified at that preliminary hearing. However, Officer Jones’ testimony apparently was not transcribed, and the Commonwealth did not otherwise attempt to introduce the substance of the testimony at the habeas hearing. Moreover, the other documents attached to the return of transcript (i.e., the criminal complaint and the “arrest warrant affidavit” containing a state*512ment of probable cause), contain no description of the parking lot or other evidence regarding whether the lot was open to the public.
¶11Similarly, a review of the notes from the April 17, 1989 hearing on the habeas petition reveals no evidence concerning the parking lot.
¶12For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the order below.
¶13Order affirmed.
¶14. It is settled that the Commonwealth may appeal from an order discharging a defendant on a writ of habeas corpus. See Commonwealth v. Hess, 489 Pa. 580, 414 A.2d 1043 (1980); Commonwealth ex rel. Bryant v. Hendrick, 444 Pa. 83, 280 A.2d 110 (1971); Commonwealth v. Oeler, 357 Pa.Super. 281, 515 A.2d 977 (1986).
¶15. The transcript from the April 17 hearing is not part of the certified record on appeal. Because the official record does not contain the notes from either the preliminary hearing or the habeas hearing, we could affirm the order below simply based on the Commonwealth’s failure to provide an adequate record for us to review. See Commonwealth v. Williams, 357 Pa.Super. 462, 516 A.2d 352 (1986). We note, however, that the Commonwealth has appended an unofficial copy of the notes from the habeas hearing to its brief, and Owen does not dispute the accuracy of the unofficial transcript. Because an examination of the unofficial notes makes clear that the Commonwealth utterly failed to prove the existence of a prima facie case and because there is no dispute concerning the accuracy of this unofficial transcript, we are satisfied that reliance on it to evaluate the sufficiency of the Commonwealth’s proof at the habeas hearing is not inappropriate. Cf. Commonwealth v. Garbett, 256 Pa.Super. 488, 498 n. 8, 390 A.2d 208, 212 n. 8 (1978) (plurality opinion).
¶16. The inadequacy of the record created by the Commonwealth calls into question the accuracy of certain of its factual statements. For example, the Commonwealth asserts in its appellate brief that the lot in question "is a reserved parking lot from 5 a.m. to 5 p.m." See Brief for Appellant at 10. The suggestion, of course, is that the lot otherwise was open to the public. If this assertion was supported by record evidence, we undoubtedly would have to reverse. However, as *513noted in the text, there is no evidence regarding when, and to whom, the lot was open.
¶17. The court below did not grant the petition based on the Commonwealth’s failure to produce evidence, but instead found that the parking lot was a restricted student parking lot that was not customarily open to the public. It is settled, however, that a reviewing court may affirm a decision of the trial court if the result is correct on any ground. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Terry, 513 Pa. 381, 521 A.2d 398 (1987), cert. denied sub nom. Terry v. Pennsylvania, 482 U.S. 920, 107 S.Ct. 3198, 96 L.Ed.2d 685 (1987).
¶18. We should emphasize the limited nature of our holding. We are aware that prior decisions in this Commonwealth have held that a parking lot may be considered a trafficway for purposes of the Motor Vehicle Code. In all of these cases, however, there was a finding that the lot in question was open to the public. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Wilson, 381 Pa.Super. 253, 553 A.2d 452 (1989), allocatur denied (June 30, 1989); Commonwealth v. Baughman, 357 Pa.Super. 535, 516 A.2d 390 (1986); see also Commonwealth, Dept. of Transp. v. Bendik, 112 Pa.Commw. 591, 535 A.2d 1249 (1988). In the case at bar, by contrast, there simply is no record evidence to support such a finding.