Volume 4 — Edwards's Chancery Reports

Bill for specific performance. The complainants held a contract of purchase, (as it afterwards appeared,) and on the strength of it, and without having had any deed of the property, ventured to sell it to the defendants, agreeing that they would cause to be executed and delivered a good and sufficient warrantee deed. The case now came before the court on the master’s report of title.

Mrs. Margaret Monro died in the month of March, one thousand eight hundred and thirty-seven, seized of real and personal property. And, .under her will, the defendants, Henry Monro and John W. Monro, and the plaintiff, Asa Whitney, (who had married her daughter,) qualified as executors.

Bill filed by Lewis S. Hewlett, as administrator, with the will annexed of Charles Hewlett, deceased, to stay proceedings in a surrogate’s office which were to make him account, and have the real estate of the said Charles sold to satisfy judgments ; and also, to have such judgments satisfied and cancelled.

Question as to who was entitled to surplus monies in court. A reference was had to ascertain priorities. The surplus had come out of real estate in Henry street, New York ; and the claimants, on the reference, were George Rapelye and De La Fayette Schanck.

Judgment Creditor’s Bill. The defendants, Adams and Welsh, had made an assignment for the benefit of creditors. Part of their properties consisted of the furniture of an hotel ± j. known as Knickerbocker Hall. The complainants insisted that there had been no change of possession.

Foreclosure. Bill filed by the complainant, George Lovett, as assignor of a mortgage of real estate, for ten thousand dollars,' made to secure part of purchase money. The property was bought by the defendant, Elizabeth Racey, as trustee for a Mrs. Curtis, subject to the mortgage. It will be gathered, by the opinion of the court, that George Lovett purchased the mortgage at an under price; and that, thereafter, something was received by him for forbearance.

The hill had been filed to restrain the vending of simulated pills, as Morrison’s pills ; and, on a motion to dissolve the injunction, it had been materially modified. At the time the injunction was granted, the complainants advertised the issuing of it; and when it was so modified the defendants also advertised such modification, but accompanied it with misrepresentations as to what the court had said and decided.

Under the act entitled, “An act concerning the sale of real estate by mortgage,” passed 12th° May, 1837, which allowed redemption of mortgaged premises within one year from the day of sale, on payment to the purchaser of t'he amount bid, together with interest at ten per cent, per annum from the time of sale, the complainant, Aaron C. Burr, claimed to redeem from the defendant, Joseph C. Stanley, who had purchased the premises under foreclosure at master’s sale, on the…

Judgment creditor’s bill; and where a supplemental bill had been filed to reach furniture that had belonged to the judgment debtor, and sold'by him to the defendant, Isaac Van Amburgh, pendente lite. No receiver had been appointed. The question was, on the effect of the filing the bill as a notice. The defendant, Van Amburgh, interposed a demurrer.

Louis Plet, a colored man and the father of the complainant, had had business transactions with the defendant, Joseph Bouchaud; and in the year one thousand eight hundred and twenty-two, a settlement of accounts took place between them. Louis Plet died in the year one thousand eight hundred and twenty-three, and devised whatever estate he possessed to Jane Rose, who had been induced to assign all claim and right in the matter embraced by this suit to the complainant.

Question as to making good a loss of two thousand dollars of notes of the Bank of Buffalo which had been received by the Bank of the State of New York in the city of New York; and which the latter insisted they had, in a parcel formed of these and other notes of the Bank of Buffalo, forwarded to the latter. Further particulars will be found in the opinion of the court.

Bill for discovery and relief, to get back goods obtained, as alleged, by fraud; but assumed to be a sale by the defendant. The latter interposed a demurrer, accompanied by an answer. The matter of the demurrer now came before the court.

There had been a partnership between the plaintiff and defendants, and then a dissolution with an agreement that the defendants were to remain in charge of the properties and wind up the business.

This case now came before the court on the master’s report, and testimony taken before him on the complainant’s petition against her solicitor. The decision of the Vice-Chancellor will be found to embrace the facts fully.

<p>A master cannot charge for:</p> <p>Attendance on receiving decree of sale, $1.</p> <p>Attending printers, $1.</p> <p> For more than one copy of terms of sale or notice'of sale to annex, or for more tlian one copy of memorandum of sale for pwrchaser to sign where there is but one piece of property sold. </p> <p>Drawing receipt of payment of tenper cent., copy or duplicate, 40c.</p> <p>Drawing receipt to pwrchaser for thepwrchase-money and copy, 52c.</p> <p>Attendance to settle with complainant, $1.</p> <p>Attendance to receive punchase money and deliver deed, $1.</p> <p>Computing amownt due complainant u/nder the decree, $1.</p> <p>Attendance on this computation, $1.</p> <p>Attendauce to pay according to decree, $1.</p> <p> A duplicate beyond draft and copy of receipt for sum paid under decree. </p> <p>Attending on receiving order made on a special motion, $1.</p> <p> A charge for payment of taxes or assessments where the pwrchaser is allowed to make and does make the payment and not the master. </p> <p>Drawing receipt for taxes and duplicate, 40c. Do. do. assessment and do. 40c.</p> <p>Computing amount of surplus under decree, $1. Attending on this computation, $1.</p> <p>Underwriting {to summons) and copy, 30c.</p> <p>Drawing certificate of clerk of payment of surplus into court, copy and duplicate, 40c.</p> <p>Attendance to pay printer for publishing notice of sale, $1.</p> <p>A master can charge for:</p> <p>Drawing terms of sale, bfo., $1, and one copy 30c; and one copy of notice of sale to annex, ifo., 24c.</p> <p>Attendance to settle terms of sale, $1.</p> <p>Draft and one copy of memorandum of sale for pwrchaser to sign, 26c.</p> <p>Attendance at sale, $1.</p> <p>Commissions on $1800, proceeds of sale, $14.'</p> <p>Drawing and signing deed to purchaser, $5.</p> <p>Commissioner’s fees taking the acknowledgment, 38c. Clerk’s certificate thereto, 25c.</p> <p> Drawing receipts for the several sums paid by the master under the decree. </p> <p>Paying taxes on property sold, $2.</p> <p>Paying assessments on same, $2.</p> <p> Drawing report of sale and schedules, where made in good faith and in anticipation of being needed. </p> <p> Signing summons to settle report. </p> <p> Copies of report of sale made for parties at reguest at Gc.perfo. </p> <p>Engrossing report of sale, tyc. to file, $2,50.</p> <p>Attendance to pay, $1.</p> <p>Drawing affidavit of publication of notice of sale, 2 fo., and copy notice to awnex, and oath, 76c. (when really performed,)</p> <p>Paid printer publishing notice of sale, $4.</p> <p>Posting notices in town and coumt/ry, $2 (when actually paid as a disbursement.) Affidavit of the fact, 67c. (do.)</p> <p> Master. ^Fees6r S </p>

Exceptions to master’s report; having relation to surplus money, being a' balance on a sale in foreclosure against the defendant, Robert Perrine. This defendant, Perrine, had, on the twenty-eighth day of December one thousand eight hundred and thirty-six, made an assignment to Alfred C. Smith ; having on the fourteenth day of June preceding executed a mortgage in his favor.

Demurrer to the bill. John Gardner, by his will, after making certain bequests, devised his real estate to James Gardner, John Hyer and John Miller, trustees, upon trust, during the lives of his son and daughters, out of the rents, to uphold, support, amend and repair such real estate and pay all taxes. There were other trusts in favor of the children and their issue, coupled with power to the trustees to receive the rents.

Prior to the twenty-eighth day of May, one thousand seven hundred and ninety, Mrs. Catharine Harsen, the wife of Jacob Harsen, was seized in fee- of certain real estate.

Bill to foreclose a mortgage. The defendant, William R Gracie, was the mortgagee, but he had assigned the mortgage, with a guarantee. He demurred to the bill. His counsel, Mr. Rockwell, took the ground that the bill did not allege that the amount due on the mortgage had ever been demanded of the mortgagor before suit brought, nor was any excuse shown upon the face of the pleading for not having demanded it; and he referred to The Mechanics’ Fire Ins.

<p>This case came before the court on the following petition of Isaac L. Kip, trustee, &c.:—</p> <p>“ Respectfully showeth, &c.—that on or about the first day of October in the year one thousand eight hundred and thirty-two, Anson Blake, of the city of New York, being seized in fee of the lot of land and premises in the city of New York known as No. 4 William street, with the five story brick store then standing thereon, borrowed of your petitioner, as trustee as aforesaid, the sum of ten thousand dollars, and to secure the repayment thereof made and executed to your petitioner, as trustee as aforesaid, his four several bonds or obligations, all bearing date on the said first day of October in the year aforesaid, and each conditioned for the payment of the sum of two thousand five hundred dollars on fhe first day of October in the year one thousand eight hundred and thirty-seven, with interest at the rate of six per cent, per annum payable half pearly ; that the said An-son Blake, at the time of the making and delivery of the said four bonds and for the purpose of securing the repayment thereof did, together with his wife, make, execute and deliver to your petitioner, as trustee as aforesaid, a certain indenture of mortgage bearing even date with the said bonds, conveying to your petitioner, as trustee as aforesaid, in fee, by way of mortgage, the aforesaid lot of land No. 4 William street, with the buildings erected thereon—which said mortgage contains a clause in the words and figures following— that is to say: ‘ And further, that at all times hereafter,</p> <p>“ until the payment and discharge of the said several sums of money mentioned in the conditions of the said several bonds or obligations and the interest thereof, he, the said Anson Blake, his heirs, executors, administrators and assigns will have and keep the buildings erected or to be erected on the above described lot of ground and premises sufficiently insured against fire in some competent fire insurance company in the city of New York, such as shall be satisfactory to the said party of the second part, his executors, administrators or assigns ; and will, by way of further security, assign the policy and policies of insurance to the said party of the second part, his executors, administrators and assigns; and that he, the said Anson Blake, his heirs, executors, administrators or assigns shall and will pay all such taxes, assessments and payments as may be lawfully laid or imposed upon the above granted lot, piece or parcel of land—and in case of his or their neglect or refusal so to do, it is hereby mutually covenanted and agreed by and between the parties to these presents, that the said party of the second part, his executors, administrators or assigns may insure the same in a sufficient manner in his and their own names, but at the proper costs and charges of the said Anson Blake, his executors, administrators and assigns, and continue such insurance, from time to time, until the payment of the several sums of money mentioned in the conditions of the said bonds or obligations, and also pay such taxes, assessments and payments as may be imposed on the said premises as aforesaid ; and the said several bonds or obligations and this present indenture of mortgage shall operate as a security for the repayment of such premiums of insurance and taxes, assessments and payments and the interest thereof respectively: —-and that the said bonds and mortgage have been ever since they were respectively executed and still are in full force and effect and unsatisfied, either in whole or in part, except as to the interest which has become payable thereon. And your petitioner further shows that, on the said first day of October in the year one thousand eight hundred and thirty-two, the said Anson Blake effected a policy of insurance in the usual form with the Mutual Insurance Company of the city of New York, for the sum of four thousand dollars on the aforesaid store standing on the lot embraced by the said mortgage; and that, on the second day of the said month of October in the year last aforesaid, the said Anson Blake, in pursuance of an agreement to that effect made at the time when the said loan was effected and by and with the written consent of the said company, endorsed on the said policy, assigned in writing and delivered the said policy to your petitioner as a further collateral security for the payment of the said bonds; that the said policy of insurance hath ever since been and still is in the possession of your petitioner under and by virtue of the said assignment. And your petitioner further shows that the said policy of insurance was continued for the further term of one year, from the first day of October in the year one thousand eight hundred and thirty-three, by a certificate in writing bearing that date and made and executed by the said company. And for the further term of six months and seventeen days from the fourteenth day of October in the year one thousand eight hundred and thirty-four by a certain other certificate in writing, bearing the said last mentioned date and made and executed by the said company—a copy of which said policy and consent, &c. &c. And he further shows that the premiums of insurance on the said policy and on the said two several renewals thereof were paid to the said company by the said Anson Blake as your petitioner believes ; and that the said two several certificates of renewal were, at or about the time they respectively bear date, delivered to your petitioner as and for such further collateral security as aforesaid and ever since have been and still .are in his possession for that purpose. And your petitioner further shows that, on or about the fifth day of February in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and thirty-five, the said store, so insured as aforesaid, was totally destroyed and rendered valueless by fire, originating, as your petitioner is informed and believes, in a neighboring building : and that the damage thereby sustained exceeded, as your petitioner also verily believes, the said sum of four thousand dollars. That your petitioner, thereupon, caused due notice of the said loss in writing to be given to the president of the said company; and afterwards, as your petitioner is informed and believes, the preliminary proofs of loss required by the said policy were delivered to the said company. And your petitioner further shows that, as he has been informed and believes, the said The Mutual Insurance Company of the city of New York was an incorporated insurance company in the city of New York within the true intent and meaning'of the act of the legislature of the State of New York, entitled, “ An act for the more convenient adjustment of the affairs of certain insurance companies in the city of New York rendered insolvent by the late fire in that city,” passed January 18,1836 ; and that the said company, as your petitioner is informed and believes, was rendered insolvent by the said fire which occurred in the city of New York on the sixteenth and seventeenth days of December in the year one thousand eight hundred and thirty-five; and that, under and by virtue of the said act and pursuant to the provisions thereof, George Ireland, John Oothout and Robert Benson were, on or about thé twenty-second day of February in the year one thousand eight hundred and thirty-six, as your petitioner is informed and beliéves, duly constituted and appointed and ever since have continued to be and now are receivers of the estate and effects of the said The Mutual Insurance Company of the city of New York pursuant to the provisions of the said act and the act therein referred to; and that the said receivers, as your petitioner is also informed and believes, have recently declared, out of the assets of the said company, a dividend of eighty per cent., on all admitted and liquidated claims upon the said company and, in various instances, have paid the same to persons entitled thereto. And your petitioner further shows, that, as he is informed and believes, the said company always admitted that the loss and damage occasioned by the fire herein first above referred to, to the said insured store, exceeded the sum of four thousand dollars ; but that the said company, before its said insolvency, refused to pay the said loss : except on certain conditions with which your petitioner is advised that he ought not to comply and the said receiver of the said company, since their said appointment, although, as your petitioner is informed and believes, one of them has been applied to for that purpose at the office of the said receivers, have not issued their certificate therefor or paid the same or any dividend thereon:</p> <p>Wherefore your petitioner prays, that the said George Ireland, John Oothout and Robert Benson, as such receivers as aforesaid, may, by the order of this honorable court, be compelled to issue to your petitioner, as such trustee as aforesaid, their certificate for the amount of the aforesaid loss, discharged from any condition or obligation whatever, except such as may be common and applicable to all other admitted creditors and claimants and to pay to your petitioner the aforesaid dividend of eighty per cent, on the said amount and to make and pay to him such further dividend or dividends thereon as may hereafter be declared and paid on the admitted claims against the said company. And also your petitioner’s costs and charges on this petition to be taxed. Or, for such other and further relief in the premises as to your honor may seem meet and proper and as may be consistent with equity and good conscience. And your petitioners, as in duty bound, will ever pray, &c.”</p> <p> (Signed and sworn to.) </p> <p>This petition was met by the following affidavit of the receivers of the Mutual Insurance Company—“ George Ireland, John Oothout and Robert Benson, being duly sworn, severally depose as follows : George Ireland maketh oath that, at the times mentioned in the petition of Isaac L. Kip, he was president of The Mutual Insurance Company therein named. That, upon examination, made on behalf of the said company in relation to the loss by fire therein mentioned, it appeared that Anson Blake, prior to the fire in the petition mentioned and on the thirty-first of December, eighteen hundred and thirty-four, entered into a contract for the sale of the said premises to John Blood good, a copy of which, as the officers of the said company ascertained from the said Anson Blake, is as follows : 1 Anson Blake agrees to give J. Bloodgood ten thousand dollars for his interest in the Yan Cleef property and nine hundred per lot for twenty lots on Atlantic street Pacific and Gerretson, the following numbers : 255, 256, 257, 258, 269, 270, 271, 223, 224, 225, 280, 281, 282, 283, 294, 295, 296, 248, 249, 250, payable as follows—-the store No. 4 William street at $25,000 ; bond and mortgage of J. E. Underhill payable 1st August 1835, for four thousand dollars and his note at six per cent, interest on the whole calculation to be considered cash 1st February 1835. . ‘ John Bloodgood,</p> <p>1 Anson Blake.</p> <p>‘ New York, Dec. 31, 1834.’</p> <p>, “ The officers of the said company further ascertained, by the records of conveyances in the city of New York, that the said store, insured in the said policy, was conveyed by Anson Blake and his wife to William Bloodgood, by deed bearing date the twentieth day of January in the' year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and thirty-five expressed to be in consideration of twenty-five thousand dollars paid to the grantors, duly acknowledged on that day, and recorded the eighteenth day of March of the same year, in which deed it was contained, in relation to the aforesaid mortgage on the lot to Isaac L. Kip in the said petition named, as follows :</p> <p>‘ To have and to hold the above granted, bargained and described premises, with the appurtenances, unto the said party of the second part .his heirs and assigns, to his and their own proper use, benefit and behoof for ever. Subject to the payment, as part of the consideration money hereinbefore mentioned, of a mortgage on the premises hereby conveyed, given by the parties hereto of the first part to Isaac L. Kip, trustee, &c. for ten thousand dollars and interest thereon accruing at six per cent, per annum payable half yearly, which said mortgage is dated on or about the first day of October eighteen hundred and thirty-two and payable on or about the first day of October eighteen hundred and thirty-seven, which said mortgage the party hereto of the second part hereby assumes and agrees to pay, together with the interest hereafter due or to become due thereon, and, when paid, is to be cancelled and given up to the parties of the first part together with the bonds accompanying the same.’</p> <p>“ And he further saith, that the officers of the company understood and he believes correctly, that the said deed was executed and delivered in fulfilment of the said contract with John Bloodgood under whose right William Bloodgood received the said conveyance ; and the officers of the company further understood, and he believes correctly, that, at the time of the loss, the building was not, in fact, at the risk of the said Anson Blake, but of the said William Bloodgood or John Bloodgood; and that the claim made by the petitioner, Isaac L. Kip, was really and truly for the interest and benefit of the said William. Bloodgood and John Bloodgood : the ground comprised in the said mortgage having, at all times, been more than adequate security for the mortgage held by him. He further saith that, upon being applied to for the payment of the loss, the said company directed a letter to be delivered to the said Isaac L. Kip, on the day of its date, of which the following is a copy:</p> <p>‘New York, Dec. 16, 1835.</p> <p>‘ Sib. : In relation to the claim made in your name on the Mutual Insurance Company, for loss by fire on the premises No. 4 William street mortgaged to you by Anson Blake and the policy on which you claim to hold by assignment from him, the Insurance Company beg leave to recall to your notice that, by a contract in writing bearing date the 31st day of December A. D. 1834 between Anson Blake and John Bloodgood, the premises mortgaged were sold by the former to the latter, which sale was afterwards consummated by the due execution of the deeds. Under these circumstances, the company are advised that, as between them and Mr. Blake and Mr. Bloodgood, the premises were at the risk of the latter gentleman and not under the protection of their insurance at the time of their destruction; and that you can only claim on the ground of holding the policy as collateral to the mortgage. While they are willing to meet such claim, so far as you are in fact interested, they cannot submit to have the money applied in prejudice to them to the exoneration of the land from a charge which Mr. Bloodgood (at whose risk the property was) ought to bear.. They, therefore, inform you, that they are willing to pay the amount of the loss into your hands : upon your giving them the benefit of your mortgage for their reimbursement, after the balance of the amount of your mortgage shall be paid, to be collectedby the companyat their own expense and risk without any act on your part to defeat or impair their rights. Or they are willing to pay you the amount of your bond and mortgage, on taking an assignment thereof by which they will be enabled to test the claim made for the benefit of Mr. Bloodgood by proceedings with him directly. Or if you are desirous of keeping the money invested, according to the present terms of the investment, they will take "such assignment and give you, in return for it, the bond of the company, payable at the same periods and with the same interest as that you hold of Mr. Blake, secured by other securities of bond and mortgage equal in value, in your own judgment, to the property now held by you as security.</p> <p>Should none of these propositions be accepted, the company will be bound to conclude that your claim is put forward simply for the benefit of Mr. Bloodgood, to seek a payment to which, in his own name, he is not entitled, and will deem themselves justified in proceeding against you in chancery for the defence of what'they deem their equitable rights and shall, in each case, hope to have the expenses of such proceedings charged upon you in case their rights shall be allowed by that court. Your obd’t servt,</p> <p>George Ireland,</p> <p>Pres’t. Mutual Ins. Co.</p> <p>£ Isaac L. Kip, Esq. Trustee, &c.’</p> <p>“ With the offers contained in which letter, the said Isaac L. Kip refused to comply; and which letter contains the only conditions which the said company have ever interposed to the payment of the said loss and which the receivers are advised are just and equitable conditions.</p> <p>“ And the said John Oothout and Robert Benson for themselves say that they believe the preceding statement of George Ireland to be true.”</p> <p> {Signed and sworn to.) </p>

The complainant, Margaret Lindsay, showed by her bill, which was filed the thirty-first day of July one thousand eight hundred and forty, that about the twelfth day of April in the year one thousand eight hundred and twenty-five, a certain company, called “ The United States Lombard Association,” was incorporated by statute and did business in the city of New York. That the act by which it was incorporated was declared to be a public statute.

