Volume 41 — Connecticut Reports

Bill in equity for the sale of certain land owned in common by the petitioner and respondents; brought to the Superior court in Fairfield County.

<p>A strip of sandy beach, mainly valuable for its sand as an article of merchandise, was owned in fee by the plaintiffs, and the defendant claimed a prescriptive right to take sand ad libitum therefrom. Held that evidence that the defendant, as one of the public, and not as incident to an estate in other lands, had taken sand ad libitum from the beach, did not tend to prove an individual prescriptive right.</p> <p>Such an unlimited right to take the sand would be equivalent to full ownership and inconsistent with the plaintiffs’ title in fee.</p> <p>A prescription, as well as a custom, to bg valid must not be unreasonable.</p> <p>The right would be a profit a prendre and not an easement, and such rights must as a general and perhaps universal rule be prescribed for as incident to other lands, for the benefit of or in connection with which the rights are to be exercised.</p> <p>The word “beach” has no such inflexible meaning that it must denote land between high and low water mark.</p> <p>It is not necessary that the court should order the parties called before taking in the verdict of the jury.</p>

General Assumpsit, to recover for a quantity of steel sold; brought to the Superior Court in Fairfield County, and tried to the jury on the general issue, with notice, before Park, J. Upon the trial the plaintiffs introduced evidence tending to prove that in the month of December, 1868, the defendants applied to them to buy, as they should order it, two kinds of spring steel, one known in the market as Greaves & Sons’, and the other as spur steel; that they agreed with the…

Petition for a divorce ; brought to the Superior Court in Fairfield County. The grounds for divorce were stated in the petition as follows: And your petitioner shows that the said respondent, for a period of more than three years last past, has been continually guilty of intolerable cruelty towards the petitioner.

Assumpsit, to recover the price of a quantity of tobacco sold; brought to the Court of Common Pleas of Fairfield County, and tried on the general issue, with notice, closed to the court, before Brewster, J. The following facts were found by the court.

Writ op Error to reverse a judgment of the Court of Common Pleas of Fairfield County in favor of the defendants in error as administrators of the estate of Coleman Rockwell. The case is sufficiently stated in the opinion.

<p>Assumpsit, to recover a balance due on sundry money transactions between the parties, brought to the Superior Court in Fairfield County. Auditors to whom the case was referred reported a balance due ,the plaintiff. The defendant remonstrated against the acceptance of the report, which remonstrance the court (Parle, J.,~) overruled, and the defendant brought the case before this court by a motion in error. The points decided by the court will be sufficiently understood without a statement of the facts.</p>

<p>Upon a heaving in damages the court below admitted evidence that was inadmissible, subject to objection, and held the same under consideration with the other evidence during a protracted trial and up to the final decision, when it was , ruled out. The damages awarded were excessive. Held that, while a large discretion must be allowed a judge in such a matter, yet that the course taken was very objectionable, and, in view of the damages given, and of the possible effect of the evidence on the mind of the judge as indicated thereby, was ground for granting a new trial.</p> <p>The plaintiff claimed damages for being disabled from the practice of his profession as a physician by an injury caused by the negligence of the defendants. Held that the defendants might show that his practice was an unlawful one.</p> <p>And that his professional reputation in this respect might be shown.</p> <p>The defendants, a horse railroad company, offered evidence to show that no repairs had been put upon their track since the accident. Held that the testimony of a witness, offered by the plaintiff, as to his knowledge of the condition of the track at a certain time shortly before the accident, was not admissible as rebutting this evidence.</p>

<p>A mortgage described the mortgage debt as a note of $1000. No such note had aver been given, but the mortgagor was indebted to the mortgagee for goods sold to the amount of $756, and the latter had agreed to furnish additional goods up to the sum of $1,000, and the mortgagor had offered to give him security for the whole, and made this mortgage for that purpose. Held that the mortgage was void against a subsequent attaching creditor.</p> <p>At the time of the attachmen t the mortgagee had a bill for a foreclosure pending, and the foreclosure subsequently became absolute by failure to redeem. After the attachment and before the levy of the execution the mortgagee brought a bill for the reformation of the mortgage in accordance with the facts, making only the mortgagor respondent, and a ftenvards obtained a decree reforming the mortgage. Held that the attaching creditor was not affected by these proceedings.</p>

