¶1James A. Cumming, Columbia Falls, Mont., for appellant.
¶2Harold F. Smith, Kalispell, Mont., for appellees.
¶6The parties are, respectively, owners of real property within the boundaries of Glacier National Park in Montana and, in this suit, dispute their respective rights to divert water from a nearby stream. The question on appeal is whether such a dispute concerning property so located gives rise to federal jurisdiction.
¶7The complaint purports to be filed under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, alleging that the rights in issue arise under federal law and exceed $10,000 in value. The District Court concluded that the case was controlled by state law and dismissed *546for lack of jurisdiction. In our judgment this was error.
¶8The question is whether Montana has ceded to the United States and the United States has accepted sovereignty and political dominion over privately owned land located within the boundaries of the park.
¶9Upon its admission to the Union as a state Montana acquired sovereignty and political dominion over all public lands of the United States. As to such lands the relationship of the United States was that of individual proprietor. Fort Leavenworth R. R. v. Lowe, 114 U.S. 525, 5 S.Ct. 995, 29 L.Ed. 264 (1885).
¶10On May 11, 1910, by Act of Congress, Glacier National Park was created. The Act, 16 U.S.C. § 161, in pertinent part is set forth in the margin.1 The United States, dealing with its own land, thus withdrew it from settlement and location and dedicated it as a public park. It did not purport to disturb Montana’s sovereignty or political dominion.
¶11Montana then ceded dominion to the United States, and the United States, on August 22, 1914, by Act of Congress, formally accepted the cession.2
¶12By this cession and acceptance, federal authority became the only authority operating within the ceded area. Collins v. Yosemite Park & Curry Co., 304 U.S. 518, 58 S.Ct. 1009, 82 L.Ed. 1502 (1938); Fort Leavenworth R. R. v. Lowe, supra. State law theretofore applicable within the area was assimilated as federal law, James Stewart & Co. v. Sadrakula, 309 U.S. 94, 60 S.Ct. 431, 84 L.Ed. 596 (1940), to remain in effect until changed by Congress. Rights arising under such assimilated law, arise under federal law and are properly the subject of federal jurisdiction. Mater v. Holley, 200 F.2d 123 (5th Cir. 1952); Stokes v. Adair, 265 F.2d 662 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 816, 80 S.Ct. 56, 4 L.Ed.2d 62 (1959); Capetola v. Barclay White Co., 139 F.2d 556, 153 A.L.R. 1046 (3d Cir. 1943), cert. denied 321 U.S. 799, 64 S.Ct. 939, 88 L.Ed. 1087 (1944).
¶13In support of the District Court judgment appellee contends that even accepting these general principles the lands of the parties here involved were not included within the cession and acceptance. Appellee points to language in the Act of 1910 (16 U.S.C. § 161, supra), “Nothing herein contained shall affect any valid claim, location or entry existing under the land laws of the United States before May 11, 1910, or the rights of any such claimant, locator or entryman to the full use and enjoyment of his land.” Ap-pellee contends that the United States thus excluded all privately owned lands *547from its jurisdiction and continued state law as the effective authority applicable to such lands.
¶14The Act of 1910, however, did not purport to deal with United States jurisdiction. State jurisdiction continued and the position of the United States remained as individual proprietor until 1914. It is the Act of 1914 (16 U.S.C. § 163, supra), that defines the area over which the United States assumed dominion.
¶15That area is described as “the territory embraced within the Glacier National Park.” Such language includes not only the public lands dedicated to park purposes by the United States but all privately owned lands within the described park boundaries. Petersen v. United States, 191 F.2d 154 (9th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. State of California v. United States, 342 U.S. 885, 72 S.Ct. 174, 96 L.Ed. 664 (1951).
¶16Judgment reversed. The case is remanded with instructions that dismissal be vacated and for further proceedings.