<p>Bill of interpleader. The complainants were'auctioneers ; and by direction of the agent of the defendant, Marie Theresa Pauline Pelletier, they advertised the leasehold property, No. 7, Barclay street, New York, for sale by public auction. The bill, after showing this, went on as follows: “ That in pursuance of the said advertisement and on the ninth day 0f March, the said premises werejmt up for sale at public auction by jmur orators at the said store and sales-room of your orators; that, thereupon, your orator Lawrence S. For-man publicly and distinctly proclaimed to the audience then present the terms and conditions of sale on which the said premises were to be sold, which terms and conditions were that ten per cent, of the purchase money should be paid down by the purchaser on the day of sale, the said ninth of March, and the balance of the said purchase money on the sixteenth day of March following, and that fifteen hundred dollars of such purchase money might remain on bond and mortgage on the said premises for the term of one year, on interest, at the rate of seven per cent, per annum. That the said premises, on such sale, were struck off to Noble K. Wolcott of the city of New York, he being the highest bidder for the same, at the sum or price of thirty-five hundred and ninety dollars, that being the highest sum bidden for the same; that, on. the same day of such sale, the said Noble K. Wolcott paid to your orators ten dollars as your orator’s fee for selling the said premises, and the sum of three hundred and fifty-nine dollars on account of the said purchase, that being ten per cent, of the sum at which they were purchased by the said Noble K. Wolcott. That your orators, thereupon, made out to the said Wolcott a receipt for the said ten per cent, of purchase money and signed the same, but the said Wolcott, either accidentally or designedly, left your orator’s store, without carrying away with him the said receipt. Your orators further show, that the said Noble K. Wolcott did not pay any other or further sum than is above stated to your orators on account of the said purchase, but refused to do so, alleging, on some ground taken by him, of which your orators are ignorant, that he was not obliged to complete the said purchase.” The bill then went on to show a demand by Wolcott of the deposit money; and that he had commenced an action for it, while the said defendant Mrs. Pelletier insisted upon her right to it. Prayer, that the defendants interplead.</p> <p>The defendant,. Wolcott, in his answer, admitted as far as the bill went, but, denied his legal liability; and stated that a tenant of the premises had misled him as to their value. The defendant, Maria T. P. Pelletier, insisted that Wolcott ought to complete his purchase ; and showed that she had tendered an assignment of the household premises so bid off at auction.</p> <p>It appeared by testimony taken in the master’s office, that James Cole, the clerk of the auctioneer, and who stood by his side at the time of sale, marked down the biddings. He testified: “1 stood alongside Mr. Forman on the stand and put down the several biddings as they were made. The figures $3,590, stating the amount at which the property was struck off, are in my hand-writing and were put down at the time the property was struck off. Mr. Forman sold the property. Mr. Miller was sick at that time. The property was sold at public auction fairly to the highest bidder. There were a great many bids. N. K. Wolcott was the purchaser, he being the highest bidder, and the property struck off to him. I wrote down the name of Mr. Wolcott in the sales-book as the purchaser; wrote it down as the clerk of the complainants and under the direction of Mr. Forman; wrote it down as soon as the property was struck off to him. Mr. Wolcott, when the biddings were closed and the property struck down, gave his name as purchaser, Wolcott. I asked for his first name, and he replied N. K. Wolcott.’ The receipt for the ten per cent, of the purchase money, namely, three hundred and fifty-nine dollars, now produced to me, was written by Mr. Forman at the time of the sale, and handed by him to Mr. Wolcott. I saw him hand it to Mr. Wolcott, and Mr. Wolcott took it from him. I don’t know what became of it afterwards; that was the last I saw of it until produced to me on this examination. Mr. Wolcott gave Mr. Forman a check on the Manhattan Bank for the amount of the deposit of ten per cent, and auction fees, amounting, altogether, to three hundred and sixty dollars ; he filled up a blank check which we had in our office. The check was handed to Mr. Forman; and I afterwards took the check to the bank and received payment of it.”</p>

In the year one thousand eight hundred and one, Henry Pritchard and Mariana, his reputed wife, emigrated from England and settled in the city of New York. It appeared that they had lived together in England as man and wife.

On exceptions to the master’s report, allowing exceptions to the answer of the defendant William H. Slosson. The judgment was obtained against the said defendant William H. Slosson ; and the other defendant Henry Slosson was made a party on the allegation that a fraudulent transfer or sale had been made to him by the former.

Exception to a master’s report on a plea of another cause pending. The master found that the former bill was “ for the same matter.”

The complainants, Ezekiel Byam, Prentiss Whitney and Seth King, were trustees for an association of persons entitled the American Patent Friction Match Company. An action had been heretofore commenced against the defendant John H. Stevens, who was the owner of certain patents for the making, &c. of matches by certain machinery.

<p>A court of chancery can interfere to protect and enforce the trusts of an assignment made by a company incorporated in another state while the person or property tó be acted upon is within the jurisdiction.</p> <p>And this might be done at the instance of a creditor provided for in the assignment or by shareholders where they are to have an express benefit under it.</p> <p>Where an incorporated company makes an assignment for creditors and no event has occurred giving shareholders any express benefit under it and its charter has not become surrendered, revoked or invalid, the shareholders cannot file a bill (which recognizes the assignment) to restrain the assignee in relation to the properties assigned. A voluntary assignment by a corporation or its insolvency or the non-user or misuser of its charter may lay the foundation for a direct application to vacate it; but, until the proper public officer of the state creating the corporation acts and a judgment or decree of a proper tribunal is had, the corporatiomremains for all the purposes of its creation and with all the legal capacity it ever possessed. field, therefore, that where an incorporated company of Maryland had assets in New York and made an assignment in Maryland, in which one of the trustees under it resided within the jurisdiction of this court, the shareholders could not file a bill, while the charter was outstanding, which recognized the trust and yet asked tire court to restrain the trustees on the grounds that there was mere virtual dissolution and that the assets had become an equitable trust fund. The shareholders should first proceed in Maryland to dissolve the corporation.</p> <p> Corporation. Incorporated Company. Insolvent Company. Rights of Shareholders in Equity. Charter. Foreign Cor por ar tion. Injunction. Jurisdiction. Assignment by insolvent. </p>

Bill filed for a construction of the will of Peter Murphy, late of the city of New York, gentleman, deceased; and for a distribution of personal property under it.

Bill filed to set aside a certain trust deed or instrument in writing, bearing date the fifteenth day of December, one thousand eight hundred and forty, executed between the North American Trust and Banking Company of the first part, and the defendants, Henry Yates, Thomas G. Talmage and William Curtis Noyes, as trustees of the second part; and to have the securities transferred to the said trustees, by means of the said instrument for the purpose of securing the payment of…

Bill for foreclosure and sale. The case came up on the pleadings.

The defendants now demurred, on the ground principally at the attorney general, who was made a party, was not necessary party.

Demurrer to the bill on the ground of multifariousness. The bill was filed by the complainant Barbara Julian Carroll, one of the children of Matthew Carroll, heretofore of the city of New York, deceased. It set forth his will, whereby he gave and devised the residue of his real and personal estate to his executors, in trust to sell and invest.

The bill was filed to reach one hundred and forty shares of the capital stock of the Mechanics’ Bank in the City of New York.

Creditor’s bill filed against Christopher Y. Wemple and Henry W. Christie, judgment debtors and against their assignees. The assignment under which the latter acted was made the twenty-sixth day of September, one thousand eight hundred and thirty-seven.

An injunction had been granted restraining the defendants, the corporation of the United German Lutheran churches in the city of New York, its officers, &c., from selling or leasing St. Matthews Church, and from disturbing or molesting the English Lutheran congregation of the said church in the use thereof, and from worshipping therein in like manner as the said English congregation were in the habit of using the same and worshipping therein at the time of the filing of the…

The contents of the bill in this case appear sufficiently in the report on the motion made for an injunction: See vol. 3, p. 571. A cross bill was afterwards filed, which will be found referred to in the opinion of the court. The decision will be understood without further reference to the particulars of the case.

Bill and Cross-bill. On the first day of May, one thousand eight hundred and thirty-seven, Otis Loomer and' Jane T. his wife made and executed to Paul Spafford, Thomas Tileston and the complainant Benjamin Wheelwright a mortgage on lots ]mown as Nos. 187 and 189, Pearl street, New York, and Nos. 1, 2, 3, 5 and 7 Cedar street, in the same city, for securing the payment of a bond for twenty-five thousand dollars and interest.

On petition for'leave to amend the bill which had been filed, under oath, to establish the validity of assignments or trust conveyances made to the complainants by the Directors of the North American Trust and Banking Company, an association under the general banking law, which had now become insolvent and over the assets of which the defendant David Leavitt was appointed receiver.

<p>The court can settle a decree without the necessity of a notice of settlement or on short notice.</p> <p>It is not regular for a master to sign his report without first issuing a warrant to settle. But, where a copy of report and order of confirmation has-been served and decree enrolled, the neglect to serve the warrant to settle will not, alone, be sufficient to open the proceedings.</p> <p>Where a decree fixes the data for computation, the master should not depart from it. Still, where a master did so and it was beneficial to the defendant, the latter could not take advantage of the irregularity. But where it was done and the execution on it was, in amount, (wrongly) against the defendant, the court put it to the complainant to relinquish the improper excess, or to consent to waive the decree.</p> <p>Where a defendant, in a bill for an account, has put in his answer without oath and does not show facts which he wishes to give in evidence or what witnesses, in particular, it will be important for him to examine, a decree, taken by default, will not be opened to give him the privilege of going back to proofs.</p> <p> Practice. Master's office. Report. Decree. Default. </p>

The bill was filed against the defendant Mr. Ralph Lockwood and others, executors of Divine Duvet, in order to reach the property in the hands of himself and his co-executors, which was alleged to have come to the hands of the testatrix as executrix of John Balbi. The bill called for an account of such property.

Bill by William Tyack, Harry Parsons, Anthony Moffat, Richard H. Tittle, William C. Neilson and William Newcomb, describing themselves as the master and wardens of the port of New York and William Hall their clerk. It set forth that the office of wardens of the port of New York was of long standing; and their duties were beneficial to the community and to commerce and the commercial marine of the port.

PETITION of Mr. John E. White to be discharged from his duties as receiver of the Chelsea Bank.

This case came up on an order to show cause why an injunction should not issue.

Decree for sale of premises, mentioning a party wall. No reference was made to it at the time of sale ; the purchasers refused to take the property; and they were let off by the court—and on the nineteenth day of April 1843, a re-sale was ordered. The master was required expressly to explain the matter of this party wall in one of the conditions of the re-sale.

Judgment creditor’s suit; and exceptions to the answer: 1st, on the ground that the bill required the defendant to answer as to property up to the time of filing his answer; and, 2nd, that he had not sufficiently set forth the value and particulars of his wearing apparel.

<p>On exceptions to master’s report. The points sufficiently appear in the opinion of the court.</p>

plus still remained in the receiver’s hands, which would go to the shareholders. A receiver had been appointed of the money, property and effects of The La Fayette Bank of the city of New York; and an order was, thereafter, entered, authorizing such receiver to pay in full, without interest, all the debts and demands of the bank. This had been done. A sur- A petition of the American Exchange Bank now came before the court, suggesting the right to interest.

The complainants (a firm) had become insolvent; and one of them, William Robinson, had applied for and he, eventually, took the benefit of the bankrupt act.

In this suit, the injunction master, on allowing an injunction to restrain the defendants from proceeding to sell mortgaged premises under a decree of foreclosure, took from the complainants a bond with sureties, conditioned to pay to the Partes enjoined such damages as they might, sustain by reason of the injunction (according to the provisions of the 31st rule.) The injunction not being sustained, the defendants obtained an order, referring it to a master to ascertain…

<p>Bill for divorce a vinculo matrimonii. On the coming in of the master’s report,</p>

Bill for foreclosure and sale of mortgaged premises. A reference had been had to compute the amounts due on the different bonds and mortgages embraced by the suit. The great dispute between the parties was, as to the extent of this amount. The case came before the court on exceptions to the master’s report. The opinion of the vice-chancellor contains sufficient of the facts to make out the principles involved.

The complainant, Charles A. Davis, showed, by his bill, that the American Life Insurance and Trust Company, a corporation created by the legislature of the State of Maryland, had, in the year one thousand eight hundred and thirty-five, an office or agency in the city of New York, under the direction and management of a vice-president and trustees and one assistant secretary.

Bill of the president and directors of the Manhattan Company (in New York) showed that about the fifteenth day of December, in the year one thousand eight hundred and thirty-five, Nathaniel G. Carnes, to secure the payment to the complainants of eleven thousand one hundred and seventy-five dollars on or before the 15th day of December, one thousand eight hundred and thirty-five, executed to them his bond conditioned for payment of such sum with interest at six and one-half…

Judgment creditor’s bill filed by John F. Delaplaine and Elijah P. Delaplaine against Miles Hitchcock, John W. Hinton and James A. Moore.

Motion to dissolve injunction on bill, answer and further answer. The facts will be sufficiently found in the opinion of the court.

Margaret Haff, by will, gave a life estate in all her real and personal property unto her daughter Sarah Ann, the then wife of William J. Ryder, the same to be for her own use anq benefit, exclusive of her then present or any future husband; and, after her decease, the real and personal property itself was to go to her children absolutely. The estate was protected by a trustee. The husband of this Sarah Ann, namely, William J. Ryder’ died ; and she married Daniel Richards.

The master had reported in favor of a plea of another suit pending. The complainants excepted; and the points were, as to the regularity of the course (by excepting) taken by them—and as to the direct point taken by the plea.

Bill filed by Nicholas Brown of Piermont, Rockland County, State of New York. It set forth the will (and codicils thereto) of Nicholas Brown, senior, late of Providence in the State of Rhode Island, under which the complainant ' was entitled as a residuary devisee; and also showed that such will, with the codicils, was proved before the municipal court being a court of probate of the city of Providence in the State of Rhode Island.

<p>Exceptions to a master’s report, allowing exceptions to the defendant’s answer—put in to a judgment creditor’s bill. Judgment recovered on the eighth day of January one thousand eight hundred and forty; ft. fa. issued the sixteenth and returnable on the eighteenth day of the same January; returned nulla bona ; and filed the twentieth day of February following. The bill was filed on the twenty-third day of March one thousand eight hundred and forty, in the usual form; and with all the common allegations of a judgment creditor’s bill in regard to property—claiming an answer in relation to the same “ as well at the time of filing the bill as until and at the time of filing his answer.”</p> <p>The defendant answered that on the twenty-eighth day of February one thousand eight hundred and forty, he did duly and according to law assign and deliver to Thomas F. Richards all his property of every nature and description, to be held and disposed of by the assignee for the payment and satisfaction of the several debts due and owing by the defendant to his several creditors pro rata; and further, that he had not, at the time of filing the bill, any equitable interests, things in action or other property of the value of one hundred dollars and more exclusive of all prior just claims thereon ; nor any amount of money, &c. [going on, following the language of the bill,] “except what may revert to this defendant after the full payment and satisfaction of all claims and demands against this defendant in virtue of the said assignment.”</p> <p>Exceptions were taken for insufficiency, mainly on the ground that while the defendant showed he had made an assignment for creditors, yet, it did not appear that the complainant’s debt was provided for; and, also, that the defendant should have answered as to property up to the filing of his answer. The exceptions were allowed by the master.</p>

Bill against some of the members and the representatives of other members of a joint stock association, formed under articles of agreement dated the twenty-eighth day of September in the year one thousand eight hundred and thirty-five, for the purpose, as therein expressed, of purchasing, selling and improving real estate in the city of Pittsburgh and its immediate vicinity and for no other purpose,” and called the Pittsburgh Land Company.

Exceptions for insufficiency and impertinence had been taken to the defendant’s answer; and he had submitted to those which were taken for insufficiency.

Judgment creditor’s bill against Jacob Vanderpool (the debtor) and Frederick S. Vanderpool, to whom he had assigned certain leasehold premises. A decree was had; and thereby the assignment was declared fraudulent and void and the assignee, Frederick S. Vanderpool, was ordered to join in assigning to a receiver, who had been duly appointed. A motion was now made for an attachment against the defendants, the Vanderpools, for not executing a transfer to the receiver.

The bill in this case, filed by John G. Coster, showed that one Jerry Cowles offered, by letter, to sell, to the Oswichee Land Company, twenty-eight thousand acres of land in Georgia for one hundred and sixty-eight thousand dollars, payable in the company’s bonds at one, two and three years, to be guaranteed by the complainant, John G. Coster; the said Cowles to be interested in one-fourth, and to guarantee to the company that the lands should sell, within five years, for…

Exception to master’s report on exception for insufficiency taken to an answer. The exception to the pleading was unskilfully drawn; and ’

A reference is necessary to the case of Dyett and wife v. The North American Coal Company, 7 Paige’s C. R. 9 and 20 Wendell’s R. 570, for a statement of the facts out of which this suit arose.

This case will be best understood from the petition of Edward B. Leefe and Caroline M. his wife, which was presented to the chancellor and referred by his order to the vice-chancellor to be heard.

A lease was dated on the twenty-first day of November, one thousand eight hundred and thirty-nine; but possession under it was not to commence until the first day of May v j thereafter, (one thousand eight hundred and forty.) It was made in favor of Michael O’Connor for the term of twenty-one years. Prior to his getting it, judgments had been docketed against him; but, before he went into possession, he assigned the lease to the defendant Joseph O’Connor.

Motion on the filing of a bill for an injunction to restrain the Long Island Rail Road Company from constructing a tunnel through Atlantic street in the city of Brooklyn; and from running cars there when completed. The bill was filed by a party owning property on Atlantic street; and was founded on the idea of nuisance, and prayed a perpetual injunction. Affidavits were annexed to it.

Mortgage case; and where a receiver was appointed tó take the rents and profits of the mortgaged premises, on account of the insolvency and subsequent bankruptcy of the mortgagor. As, after a sale, the amount was insufficient to satisfy the sum due to the complainants, they now presented a petition that the receiver should pass his accounts and pay over the money in his hands to them, in order to make up the deficiency.

Oliver Ames had filed a judgment creditor’s bill against Horace St. John and George Withered; and the present complainant had been appointed a receiver therein. Mr. Richard M. Kimball was the solicitor for the complainant in the original suit; and he was also appointed on the papers as solicitor for the present complainant (the receiver.) It appeared too that the solicitor for the judgment debtors was the same as for the present defendant.

Petition of John L. Mason, trustee, appointed by the court to execute trusts contained in the will of Marcella O’Neil, deceased. It set forth such will, containing the following clauses: “ Item.

Application to dissolve an injunction on bill and answer. The facts producing the principle in this case appear in tbe opinion of tbe court

Case of exceptions to a master’s report, having reference to exceptions taken to an answer to a bill of discovery. The opinion of the court sufficiently illustrates the points reported, without necessity of any reference to the pleadings.

The defendants, Edward Poppe and Charles E. Poppe, were commission merchants in the city of New York. The-complainant, three or four years ago, came to this country from England; and was introduced to the defendants as suitable persons to whom to consign a large quantity of sherry wine. On his return, he consigned to the defendants, in three shipments, about twelve hundred dozen of wine, valued at ten thousand dollars, on which Messrs.