Assumpsit, brought to the Superior Court in Fairfield County, by the plaintiffs as executors of Aaron Turner, being the same case reported in 37 Conn. R., 349. The following facts were found by the court:— The defendant is indebted to the plaintiff in the sum of $433.33, and interest from the 1st day of October, 1852, unless upon the following facts the defendant has a good defense agaiiist the plaintiffs’ demand.

<p>Petition for an injunction against a payment by the defendants; brought to the Superior Court in Fairfield County.</p> <p>The petition alleged that the petitioner was an inhabitant of the city of Bridgeport, a taxpayer thereof, and an owner of real and personal estate liable to taxation and actually taxed therein ; that on the 29th day of September, 1866, he brought his action on the case against John Brooks, of said city, to the City Court of said city, to recover damages sustained by him from the wrongful and malicious conduct of said Brooks, as set forth in his declaration in said action; that said cause was tried before said court and a jury, and upon the trial the jury rendered their verdict that the petitioner recover of said Brooks the sum of ten dollars damages, which verdict was accepted by the court, and thereupon judgment was duly rendered against said Boooks, in his favor for the sum of ten dollars damages, and his cost taxed at 126.15, which judgment remained in full force; that said Brooks afterwards filed his motion in error from said judgment to the Superior Court, which motion was allowed, and said cause was entered on the docket, and was now pending in said Superior Court; that said Brooks employed as his counsel in said cause and upon said trial, Beardsley and Sumner, attorneys at law in said city ; that said attorneys on the 4tli day of March, 1867, made out and presented to said Brooks their bill for their services in said cause to that time, and amounting to the sum of 1104.09; that said Brooks on said day was and still remained an alderman and a member of the common council of said city, and as such on said day presented said bill to said council and requested payment of the same, and thereupon, on motion of said Brooks, said bill was by said council passed and ordered to be paid; that said action was personal between the parties thereto, and it was the sole duty of said Brooks to defend the same and pay all the expenses incurred in such defence, and all the damage recovered therein; that said Brooks employed said attorneys in his own behalf and their services were rendered under his direction and for his sole and exclusive benefit; that said city had no interest in the subject matter of said action, and was in no wise liable for any of the causes of action therein, never employed said attorneys, and had no legal power or right to employ them or to defend in said action; that lie was informed and believed, and therefore averred, that George F. Tracy, clerk of said city, intended to draw, and unless restrained would draw, his order upon Hervey Higby, treasurer of said city, in favor of said Brooks for the amount of said bill, and that said treasurer intended to pay and unless restrained would pay said sum to said Brooks upon said order, out of the funds of said city in his hands, or to be collected of the taxpayers of said city; that he was also informed and believed that the common council intended to assume the further prosecution of said motion in error and of the defense of the suit; praying for an injunction against said officers and against the city, forbidding such payment, and any further payments in the defense of the suit.</p> <p>The respondents filed an answer alleging that, pursuant to the authority conferred upon the respondents by their charter, a by-law was enacted in due form by the city of Bridgeport, approved in a city meeting December 15th, 1863, a copy of which was appended ; that pursuant to the provisions of the charter and by-law, said Brooks, named in said petition, was afterwards, and before the acts complained of, duly appointed superintendent of wharves, and held such office at the time of the alleged acts; that as such superintendent, the said Brooks was empowered, and it became his duty, to order that a certain vessel lying at the wharf of the petitioner in the city of Bridgeport, and within the limits of the district assigned to said Brooks as such superintendent by the common council, should be hauled astern far enough to permit a certain other vessel to obtain a berth at the adjoining dock, and that the suit referred to in the petition was brought by the petitioner to recover damages claimed by him therefor; that the said Brooks, as such superintendent and as the agent of the city by virtue of said appointment, bad full power and authority to make said order,- and the same was made by him honestly, in good faith and without malice, and was a just and reasonable order.'