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40 Me. 133

State v. McAloon

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine

Decided July 1, 1855

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine · decided 1855-07-01

On Exceptions from Nisi Prius, Cutting, J., presiding. Indictment, as follows: — “ The jurors for the State aforesaid, on their oath present, that Newell Burrill,otherwise called Joseph Burrill, of Bangor, in the county of Penobscot, on the 24th day of Nov. 1854, at said Bangor, three sleigh shawls, &c., (describing the property) and all of the value of thirty-seven dollars, then and there in the possesion of said Thomas H. Goodale and Walter Smith being found, feloniously…

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1855-07-01

How this case has been cited

Cited by 8 later decisions — most recently September 1978

1 federal appellate · 7 state decisions

301855186018701880189019001910192019301940195019601970decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

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Goodenow, J.

¶1The 26th Rule of Court, referred to by the Attorney General, was probably intended to be applied to civil cases only. It was made before the statute disallowing motions in arrest of judgment in civil cases.

¶2The late Rule 19, was made since this case was tried, and is confined to criminal cases. It requires that motions in arrest of judgment, in criminal cases, shall be filed and presented to the Court for adjudication, during the term in which the accused has been found guilty.

¶3At common law the defendant may move at any time in arrest of judgment, before sentence is actually pronounced upon him ; and even when the defendant waives the motion, yet if the Court, upon a review of the whole case, are satisfied that he has not been found guilty of any offence in law, they will themselves arrest the judgment. 1 Chitty’s Crim. Law, 663. As a general rule, it is necessary to allege,in an indictment for larceny, the ownership of the goods stolen to be in some person. There were some cases, under English statutes, where it was unnecessary either to allege or prove the ownership of the property stolen; but they were exceptions to the general rule. Roscoe’s Crim. Ev. 579.

¶4In an indictment against a receiver of stolen goods, it is necessary to allege and prove the ownership of the property stolen ; or that the principal has been duly convicted.

¶5The indictment in this case contains no such allegation. It is fatally defective.

¶6Exceptions sustained. — Judgment arrested.

Rice, J., took no part in the decision.
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