<p>This case involved questions touching the validity and consequent effect of certain instruments on the properties of a married woman.</p> <p>By the original bill, the complainant, Henry D. Cruger, showed that on the 29th day of June 1833, he was united in marriage in the city of New York with the defendant Harriet Douglas; and that, from that period to the present time, they had continued to live together as man and wife, except as thereinafter mentioned; and that, during such living together, they were inhabitants of this state. That at the time of their marriage, and for many years previous thereto, he was engaged in the practice of his profession with such success as to enable him to live in entire independence and with every prospect of an increasing and lucrative business. That his wife, at her marriage, was in possession of or entitled to a large personal estate, amounting to $100,000 and upwards, and real property estimated to be worth $60,000 and upwards; and that she now was the owner of and entitled to an estate, which, if properly managed and reduced into possession, was believed to be worth $400,000 and upwards : of which $250,000 consisted of personal property. That, on his marriage, he became absolutely entitled to and invested with so much of the estate as was personal and the income of so much thereof as was real for life or during the marriage. That immediately after the ceremony of the marriage had taken place, he, of his own accord, executed and delivered the following settlement of the property to which his marital rights had thus attached :—</p> <p>“A marriage having been solemnized between Henry D. Cruger, Junior, and Harriet Douglas, by means whereof he has acquired at law certain interests and rights in her property, the said Henry D. Cruger, Junior, hereby freely, fully and unreservedly releases and conveys all the estate, both real and personal, heretofore owned by her or which she may hereafter acquire, and all his right, title and interest therein, to George Douglas, William Douglas, James Monroe and Robert Halliday, and to such substitutes as she may from time to time appoint, jointly and severally in trust to hold and keep both the principal and interest thereof during the said marriage, exempt from his debts, contracts or control, to be managed and disposed of on her separate orders or receipts or by her deeds or will, so that she may enjoy and dispose of the same as it came from her parents and sister or may hereafter in any manner accrue to her in all respects as if she were unmarried. In witness whereof the said Henry D. Cruger, Junior, has hereunto set his hand and seal, at the city of New York, this twenty-ninth day of June in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and thirty-three.</p> <p>Henry D. Cruger, Jr. [l. s.]</p> <p>“ Signed, sealed, and delivered, in presence of</p> <p>“ Benj.x McVickar, 496 Broadway, New York.</p> <p>“ William Moore, Col. College, New York.”</p> <p>The complainant also showed that the marriage settlement or instrument in writing under seal, having been so made and executed, was thereupon delivered to the trustees named therein or one of them then present and the contents thereof were immediately made known to the wife who, thereupon, surprised and gratified, of her own accord, in consideration thereof, verbally gave the complainant, in return, the entire income of the estate for life, in the presence of two of the said trustees and of others then present, who were specially called by her as witnesses; of all which the complainant was shortly after informed by the said trustees. That it was his full intention, in thus surrendering the property he had become entitled to by his marriage, to continue his professional pursuits at large, irrespective of his wife’s fortune ; and that, as this gift rested in parol and was not reduced to certainty, he in no degree relied or acted upon it until one of the trustees, Robert Halliday, of his own motion brought the subject to the attention of his wife and represented to her the danger of leaving matters in so loose a state, as the declarations at her wedding would no longer operate even as a nuncupative will. Whereupon she signed •and delivered the following order in duplicate, one to the trustees and the other to her husband :</p> <p>“ Bloomingdale, 15th July, 1833.</p> <p> To Robert Halliday, Esq., </p> <p>As acting trustee and agent of my property, you are hereby authorized and requested to pay to Mr. Cruger, upon his written order or receipt, the income of my estate as it accrues.</p> <p>Signed with all the heart of</p> <p>Harriet Cruger.”</p> <p>Which order, direction and appointment was made and delivered by her of her own accord and was in confirmation and fulfilment of the gift made on the evening of their marriage. The complainant charged, that by virtue of the order, direction and appointment so made and confirmed, he became absolutely and irrevocably entitled to the whole income of the estate, whether in possession^ or otherwise, for and during his natural life ; and that it was so received and understood by his wife, by himself and by the trustees, with the sole qualification that it was to be paid as it accrued—the power thus given him to receive the income being competent to his wife to confer under the settlement and there being no authority to revoke it reserved in the instrument creating the power. That in order further to insure the income to him for and during his life, his wife shortly afterwards, to wit, on the twenty-fourth day of the same month, made and executed and ^delivered to him a certain other appointment in the nature of a last will and testament under seal, whereby she gave and bequeathed the principal of her property to her collateral heirs and the income thereof she gave to him for his life. And he averred, that at the instance and through the persuasion of his wife and upon the faith and credit of the disposition of the income thus made by her in his favor, the same being abundant for all their wants, without his following any longer a laborious and engrossing occupation, he gave up his profession and withdrew from business in general; and, at the request of several members of his wife’s family and of herself, devoted much time and labor to the recovery, improvement and management of their several estates, being six in number and of large amounts respectively, investigating, arranging and promoting the interests of the estates thus entrusted to his care, ascertaining, rectifying and adjusting the books, vouchers and accounts belonging to them for periods of from six to eleven years and examining and putting in order the muniments and proceedings appertaining thereto during that space of time. And that, in further discharge of the office he had thus undertaken, he, in the spring of 1834, embarked for Scotland, to look after what had been left them by an uncle twenty-five years before; and, being clothed with full powers of attorney, he remained six months abroad for that purpose ; during which time he saved and recovered for their estates, including that of his wife, very large sums of money, which he transmitted to this country and had invested at seven per cent, interest, instead of from two to three per cent., at which it had been lying there for a quarter of a century. That previously embarking on this mission, he deposited in his wife’s hands the order she had given him as above stated on the trustees of her estate for the income and, also, the deed of appointment in the nature of a last will and testament which she had executed to carry out the same object as before mentioned. That in course of the correspondence which ensued between them in a letter of July 16th, 1834, she said:—“ The interest of all my property you shall have as long as you live.” But that before he returned home he wrote to her under date of 29th September following, to explain that his purpose in leaving the order and will with her was to put it at her option.to cancel the one and revoke the other ; and that if, on his return, he found this done, he would resume the practice of his profession at large. That so far from availing herself of this opportunity or giving the least intimation that she wished the disposition of the said income made thereby should be in any way changed, shortly after his return she restored the order to his possession and he went on to receive the whole income under it, as theretofore, from the trustees. That on or about February 14th, 1835, she made and executed and delivered to him another deed of appointment, in the nature of a last will and testament, to the same purport and effect, in respect to the disposition of the said principal and income, as by the one previously made, the latter being supposed to be defective. And he submitted that the same was further proof of the understanding and intent on the part of his said wife that, while the principal of her estate was to pass to her brothers and sister, the entire income was to be his for and during his lifetime. And he averred that he had, at all times, been willing to abide by and carry out this agreement in perfect good faith; and that all he had ever asked for was that the counterpart of the contract as to the income should be kept in like good faith. In proof whereof, he proceeded to state that when the sum of $10,000 was awarded him in compensation for his services rendered to the estates whose interests he had been attending to, although the amount had been hardly earned and was all he was worth in the world and he had many better purposes to which he would gladly have appropriated it without adverting to his wife’s large fortune or stopping at the consideration that it had been laid out as much for her benefit and enjoyment as his own, he called on the trustees to ascertain and report any excess beyond the income they might have expended since their marriage ; and on being certified that they had gone beyond it to the extent of $2,785 22, he immediately, in June 1835, replaced that amount in the hands of the trustees, to make good the principal of the estate. So, also, out of this fund, at the same time, he paid off to the trustees the sum of $1080 60, being principal and interest of money loaned by them on bond and mortgage to his uncle, Henry N. Cruger, because he considered the debt as then desperate. And he repaid to William Douglas (his wife’s brother) the sum of $1000, borrowed from him shortly before for the purchase of horses for her use ; and, moreover, applied $1000 towards defraying current family expenses. All which was done to make good the capital of the estate, in consideration of and upon the faith of his having the whole income for life. That considering and believing this arrangement to be certain and final, upon the strength of it he determined to avail himself of the greatest advantage the possession of wealth can give ; not idleness, but choice of occupation. That accordingly he made preparations to retire altogether from a profession he had long followed (not from preference, but on principle) and to embark actively in agricultural pursuits and, at the same time, to enter upon public life. That, in pursuance of this plan, with the full knowledge and approbation of his wife, he undertook the management of a large landed interest belonging to her estate, consisting of from 12 to 1500 acres, situate in Herkimer county in this state ; and against his own judgment and wishes, but to gratify her, he erected and furnished an appropriate residence on the spot, selected and according to the plans designated by herself, but, of course, for their joint use and benefit during life. That he was given the possession and control of this property with the full knowledge and concurrence of the trustees also and carefully and laboriously devoted himself to its management and improvement, whereby he soon doubled the rents and enhanced its value at least one-third; and would, by this time, have made it yield from seven to ten per cent, instead of its present income of about three per cent, on its marketable value. Also, that, in like manner, whenever the opportunity had been afforded to him, he had uniformly added to the substantial and permanent value of the capital of his wife’s property, although well knowing that, under the understanding above set forth, the fruits of his exertions were to enure, not to himself or to his heirs, but for the benefit of those who did not want it, who were making no returns even in favor of his wife and for whom he was suffering constant disparagement at her hands. Also, that on a subsequent misunderstanding with his wife as to money matters, notwithstanding all that had taken place, he instantly tendered to her again the order for the income of the estate j thereby, by his own act, making it optional with her to revoke it and, in that event, proposed to resume the business of his profession; instead of which, she gave him a confirmation of the order in the following form:</p> <p>The whole income of the property I derive from my father and uncle, to be paid under the order to you, spent by you for our mutual benefit and a general account kept for me, if I call for it. The rents of the Herkimer lands to be paid me; the rest of the proceeds of my share of my sister’s fortune to you, for your own sole use and no part or account of it ever given back to me. These will beacon-firmed by orders to my trustees.</p> <p>Staten Island, 29th June, 1835.</p> <p>Harriet D. Crtjger.”</p> <p>For H. D. Cruger, Esq.”</p> <p>And that to make no difficulties, he assented to this modification of the original order, but that, subsequently, his wife, from his having acted under it in one particular, in an entire mistake as to facts, but without asking any explanations or giving him the slightest notice, recalled the order from her trustees; and directed the agent to pay the income to herself, declaring, then, for the first time, that she had always intended the order to be revocable. After remonstrating against this breach of good faith and the intolerable state of incertitude and dependence to which it-subjected him, he acquiesced in the revocation ; but declining to occupy a position of false appearances, he left their expensive residence and taking accommodations suited to his own circumstances, invited his wife to join and share with him whatever his professional earnings might acquire. In consequence of this a long discussion ensued, in the course of which she wrote to him under date of July 27th, 1836: “Ihave but two clear and distinct wishes, as regards my property, namely, that you should enjoy with me and after me the entire income of it and my heirs the entire principal.” And, subsequently, she herself referred all matters in difficulty to the umpirage of William Bard, Esq., conjointly with Captain John Whetten. Against the interposition of the former he protested in writing, on the ground of his being his uncle ; and was willing that her own relatives, to whom he had already referred every thing, should make an adjustment; but, his wife waiving the objection, full information was laid, on both sides, before the arbiters and their decision was embodied in a letter from Mr. Bard to Captain Whetten, to the following effect :</p> <p>“ 27th Nov. 1836.</p> <p>My Dear Sir,—I agree in the views expressed by you, “ this morning; and in the spirit of the proposition you left with me in writing. I hope our friends, forgetting entirely the past, will live the residue of their lives in affectionate harmony. A bystander would say they have happiness within reach—permit me to hope they will not reject it. It is proposed and I understand Mrs. Cruger assents, that the debts to the estate of Mrs. Cruger, which have- accrued by loans to Mr. Cruger’s family, shall be the property of Mr. Cruger and that the debts so created to the estate shall be paid by a sum taken out of the semi-annual income, to be accumulated until the whole debt is paid. Mrs. Cruger’s wishes should be complied with on this point; though, knowing no use she can have now or in future for money, but to promote her own pleasure and happiness and that of those around her, I would advise her not to sacrifice either nor even her convenience to an imaginary duty, to those whose wealth puts them far beyond the need of her assistance. If, in the deduction of seven per cent, semi-annually, she thinks she will not feel the want of income, there can be no objection to retaining it—but she must agree to live within the remaining income; and to do so, I would not advise her to refuse herself the gratification of a wish, purchased by the giving up the seven per cent, to the object she has in view. I do not think it worth the sacrifice of a wish. With the above deduction, the remaining income and, after the debt is paid, the whole income should be divided into two parts, over one of which (whenever desired by her) Mrs. Cruger should have the absolute control and over the other Mr. Cruger should have the absolute control during his whole life; and this should be put, by legal papers, on such a footing that neither party can ever alter or amend this disposition of the income and not be left to a mere understanding between the parties. There will be no permanent peace unless this is irrevocably fixed and such papers drawn and executed as may be necessary for the purpose. It should be an understanding on the part of Mrs. Cruger, but still leaving her the final control over half the income, that her husband shall have the management of her whole income, to spend it for their mutual comfort and support, without accounting for the manner in which “ it is spent, further than may be done and, where there are right feelings, is always done, in the mutual confidence between man and wife in whatever concerns their mutual interests. Whether Mr. Cruger receives the income or whether an agent receives it and deposits it in his name, can be a matter of no consequence; some expense may be saved if he does it. I see no other difference in the two modes.' In giving the above opinion, I have endeavored to free myself from partialities of all kinds and to give such counsel to two individuals, in whose happiness I feel a deep interest, as I think is most likely to secure it.</p> <p>Truly yours,</p> <p>(Signed) William Bard.”</p> <p>And the complainant further stated that, with this decision, he was, at the time, perfectly satisfied, although it was an interference with his wife’s absolute gift of the whole income and withdrew one half of it from his ownership; still, it was reasonable and fair and consistent with the relationship of husband and wife—he therefore acquiesced in it, hoping that it would lead to certainty and permanent peace. And he insisted that his said wife was bound to submit implicitly and to carry out, literally, this decision of her own chosen arbiters, made upon a full hearing and unqualified submission of all matters in controversy. On the contrary, she wholly refused to comply with the award of the said umpires—and in particular, she declined executing the legal papers considered by the referees so indispensable to secure the object of all parties; and in lieu thereof, addressed a letter, under date of November 30th, 1836, to her sister, Mrs. Elizabeth Mary Monroe, in which she used the following language : “Know then that, though the offer has been twice rejected by Mr. Cruger, I now assign to him, willy nilly, all the evidences I hold, not- only of the advances made to Messrs. N. and L. Cruger, but those to himself, his sister, his brother-in-law, his uncle, and his uncle-in-law, which, on reference to Mr. Halliday, I believe you will find is getting over $40,000. The most of this, my dear sister, is out of the principal of my estate ; but you (the only one of my three heirs who know my circumstances) have urged me to it. Of myself, I never would have signed away or even compromised the collateral birth-right; you, George, and William, have—and when the post-nuptial settlement was made, I thought I had secured them. I also mean to relinquish my plan of reserving a per-centage of my income to gradually restore the sums taken from my principal, which would have (had I lived long enough,) again given you the unimpaired whole I had received by my birth-right. Thus Mr. Cruger remains in the full possession of my whole income, lessened only by the non-payment of interest by some of those of his family, to whom he has made loans. I never will sign any other papers than those that are signed, my will, and my revocable order; but I have said to Mr. Whetten, and will say to all those who deserve the respect, when you see me revoke that order (let Mr. C. act as he will,) you may give me up, for I will then be given up of God !’ Mr. C. in signing the settlement, has signed the only paper in my favor I ever will receive from him; that secures your rights, in which are wrapped up my duty to my deceased parents. And now to this solemn paper I put my name.</p> <p>(Signed,) Harriet Douglas Cruger.”</p> <p>On which paper was moreover endorsed :—</p> <p>“ I truly believe my sister is sincere in the declarations made in this letter, and that she will strictly adhere to them throughout her life.</p> <p>(Signed,) E. M. Monroe.”</p> <p>“ I have entire confidence in the above sentiments.</p> <p>(Signed,) John Whetten.”</p> <p>That the said letter was put into his hands as a substitute for a regular deed and as having the same validity in honor and good conscience. But, warned by the prophecy of the arbitrators, that there would be no permanent peace if matters were left to a mere understanding and not irrevocably fixed by papers necessary for that purpose and apprehensive, himself, from the experience of the past, that it was a dangerous power to leave in his wife’s hands, he, at first and for some time, was reluctant to receive so informal a document—but being urged by his wife’s relatives and considering that the faithful performance of the stipulations it contained were guarantied by her own and only sister and by her venerable friend and chosen adviser, and by an im- ■ precation of her God, for the sake of peace and in the hope that, by indulging her humor, he would conciliate harmony, he, at length, acquiesced and again abandoned his intention of returning to the bar, and went on with the mode of life he had preferred, the permanent profits of which were to redound to his wife’s heirs.</p> <p>That the loans to his family, referred to in the above recited decision of the arbiters, and thus absolutely assigned by his wife to him, whether he would or not, consisted ;— 1st. Of advances made to his brother, Lewis Cruger, to enable him to purchase a sugar plantation in the state of Louisiana. These amounted to $20,060, the re-payment of which was secured by bond and mortgage on the property— and the debt he believed to be perfectly safe, although it would occasion the entire sacrifice of the property, were the said mortgage enforced at the present time. 2d. A loan to Nicholas Cruger, also a brother, of $10,000, to enable him to enter into mercantile business in New York; for which, having become unfortunate in business, he was entirely unable to respond. 3d. The sum of $1500, loaned to his uncle Henry H. Cruger, on his bond, secured by mortgage on a house and lot in the village of Angelica, and 362 acres of land in the county of Alleghany, state of New York. This debt he believed to be safe. 4th. A bond given by him, to the trustees of his wife’s estate, for $9,500, to cover all other advances from the principal for loans to his relatives and expenditures beyond income up to the period of its date, to wit, June 29th, 1836. The loan to his uncle, Henry N. Cruger, of $1000, had been paid off, as above stated. That these loans were made at the instance and on the free-will offer of his wife, who had always taken full credit for them, as acts of kindness and liberality on her part; that they were, moreover, arranged with the knowledge and concurrence of her acting trustee and agent, Robert Halliday; the persons to whom they were made, always giving every security in their power. And that the complainant, although not called upon in each instance, except that of the loan of $1500 to Henry H. Cruger, became himself responsible, by either giving his own bond or joining in those given by the other parties—thus fulfilling, conscientiously and to the letter, as far as in his power, his share of the agreement to preserve the principal of the estate untouched, in consideration and on the faith, as he expressly alleged, of his receiving the whole income during his life. That, although his wife had repeatedly given him the bonds and mortgages above mentioned, as declared in her letter to her sister, he always declined receiving them, on the ground that it was a departure from the understanding between them that he was to have nothing of the estate but its income : and he had always been willing, so long as this portion of the agreement was kept in good faith, to abide by its reciprocal obligation. But he submitted that, failing this consideration, he was fully entitled to the benefit of whatever deviations might have supervened in his favor. That, considering the arrangement last made as final and such as he might rely on under the circumstances with implicit confidence, he went with his wife to pass the summer of 1839, at their country residence in Herkimer county, during which time he was actively and effectively occupied in the improvement of the property under his management, in the well assured expectation that he was to reap the fruits of his labors, at least during his own day and generation. That in the fall his wife left him, to make a visit to her brother on Long Island and to prepare their residence in town for the winter—and in preparing to follow her, in order to pay off the workmen on the place and the bills contracted during the season for family expenses, he drew upon the agent of the estate in town, through a bank in the neighborhood ; which draft came back protested for non-acceptance, although there would have been abundant funds in his hands to meet it at maturity. That, at this time, Francis Brown was agent of the estate, who stated, by letter, that he had received instructions not to pay him the quarter’s income next accruing, but to appropriate it in a different channel : and hence it was that the draft had been dishonored and he was left destitute of the means not only of meeting the engagements he had entered into on the faith and credit of having the whole income at his disposal, but of funds to defray the current expenses of his household. Upon inquiry, he then ascertained that the order to the agent, thus diverting the income from his control, was given by William Douglas and Robert Halliday, two of the trustees, at the instigation of his wife, but without the concurrence of the other trustee, James Monroe, whom they did not venture asking to join in so outrageous an act, although he had previously been co-operating with them and was at the time in the city if not in the very house where and when the said order was signed. And thus the complainant, after all that had passed, was made to feel that he was at the mercy of the capricious monied tyranny of, not only his wife, but, at second-hand, of the trustees also. And he averred that his actual though not direct revocation of the Order in his favor ¡for the whole income took place in his absence, without consulting his convenience or giving him the slightest notice ; and was made on a mere pretext of paying off the interest on a debt due by his wife’s estate to that of her sister Margaret Douglas the younger, deceased—although that estate was at the time indebted to his wife’s in a much larger sum. He then insists that whilst the Order on the trustee to pay him the income of the estate was in force, which his wife had so solemnly and explicitly pledged herself never again to revoke, it was not competent for her trustees, nor even herself, to interfere with any part of the said income, nor to divert a dollar of it from his hands for any purpose whatever ; and that this could be done only by a violation of good faith and by a breach of a positive contract. And when it was thus done, he earnestly remonstrated with his wife and with her trustees and appealed to her own family and friends to rescue her from a course of conduct so perfidious and dishonorable and her husband from a state of such harassing and degrading insecurity and dependance. Whereupon she gave to her brother-in-law and trustee, James Monroe, full authority to arrange matters as he might think proper and advisable,—engaging to abide by such arrangement when completed. And in earnest that she would do so, she placed in his hands an order or stipulation, of which the following is a copy :</p> <p>“New York, 26th October, 1839.</p> <p>James Monroe, Esq., 28 Park Place:</p> <p>Dear Sir :—I hereby give to my husband, Mr. H. D. Crecer, the power to draw the whole of my present income as it accrues during his life.</p> <p>(Signed,) Harriet D. Cruger.</p> <p>“ The above is different from my former order one syllable of a word—that was meant to be revocable, this is irrevocable.”</p> <p>And the complainant insists that this order, thus given, was an admission that she had, as far as in her power, revoked the former order and that this was all that was necessary as a remedy for any difficulties. Being clothed in this way with plenary authority, Mr. Monroe wrote to him to inquire what settlement would meet his views ; and in answer, he declined expressing any wishes or opinions whatever upon the subject, preferring to leave the whole matter to his wife and her friends—only asking, that whatever was done should be done in a definitive and permanent form, so that he might know what he had to depend upon and the only real cause of difficulties in his married life might be taken away finally and for ever. And, at the same time, he released and absolved his wife from all previous promises and engagements, and offered, if she chose to withdraw the whole income from him, to acquiesce—and, even then, to go to work and provide for himself as best he might.</p> <p>That thereupon, the said James Monroe had a deed prepared, which was duly executed by Mrs. Cruger and acknowledged by her before a commissioner, on an examination separate and apart from her husband, as her own free and unbiassed act, in the words following:</p> <p>“ Know all Men by these Presents, That I, Harriet Douglas Cruger, the wife, of Henry D. Cruger, Esquire, for divers good causes and considerations me thereunto moving, and by virtue of my marriage settlement with him, and of every power and authority enabling me so to do, have settled upon, and limited and appointed to, and by these presents, do settle upon, and limit and appoint to my said husband, all and singular the net annual or other periodical income of my present property and estate, both real and personal, which is now in the hands and under the control of my trustees under the said settlement, to have and to hold the same unto my said husband, for and during the rest, residue, and remainder of his natural life, to and for his own use and benefit; meaning and intending to except from the said settlement hereby made my share in the income of my mother’s estate and in that proceeding from my rights in law and equity under my sister Margaret’s will.</p> <p>In witness whereof I have to these presents set my' hand and seal this second day of November in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and thirty-nine.</p> <p>Signed Harriet Douglas Cruger, [l. s.]</p> <p>Sealed and delivered in presence of</p> <p>William J. Porctor,</p> <p>Jas. Monroe,</p> <p>Robert Halliday,</p> <p>George W. Strong,</p> <p>William Bard.”</p> <p>Which deed so executed in the presence of her relative, William J. Proctor—her trustees, James Monroe and Robert Halliday—her solicitor, George W. Strong—and her former umpire, William Bard—was forwarded to him by her then umpire, chosen and empowered by herself, the said James Monroe, as an instrument made in good faith and for the best of purposes, valid, binding and conclusive; and was so received by him, who, immediately on its coming to hand, executed, acknowledged and remitted to the said James Monroe an obligation of the following purport:</p> <p>“ To George Douglas, William Douglas, James Monroe and Robert Halliday, and their successors s</p> <p>By deed of appointment, bearing date the second day of November, one thousand eight hundred and thirty-nine, my wife, Harriet D. Cruger, having settled upon me for life, all and singular the net annual or other periodical income of her present property and estate, both real and personal, which is now in your hands and control as her trustees, under her marriage settlement, with the exception of her share in the income of her mother’s estate and of her rights in law and equity under her sister Margaret’s will: Now know ye, that I, Henry D. Cruger, for divers good causes and considerations me thereto moving, by these presents do authorize and empower you, as trustees of the said estate, to retain and pay over to the said Harriet D. Cruger, for her own use and benefit, as often and whenever during her lifetime she shall in writing so require, and upon reasonable notice to me given, so much of the said income thus appointed and settled as will, with what she has above reserved to herself, constitute one-half of the whole income of her estate for the time being.</p> <p>In witness whereof I have hereunto set my hand and seal this fifth day of November, one thousand eight hundred and thirty-nine.</p> <p>(Signed,) Henry D. Cruger, [l. s.]</p> <p>Sealed and delivered in presence of</p> <p>Jonas Cleland,</p> <p>Lawrence Harter,</p> <p>Ephraim Tisdale.”</p> <p>That his motive in thus securing a half of the income to the ulterior disposal of his wife was not from any doubt but that she was bound to give him the whole, but simply because the arbiters, whose decision in 1836, she herself had set at nought, had recommended that this should be done; and he was desirous of enjoying the approbation of his wife’s family and friends and, if possible, of rendering her satisfied. He admitted, however, that he did at the time express his regret and that he has always regretted that she, in any instance, has not fulfilled her obligations of honor and truth in giving him the entire income and that, on this occasion, she kept back part of that income and limited the appointment to that of her then property.</p> <p>That nine or ten days after the deeds had been so exchanged between James Monroe and himself, his wife wrote to him that her referee entirely approved of the arrangement effected; and the more so because he had acted so handsomely in returning a portion of what had been conveyed to him and that she herself would abide by it literally. Notwithstanding all which, when he came to town to reside with his wife, he found she had left their home and gone to live with one of her brothers: giving it out that she would not live with her husband so long as he retained the deed prepared, executed and delivered to him, even under all the above recited sanctions. That he, thereupon, made use of all the arguments and persuasion in his power and availed himself of the intercession of her own friends, to the utmost, to induce her to return to her duties and reside ,with him. But finding it all in vain, he made the following endorsement on the deed:</p> <p>“ Know all Men by these presents, That I, Henry D. Cruger, for divers good causes and considerations me thereto moving, do hereby cancel and surrender this deed and release and relinquish all right, claim and interest under and by virtue of the same. Witness my hand and seal, at the city of Washington this 22d day of February, 1840.</p> <p>(Signed) Henry D. Cruger. [l. s.]</p> <p>Sealed and delivered in presence of</p> <p>Franc’s Stoughton,</p> <p>John Bard,</p> <p> James Monroe.” </p> <p>And thus, for the fifth time, he gave up the whole income; and, although thrown out of his profession and connexions in business, by his wife’s treacherous conduct, he went forth penniless into the world afresh, to earn that honorable independence he had always enjoyed before marriage through his own exertions and to obtain the means of supporting her apart from her own property and to pay off the liabilities he had incurred to her estate as above mentioned; intending, whenever he had it in his power, to offer her a home, to invite her to enjoy, with him, all the rights and considerations due to a wife by the feelings of nature and the laws of our country, regardless of birthright, hard earnings or collateral heirs.„ He next shows, that, although the only obstacle she pretended to be in the way of living with her husband was thus removed, by his cancelling and returning the deed, as above stated, yet his wife never came near him, nor made any arrangements for their living together. On the contrary she not only, by her course towards him, exposed him to all manner of suspicions and slanders, but busied herself to injure him by all the means in her power ; and, with this view, entered into a correspondence with his brother-in-law, Gen’l James Hamilton, with whom he was then residing in Charleston, South Carolina; in the course of which correspondence, however, she wrote to said Hamilton, on March 14th, 1840, as follows: •</p> <p>“ At present, I will confine myself to giving you the explicit answer you want for the question you propound; and to informing you of how I am acting and mean to act, under the annulled deed. This I wished to do, the moment it was returned; but my sister advised me to give it a little more consideration. You say ‘ he has, with a liberality and magnanimity which few men, under similar circumstances, would have practised, given up a legal claim, guaranteed by the solemn sanction of a deed, to the whole income of your estate.’ Now, sir, when the time arrives, that this magnanimous act puts the income again in my power, which cannot be till the debt due the younger children and the one I claim as trustee to my sister’s estate, are paid, I intend to order it paid to Mr. Cruger: and, he refusing, it shall be offered to any other member of Mr. C.’s family who will take it. For I will not touch a dollar of it again, nor have I done so since I gave the deed: living on money borrowed from the remainder of my sister Margaret’s estate, undivided, secured by a mortgage on this house.”</p> <p>That whilst remaining in Charleston, arranging his plans with the advice of his friends, either to emigrate or to establish himself in some business, information was received that, in consequence of his wife’s separating herself from him and his having left New York, all sorts of injurious reports and suspicions were afloat concerning him; such as, that he had squandered all his wife’s fortune—that he had gone off with a large amount of it in his possession—, that he had been unfaithful to her and had ill-treated her. All which were utterly untrue. That he came back to the city of New York in June, 1840, prepared to re-unite himself to his wife. But, on his arrival, found that instead of waiting for him, she had, to avoid him, gone off shortly before to her country residence—where she remained apart from him and without his consent during the summer. Thereupon he occupied himself in refuting the misconceptions and suspicions he found rife in relation to his conduct as a married man and in reference to his wife’s property. And, whilst so engaged, as was natural, the mediation of mutual friends was offered to bring about a re-union between his wife and himself. And, he offered to leave matters to the decision of his wife’s sister, Mrs. Monroe, of her cousin, Mrs. Eliza C. Kane, and of her friend and agent William Whetten, Esq.: but she refused her concurrence in such reference and again placed herself in the hands of William Bard, Esq., above mentioned, authorizing him to do as he thought proper.