</p> <p>Upon these pleadings the court made the following finding of facts:—</p> <p>The court finds the facts to be as alleged in the petition, in relation to the petitioner being a taxpayer of the city, in relation to his bringing his action against Capt. Brooks and the proceedings had thereon, in relation to the employment of Messrs. Beardsley and. Sumner and the vote of the common council to pay their bill, and in relation to the contemplated payment by the city of the expense of the further prosecution of the defense to the suit.</p> <p>The parties were at issue, whether Capt. Brooks was acting as the servant of the city; and within the scope of his powers' as superintendent of wharves, in doing the acts for which the action was brought, and whether the city council had power to pass the vote complained of. The petitioner also claimed that Capt. Brooks acted in-bad faith and maliciously, and the respondents claimed the contrary.</p> <p>It was. conceded that Capt. Brooks was appointed by the city superintendent of wharves, and that he held the appointment at the time of the acts complained of, and that the brig was lying within the limits of his jurisdiction as such superintendent.</p> <p>The acts done by Brooks for which the petitioner’s action was brought, appear at large in a report of the plaintiff’s evidence as detailed in 37 Conn. R., 365, to which it was agreed reference -might be had.</p> <p>In addition to the evidence there reported, the respondents now examined Capt. Brooks as a witness, upon whose testimony the court finds that he acted in the premises at the request of Miller & Co., and that he believed the brig could be safely hauled astern according to his order, and that she could safely discharge her cargo at the railroad dock,- at which, if hauled astern according to the effect of the order, the cargo would have been discharged; and that the acts complained of were done in the discharge of what he believed to be his duty, unless bad faiih may be inferred from the facts themselves as proved.</p> <p>The ninth section of the city charter provides as follows:— “ Said common council shall have power, by a major vote of those present, to make and ordain by-laws or ordinances relating to wharves, and the anchoring, moving and mooring of vessels within said city.”</p> <p>The 32d section of the charter is as follows :—“ The common council of said city shall have power and authority.to constitute and appoint all necessary and proper officers, under such names and appellations as they may deem appropriate, and may invest them with the power and authority necessary and proper, not inconsistent with the laws of this state and of the United States, to carry into effect all the by-laws, ordinances and lawful orders of the common council.”</p> <p>The following by-law was passed by the common council and approved by the freemen of the city in a city meeting:—'</p> <p>“ Seo. 1. That the common council of said city shall, from time to time, .appoint one or more persons superintendents of wharves and docks, who shall hold their office during the pleasure of the common council, each of which superintendents shall have power to act only within the limits of the district assigned to him by the common council.</p> <p>“ Sec. 2. The superintendent of each district shall have full power to order and regulate, whenever thereto requested by the o-wner or lessee of any wharf within his district in said city, the laying or mooring of any and all vessels at such wharf, and when and how any and all vessels shall haul off from such wharf, to allow other vessels to pass or wind, or to receive or discharge their cargoes. The superintendent of each district shall also have full power, whenever in his judgment injury may be occasioned to any wharf within his district by reason of any impending storm, to order and cause any vessel lying at such wharf to haul off and anchor at such reasonable distance therefrom as he may direct.</p> <p>“ Sec. 3. The superintendent of each district shall have full power, whenever called upon by the owner or lessee of any wliarf within his district in said city, or by the owner or master of any vessel wishing to discharge her cargo at any such wharf, to settle and determine in what manner and at what part of such wharf the whole or any part of the cargo shall be discharged.</p> <p>“ Sec. 4. Said superintendent shall be entitled to receive from the person or persons at whose request he may act, the sum of thirty cents per hour for the time he shall be actually employed.</p> <p>“ Sec. 5. The masters and owners of every such vessel who shall fail or refuse to comply with any of the orders, directions and regulations that may be made by the superintendent of each district as provided by this law, shall severally forfeit and pay for the use of said city for each and every such failure or refusal, a fine not less than twenty-five nor more than thirty dollars.”</p> <p>Upon these facts the case was reserved by the Superior Court for the advice of this court.</p>

