¶1delivered the following opinion
¶2“ There can be no doubt that the trust for accumulation established by this will exceeds the limits allowed by law in ordinary cases. It is, however, a trust for a chari ty of the most meritorious character, the foundation of a school for the training of female teachers. In Mann v. Mullen, 3 Norris, 302, Chief Justice Sharswood says: ‘While the statute of 43d Elizabeth is not in force, the principles which the English chancery has adopted on the subject *340obtain here, not by virtue of the statute, but as a part of pur common law. Hence, trusts for charities, with us, have always been upheld and enforced, no matter how uncertain were the objects; and though the effect evidently was to create a perpetuity, these have never been allowed as objections to their validity.’ To the same effect is Yard’s Appeal, 14 P. F. S., 99, and Mr. Justice Gray in Odell v. Odell, 10 Allen, 1, well says: ‘The justice or policy of a rule is not apparent which would prevent a person charitably disposed, but whose means are not large enough to carry out his purpose, from providing for an accumulation beyond the limit in other cases.’ We do not understand Hillyard v. Miller, 10 Barr, 337, to establish a different doctrine, but on the contrary, one quite consistent with it. There the attempt was to establish a formidable perpetuity by ‘tacking an insignificant charity’ to it. The Court say there was neither certainty or probability that- the hospital would be erected, and to sustain the trust, it was necessary to be absolutely certain ; if a time should arrive when the trustees could do no better with the surplus interest, they were to build a hospital with it, but not till then; thus a trust for indisputable accumulation would remain to go forever, founded on what is substantially a loan office in the garb of charity, and essentially no more so than a bank is a charity.
¶3To none of these objections is the present trust liable. Our act of Assembly of 18th April, 1853, is in entire accordance with our common law, while by the ninth section, accumulations of incomes are declared void in so far as they exceed the limit of the act; it is expressly provided that a ‘donation, bequest, or devise for any literary, scientific, charitable, or religious purpose shall not come within the prohibition-of this section.’ But suppose this will is liable to all the objections urged against it, how can it profit the heir at law since the act of 1855? We surely cannot declare the trusts void, and hand the estate over to him, when, by the tenth section of that act, it is enacted ‘that no disposition of property hereafter made for any religious, charitable, literary, or scientific use, shall fail for want-of a trustee, or by reason of the objects being indefinite, uncertain, or ceasing, or depending upon the discretion of a last trustee, or being given in perpetuity or in excess of the annual value hereinbefore limited, but it shall be the duty of any orphans’ court, or court having equity' jurisdiction in the proper county, to supply a trustee, and by its decrees to carry into effect the intent of the donor or testator, so far as the same can be ascer*341tained and carried into effect consistently with law or equity.’
¶4*341This clearly, in our opinion, preserves the gift, and enables the Court so to administer it as to avoid any transgression of the law.”
¶5The plaintiffs thereupon took this appeal, assigning for error the entry of the decree dismissing their bill with costs.
¶6We have no doubt that the devise in question created a trust for a charitable purpose. This brings the case within the proviso to the ninth section of the act of 18th April, 1853, and prevents the devise from being held void, by reason of its provision for accumulations. If, however, the accumulation be in excess of that authorized by previous legislation, the tenth section of the act of 26th April, 1855, P. L., 328, gives to the' Legislature .the right to direct as to the manner in which such excess shall be disposed of, whether in conformity to the will of the testator, or by directing the same to be paid into the public treasury, It gives the appellants no right to the fund in question. The opinion of the learned judge contains a clear and correct statement of the law of this case.
¶7Decree affirmed and appeal dismissed at the costs of the appellants.