</p> <p>That Mr. Bard, in consequence thereof, but believing it impossible, from the representations made to him by her, that they could ever live together again—and yet considering that he, the complainant, was entitled to some indemnity, at least, for the serious injury he had sustained in giving up his profession on the faith of the gift to him of the whole income of the estate—had a deed prepared and executed, in the words following:—</p> <p>“ Know all men by these presents, that I, Harriet D. Cru-' ger, the wife of Henry D. Cruger, Esquire, by virtue and in pursuance of the power and authority in that behalf contained in my post-nuptial settlement with him and by virtue and in pursuance of every other power and authority enabling me so to do and for divers good and sufficient causes and considerations me thereto moving, have irrevocably assigned, transferred, limited and appointed and in and by these presents, I do irrevocably assign, transfer, limit and appoint to my said husband, for and during the rest, residue and remainder of his natural life, out of the net income of my separate fc*une and estate, a clear and net annuity of three thousau_ 'liars a year, free of all and any abatement and deduction whatsoever, payable quarter-yearly, in four equal instalments ; that is to say, on the tenth days of August, November, February and May, in each year—commencing the first instalment immediately upon the execution and delivery of these presents. Which annuity is not to be construed as impairing or in any way affecting any provision which I have made or which, at any time or times hereafter I may make for him, in and by my last will and testament or other instrument of appointment in the nature thereof. And I hereby fully authorize and empower him, immediately on the receipt of these presents or at any time thereafter and on the tenth day of every November, February, May and August thereafter, to draw at sight on my trustees or the agent of my estate for the time being for the said sum of seven hundred and fifty dollars; which drafts, so to be drawn by him, I do hereby fully authorize and direct my said trustees or agent for the time being to duly honor and discharge upon sight thereof. And I do hereby assume upon myself the collection of all debts, dues and demands due or belonging to me or to my estate; and I do hereby fully acquit, exonerate and discharge the said Henry D. Cruger his heirs, executors and administrators of and from all debts, dues, claims and demands now due or owing by him to me or my said trustees or estate and all further or future responsibility or liability touching the same or any parts or part thereof.</p> <p>In witness whereof I have to these presents set my hand and seal this seventh day of September in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and forty.</p> <p>(Signed) Harriet Douglas Cruger. [l. s.]</p> <p>Sealed and delivered in presence of</p> <p>Moses Shaw.</p> <p>(Acknowledged before a magistrate in Herkimer County, the seventh day of September, 1840.)</p> <p>That when this deed was sent to him by Mr. Bard, he returned it to him, with a remonstrance against its going into operation, on the grounds that it was not a fulfilment of his wife’s promises, but a departure from truth and moral obligation—that it was a deed for separation and not for union. But, as Mr. Bard declined interfering any further, he consented to receive the said deed, inasmuch as it embodied the principle of making him secure and independent ; and, in the hope that by acquiescing, in such an arrangement even, he would be able to live with his wife and at peace ; he immediately went to her at her residence in Herkimer County—and this, the sole, real obstacle in the case, being adjusted all other difficulties vanished—and they were re-united and returned and took up their residence together in the city of New York for the winter. That, being thus limited to but about one-fifth of the income, immediately on his return to the city he re-opened his office and resumed the practice of his profession, which he has assiduously followed to the present time; attending diligently to whatever business had been entrusted to him, in the sincere desire to increase his means. But in this he had, as he was apprehensive, failed almost entirely; both because he had been out of business for so long a time and because, as the community cannot comprehend why his wife should be locking up her large property or keeping it for heirs who do not need it from a husband who does and against whom she has nothing to allege, they cannot be made to believe that he is in any want of their custom. He next showed that, under this division of the income, his "wife received and disposed of the rest of it as she pleased and often in large sums against his advice and approbation. And, although she would not live with him, while the arrangement made between him and the aforesaid James Monroe, by which he was entitled to one-half of it, was in existence, yet, when his share was reduced to a fifth, she was content to do so; and they resided together, for a period of ten months and upwards harmoniously and as a man and wife should do. During which time she never, even by a revocable order, authorized him to receive anything beyond what the last deed of appointment gave him, notwithstanding all her avowals, protestations and pledges that he was to have the whole income and that she never would take any part of it back nor use a dollar of it herself, except as derived through him as her husband. Nevertheless, he neither interfered nor complained under what he could not but consider as wrong in her and disparaging to himself, but continued the pursuit of his business and the discharge of the duties of life, faithfully and conscientiously, wishing to make any pecuniary sacrifice in the hope of living with his wife in harmony. That, during the continuance of this state of things, doubts having arisen on the subject of his wife’s power of making a will which would be a valid disposition of the income arising from her real estate and from the portion she was entitled to in her mother’s property the said will, made as hereinbefore stated, was submitted to her solicitor, George W. Strong, Esq., who gave it as his opinion that the bequest to him of the income from the real estate was void ; and that, although she had the power of giving the principal what she-was entitled to under her mother’s will to him, she could not, by the terms of that will, dispose of the income of such portion in favor of any one. That, on reading this opinion, his wife appended to it the following remarks, in her own handwriting and signed by her and delivered the same to him as declaratory of her intentions, as they had always and still existed:</p> <p>“New York, 29th January, 1841.</p> <p>It seems, by the above opinion, that the intention of my whole life, namely, that ‘ my husband should enjoy, to the end of his life, the entire income of my estate,’ would have been defeated, by complying with that husband’;. wish to have his settlement post-nuptial, if I had died before the accidental discovery of the danger—I say danger only, because I think my brother; and my sister would never have interfered with the le.ittii: of such intention—when they know so well its srirs or ths years of my life, since I was fifteen recommending him to this knowledge, I believe I m Ji:’f leave him to the stead of his caution, ante-nuptial. mother’s will authorizes me to dispose of the capital o- dry share of the property r but my own will, as above declared, forbids my availing myself of this authority, except in favor of her descendants; and their respect {or my loyal wish that the one who had stood in that relati/jn towards me, should, as my other self, enjoy, with me -and after me, all the part of my mother’s estate or any estate I consider belongs to any one, namely, the income, I must submit; and not defeat her intention. George, William and Betsey Mary Douglas will never institute against my husband for taking the whole benefit I wished to leave that husband. Their wives or husband may: when he must defend himself; as we did against uncle James’ sons-in-law and George against his brothers-in-law.</p> <p>(Signed) Harriet Douglas Cruger.”</p> <p>That, while thus living with his wife, of a sudden and without any previous mention to him of the subject, by her or her trustees, he was served by Frederick De Peyster, Esquire, then and now agent of the estate, with a copy of an order, signed by the trustees, George and William Douglas, dated March 19th, 1841, requiring him to collect all arrearages of interest upon the bonds and mortgages belonging to the estate and, in case it should become necessary, to foreclose the said mortgages and to collect both principal and interest—the said order having reference to the bonds and mortgages given by the complainant’s relations to the estate, as hereinbefore particularized. The said bonds and mortgages were in the complainant’s possession and had been so ever since the assignment of them by his wife, in her letter to her sister of November 30th, 1836.</p> <p>That, when the call upon him was persisted in to deliver them up, all he required, after asserting his right to them, was a written order from his wife; and, immediately upon its being produced, transferred the custody of them. And he submitted that the object for which he parted with the possession of the said bonds ana mortgages having failed, the property in them remained in him an¿ they should be re-delivered to him accordingly. The complainant, also, stated that his said wife, of her own accord and voluntarily, executed a deed, a copy whereof is subjoined :</p> <p>Know all men by these presents, that I, Harriett D. Cruger, the wife of Henry D. Cruger, Esquire, by virtue and in pursuance of the power and authority in that behalf contained in my post-nuptial settlement with him and by virtue and in pursuance of every other power and authoi-ity enabling me so to do and for divers good and sufficieiqt causes and considerations me thereto moving, have irrevoX cably assigned, transferred, limited and appointed and, in and by these presents, I do irrevocably assign, transfer, limit and appoint to my said husband, for and during the rest, residue and remainder of his natural life, the one equal half part of the net income of all and singular my separate fortune and estate, both real and personal, commencing on the first day of November instant, inclusive. Which provision hereby made for him by me is not to be construed as impairing or in any way affecting any provision which I have made or which at any time or times hereafter I may make for him in and by my last will and testament or other instrument of appointment in the nature thereof. But, the provision hereby made is to be accepted by him and is intended by me in lieu of the provision of an annuity of three thousand dollars, which I made for him in and by a certain instrument, executed under my hand and seal the seventh day of September in the year one thousand eight hundred and forty. And I do hereby fully authorize and direct my trustees under the said settlement or the agent for the time being of my estate to pay to the said Henry D. Cruger the . said equal half part or moiety of the net income of my said fortune and estate, during the residue of his natural life. And I do hereby assume upon myself the collection of all debts, dues and demands due or belonging to me or my estate. And I do hereby fully acquit, exonerate and discharge the said Henry D. Cruger his heirs, executors and administrators of and from all debts, dues, claims and demands now due or owing by him to me or my said trustees or estate and all further or future responsibility or liability touching the same or any part or parts thereof. In witness whereof I have to these presents, set my hand and seal this nineteenth day of November in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and forty-one.</p> <p>(Signed) Harriet Douglas Cruger. [l. s.]</p> <p>Sealed and delivered in presence of (the word “ fully” on 1st page, was interlined before execution.)</p> <p>Wm. L. Morris,</p> <p>Wm. Douglas,</p> <p>Eliza G. Douglas.</p> <p>(Acknowledged before a commissioner of deeds the twentieth day of November, 1841.)</p> <p>That, during the summer and fall of 1841, being compelled to remain in town to attend to his business, it was his wish and he requested his wife to stay with him—but she left him and went to the house he had built in Herkimer county and in this, to gratify her, he acquiesced in the first instance. But, on a second occasion, when she had returned home, he forbad her leaving him again; notwithstanding which, in the beginning of September she, a second time, departed for the country and had ever since lived apart from him—thus not only holding four-fifths of the income of the estate at her separate disposal, but exempting herself entirely from the aúthority and personal control of her husband. And it was whilst she was so beyond his influence and when he had not even seen her for a long time that she executed the deed of appointment last above set forth. . Which deed was prepared by George W. Strong, Esq., then and for a long time previous the solicitor and confidential adviser of his wife and of her trustees—who, before .it was executed, submitted a draft of it to him, who candidly stated his objections to it. But he was informed unless this deed was accepted none other would be executed—and that, on a surrender of the one in his possession, this would be substituted in its place; upon which he consented to receive the latter, and in consideration of its delivery to him, as a valid and complete instrument, he accordingly gave up, in exchange, the one appointing him $3,000 a year from the income of the estate for life. That, after the existing deed of appointment was delivered to him, he applied to the agent of the estate for a balance sheet, by which he could become informed what the half of the income amounted to. And although he had repeatedly himself and through his - solicitors made similar applications to the agent and the trustees, they refused to furnish him with a copy of said accountant’s report or to give any information concerning the estate in their charge subject to the operation of the said deed of appointment in his favor.</p> <p>That although the trustees, through their agent, with the full knowledge and consent of his wife, had, from time to time, during the past twelve months, made payment to him under the deed and had, in various other ways, recognized, acted on and confirmed the same, yet the trustees had recently wholly refused compliance and had repudiated the contract, sometimes pretending that it was void as having ■been made under a post-nuptial settlement and at others, that it was defective because the trustees were not parties to it and especially that it was not valid, as having been procured by duress and coercion. All which he denied.</p> <p>The complainant charged that the present trustees of the estate had been and were wholly regardless of their duty to manage it well and make it as productive as possible; and that there was a large amount of the capital of the estate lying dead or producing inadequate returns and much of its income in arrears and uncollected. And, in particular, he designates:—1st. A large tract of land in the state of Virginia. 2d. Three lots near Fourteenth-street in the city of New York. 3d. The great body of the land in Herkimer county.</p> <p>But chiefly, that his wife became entitled on the 29th of June, 1840, under the will of her mother, the late Mrs. Margaret Douglas, to an annuity, payable semi-annually, of from 3 to 4,000 dollars a year; which the trustees had hitherto neglected to gather in from the trustees of Mrs. Douglas’ estate, although the said estate had at all times been abundantly able to pay it. Also that his wife was entitled to receive from the estate of her late sister, of which she, with the said George and William Douglas, were trustees, a large sum of money amounting to $10,000 and upwards. And that his wife had a just claim against the said George Douglas, for between 50 and 70,000 dollars, for a disproportion of their uncle’s estate, irregularly obtained by him.</p> <p>That one of the trustees appointed by the complainant in his post-nuptial settlement, Robert Halliday, was dead; another of them, James Monroe, had resigned and been released from the trust; and that the said George and William Douglas were the sole remaining trustees. That the complainant named them originally as such merely out of compliment and expressly created the trust, joint and several, that they might not be, except in the last emergency, called onto act. For that, indeed, they were wholly ignorant of business, and entirely incompetent to perform the duties of trustees; in addition to which, they occupied the incongruous relation of cestuis que trust also, inasmuch as their sister, besides making her will to that effect, had uniformly declared that the principal of the estate in their charge, was to be theirs, after the death of herself and husband.</p> <p>That after the deed, appointing to him one half of the income, had been delivered to him, as above mentioned, he continued to occupy the house that had always been the residence of his wife and himself in the city of New York, in readiness to receive her, whenever she chose to return home; but that she refused to do so, and persisted in living with one or the other of her brothers. That, upon going to the/ south in February, 1842, of his own impulse and with the advice of his wife’s sister he addressed to her a kind and affectionate letter, which he left in the hands of the Rev’d. W. W. Philips, by whom they were married, urging her to return home and be there to welcome him when he came back. This letter, his wife refused even to receive; notwithstanding which, he, before starting on his return, wrote another letter, addressed to Mrs. Monroe, to be shown to her sister—pointing out the duties of a wife, the serious injuries she was inflicting on him and the sin she was committing herself, and entreating her to be at home to receive him; but it was all in vain. And he, finding that she could not be prevailed upon by any appeals to feeling, to reason or to a sense of duty, determined no longer to live in the house alone and, therefore, notified the' trustees of the estate, in due season, that he should not continue to occupy their town residence after the first of May ensuing—and that they might either sell or rent it, as would be most advantageous to the income. In like manner, and for the same purposes and none other, he had given up to them possession of the house in Herkimer county: reserving to himself the right, in each instance, of occupying either or both of them whenever he might think proper, in the event of their not being so disposed of. And holding them, the said trustees, responsible for whatever ought to be the avails to the estate. At the same time that the complainant thus declined to live alone in these houses, he avowed his readiness to occupy them with his wife; declaring that, although he should not compel her to live with him, he never would himself consent to a separation and expressed his decided disapprobation of her residing in them without him; considering it but proper, if she withdrew from his protection, that she should remain under that of one or other of her brothers. In despite of all which and in defiance of his just authority as her husband, his wife had passed a great part of last summer by herself in the house in the country: and was now living apart from him. That he had at all times been ready to live with his wife, in performance of his duty, faithfully and kindly, according to their marriage contract, the laws of the country and the precepts of their religion; but that she had wilfully and maliciously deserted and perversely and obstinately avoided him and refused to fulfil her matrimonial obligations—thereby depriving him of her society, destroying their home and grievously injuring his feelings, his rights and his. character. And he averred and charged that there was no just reason or cause whatsoever why his said wife should be unwilling or refuse to live with him. That he was no party to any deed or contract made subsequently to his cancellation of February 22d, 1840; but had accepted of them or acquiesced in them, whether for a fifth or a half of the income, for the sake of that union and harmony which he had not found in return.</p> <p>That he had been advised by his counsel that the post-nuptial settlement, hereinbefore set forth and therefore insisted, that said post-nuptial settlement was wholly void and repugnant to the revised statutes of the state of New York and of no force or effect upon his rights as the husband of the said Harriet D. Cruger; and that he was entitled, as such husband, to the full and entire possession, control and ownership of all the personal estate in any manner owned or claimed by the said Harriet D. Cruger and also of all the income, rents and profits in any manner arising out of the real estate of which the said Harriet D. Cruger was seized or possessed or of which the said George Douglas and William Douglas, as such trustees as aforesaid or otherwise were seised or possessed for the use and in the right of the said Harriet D. Cruger.</p> <p>That there were in the possession of his said wife various letters written by her to him at sundry times; and also many other papers and documents, which were delivered to him and which were afterwards loaned to her, under the express promise by her that the same should be returned. That there were also in the possession of the complainant’s wife many other letters, papers and documents which were or might become material to the matters in controversy. That he could not particularly enumerate the said letters: but that, among the said papers and documents, were the two wills made by her, the one on July, 24th, 1833, and the other on February 14th, 1834; the note, order or memorandum in writing delivered to James Monroe, as aforesaid, on 26th October; and the deed of appointment bearing date November 2d, 1839 ; the opinion given by George W. Strong, Esq., with the note or remarks endorsed thereon by the complainant’s said wife bearing date January 29th, 1841 y the letter of William Bard, Esq. to Captain John Whetten dated November 27th, 1836: all of which the complainant submitted should be produced or accounted for and such of them as were his property restored. And that he had also frequently and in a friendly manner applied to the said George Douglas and William Douglas to render an account of all the estate, real and personal, whereof they had charge, as such trustees as aforesaid, and of the rents, profits and income thereof; and to pay him over s.uch portion thereof and let him into the enjoyment of such parts as by the deed of appointment thereinbefore last recited he was entitled to, being the one-half or moiety thereof.</p> <p>Prayer : That an account be decreed to be taken of the said trust estate; and of what the same was now composed. And that an account might also be decreed to be taken of the persona] estate; and that, whatever balance should be found due, might be decreed to be paid to the said complainant.</p> <p>And that the said post-ntiptial settlement be decreed to be void and insufficient to bar the rights of the complainant to the free and entire possession, control and enjoyment of all the personal property belonging to the said Harriet D. Cruger, as well such personal property as was owned by her, at the time of her said marriage, as aforesaid, as all other personal property since acquired by her, by increase or otherwise, whether standing in her name' or in the names of her trustees, for her use and benefit, or in the name of any other person whatsoever, for her use and subject to her control. And that, if the court should deem said post-nuptial settlement to be good in part and void in part, then that this court might decree that said settlement be thenceforth null in such parts as to the court the same should seem invalid and objectionable ; and that he be restored to all his rights, as the husband of said Harriet D. Cruger, in all such portions of the property of said Harriet D. Cruger as were not affected or controlled by said settlement.</p> <p>And that the said George Douglas and William Douglas, acting as trustees under the said settlement, be enjoined from further interfering with said property and be decreed to account.</p> <p>And that the said George Douglas and William Douglas let the complainant into the possession and enjoyment of the real estate belonging to the said Harriet D. Cruger.</p> <p>And that the trustees of the estate might also be enjoined and restrained from proceeding, in any way, to collect the debts contracted to the said estate, as hereinbefore stated, by the complainant’s relatives or by himself on their account. And that the said trustees be decreed to assign the said bonds and mortgages to him in due form.</p> <p>That in case the said trustees, in the opinion of the court, should have full power and authority, under the post-nuptial settlement as aforesaid, to act as such trustees, that they be directed and required forthwith to proceed to demand and recover from the said George Douglas the property in his hands belonging to' the complainant’s wife—and that they collect in the same with all due diligence and invest it; and that they be decreed to convert all of the principal into productive property and to manage the same so as to yield the most income ; and pay whatever arrearages of the income of the said estate might be outstanding. And that a receiver be appointed. And that the said George Douglas and William Douglas might be enjoined from collecting, &c. And that the said George Douglas and William Douglas might be removed from being trustees, under the said marriage settlement. And for further relief.</p> <p>The defendants, Mrs. Cruger and George and William Douglas put in a joint and several answer. It admitted the marriage.</p> <p>The defendant, Harriet D. Cruger, denied that the complainant, on his said marriage, became entitled to or was invested with the personal estate or the income of her real estate for life or during the said marriage.</p> <p>The said defendant, Harriet D. Cruger, further answering said, that previously to her acquaintance with the complainant and in obedience to the opinions of her parents, now deceased, she formed a resolution to keep secured, in any event, to her own use, during her life, the income of her whole estate; and to transmit the principal thereof unimpaired to her next of kin and heirs at law; and never, freely or willingly, departed therefrom in any particular. That prior to any offer of marriage the said complainant and this defendant had conversed concerning the practice of settling the fortunes of married women to their own separate use; and, in such conversations, the complainant expressed great aversion to such practice and asserted that the husband ought always to possess an absolute control over the wife’s property. That the said complainant, in the year 1823, made to the defendant a proposal of marriage, which she, for the time, declined; and assigned, as one reason, his opinions in relation to the settlement of the fortunes of married women. That in the year 1826, the tsaid complainant máde another proposal of marriage; and in making such proposal, amongst other things, addressed to this defendant, in writing, the following language: “ Nor do I know or have I ever inquired what property you may be possessed of or how it is situated ; and I should be most reluctant to forego my present independence, with no other expectation than to exchange it for a dependence upon that property, be it much or little ; which, though I might wish it to be placed beyond the reach of misfortune, I could not brook to be beyond the pale of my control; since I should deem myself competent to its charge, if esteemed by others worthy to be entrusted with your person and your happiness.” And this defendant finding, by the terms of such last mentioned proposition, that the complainant’s said opinions were unchanged, she returned an unequivocal rejection. That within a very short time after such last mentioned proposal, she departed on a visit to Europe. That whilst she was absent in Europe, the said complainant visited her in Scotland, England and France. And that, on those occasions, he renewed his said proposals of marriage. That this defendant steadily adhered to her said resolutions—and, in the most express and distinct language, announced her fixed determination never to contract matrimony with the said complainant, unless on the condition of her whole estate being duly settled to her own use in such manner as to exclude a husband from acquiring any right over any part thereof or any of the income thereof. That at the city of London, upon an evening in the month of November, 1829, the complainant did, whilst in company with this defendant and several other persons, privately place in the hand of this defendant a small piece of paper, on which was endorsed in pencil writing, “ I live for your happiness and within which was written, in pencil, the following words, “ The property to be conveyed to trustees. The income for the joint use of the parties and of the survivor. The principal for their children ; the eldest son to bear the surname of Douglas.”</p> <p>That the said pencil writing produced a renewal of discussion, whereupon this defendant expressed to the said complainant her entire dissent from the kind of settlement, in case of a marriage between him and this defendant, suggested in said pencil writing.</p> <p>That such discussions were from time to time still continued, until the said complainant, in London, in or about June, 1839, expressly relinquished his said objection to a settlement of this defendant’s estate and income to her separate use; and agreed that that point should be deemed settled and at rest and that, in case this defendant would marry him, all the property of this defendant, real and personal, and all income thereof, should be vested in trustees, in such manner as the laws of the state of New York required and permitted and as counsel should reasonably advise for securing the whole principal and income to the separate use of this defendant, during such expected coverture, free from any control or interference of the said complainant and excluding him from acquiring any right, title or interest in any part thereof or of the income ; and that she should be vested, notwithstanding such coverture, with the fullest powers of control and disposition. That, at the time of making such agreement, he observed that his sole objection to such settlement was his repugnance to admit himself to be unworthy of confidence ; that if the settlement to be executed should be executed before marriage, it would be published to all who might see it on record; that full confidence had not been reposed in him; and he, the said complainant, therefore, requested this defendant to consent that the formal instrument required to make such settlement effectual might be executed after and not prior to such marriage. And she acquiesced in such request—stating, at the same time, that although she was willing that the said settlement should he made in the manner most agreeable to his feelings, yet, she would expect it to be made in a proper, legal and binding way.</p> <p>That, in several conversations subsequently and prior to the said marriage, the same agreement was, in general terms, recognized by him as the basis of his suit for the hand of this defendant. And the same continued to be in full force at the time of such marriage; and had never since been can-celled or rescinded. That the said complainant obtained the consent of this defendant to the marriage on the express condition that such agreement should be observed and performed by him. And she assented to the marriage in full reliance on such agreement and in performance thereof on her part. That almost immediately after the marriage ceremony had been performed, Mr. Robert Halliday, now deceased, announced to this defendant that the said complainant was about to execute a settlement of her property to her separate use-—and invited tnis defendant into the next room to hear it read. And immediately thereafter the said complainant read over to this defendant the said deed of marriage settlement, bearing date June 29th, 1833, in the said bill of complaint set forth and delivered the same to one of the said trustees then present. That she was not surprised at the making of such deed of marriage settlement, as in said bill untruly suggested; although she was somewhat surprised at the time and place selected for the making thereof. She denied that she did, on that day or evening, verbally or otherwise, give to the said complainant the entire income of her estate for life or any part of such income or anything else whatever ; or specially or otherwise call two of the said . trustees or any person or persons whomsoever to witness any such gift, or any gift whatever, from this defendant to the said complainant. And she wholly and absolutely denied the allegation in said bill contained touching the gift therein alleged to have been made by her to the said complainant in return for such settlement deed. But she said that after the said deed was executed, she, then and there, did request the said Robert Halliday, James Monroe and other persons then present, to bear witness to her declaration that if she should die that night or before having an opportunity to make a will, it was her will that the said complainant should enjoy the income of her property during his life. And that she did not, on that evening, make or intend to make any gift or disposition in favor of the said complainant, other than a verbal or nuncupative last will, to take effect at her death in case he should survive her; and she then and long before well knew that wills were revocable; and that she used that revocable form of disposition in conformity with her said long previously conceived determination not to give to her husband any right or title to her property as long as she lived.</p> <p>And this defendant denied that the said complainant named the said George and William Douglas as trustees out of compliment or otherwise—for she herself named her said brothers to the said complainant to be such trustees.</p> <p>That the said order on Robert Halliday dated “ Bloomingdale, 15th July, 1833,” was signed under (he following circumstances, that is to say: the said complainant stated to this defendant that there was some inconvenience in the then existing state of things; for that this defendant, being a married woman, could not give a check for money and that he, having made a settlement on this defendant, could not give one. This defendant inquired how this inconvenience could be obviated and the said complainant suggested that this defendant should give him an order on her said trustees named in said marriage settlement, to the end that he might receive the income of her estate and pay it out as might be required. That it was her desire that her husband should have the disbursement of her income, but subject to her said separate rights ; and, therefore, she at once acquiesced and proceeded to draw an order accordingly; but not understanding precisely how to frame the same, her said husband came to her aid and wrote the said order down to and including the word “ receipt,” in duplicate, one for himself to keep and one to be left with the said Robert Halliday; whereupon this defendant added the subsequent words and subscribed it.</p> <p>She denied that the said order was an irrevocable order or appointment or that the same was in fulfilment or confirmation of an alleged gift; on the contrary that the same order was applied for and given merely as a temporary direction to the said Robert Halliday, as the agent and acting trustee and for the purpose of supplying her said husband with means of disbursing the income as received in such manner as the uses of this defendant might require: she intending to conform herself, as far as reasonably possible, in all things, to the pleasure of her said husband. But she did .not intend; nor did her said husband, when obtaining the same order, intimate in any way that the same was or should be irrevocable. And if it was so irrevocable in strictness of law and was intended to be relied on as such by her said husband at that time, then she, this defendant, said that her said husband, in obtaining the same, took an unfair and undue advantage of her ignorance and confidence in him; and that the same order was therefore fraudulent and void.</p> <p>That, under the impulse of affection and in pursuance of her good intentions but not under any sense of obligation nor believing or supposing that any will or appointment in the nature of a will which she might make would be irrevocable, she, shortly after the giving of such order, requested the complainant to write a will for her ; and he accordingly drew a will to the purport stated in the said bill and bearing date July 24th, 1833, which this defendant duly executed and delivered it to the said complainant for safe keeping. And she admitted that the said order on the said Robert Halliday and the said last will were left in the hands of this defendant, by the said complainant, on his departure for Scotland. That the said complainant did, during his said absence, write a letter, bearing date at Edinburgh in Scotland, September 29th,. 1834. That the foliowing extracts therefrom contain, according to the best judgment of this defendant, the nearest approach to the sense imputed to said letter in the said bill of complaint, to wit: “ My mind will never be perfectly at ease until assured, beyond the reach of all casualities, that at no period of my existence, upon no contingency, however remote or improbable, shall I become indebted, without the power of requital, to others, for the means of a gentlemanly subsistence.” Again, “ It is time now that I should choose a settled mode of life, neither my temper or my convictions, my pride or my confirmed habits will allow of this being left to chance or the government of circumstances—nor will they admit of any plan of which idleness, frivolity or insignificance are to be the characteristics. On my return home, measures must be definitely taken for me to commence the career of a professional man, a public character or a private citizen. The decision must be upon full deliberation. Deeply concerned, you are called to the counsel;—be it my part to lay before you, in fitting, business-like though perhaps chilling manner, all the circumstances that need be weighed to strike the balance ; and yours to con them over hourly from this moment until your hand is again in mine to help me on in the path you choose.</p> <p>“ Consistently with that longing after independence I have related, my situation admits of but one pursuit—that of the law. If this is to be my course, the first step on my return, should be the removal of my office to the business part of the city; and then my mode of life would be thus: To breakfast at eight, and be at my desk at nine punctually—and as the clock struck three, start for home, the dinner being served while on my way. Returning at four, my stay in the afternoon would be until dark always, and frequently until ten at night. I should decline all invitations, make no visits, and resort to no place of public amusement: but be indeed what I professed to be, a man of business. The great competition in New York, my newness there, and indeed my marriage itself would all impose this assiduity and self-denial upon me. It is not a life of pleasure or perhaps of happiness, and has little to invite but stern principles. I, however, have done it—and although now surrounded with temptations, especially of your society, greater than formerly, “ I trust that my resolution to do that which is right would not fail me. The reward would not be distinction at the bar, for princes are not the competitors : but it would enable me, in the course of about ten years, besides supporting myself' and helping others, to acquire property enough to insure an income of twelve hundred dollars a year, and that would place me beyond all chance of ever standing in need of foreign aid.” Again,</p> <p>“ Before leaving New York, I placed in your hands three papers, with a request that you would look them over. The first was the order upon your trustee to pay to me the income of your estate as it accrued. The purpose of returning you this, was, that you might, if you choose, revoke the stewardship. It was accompanied with one requisition which made it irksome—that of a minute accounting for all expenditures. Of the policy even of such reckoning, I have ever had my doubts. In one’s own case, besides the incessant loss of time, trouble and perplexity it occasions, I know of no motive for it, except that we doubt our own good purposes in spending and so keep up this frail check ; with regard to others, it directly conveys the imputation that they may misapply our money. For the purposes of real economy, it is enough that we previously determine upon the amount of our annual disbursements, whether it be the limit of our income or any thing short of it—and then, by memoranda of large payments, and a periodical general computation of current expenses, see that we keep within it. But to worry for an hour over confused pencil marks or petty accounts, for the price of a turnip or a piece of tape, is decidedly bad economy; for, the same time applied to earning money would answer ten times as well—and the worst of the practice is, that it becomes a superstition and an inveterate habit. It was melancholy to see the piles of account books my poor father left, containing the most scrupulously minute entries of daily expenses, his princely estates ‘ running to ruin the while.’ You proposed, at one time, to give me the whole of your share of your sister Margaret’s estate,—then the income of it—and latterly, four-fifths of the income, to be disposed of by me, without accounting for it to you. This implies that for the rest of your income, rigid and detailed accounts “ are to be rendered; and further, that there may be uses of the money I might wish to conceal from you. There are none such : Heaven forfend there ever should be. I have no vicious tastes to gratify, and no sinister purposes to sub-serve. Neither of my own, nor of your money, shall I ever wish to spend any, without your knowledge and approbation. Take away this poignard of ice from between us—it is brittle, but it is cold. It portends that you and I are not one, and curdles the confidence that should flow to and fro. I desire no interests separate from yours, for I love you, and .we are married. Although accounting in detail be irksome and humiliating, yet, I wish for the use of no part of your property that shall be unknown, and so the fruitful source of suspicion to yourself.” Again : 11 The last of these important papers was your will: as far as delicacy would permit, I had before intimated to you my wish to have it executed anew. You will remember it was but a rough draft, intended to be engrossed in your own hand writing, which I had prepared at your instance. My reason for wishing it altered was, that the manuscript was mine. The credit of the act I desired to be wholly yours: whereas, remaining in my hand-writing, it would bear the appearance of importunity or dictation on my part—both of which, I aver, are foreign to my nature. That the instrument was defectively executed, was a suggestion of Mr. Halliday’s, of his own accord. When appealed to, I confirmed his objection. You declared you would make a new one, or if you did not, that your brothers and sister would never dispute it, that would depend not upon them, but upon the decision of the law, and the duty of executors; or even were they to assent, I should not, perhaps, be willing to receive from their forbearance what I might be willing to accept from your affection. Under any circumstances, a will is the most unstable of all things ; a new one may be made every day or every hour in one’s life; but when we superadd doubts of its validity, its provisions are the last dependencies we should ever look forward to. When we meet again, tell me directly that yours is destroyed and I shall'be better satisfied than under a knowledge that it subsists as my autograph or your imperfect design; and I will take my measures for life accordingly. “ Reflect well and dispassionately on all I have said, and when your mind is maturely made up, do whatever you conclude, ere I get back, perfectly, completely, and may the God of Heaven vouchsafe to your acts all the happy results desired by a love such as that of your</p> <p>“ Husband and Friend.”</p> <p>He, the said complainant, in the said letter, also, uses the following language, to wit: “ My repugnance was alone to sign any document proclaiming to the world a doubt of my honest affection before marriage or of my honorable conduct afterwards. Little, however, did I expect this instrument to be singled out for suspicion. I know it to be all-sufficient and done in the best faith; but now, in addition to the explanations heretofore given, I can do no more than tender the inclosed means of dispelling all doubt.”</p> <p>That within the said letter of September 29th, 1834, there was enclosed a letter in the proper hand-writing of the said complainant, in the words and figures following, to wit:</p> <p>“ Edinburgh, 29th Sept., 1834.— To Robert Hallidayr, Esq. Dear Sir : Understanding that doubts have been entertained as to the comprehensiveness of the post-nuptial settlement I executed of Mrs. Cruger’s property, I conceive it to be your duty, as it certainly is my desire, that another be drawn out with every formality of the law, to quiet all misgivings, so that I may execute it immediately on landing again in New York. Very sincerely, yours, &c.</p> <p>“ H. N. Cruger, Jr.”</p> <p>That the said complainant, whilst thus absent, also sent to this defendant a paper purporting to be a journal of reflections and events occurring at sea on his voyage to Europe, in his own hand-writing, in the form of a letter to this defendant: in which, under the date of May 14th, in the year last aforesaid, the said complainant, referring to the said deed of settlement, used the following language :</p> <p>“And now to extract a thorn in my side. You have asked me often to speak out and. not be calm and silent: and if the thoughts do come, it perhaps is best you should know them. As I shall never ask for that confidence which your generosity might bestow or my character entitle me “to or which may be due to the identity of interests and intimate relation existing between us, so I shall ever feel keenly sensitive to anything that has a contrary look. Perhaps the explanation I gave you a day or two before coming away, as to the words you pointed out in the settlement of your property, as it was brief and hasty, may not have proved entirely conclusive and satisfactory. The words were, ‘ so that she may enjoy and dispose of the same, as it came from her parents and sister or may hereafter in any manner accrue to her;’ and the doubt was, whether the specification of parents and sister’ might not restrain the generality of the other words, so as to exclude any other property heretofore acquired in a different manner—as, for instance, from your uncle. Of course, the question could not embrace anything hereafter to accrue, for the terms expressly include such acquisition, made “ in any manner.” Then as to the property you have hitherto received from your uncle, being the only property you have received, seemingly, from any other source than your ‘ parents and sister.’ In legal construction, you have derived even this from your parents, for it came to you in right of your father and through him solely by the terms of your uncle’s trust settlement. But again, the rule of construing a legal instrument is that all the parts are to be taken together to determine the meaning of the maker and not an isolated sentence. Now, in the beginning of the paper, I had 'freely, fully and unreservedly restored to you all the estate theretofore owned by you or which you might thereafter acquire;’ and such language, I conceive, conveys, most strongly, what certainly was my intention, a total abdicacation of all interest or right in your property, in possession or expectancy whencesoever derived or howsoever situated. And I can only add, that 1 shall be prompt, at any time and in any manner, upon the slightest suggestion, to make your property, if possible, more secure for ‘ heirs you know not whom,’ or for those who are already sure of a pernicious superabundance; trusting, as of course, they must be nearer and dearer to you than I am, so also that they will make a better use of it (which alone makes it worth preserving,) “ than I should—at least as good a use as George is making of his.”</p> <p>And this defendant, further answering, said, that she did address to the said complainant a.letter, dated July 16, 1834, in reply to the said Journal at sea; and which was her first letter after he left said order and will in her possession. And she admitted that she did in such letter use the words “ the interest of all my property you shall have as long as you live,” as mentioned in the said bill; but she said that the true intent and meaning of these words were, by the other matters in said letter, fully explained and shown to be, that he by living with her, would actually ■enjoy the said income, although he would have no legal or equitable ownership thereof. That, among other things, the last mentioned letter contained the following matter: “ I came to the part you call taking a thorn from your side. And I read the feeling that had been rankling in your breast since I spoke to you of a sentence in the marriage settlement: and I read on without pain or misunderstanding of what you wished me to do, your fuller explanation of that sentence and declaration of being ready at any time and in any manner to make my property, if possible, more secure; but why did you end this last thus: ‘ for heirs you know not whom,’ or ‘for those who are already sure of a pernicious superabundance trusting, as of course, they must be nearer and dearer to you than I am, so also, that they will make a better use of it than I should or, at least, as good a use as George is making of his.’ Oh ! how this and what followed changed the spirit of my dream.” Again—‘ Mr. Haliiday was the author of the doubt on that sentence, though he forbid me to mention his name: but I .thought I had done so. I have no suspicions of you ; no want of confidence, so help me Heaven. . My marriage settlement was such as I had always resolved it should be, a security of .the abstract rights my parents had left me: which I think I have no fight to alienate or you to wish me to do than taking the eyes out of my head and give them to you literally, because I had committed my person to you.”</p> <p>That such last mentioned letter was extorted from her, by the indications of dissatisfaction on the part of the said complainant referred to in such letter and by a consequent apprehension that his affections were becoming alienated from her. She, therefore, insisted that her said letter could not be justly regarded as a free and voluntary gift of the income or of any part thereof. That the said complainant returned to New York, December 6th, 1834 and having, on his own request, received the said order from this defendant, proceeded as before in the receipt and disbursement of the income of this defendant’s property. That afterwards and on February 14th, 1835, she, at the special instance and request of the said complainant, copied her said will of July, 1833, except as to the date and executed the same copy in due form of law, as her last will and testament, in the presence of three attesting witnesses. She denied that the said wills were or that either of them was executed in pursuance of any agreement. That the first and the latter were the expression of this defendant’s will and pleasure that in case her said husband should survive her, this defendant, he should, from and after her death, enjoy the income of her said property, so far at least as any will which she could execute was adequate to give him that right. And this is her present will; and she has no present intention of ever revoking the same. That in the year 1835, shortly prior to and in anticipation of the usual annual settlement of her estate, on the twenty-ninth day of June, that being the anniversary of her birth and marriage, the said Robert Halliday, as acting trustee of her said estate, announced that the sums drawn from him by the said complainant, had exceeded the income of this defendant’s said estate and enroached on the capital many thousand of dollars ; that, thereupon, the said complainant entered upon the examination of the accounts of said estate and so stated the same as to reduce the said excess to $2,785 22. And this defendant admitted that the said complainant, on that occasion, did pay to the said trustees such last mentioned sum of money and also $1,080 60, being for principal and interest of money lent by her said trustees on bond and mortgage without her knowledge and consent, but by direction of said complainant to Henry N. Cruger, the uncle of the said complainant: all of which was done to make good the capital of her said estate. And, also, admitted that the said complainant repaid to William Douglas $1,000, theretofore borrowed by the said complainant.' But she denied that the $1,000 borrowed from the said William Douglas or any part thereof was applied for the purchase cf horses for her use although she admitted that she had some use of the horses which were purchased therewith, by the complainant. And this defendant had no reason to believe, did not believe and, therefore, denied that the said payments by the said complainant or any of them or any part thereof were or was made by the said complainant in consideration of or on the faith of his having the whole income of her estate for life or any part of such income. That during the time that such adjustment of accounts was progressing, the said complainant evinced great dissatisfaction at being thus obliged, as he considered it, to state minute and particular accounts of the moneys disbursed by him and made this defendant very unhappy by his conduct, absenting himself from her society and complaining of the labor so imposed on him and of this defendant’s want of confidence. That he, again, during such absences, presented to this defendant a view of the sufferings which would result to her from his applying himself to business; that among other intimations to that effect, he, said complainant, on the nineteenth day of June, in the year last aforesaid, addressed to this defendant, at Staten Island, (Richmond County,) where she was then residing, a letter containing the following matter: “You know my reasons for not coming to Staten Island— and if this much is irksome to you, how would you bear the pre-occupation and absence of a regular man of business ? Whatever you wish me to. be—whatever may conduce most to your happiness—choose for yourself and you have the proud satisfaction of knowing that want of capacity on my part does not prevent; but when your choice is made, let there be no half way measures and no repinings, for they would be unworthy on each side.” And whilst such accounts were being examined, the said complainant urged this defendant to write a letter to the said trustees other than said Halliday, inquiring of them whether they had accepted their said appointment and, in that, event, requiring them to take an active part in the management of her said estate, in order to preserve it from injury ; and, on her declining so to do, the said complainant himself addressed to them a letter, dated the second day of May in the year last aforesaid, containing the latter request and, also, the following matter: “ Doubts having been entertained of the sufficiency of the post-nuptial settlement, drawn up by me, the first subject for your consideration will be the expediency of having another prepared and I shall be ready to execute it in whatever terms it may be couched.”</p> <p>That the said complainant, for the purpose, as she believes and charges, of vexing and annoying her and thereby forcing her to settle upon him her income or some part thereof, did, on the thirteenth day of June in the year last aforesaid, send to this defendant and her sister, Mrs. James Munroe, some business letters which had been received from Europe and a letter from himself, in the following words:</p> <p>New York, 13 June, ’35.</p> <p> To Mrs. Cruger and Mrs. Munroe : </p> <p>“I wish you, dear ladies, to take the accompanying letters into consideration, in connection with those previously received, in order to deternfine whether your family should send an agent out to Edinbro’ to represent them, on the approaching final settlement of your uncle’s estate.</p> <p>“Should you determine affirmatively, I shall be glad to be preferred to the office.</p> <p>“My object in going would be to earn for myself a little money; for I desire to be out of debt, and should like before I die, to enjoy the feeling of absolute independence and gratify the natural craving of the human breast to be the possessor of some property.</p> <p>“ This being the motive, of course there would be an impropriety in my expressing an opinion as to the expediency of your employing an agent, and I must refer it to your family councils exclusively. You will, I trust, pardon my suggestion however, that a decision should be soon made.</p> <p>“ The suffering I shall have to undergo, and the sacrifices I must make, are but a part of the condition of a poor man; “ and I beg of you to regard it but in one point of view—a a means of bettering me in pecuniary circumstances.</p> <p>“Your friend indeed,</p> <p>H. D. Cruger.”</p> <p>That about the same time, this defendant received from the hands of the said complainant, or in an envelope, the said order for her income. That, although as yet fully determined not to give to said complainant the legal right to her income, she was very willing to render the manner of its receipt and disbursement agreeable to him: and, therefore, and for no other cause and not with any view to confirm any former order or make an irrevocable appointment in respect to her said income, she gave to the said complainant the paper dated June 29th, 1835, in the said bill mentioned. But the said paper was given whilst she was in great distress of mind from the said annoyances and his manifestations of anger and discontent; and that the same was in fact extorted from her by the said complainant, by means of his murmurings, neglects and unkindnesses; and that the only difference which the same paper was understood to make or did make, in respect to the receipt of the said income by the said complainant, was to relieve him from the necessity of keeping minute accounts and to permit him to spend, without regard to this defendant’s wishes, a portion of the income from her sister Margaret’s estate and to allow a general method of accounting to this defendant when she should see fit to require accounts.</p> <p>That she did not recall her said order from her said trustees without notice to the complainant, but in July, 1836, she withdrew the agency of her estate from Halliday and appointed Francis Brown as agent; and upon the same occasion she also withdrew from the hands of the said Halliday his duplicate of the said order. That she did not give the complainant any prior notice of such change; but she did notify him thereof and of the causes thereof immediately after such change was made by a letter bearing date July 27th, 1836: being the same letter of that date incorrectly stated to have been written in the course of a long correspondence on that subject. That the said complainant, on receiving such notice from this defendant, became greatly excited and addressed to this defendant a letter, in the following words: “ 29th July, 1836. Instead of yourself, my dear Harriet, to welcome me last evening, as I had eagerly expected, I found your letter of the day before, which has well nigh turned me out of your house. God in his mercy forgive you for the agony and humiliation it is inflicting on me, whose bosom was fraught with the kindliest thoughts and purposes toward you. Not for three times your whole fortune, dedicated to the best and wisest uses, would I have made even a stranger suffer so much as I am now undergoing. Until Monday morning I will wait for you either to confirm or recall that letter: and, in the meantime, shall neither act or decide upon its contents. But merely for your own sake, solemnly urge you to consider well for what it is you are on the brink of sacrificing your own respectability and happiness and that of your unoffending and still devotedly attached husband, Henev D. Cruger.”</p> <p>That the said complainant, on the said Monday, left the Jrouse of this defendant and went to board with a Mrs. Forest, in the upper part of the city—and gave this defendant notice that he had done so because she would not revoke her said determination to economise in her expenditures ; incorrectly alleging that it was a measure of self-respect and an effectual compliance with this defendant’s wishes. And the said complainant not only invited this defendant to go and reside with him, at his said lodgings, but insisted that she was bound so to do. That the said complainant, whilst so boarding at said Mrs. Forest’s, stated that he was about resuming the practice of the law; and was constantly addressing to this defendant letters relative to her property. That being much distressed, she requested William Bard, Esq., to call on the said complainant and explain to him the unreasonableness of his said conduct— and endeavored to persuade him to return to his home. That upon that occasion the said complainant addressed a letter on the subject to the said James Munroe, then one of her trustees, urging the necessity of having his said accounts of the disbursement of this defendant’s income settled and approved, and concluding this—“ With my accounts settled, then the order to her trustees made unchangeable and with- “ out accountability, and the appointment of myself as her agent, I believe we can again be united and permanently happy. Until the first requisite is complied with, we must remain apart; and without the other two, I can but say she is welcome to a full share of all I can earn by my industry.” That she refused to yield to his requisitions, except as to settling accounts; upon which the said complainant addressed her a letter in the following words :</p> <p>Sunday Night, 7 Aug. ’35.</p> <p>“ My Dear Harriet:—My uncle informed me last evening, with deep distress, that his mediation had been in vain, as you refused to do anything unless I ‘ would return to you and trust to your confidence and affection.’ He also expressed the opinion that our friends could be of no use or anything be accomplished unless we came together in a spirit of mutual concession.</p> <p>“Through the long hours of a sleepless night and of this sacred day I have communed with my inmost soul under the teachings of religion and affection, and am now resolved to do my utmost to remedy this horrid state of things.</p> <p>“I will meet you on your own terms. I will confide in the affection, honor and generosity of my wife—and God grant, for her own sake, that she may justify that confidence. Whatever you mean to do, let me beseech you to do it the instant we are re-united, that the whole matter may be once and forever folded down and the past consigned to oblivion. We will, then, if agreeable to you, immediately leave town for Henderson, after giving directions to Mrs. Peckwell what furniture is to be packed up for the country; and I devotedly hope and pray that this may be the auspicious exodus of a mutual happiness, never to be disturbed again during life.</p> <p>“ In all truth and sincerity,</p> <p>“ Your devoted husband,</p> <p>Henry D. Cruger.”</p> <p>That the said complainant returned from Mrs. Forest’s to the house number 55 in Broadway, on or about the eighth day of August in the year last aforesaid. And, on such return, the said complainant produced a formal document, ready for this defendant’s signature, which was intended to settle some part of her property irrevocably on him—and required that this defendant should execute the same. That she positvely refused to sign or execute the said document; and, after some discussion, finding that this defendant could not be induced to recede from such refsual, the said complianant stated that he would stand on his rights and that the order which he already had—meaning the said order of July, 1833—was irrevocable ; which this defendant supposed to be a true statement. And, thereupon, taking from its place of deposit the said duplicate of such order, which she had so withdrawn from the said Halliday, she handed it to the said Halliday; saying to him, in the presence of the complainant and the said James Monroe, as nearly as this defendant can now remember her words: “ There Mr. Halliday, pay the whole income to Mr. Cruger. I will sooner beg my bread from door to door, than touch a dollar of it.”</p> <p>That, on the same day, after the said Messieurs Monroe and Halliday had left said house, and no other person being present, under the influence of the same feeling, she addressed to the said complainant, as nearly as she can recollect, the following words:—“ Mr. Cruger, no person knows how that order was written but you and myself. If you wrote it irrevocable, when you knew I intended it to be revocable, how do you stand ? I beg of you to retrace your steps.” That the complainant appeared confounded by this appeal, answered confusedly that he was willing to do anything to rectify any error into which he misfit have drawn this defendant and that he would rectify it. And on the same day, he wrote and delivered to the said trustee the following declaration:</p> <p>New York, 8th August, 1836.</p> <p>“ To Robert Halliday and James Monroe, Esquires,</p> <p>“ Acting Trustees of Mrs. H. D. Cruger :</p> <p>“ Gentlemen:_Under Mrs. Cruger’s assurance that she did not intend the order for the payment of the income to me to be irrevocable, I, of course, have not the right to have it so considered, which I asserted before receiving that assurance. Respectfully yours, &c.</p> <p>“ H. D. Cruger.</p> <p>That on the fifteenth day of the same month, just before going up to their country residence, he left for this defendant, at her brother’s residence on Long Island, where she was then staying, a paper containing only these words : “ I leave our happiness in your hands. August 15, 1836.”</p> <p>That the said complainant, about the last mentioned date, went to their country residence at Henderson, in the county of Herkimer, and early in September next following returned and rejoined this defendant at the said house in Broadway, for the purpose of making arrangements to furnish and prepare for occupation the new dwelling house of this defendant at Henderson aforesaid, then just completed ; that, at this time, the said complainant was for some days excessively moody and sullen and evinced his discontent at the condition of this defendant’s property in various very offensive ways. That he would refuse to take wine at table, saying that he did not own it; would refuse to ride, saying that he did not own any carriage; and constantly complained of the aforesaid alleged revocation of said order by taking it from the said Halliday. That on or about the 17th of September, in the year last aforesaid, she remonstrated with the said complainant about his conduct—assured him that she did not intend to revoke said order, by taking it from the said Robert Halliday, but only to prevent a waste of the principal of her estate and, by proper economy, to repair the injuries which it had suffered. Whereupon, the said complainant produced the said order and wished this defendant to write thereon the words “ restored and confirmed.” But she refused to reinstate it; and thereupon the-said complainant wrote upon and beneath the same, with his own hand, these words : Revocable 17th September 1836. Henry D. Cruger.” That he spent part of the autumn with this defendant at their said country residence; and after their return to their said house in Broadway, in the month of November in that year, he renewed his murmurings about his dependent condition and urged this defendant to unite in three certain papers which he then produced, in his own hand writing: being an authority from her to her trustees to allow her husband to receive the income for life; a power from her and the trustees to that effect; and a bond from him to pay over to the extent of one half of the income to her. That in order to avoid his importunities, she left her house in November, in the year last aforesaid, and went to reside with her friend, Mrs. John Whetten, with whom she remained until about the fourth day of December following. She denied that she and the said complainant referred all matters or any matters in difference to Messieurs Bard and Whetten. But she did, during her residence with Mrs. Whetten, request the said John Whetten, as her friend, to consult with said Mr. Bard, the friend of the said complainant, for that purpose appointed on his part, as to the best method of pacifying the said complainant and terminating his interruptions of her domestic peace. That no award or decision was made nor did they unite or concur in any opinion, but, on the contrary, each of them put in writing his own opinion. That the letter from Mr. Bard to Mr. Whetton in the said bill set forth and bearing date November 27th 1836, contained the opinion of Mr. Bard only; and that she, on being shown the same, did forthwith absolutely refuse to comply with or act upon the advice contained in such letter.-^That the^said complainant did not acquiesce therein ; and, on the contrary, did, on the twenty-ninth day of November in the year last aforesaid, object to the said opinion of Mr. Bard in writing. That the opinion of Mr. Whetten was exhibited to the complainant; and he positively refused to accede to the same and again proposed that this defendant should unite in the said three papers. That she sent to her sister, Mrs. Elizabeth Mary Monroe, the paper under date of the thirteenth day of November one thousand eight hundred and thirty-six as in the bill stated; and she denied that the said complainant accepted or acquiesced in any such paper. But in order to pacify said complainant and restore harmony, so that she could return to her home, she did address to her said sister a letter; and that the following is a copy of the same and of the certificates of the said John Whetten and of this defendant’s said sister thereto annexed:</p> <p>“ Snug Harbor, November 30, 1836.</p> <p>Dear Sister :—The first restless night I have had since “ I have been here was the last, which proceeded from the painful feelings your note awakened—not received till Mrs. Barber returned in the last boat. You said nothing cross— but I sunk under the conviction that I should go out of this world without even my own and only understanding me.</p> <p>Show the Purity and Portia to Mr. C.; he will and should understand them, as he both put the whole play in my hand when I was going to the farm for you, with a request that I would read it—but, on the resolutions steadied by their illustrious examples, I mean to act.</p> <p>They were not altogether irrelevant for you, my sister and collateral heir, as you will see when I give you a “ clear view,” not only of my wishes and feelings, but my resolutions—under the determination I have to make the world understand me that I do not act for money either to spend myself or save for you. ■</p> <p>Know then that, though the offer has been twice rejected by Mr. Cruger, I now assign to him—willy nilly—all the evidences 1 hold, not only of the advances made to Messrs. N. and L. Cruger, but those to himself, his sister, his brother-in-law, his uncle and his uncle in-law. Which, on reference to Mr. Halliday, I believe you will find is getting over #40,000.</p> <p>The most of this, my dear sister, is out of the principal of my estate : but you, (the only one of my three heirs who know my circumstances,) have urged me to do it. Of myself, I never would have signed away or even compromised the collateral birthright—you, George and William have— and when the post-nuptial settlement was made, I thought I had secured them.</p> <p>I also mean to relinquish my plan of reserving a per cent-age of my income to gradually restore the sums taken from my principal; which would (had I lived long enough) again have given you the unimpaired whole I had received by my birthright.</p> <p>Thus Mr. Cruger remains in the full possession of my whole income, lessened only by the non-payment of interest by some of those of his family to whom he has made loans.</p> <p>I never will sign any other papers than those that are signed, my will and my revocable order. But I have said to Mr. Whetten and will say to all those who desire the respect : “ When you see me revoke that order, (let Mr. C. act as he will,) you may give me up, for I will then be given up of God.”</p> <p>Now, as to my will, a dark thought came over me that I would destroy it; but it was a thought of vengeance and the great lawgiver has said “ Vengeance is mine.” So now, I here solemnly say, that (also let Mr. C. act as he may,) it shall never be touched.</p> <p>The light that a word in the last sentence throws on the state of my feelings leads very naturally to my telling you and him that had Mr. Whetten come over with the paper he drew for me, signed “ With all the heart of Henry Cruger,” there was still a great deal on the score of feeling to be settled sine qua non, between him and I, before he would again lie by Portia’s side and she have a quiet soul.</p> <p>Don’t let Mr. C. here make the mistake that you did, that I am going from business because I have got a fine idea in this last sentence.</p> <p>Mr. C., in signing the settlement, has signed the only paper in my favor I ever will receive from him. That secures your rights, in which are wrapped up my duty to my deceased parents.</p> <p>And now to this solemn paper I put my name.</p> <p>Harrtet Douglas Cruger.</p> <p>To make a finish. Know that I as much expected by the ceremony of the 29th of June, that Mr. C. would have become my agent, as that he would become my husband—■ and so did Mr. Halliday.</p> <p>Now, without enumerating—but speaking to the experience fresh in all your mind’s memories and I think all my other trustees have said they would not act if he became my agent—the time is past, I have no obstinacy to have Mr. Brown, but an insurmountable one to have Mr. H. again.”</p> <p>I truly believe my sister, in the declarations made in this letter, and that she will strictly adhere to them throughout her life.</p> <p>E. M. Monroe.</p> <p>Dec. 20th, 1836.</p> <p>I have entire confidence in the above sentiments.</p> <p>John Whetten.</p> <p>Dec. 21st, 1836.</p> <p>(This schedule verified by the initials.)</p> <p>G. D.</p> <p>W. D.</p> <p>H. D. C.</p> <p>That the said complainant did not nor would acquiesce in or receive such last mentioned letter or the accommpda.tions therein proposed or any of them, but refused to receive the same, in consequence whereof the said last mentioned letter was, shortly after its date, returned to this defendant by her said sister as rejected by the said complainant. She denied that the said letter ever was put into the hands of the said complainant as a substitute for a regular deed or as having any validity. She was obliged at length to return to her home as aforesaid, without having effected any reconciliation with her said husband.</p> <p>That the said complainant, on or about March 26 1837, when setting out on a journey to Virginia to make some inquiries about the, condition of certain lands there belonging to this defendant and her brothers, took with him the said letter of the thirteenth of November previous and had ever since retained the possession of it. That in the autumn of the year 1838 she visited England with the complainant; and whilst residing with him in London, was again importuned to settle her income upon him; that being in low health .and spirits, alone with him and completely subject to his power and influence and being very much distressed and completely overcome and deprived of her free agency by his importunities, she requested him to take her home—and stated that she would give him whatever settlement he desired. But the said promise was not a free or voluntary act and ought not, under the circumstances, to be regarded as of any force or effect.</p> <p>That the defendant prosecuted his demands for an irrevocable settlement with such vehemence that her domestic peace was almost entirely destroyed. And that whilst she was in great distress from this conduct, her brother-in-law, James Monroe, called on her and urgently requested her to make some arrangement which would he satisfactory to the complainant. Whereupon she, being worn out by such incessant importunity and most anxious for peace and repose, answered her said brother-in-law that she would sign whatever paper he might dictate, but that she would not live with the complainant after he should have accepted any instrument settling her income or any of it upon him irrevocably. That shortly thereafter, at the instance and on the dictation of the said James Monroe, she executed and handed the said James Monroe, the paper mentioned in said bill and dated October 26th, 1839 ; and, also, the paper in the said bill set forth and dated November 2d, in the same year. That the said paper of October 26th was tendered to the complainant by the said Monroe and rejected as not sufficiently formal and binding to secure to him an absolutely independent power over the income. That the said James Monroe procured the execution of said paper, dated November 2d, in consequence of such refusal and of the desire of him, said James Monroe, to do whatever might be requisite to satisfy the said complainant. That the said James Monroe was not, in the procuring of the said two last mentioned papers signed by this defendant or either of them, the umpire, the agent or the friend of this defendant. But, that the same papers were extorted from this defendant; and when she gave them, she did suppose they would take effect according to their terms, because she knew no means of avoiding any paper which she might be compelled to give to the said complainant. She denied that she, nine or ten days after the pretended exchange of the said papers, in the said bill mentioned or at any other time, wrote to the said complainant that her referee approved of the arrangement thereby effected—and the more so because the said complainant had acted so handsomely in returning a portion of what had been conveyed to him and that she, this defendant, would abide by it literally or anything to that or the like effect. That this denial is made according to the best of her recollection and belief; that she could not recall to mind any such letter; that she distinctly recollected that at the time referred to her mind was distracted with indignation and with the most painful emotions ; and, that if there exists any letter containing words which resemble the matter in that behalf alleged in the said bill, the said letter will prove, on being exhibited, that such words were used and ought to be understood in an ironical sense. That shortly after the said second day of November, in the year last aforesaid, the complainant did return from Henderson aforesaid to the said house in the city of New York ; and she, acting upon her resolution, did withdraw herself from the house and go to reside with one of her brothers. That she persevered in such resolution and the complainant did at length execute, under his hand and seal and forward to this defendant, the said paper, dated November secpnd, together with the deed of cancellation release and extinguishment thereon endorsed and dated February 22d, 1840. And she claimed that the last mentioned deed was a complete, valid and effectual extinguishment of all right in her estate or any part or income thereof under or by virtue of any act or deed prior to that date. That the said complainant, on sending said papers, announced to this defendant and to her friends, by means of a letter to her sister Mrs. Monroe and another to her brother William Douglas, that having thus renounced his claim to the income of this defendant’s estate, the existing separation should be continued and be thenceforth regarded as the act of him the said complainant and that, in surrendering the said paper dated November 2d, 1839, he surrendered with it all hope of ever being reunited to this defendant. That according to such announcement, instead of returning to New York from Washington city, where said deed of the twenty-second February purported to have been executed, he went to Charleston, South Carolina, and did not return to New York until June following. She admitted that in the same month, in anticipation of the said complainant’s arrival in New York, she did go to her country residence at Henderson and there spent the summer. She admitted that, in the course of her correspondence with General James Hamilton, she did, on March 14th, 1840, write to him as for that purpose stated in the said bill. That the said complainant, on such his return to the city of New York, recommenced his efforts to obtain a settlement upon himself of this defendant’s income or some part thereof. And he did, by indirect means, enlist in his behalf the exertions of his own and this defendant’s friends and relatives—and caused several of them to make applications for that purpose to this defendant at Henderson aforesaid; and such Applications were all accompanied by offers of a re-union, in case this defendant would give to the said complainant her income or some large part thereof. That whilst her relation with her said husband continued in this unhappy condition and about the twenty-fifth day of August in the year last aforesaid, the said William Bard, Esquire, a connection of the said complainant and at said complainant’s request, as she was informed and believed, addressed to her a letter in the following words:</p> <p>“ 25th Aug. 1840.</p> <p>“ My Dear Madam:—I have been your warm friend; and without concealing from you faults which I thought belonged to you, I have felt and acknowledged the influence of virtues which have led me sincerely to vindicate you where I thought you ought to be vindicated in the unhappy circumstances which have existed between" you and your husband. You will, therefore, I know, do me and my motives justice, when I say to you that I fear your present position is unfavorable to your peace—and must, at least in one point, be altered, to enable you to justify yourself or your friends to justify you. You conveyed to your husband, irrevocably, the whole of your income—with the declaration that whoever conveyed the deed to him would separate you for ever. It was conveyed to him—did separate you, I hope not for ever—and was returned by him. When you sent it, I earnestly advised you to convey but one half; and when he returned it, had I been near him, I would have advised him to return but half. Had either been, your difficulties would have been easier settled. As matters now stand, you feel that, unless you persevere, you abandon your grounds; and if he yields, he feels not only that he is humbled, but that, however his own feelings of affection may lead him to do so, in the opinion of the world he is driven to a base humility from the love of your money— “ not of your person—from the love of ease and not from more worthy and better motives. My earnest wish is to see your relative positions altered, as the most likely and easiest means of future reconciliation. But whether reunited or not, your husband’s situation at present, is one, I must say it plainly, as I have been accustomed to do, will do you discredit with the public and cannot be approved by those who most esteem you and most desire to see you happy. In such perilous controversies as controversies between man and wife, the party that wishes a quiet conscience must be very sure he is in the right and must take care that all has been done that can be done for peace. From the bottom of my heart I wish your happiness. You will excuse, therefore, my anxiety, when I think you in danger; and that I press you, at least to do that which alone can secure hereafter your own or at present the approbation of your sincerest friends. Henry’s present situation of absolute want of the means of respectable living, is not one worthy of you or him. And I earnestly press you to alter it, by settling on him immediately and irrevocably, if not one half your income, such proportion as will enable him to live as one ought to live who has been in the intimate relation of husband to you. I know your intention is, as you have frequently assured me, never to use, for your own purposes, the income you conveyed to him ; and that you now withhold it to repay the debts which he owes to your mother’s or sister’s estate. I have before said, I thought you carried this point too far. But if you leave him in his present situation, friendless and dependent, you carry it to a length that cannot be defended by your best and warmest friends—and will lose you the good opinion of the public. Now let me advise and beg you, for your own sake and in the opinion of one, though as partial to you as I am, absolutely your duty to do in this matter, what is plainly right. Make him easy as to his means of living, as is due to him and as your husband ought to be. No matter whether he does or does not come up afterwards to your ideas of what is right, no matter whether you live with him or do not live with him the remainder of his life. Put it out of the power of others to say you kept him on the rack till you forced “ an unwilling confession and that you looked on his distress triumphing in your power and hoping to force him to your terms. I know such feelings do not belong to you and are abhorrent to your nature. I am, therefore, doubly anxious they should not be imputed to you; and that your anxious friends, among whom 1 am, should be able to disprove them, by appealing to proofs of a more generous and higher feeling. With regard to the debts due to your mother’s or sister’s estate, the balance of the income, after deducting what will be proper for Henry, will soon pay their debts • and to leave your husband to starve, expatriate himself or to be dependent on the bounty of others, when you can prevent the necessity of either, would neither comport with your dignity, your character as a woman, nor your religion. Excuse, I beg you, my warmth and earnestness. It arises from the truest anxiety for your welfare, from the peril in which I see you are, and from my sincere desire of being able to vindicate you in all points against partial misrepresentations or unfavorable opinions.</p> <p>“ Affectionately and sincerely,</p> <p>“Yours,</p> <p>“ Wm. Baud.</p> <p>“ Aug. 25th, 1840.</p> <p>“ N. Y. L. I. & T. Co.”</p> <p>That this defendant did, on the 29th of August 1840, answer such letter of the said Mr. Bard, in the following words:</p> <p>“ The spirit of this letter must be complied with ! I hereby put at your disposal the whole of my present income, to decide absolutely what portion of it is to be assigned irrevocably to Mr. Cruger; and will you, dear sir, after having so decided, request Mr. Strong to reduce it to form and forward it to me for execution, for you cannot hesitate to decide on a portion, when I was willing to give the whole.”</p> <p>That conformably to the said correspondence and his opinion in the premises, the said William Bard procured and sent to this defendant at Henderson aforesaid, the paper in the said bill set forth dated September 7th 1840, which this defendant executed, acknowledged and returned to the said Bard. But she insisted that the last mentioned paper was extorted from her by undue means and improper importunities, practiced by and at the instance of the said complainant ; and that the same paper was not a free and voluntary act. That the last mentioned paper was given by her and received by the said complainant, on the condition that by reason of the exaction thereof he and this defendant were to remain so living separate and apart.</p> <p>That after this occurrence and on or about October 4th, in the year last aforesaid, to her great surprise, on returning to her house at Henderson aforesaid from church late on a Sunday evening, she found the said complainant in said house; that on addressing the said complainant, she referred to the condition on which the said annuity was granted. But after considerable discussion, not seeing how she could do otherwise, she acquiesced in his remaining; and by reason of the said complainant’s promises and professions of kindness, soon became so far reconciled to his said breach of faith in exacting such annuity that she ceased to insist on a separation. That the said complainant and this defendant returned in November following to the city of New York and there resided until about June 1st 1841, in external harmony. But during the most of that time, the complainant was continually importuning and harassing this defendant, by speech and action, in relation to the alleged inadequacy of his said annuity and striving to obtain an irrevocable settlement upon him of the whole income. That as early as January 7th 1841, the complainant suggested doubts about the sufficiency of the said will of this defendant ; and, thereupon, with this defendant’s consent, he drew up a case containing a copy of said will and certain questions as to the validity thereof, which was laid before George W. Strong, Esquire, for his opinion. And that Mr. Strong gave such opinion as stated in such bill; and that she, this defendant, wrote such remarks upon the same opinion as are for that purpose stated in said bill. That when Mr. Strong gave said opinion, she asked him what should be done to obviate the difficulty suggested. Upon which said Mr. Strong advised this defendant to consult with said complainant. This defendant requested said Mr. Strong himself to do so ; and she was informed and believed that, on being applied to by said Mr. Strong, the said complainant produced and recommended as proper documents the said three papers before mentioned. That she declined uniting in the said three papers; and then, and not before, wrote the said remarks on such opinion. That from that time until about the first day of June next following, the said complainant importuned and harassed this defendant in relation to her said separate estate almost incessantly. And that her domestic peace being wholly destroyed by such conduct, she, at length, concluded that it was impossible to live with him. That she returned to her said original defensive resolution of 1839 and, accordingly, on or about the said first day of June, left her said house in Broadway ; and she had not, since that time, lived with the said complainant.</p> <p>That in order to make herself fairly understood, she, on or about the tenth day of the said month of June, addressed to the said George W. Strong, Esquire, a letter, to be communicated to the said complainant, in which she fully explained her aforesaid views ; and stated her said resolution not to live with him so long as he continued to claim a title to any part of said income—but that to relieve herself from his importunities, she would yield to his demands. And she, this defendant, in such letter, gave the said complainant his option, to live apart from this defendant and receive the said annuity of $3,000 mentioned in said paper, dated the 7th day of September then next previous, or the whole income of her estate, except about $3,000 a year and the said house in Broadway or to relinquish all claim whatever to any part of said income and to enjoy with this defendant the whole of such income ; the agent to honor his, said complainant’s, drafts or those of this defendant—-each to keep an account of disbursements upon a plan to be mutually agreed upon—and each regularly and cheerfully to submit his or her accounts and disbursements to the other for approval; and requested that the said complainant should make up his mind definitively thereon by the 1st day of November then next. That on so leaving said house in Broadway, she went to reside with one of her brothers and also spent part of the summer at Henderson; but that, until the said first day of November, she occasionally visited the said house in Broadway, in which the said James Monroe and his family and the said complainant then resided ; the object of such visits being to conceal from the public the fact that she, this defendant, was so separated from her said husband, until she should ascertain with certainty whether he could be induced to abandon his attempts to acquire an interest in said income and return to an observance of the terms of their said ante-nuptial agreement. That she holds a paper in the proper hand-writing of the said complainant. Which said paper is in the following words :</p> <p>“ Substance of a conversation with Mr. Strong at my offlce, 17th June, 1841.”</p> <p>“ At the instance of Mrs. Cruger, he made verbally two propositions. First—That her deed of appointment of September last would be cancelled and that the agent should hold the whole income subject to our drafts indifferently. I enquired what security I was to have that this arrangement would not be rescinded. He answered, none but her good faith.</p> <p>“I replied, that this was going back to precisely the loose state of things and of pecuniary dependence and subjection on my part, out of which all our difficulties had arisen; and that, having been twice warned of its evils by her revoking the order to her trustees to pay me the income, for both our sakes, I would not consent to the arrangement.</p> <p>“ Second—That she would secure to me the entire income, reserving to herself the use of the house in Broadway and the income to which she is entitled from her mother’s estate, but she would then separate herself from me.</p> <p>“ To this, my response was that I would listen to no proposition whatever involving a separation. That Mrs. Cruger had no right to separate herself from me. That this would be no cause nor had I ever given her any for doing so. Henry D. Cruger.”</p> <p>That the said complainant wrote to this defendant, bitterly complaining of this defendant’s conduct in declining to settle upon him unconditionally the income of her estate ; that he refused to visit this defendant either at Henderson or at her brother’s, about twelve miles from the city of New York, om account of its incompatibility with his alleged professional occupations in the said city—and repeatedly declared in the most positive terms that he and this defendant never could enjoy peace or happiness together until this defendant should cause to be definitively and formally settled upon him the income of her estate or, at least, one half of it.</p> <p>That she returned to the city from her said country residence on the 18th of October, 1841; that she went immediately to the house of her cousin Mrs. Eliza C. Kane and there met the complainant and had a very painful interview with him. That the said James Monroe alone or conjointly with the complainant instructed his wife, Mrs. Elizabeth Mary Monroe, the only surviving sister of this defendant, to procure from this defendant an appointment of one half of the said income to the use of the said complainant. That all the acts and proceedings of the said Elizabeth Mary Monroe were guided by the complainant either directly or indirectly through the agency of the said James Monroe¿ and that the said complainant at the time, by some indirect means, procured for the attainment of his said designs on the income of this defendant’s estate the aid and assistance of the said Mrs. Eliza C. Kane and of Francis B. Ogden. That immediately after this defendant’s said return to the city, the said Mrs. Monroe, aided and seconded by the said Mrs. Kane and Mr. Ogden, addressed this defendant and requested her to settle upon the said complainant the one half of the income. This defendant replied to such request, that by virtue of her said offer of June previous, which still lay unrescinded, he, the complainant, had the liberty of taking nearly the whole of said income; and it was, therefore, unnecessary to apply to this defendant for a smaller sum. That her said sister, aided and seconded as aforesaid, treated such answer with ridicule and derision—stated that this defendant had no right to give the whole—but was bound, in order to save herself from general censure, to give to said complainant one half of such income. That her said sister, so aided and seconded by the said Mrs. Kane and Mr. Ogden, pursued such application to this defendant for a settlement of one half of said income upon the said complainant unceasingly and in so harassing and importunate a manner as to leave this defendant no peace or quiet. That she resisted the said application and importunities of her said sister to the utmost of her ability: but at length her powers of resistance failed her; and she yielded—and directed her said counsel to draw the required settlement. That the said George W. Strong accordingly drew up an instrument, bearing date 26th October 1841 and to the same purport as the paper last set forth in the said bill, except that the settlement therein named was for the life of this defendant. And she signed and sealed the same.</p> <p>That the said paper was tendered to the complainant and that he refused to receive the same. That at this stage of the controversy she was again addressed by her said sister, aided by her cousin and Mr. Ogden, with complaints against the frame of the paper—in this, that it was for the life of this defendant only instead of being for the life of the complainant. They also charged this defendant with having, after her aforesaid submission to their requests, given private instructions to her said counsel to draw the same paper in such unsatisfactory form and renewed their said importunities, censured her for unreasonable obstinacy, threatened her with public odium and continued such importunities until on or about the 8th day of November in the year last aforesaid, when they literally compelled this defendant to secure her tranquility by agreeing to make the said settlement upon the said complainant of half the income of her estate during the life of him, the said complainant, which was going beyond even her said offer through the said Mr. Strong. That having so yielded, she accordingly sent for the said George W. Strong. But, before he called on her, she was obliged suddenly to leave the city for the purpose of visiting a sick friend. She stated to her said sister that she might give such instructions as she thought proper to the said Mr. Strong for the preparation of said settlement. That agreeably to the instructions of her said sister the said Mr. Strong prepared the said paper dated November 19th 1841—and on the ninth day of that month submitted the draft thereof to the said complainant for his approval. That the said complainant, on receiving such draft, instead of acquiescing therein did, on or about the 10th day of November in the year last aforesaid, submit to the said Mr. Strong a counter-project for a settlement, of which a copy was contained in a schedule annexed to her answer. That the said complainant'was given to understand that the paper so proposed by him would not be executed. That after considerable hesitation and on or about the 17th day of November in the year last aforesaid, he signified to the said Mr. Strong that he would accept as satisfactory the said paper dated the 19th November. Whereupon the same was signed and .acknowledged by this defendant and sent to said Mr. Strong, who delivered it to the said complainant. And this defendant denied that the said last mentioned paper emanated from her own free will or was obtained without the privity of the said complainant; and she also denied that it was executed whilst she was beyond the said complainant’s influence or when he had not seen her for a long time. That during the period of twenty days which intervened between her said arrival in the city of New York and the submission of the draft of such paper to the said complainant, she had had one extremely painful interview with the complainant as aforesaid and was obliged, by the importunities aforesaid, to execute one instrument in favor of said complainant which was rejected by him—and was also obliged to give a reluctant assent to another, purporting to give him further rights. That the said Mrs. Monroe, Mrs. Kane and Mr. Ogden, during the said twenty days and until said paper bearing date November 19th 1841 was executed, were in constant correspondence with said complainant in relation to the obtaining from this defendant such last named paper or some similar document and that all their said urgency, applications and importunities were at the instance and request and with the knowledge and privity of the said complainant.</p> <p>That although the said complainant so received the said last mentioned paper with the understanding on his part and on the part of this defendant that they were to live apart, yet he remained in the said house of this defendant in Broadway, thereby excluding her from the enjoyment thereof until May 1842, when the said complainant removed therefrom and this defendant has ever since occupied it. That she has in her possession various letters written by her to him which he lent to her under a promise that the same should be returned to him ; but not any other papers or documents as far as she could remember ; and she said that, on being allowed a reasonable time to take copies thereof, she was willing to return the same letters to the said complainant, provided he would deliver to her or her trustees the papers and documents belonging to her estate in his, said complainant’s, possession. That the two wills and the papers respectively dated October 26th and November 2d 1839, January 29th 1841 and November 27th 1836 were in her possession, but the said complainant did not lend the same or any of them to her. And although some of them were occasionally in the possession of the said complainant who always had free access to this defendant’s papers while living with her—yet she had a right to retain the same.</p> <p>That said papers respectively, dated September 7th, 1840 and November 19th, 1841, were and each of them was obtained from her in opposition to her will and by the persevering and vexatious importunities of the said complainant and his agents ; that neither of them was a free or voluntary act; and that the same were and each of them was .obtained fraudulently against good faith and contrary to the true intent and meaning of the said ante-nuptial agreement and of the said deed of June 29th, 1833. And that her said separate estate ought to be exonerated and discharged from all claims or demands of the said complainant or any other person on account thereof. She admitted that no physical force- was employed to compel her to execute the said paper of November 19th, 1841; and that she was, at the time of the execution thereof, exercising such independent and separate power of locomotion, without reference to the will or pleasure of the said complainant. That he persevered in threatening this defendant that she could have no peace, comfort or happiness or save herself from the odium of all who should believe his, said complainant’s, representations until she should execute to him, said complainant, such settlement of her estate as he should be content to accept. She denied that there ever was any agreement or any promise that the said complainant should have the income of this defendant’s property during his life, leaving the principal to her heirs. That the said complainant did, at the request of this defendant, acting for herself and others, members of her family, devote some but not any very great amount of time, to settling and adjusting their several estates and, that he caused the business to be brought to a close. And that for such services the said complainant was allowed and paid the sum of §10,000. That she never did persuade or wish the said complainant to withdraw from or discontinue his professional business. That, although true it is that, by mutual assent of herself and her said husband, a new country house was erected in the years 1835 and ’36 upon land belonging to this defendant at Henderson aforesaid, yet, that she did not believe that the said house was erected against his own judgment or wishes or merely to gratify this defendant. . But this defendant denied that the said complainant’s management of the property in the county of Herkimer rendered the same more productive or profitable to her estate. That the large loans to relatives of the said complainant mentioned in the bill out of the cash capital of this defendant’s estate, together with the said complainant’s own drafts from such capital, amounting in the whole, with interest, to about §70,000, had greatly diminished the income of her said estate. And this defendant admitted that, either before or after the making thereof respectively, she had expressed her acquiescence in such loans; and, although some of them were made without her previous assent, yet, for peace sake, she afterwards acquiesced. And she also admitted the assent of said Robert Halliday; but this defendant could not admit that the responsibility alleged in said bill to have been incurred by the said complainant, by giving or joining in bonds for such loans, afforded any security to this defendant for the re-payment thereof or was any fulfilment, in part or in whole, of any agreement between the said complainant and this defendant. And this defendant admitted that, when suffering under the importunities of the said complainant, but at no other time or times, she repeatedly offered to give to the said complainant the said bonds and mortgages and securities for the loans to his said relatives in the said bill mentioned; but she denied that he, the said complainant, ever accepted any such offer. That she never freely gave the said bonds, mortgages and securities to the said complainant—and that, if the said complainant ever had any title or pretence of title to the same, he wholly relinquished and surrendered the same for the benefit of this defendant’s separate estate by the said instrument dated the twenty-second day of February one thousand eight hundred and forty in the said bill set forth. That on or about March 19th, 1841, Frederick De Peyster was employed as agent. That said newly employed agent was instructed by this defendant’s trustees to collect all arrearages of interest upon the bonds and mortgages belonging to her estate. And, in case it should become necessary, to foreclose the mortgages and collect both principal and interest. That the said complainant treated with her said agent and trustees for permission to retain the said bonds, mortgages and securities, for the purpose of collecting the same—and had never, in fact, given up or transferred them or any of them to this defendant, her said trustees or agent; but, on the contrary, at last, when urged to deliver up the same to said agent, wholly refused so to do.</p> <p>And the defendants, George Douglas and William Douglas, answering, said they had a personal knowledge of very few of the foregoing matters ; but, they were informed and believed that the several matters set forth by the said defendant, Harriet D. Cruger, were true and they, therefore, insisted on the same. They admitted that after receiving the said paper, dated November 19th, 1841, in the said bill mentioned, the said complainant applied to the agent of the said estate for a balance sheet of the estate ; and that an accountant was employed to prepare the same at the expense of the said estate; and that the complainant had frequently applied for the same account and that these defendants refused to furnish the same; and also, that the said defendants, George Douglas and William Douglas, with the knowledge and consent of this defendant, Harriet D. Cruger, had, through the said agent, from time to time, for about twelve months, made payments to the said complainant, in pursuance of the terms of the said last mentioned paper and had so far acted upon the same. And that they, these defendants, were under the belief and impression, until about November 14th, 1842, that the said complainant (having, as aforesaid, extorted the said last mentioned paper from the defendant, Harriet D. Cruger) could enforce the same according to its terms and that these defendants had no remedy against the fraud and injustice attempted to be perpetrated by means thereof. But these defendánts on or about the last mentioned date were advised that’ the same was void at law and in equity. That by reason of such advice they had ever since refused to recognize the same or to make any payments thereunder. And that the same balance sheet not having been completed until after they had received such advice, they, of course, refused to exhibit the same to the complainant when it was completed. And these defendants denied that they weré regardless of their duties as trustees. That they had executed the same with ordinary care and ability and to the entire Satisfaction of the defendant Harriet D. Cruger ; and that they were perfectly solvent and able to make good any loss of said estate for which they might be made chargeable. And these defendants denied that they were ignorant of or incompetent to perform the duties of trustees. And this defendant Harriet D. Cruger, further answering, admitted'that ever since her said marriage she had been and was willing and desirous to live with the said complainant as his wife and to suffer and permit him to enjoy all the benefit of her whole inicome ; but that so long as the said complainant, in violation of the said ante-nuptial agreement and of the said post-nuptial settlement deed, insisted on having a right in or title to the income of her said estate real or personal or any part thereof she could not consent to live with him; that she could not so far control her feelings as to associate in her own house on terms of affectionate intercourse with one whose daily acts of dominion over her property would continually bring to her mind the injustice by which that dominion was acquired. These defendants admitted that at the time of the said marriage the personal estate of the defendant, Harriet D. Cruger, amounted to about $ 135,000 in value and her real estate to about $130,000 in value. That the income of her whole estate real and personal did not exceed $10,000. The defendants insisted that the post-nuptial settlement deed was not void, but was valid at law and in equity. And that if the same or any part or provision thereof was void as being repugnant to the revised statutes of the State of New York or otherwise, then, the said complainant was bound by the principles of equity and ought to be decreed to execute or unite in proper instruments and conformably to the ante-nuptial agreement between him and this defendant Harriet D. Cruger, subject to the trusts and powers in that behalf above mentioned or so settle all the estate and interest in such property which he, the said complainant, could or did acquire at law by or by means of the said marriage. And this defendant Harriet D. Cruger, further-answering, said that the said post-nuptial settlement deed was executed by the said complainant in consideration of the said ante-nuptial agreement and of the said marriage duly solemnized upon the faith thereof and was delivered to and accepted by this defendant and her said trustees as and for a compliance therewith and upon the representation of the said complainant that the same was a valid and binding instrument and effectual for the purposes so as aforesaid contemplated by the said ante-nuptial agreement.</p> <p>A cross bill was filed by the wife, wherein she showed that the said Henry D. Cruger, in consideration that she would marry him, did undertake and faithfully promise her that he, as soon as conveniently practicable after the then intended marriage, should and would cause all the property, real and personal which she might have at such marriage and all income thereof to be settled on her and vested in trustees in such proper and usual manner as the laws required and permitted and as counsel should advise for the purpose of securing the whole principal and income to her sole and separate use during coverture, free from any control or interference of the said Henry D. Cruger and excluding him from acquiring through or by means of such marriage any right whatever in such property or the income thereof and that she should be vested, notwithstanding such expected coverture, with the fullest powers of disposition and control over the said estates and income that the laws would permit in a marriage settlement for the purposes aforesaid. That, at the instance of the said Henry D. Cruger, she thereupon consented so to marry him and that relying upon the promise and undertaking aforesaid and in pursuance of the ante-nuptial agreement so formed between her and him as aforesaid and in performance of such agreement on her part, she married. That the execution of formal instruments, so settling her said property as aforesaid, was deferred, at the special instance and request of the said Henry D. Cruger, until the said marriage should have been solemnized, in order to prevent the implication which he, the said Henry D. Cruger, alleged would arise from any earlier execution thereof that full confidence had not been reposed in his honor and integrity—an implication which he alleged was offensive to self-respect and tended to degrade him in the estimation of others. That immediately upon the solemnization of said marriage, the said Henry D. Cruger, in her presence, delivered into the hands of one of the trustees therein named, who was then present, as the act and deed of him, the said Henry D. Cruger, the said deed of marriage settlement dated the twenty-ninth day of June one thousand eight hundred and thirty-three ; and he insisted that the same was good and valid, but, still, was so inartificially and unskilfully expressed as to render its validity, in some respects, liable to be questioned—and ought to be made good in equity. That the order of the fifteenth day of July:one thousand eight hundred and thirty-three was given merely for the purpose of facilitating the disbursement of'her income as, from time to time, she might desire and was merely temporary and revocable in its nature. And that transfers or papers of the seventeenth day of September one thousand eight hundred and forty and the nineteenth day of November one thousand eight hundred and forty-one were obtained by the unkindness of the husband, Henry D. Cruger, and by excessive and irresistible persuasion and importunity and threats and coercion practiced upon her, the said Harriet Cruger, by him and others acting (as she believed) on his request and by his procurement; and that these two papers were not voluntary acts, but were obtained by undue means and were void. Prayer: That the said Henry D. Cruger might be decreed specifically to execute the said ante-nuptial settlement or duly to execute such deed of marriage settlement as was designed and intended by him when he made the said deed of the twenty-ninth of June 1833. And that proper instruments for these purposes or one of them might be settled by or under the direction of the court and duly executed by the proper parties and that whatever was or might be defective in the said deed of marriage settlement of the twenth-ninth day of June 1833 might be reformed and corrected and supplied by the court so as to bind the said estates real and personal and quiet the complainant and her trustees in the possession of their respective rights therein. And that the said Henry D. Cruger might deliver up all the said papers or transfers of the seventeenth day of September one thousand eight hundred and forty and nineteenth day of November one thousand eight hundred and forty-one, to be cancelled ; that he might be restrained by perpetual injunction from making any further claims under either of the said two last mentioned papers ; and that he might be compelled to perform and execute all such acts and deeds as the court should direct; and, further relief.</p> <p>By the answer to this cross-bill the defendant therein, Henry D. Cruger, denied that the papers or transfers of 1840 and 1841 were obtained by unkindness, threats or coercion or by improper persuasion or importunity or by any undue means; that the same were binding on the said Harriet Cruger and her trustees; and that she was estopped, by her acknowledgments thereto, from denying their validity as free acts. Much of the matter embraced by the original bill was turned into the answer to the cross-bill; and the defendant therein set up the statute entitled of “ Fraudulent conveyances and contracts relative to goods, chattels and things in action” against the alleged ante-nuptial parol agreement.</p> <p>Both causes came up together on pleadings and proofs. A mass of testimony, with many exhibits, embracing private letters, was used. But it is believed that the pleadings set forth and the facts and circumstances embraced by the opinion of the court will be found quite sufficient for an understanding of all useful points involved in this case.</p>

Master’s sale of mortgaged premises, at which the defendant Samuel L. Gouverneur bid off the property at seventeen thousand four hundred dollars; but he made default in regard to completing his purchase. An order was made on default for a resale and that he make good the deficiency. At the ultimate sale, T. Cadwallader bought the property for fifteen thousand five hundred dollars.

The complainant had obtained a judgment of non-suit against the defendant in an action at law ; and having, on notice but while unopposed, taxed his costs at an amount exceeding one hundred dollars, he perfected his judgment for that sum and had an execution issued and returned nulla bona. He then filed the usual judgment-creditor’s bill.

Petition of Joseph Brice Smith, receiver of the estate and effects of Samuel T. Armstrong and James B. Douglas, for instructions as to the manner in which he should distribute funds in his hands. The difficulty was to decide upon a priority between the complainant John L. Safford and the complainants Gray and Crosby. They had both filed judgment-creditor’s bills on the same day.

Booth became the proprietor of the bank of Florida, a bank incorporated by the legislature of the territory of Florida and established at Tallahassee ; that, being such proprietor, the said Booth conducted and carried on the business of the said bank at Tallahassee and, in the course thereof, issued and put in circulation a large amount of the bank bills and circulating notes of the said bank and which said notes were, upon the face of them, made payable at the office of…

Edward Smith had a debt against Lambert Wyckoff; and the latter, by his will, made it a lien upon his real estate —as he also did a bond debt which he had given to Henry Onderdonk. Lambert Smith then died; as did his creditor Edward Smith. The executors of the latter filed the present bill to obtain payment of the debt and made the said Henry Onderdonk a party, supposing him still to be the holder of the bond debt. An answer on oath was waived.

Petition of Pierre Van Cortlandt and Others, owners of lands contiguous to the Croton river, whose damages were about to be assessed at the instance of the Water Commissioners for and in consequence of the diversion of the water? of the river by means of the aqueduct.

Judgment-creditor’s bill against the defendant David J. Ely; and when it was filed, he was a resident of the state of Ohio. On his coming into the state of New York, he was arrested on a writ of ne exeat; and a motion was now made to discharge it, mainly on the ground that he came within this jurisdiction as a witness.

Cause heard on bill and answer. William Fogal lived, made his will and died at Bridgeport in the state of Connecticut. He left property there; and also real and personal estate in the city of New York. The will was proved by the complainant, as executor, before the surrogate of the city and county of New York. The testator left him surviving his widow, the defendant, Susan Fogal, and three young children—one of whom was born after the will had been proved.

Motion to compel John P. Moore to complete his purchase made under a master’s sale. The bill was filed on the twenty sixth day of April one thousand eight hundred and forty-three, to foreclose a mortgage for twenty-three thousand dollars dated the seventh day of September one thousand eight hundred and thirty-eight, made by the defendant Charles Oakley to the North American Trust and Banking Company.

<p>The fact of non-cohabitation, in a divorce case, is not sufficiently proved by a witness merely deposing that the parties (since separation) had not resided together “ to the best of deponent’s knowledge and belief.” The persons with whom the wife has resided had better prove the fact.</p> <p>Nor will a divorce be granted on the unsupported testimony of abandoned women.</p> <p> Practice. Adultery. Divorce. Husband and wife. </p>

Bill for direction to settle the construction of the will of Richard Cunningham.

Bill of foreclosure by the Farmers’ Loan and Trust Company, a corporation located and doing business in the city, county and state of New York, of a mortgage by the defendants Thomas Clowes and wife of Troy, dated the nineteenth day of August one thousand eight hundred and thirty-seven, on premises in the town of Brunswick, county of Rensselaer, for securing $3000 in one year, with interest.

<p>On the third day of February one thousand eight hundred and forty-two, the defendant, Barney Corse, presented to the district court of the United States for the southern district of New York, his petition, in due form, for the benefit of the bankrupt act; and, on the fourth day of March following, was duly declared a bankrupt.</p> <p>Subsequently to this and on the eleventh day of June one thousand eight hundred and forty-two, the complainants filed their bill in this cause, as judgment creditors, having previously recovered judgments upon which executions had been issued and returned unsatisfied. The object of the bill was to reach property devised by the will of the father of the debtor—by breaking up the trusts and to have the property applied—not to payment of debts generally—but to the payment of their judgments as debts which had acquired a preference by the filing of the bill.</p> <p>The defendant interposed a plea of his proceedings in bankruptcy ; that the complainants had come in and proved their debts against him; that, by virtue of the § 5 of the bankrupt act, they had waived all right of action and suit against him; and that the judgments they had recovered were to be deemed surrendered thereby.</p> <p>The complainants filed a replication to the plea, taking issue on it. The defendant having been declared a bankrupt, proceeded to obtain a discharge from his debts. His right to which the complainants contested; and, on a jury trial, the verdict was against him and his discharge was denied.</p> <p>The complainants, then, filed a supplemental bill, setting forth the fact of the defendant being defeated in obtaining a discharge ; and alleging that, although they had proved their debts against him under his proceedings in bankruptcy, such proofs were made, not for the purpose of claiming or securing any dividend, but wholly with a view to oppose and defeat the final discharge of the defendant and which they could not do under the act without proving their debts. They, therefore, insisted that their rights and claim against the defendant in this suit were altogether unaffected by the proceedings in bankruptcy ; and that they were entitled to the same relief as if no such proceedings had been instituted.</p> <p>The defendant interposed a demurrer to this supplemental bill.</p>

<p>On a bill filed in the name of a company and J. B. and L. O. B. and the bill stating that the latter were the assignees of the company, a plea was interposed, denying that they were assignees and setting forth matter showing that, in a decree in another suit, their assignment was set aside and the property of the company was in receivers hands: Held, that this showing did not amount to duplicity.</p> <p>Also held, that if it had been a mere naked plea of the decree, without an averment of its remaining in force, the plea would have been bad; but the positive averment that the said J. B. and L. O. B. were not assignees, coupled with the above (first mentioned) statement as to the decree, carried a sufficient implication that the decree was in force—and the plea was allowed.</p> <p>pé m°'</p>

Demurrer to bill, on the ground of multifariousness and for want of equity—taken by the defendant Maria McGown, administratrix of the estate and effects of Felix O’Neil, ^eceaseck ^ was a kill of revivor and supplement; and set forth the history of three distinct suits in this court—in all of which the present complainant was a defendant. One of the suits was for foreclosure; and a fund arising from, a sale under it had been transferred to another of the suits.

Bill and Answer. The bill was filed for a specific performance of a covenant to renew a lease. The defendant tendered a lease requiring the lessee to pay all taxes and assessments; and the complainants declined to accept a lease on those terms. The question was, as to what covenants and conditions a new lease should contain. The covenant in the old lease for a renewal will be found ip the opinion of the court.

A case of actual partition. The commissioners, William h, Wilson, William H. Dewitt and Henry Staats, had been name Objections were taken by two of the defendants, Edward H. Ludlow and wife, to the report of these commissioners. First objection: That the valuation of the fee of each parcel of property was not set forth.

On a motion for an attachment for violating an injunction, it appeared that the working of the latter carried the enjoinment further than the prayer in the bill.

This case involved a matter of professional confidence and liability, arising from the fact of advance of money, by way of investment, on the assignment of bonds and mortgages by a solicitor to his client. - The decision of the court embraces the circumstances sufficiently.

A question upon an exception taken to the answer of the defendant Seth B. Roberts for impertinence. The bill alleged the insolvency of the other defendant Lawrence; and this point was met by the defendant Roberts—as will be sufficiently seen by a reference to the opinion of the court.

Bill and Answer.. It appeared by the bill that Henrick Zimmerman made his will on the eleventh day of February in the year one thousand seven hundred and eighty-seven, containing the following clauses: “ Third, I do give and bequeath unto my said wife the rents, issues and profits of all my estate, both real and personal, of what nature or kind soever, during her natural life, if she so long remains a widow ; but in ease my said wife shall remarry, then and in such case I…

Bill of foreclosure. A mortgage for $1000 had been made to the complainant by the defendants John P. Haff and wife on certain undivided real estate and a part of which estate was known as No. 38 McDougall street, New York. A prior mortgage had been executed by the same parties on the last mentioned property to Francis W. Speck, who was made a defendant and had put in an answer and who was recognized as a prior incumbrancer as to No. 38 McDougall street.

This suit came before the court on a case for a new trial at law of a feigned issue. The bill was for a divorce by a wife. Eliza Van Cort, against the defendant, Charles J. Van Cort, on the ground of adultery. The jury had found that the defendant had committed adultery. The decision of the court contains sufficient of the facts.

The bill had been taken as confessed, on an advertisement against the defendants as non-residents; but, on motion of counsel, the order pro confesso was set aside and the defendants were allowed leave “to put in their answer to * the said bill within thirty days from the making of the order aforesaid, on payment of costs.” The defendants, then, put in a general demurrer. Motion made to take it off the files. The costs had been paid.

Demurrer interposed by the defendants Daniel C. Kingsland and Ambrose C. Kingsland. The complainant, Augustus T. Cowman, had come into this court, by his bill, after an unsuccessful defence of usury in the supreme court against certain bonds founded on a loan. The facts at law will be found in the case of Kings-land v. Cowman, 5 Hill’s Rep. 608.

Demurrer to Bill. The complainant, by his bill, showed that in the month of March one thousand eight hundred and thirty-six, he, in conjunction with Henry Wilkes, Horatio Wilkes and Peter Seton Henry, purchased of Samuel B. Schieffelin fifty-one lots of land at Manhattanville for twenty thousand four hundred dollars; and the title was conveyed to the sai^.

Petition to open enrolment and to vacate the decree. The petition stated that the bill in the cause was filed against the petitioners and the rest of the defendant son the twentieth day of June one thousand eight hundred and forty-two, for the foreclosure of a mortgage alleged to have been executed by Hannahrietta C. Ballagh, George D. Strong, William Ballagh, John S. McKibbin and Oliver Woodrufij executrix and executors of James Ballagh, deceased, the father of the…

Bill filed by Mrs. Mary Ann D. Bruen against George W. Bruen and John B. Beck.

Bills op Interpleader. The complainant in the first above mentioned suit had made two accommodation promissory notes for the respeclive sums of two hundred dollars payable to the order of the complainant in the second suit, James R. Palmer. Sex 1 parate actions had been commenced on the notes in the supreme court against maker and endorser by John Elliott. An attaching process had been commenced against the estate of one Thomas Faulkner, and they claimed the said notes.

Demurrer to Bill. The bill showed that, on the twenty-third day of October in the year one thousand eight hundred and twelve, William ■ Badcliff purchased of Garrit Van Benthuysen the western-half of lot No. 4, &c. in the town of Edmeston, County of Otsego, containing five hundred and twenty acres for four thousand three hundred and forty-three dollars. Deed given, Tyith full covenants.

Judgment Creditor’s Bill. The defendant was a judge of one of the courts of the city of New York ; and the bill was filed on the first day of November one thousand eight hundred and forty-four, on which day a quarter’s salary for services as judge became due to the defendant.

A judgment creditor’s bill had been filed against George Brinckerhoff, as the judgment debtor and Thomas F. Richards, as his assignee under voluntary assignment. Answers had been put in and replications filed.

Question on the lapsing of a legacy given under the will of Eliza McCarthy, deceased. The clause relating to it was in these words: “I give and bequeath to my niece Mary Phelan and to her heirs the sum of six thousand dollars.” Mary Phelan died after the making of the will, but before the testatrix, leaving the complainants her children, next of kin and heirs at law. They now filed a bill for the legacy.

Motion to dissolve an injunction. The complainant had purchased real estate in the city of New-York, subject to a lease. Circumstances seemed to render it doubtful whether a certain lease, alleged to be on the premises, was a bona fide instrument; and, as proceedings were taken for summary possession and the buyer of the property considered there was an attempt to force him unequitably to buy parties off, he filed the present bill, to which affidavits were attached.

Demurrer to a bill for partition, on the ground that the parties filing it had not such an interest in the estate proposed to be partitioned as authorized the bill. This interest was a dower right and also the grant of a tenancy by the curtesy initiate.

Demurrer taken by one of the defendants, Volney Gunn, to the bill.

Bill filed against the defendant Matthias Bruen, on the ground that he, being trustee, wrongly took the title in himself and in the defendant Alexander M. Bruen; and that • ’ certain releases, executed by the complainants, were void. The allegations, embracing the equity, were charged on information and belief. A preliminary injunction had been granted j a motion was now made on the bill alone, to dissolve it.

<p>On the master reporting a plea as true, the complainant can except on the point of the truth in fact. The proceedings referred to by plea are produced ; and if the exception be overruled, the plea stands for argument as to the question of its being a bar;</p> <p> Pleading. Plea. Practice. Plea. Exception. </p>

Question as to who was entitled to a surplus of monies arising from a sale of mortgaged premises. The complainant, Mr. Francis Griffin, had agreed (in writing) with Daniel H. Burtnett, who was about to erect seven dwelling houses on certain vacant ground, to advance him fourteen thousand seven hundred dollars—to be given in ten instalments, according to a specified progressive state of the buildings.

On exceptions to master’s report in relation to surplus. On the third day of April 1821, a bond, with a mortgage for securing $1,000 and interest on a farm and premises at Dosoris, Queens County, was executed by Ralph Peacock and wife to Jarvis Frost. There was a deed dated the fifth day of October 1831, of the said premises or of a part thereof between Ralph Peacock and Eliza Ann his wife of the first part and Sarah Ann Betts of the other part, subject to the said mortgage.

The complainant, John Mitchell, desired to remain in certain leasehold premises as a tenant. They had been occupied by one William Augustus Spies, and whose lease was to end on the first day of May one thousand eight hundred and forty-five. He was desirous of moving out; and the complainant, as to hiring, was referred to the landlord, the defendant John Wilson.

The bill of foreclosure in this case was filed on the first day of February in the year one thousand eight hundred and forty-two. It was grounded on a mortgage made by the defendant Oliver Woodruff and his wife. The bill had heen taken as confessed against them for want of appearance.

The present suit was for partition of real estate, embracing premises at the north-easterly corner of Beaver street and New street in the city of New York. On the tenth day of April in the year one thousand eight hundred and forty-five, a decree for sale was entered; and, on the thirtieth day of May thereafter, the above premises were sold thereunder by master Cambreleng to one of the complainants, Ann Nisbet, for eight thousand five hundred dollars.

Bill for specific performance and the goodness of title to the premises sold, being No. 162, Spring street, New York, dependent on clauses in the will of George Wragg. The will was made on the thirty-first day of January one thousand eight hundred and twenty-five; and che testator had died and his will was proved in the same year. The following are such clauses: “ Item.

Bill filed for the partition of certain real estate in the town of Harrison, Westchester county. The plaintiff was the widow of Jeremiah Maynard, deceased, who had devised to her (by his will) a life estate in one-third of his estate and to his three children who were infants, the residue of his property.

By the will of Cornelius Van Velsor, his widow Phebe Van Velsor and two infant children were interested in his estate. His executors were the present appellants Jacob Jackson and Andris Bogert. After a lapse of eighteen months from the time of the will being proved, the widow petitioned the surrogate of Queen’s County (on behalf of herself and the children) that the executors should render their account. This was, accordingly, ordered.

Bill for specific performance. John Weeks, the father of the plaintiff, died prior to the seventh day of April one thousand seven hundred and eighty-one seized in fee simple of a certain house and lot of land (containing about twenty acres) in the occupation of the plaintiff and also of a piece of woodland of ten acres, all in the town of Oysterbay in the county of Queens. He had made his will, attested so as to pass real estate.

This was a suit brought by the plaintiff, Isaac C. Frost, as sole next of kin of Stephen Frost, deceased, to recover in that capacity and in right of his father his proportional part of a legacy left to the latter in his lifetime by the will of his grand-father. The widow and administratrix of Stephen Frost had refused to be a plaintiff and was made a defendant. Facts appear in the opinion of the court.