<p>A woolen mill was established on a water course, which it used in part for power and in part for washing its wool, the supply in dry seasons, being sufficient only for the latter. Afterwards a corporation, under a charter from the legislature, purchased a tract of land four miles above on the stream, and at that point diverted a portion of the water to the borough of S, for the domestic use of the inhabitants, and for manufacturing and other purposes. The charter contained a provision that the corporation should be liable to no damages for taking the water. The owners of the mill brought a petition for an injunction, pending which the corporation procured an amendment of its charter providing for compensation for property taken. The petitioners had not known of the existence of the charter until two years after it was granted, but as soon as they learned of the intention of the corporation to divert the stream had given notice to one of the directors that they did not consent to it, and as the work was progressing had again given like notice. The diversion of the water was no damage to the petitioners except during the dry season. The corporation had constructed a reservoir upon a branch of the stream, by which water was stored for use in the dry season, and which at such times added to the quantity in the stream, and would have benefited the petitioners but for the diversion to the borough of a great part of the quantity thus added. Held—</p> <p>1. That the diversion was one which the respondents as riparian proprietors had no right to make.</p> <p>2. That the provision of the charter giving them power to take the water without making compensation was unconstitutional and void.</p> <p>3. That it would seem that the diversion of the water for manufacturing purposes, although to be regarded as a public use, could not be authorized, while the stream was already used by the petitioners for manufacturing purposes.</p> <p>4. That the respondents could not justify themselves for the diversion by the fact that they had provided the reservoir for supplying water to the stream in dry seasons, since the additional supply, even if adequate, was controlled wholly by the respondents, and for their own interest.</p> <p>5. That the petitioner's could not be regarded as having slept upon their rights.</p> <p>6. That, in view of the amendment of their charter providing for compensation, the court in its discretion would allow the respondents time to make compensation, and if not made, that a perpetual injunction should be granted.</p>

Assumpsit on a policy of life insurance; brought to the Superior Court in Hartford County, and tried to the jury on the general issue before Granger, J. On the trial the plaintiff laid in a policy of insurance, duly executed by the company and countersigned by D. A. Keyes as agent, on the life of Charles B. Crofut, of whose estate the plaintiff was administrator, for the sum of $2,000.. He also proved the death of the insured.

<p>Entries in books of account are not admissible in a party’s favor unless verified by the person who made them, if living and within the jurisdiction of the court and a competent witness.</p> <p>Where such entries in the books of a railroad company were offered in evidence by the petitioners, who were receivers of the insolvent corporation, and the respondent had been the vice president and an active director of the company and a member of its executive committee, but it was not shown that the *books had been in his custody or that it had been his duty to inspeet them, nor even that he knew of the existence of the entries, it was held that his relation to the company did not render the entries admissible against him without authentication by the clerk who made them.</p> <p>Where the person who made the entries is dead, or beyond reach, or incompetent as a witness, his testimony is dispensed with ex necessitate.</p> <p>Where evidence is in itself inadmissible it derives no aid from the fact that other proper evidence in the case tended to prove the same thing. »</p>

<p>Action of covenant, for a breach of the covenants of seizin and against incumbrances in a deed ; and a bill in equity by the defendant in that action against the plaintiffs in it, for the reformation of the deed ; brought to the Superior Court in Hartford county. The cases involved the same general facts and were referred together to a committee and heard as one case. As most of the questions in the case arise in the action at law the term plaintiffs will be applied solely to the plaintiffs in that action and the term defendant to the defendant therein; except where the context shows clearly that a different application is intended. The following facts were reported by the committee:—</p> <p>John M. Holley, formerly of the town of Salisbury in this state, died the owner of a large estate. After his decease, in the year 1836, this estate was regularly settled under liis will, and in due course of law distributed to his widow and seven children. A large part of the property was land in.Salisbury amounting to many hundred acres, and of this there was an extensive tract, part of which, being about. two hundred and six acres, was distributed in equal undivided thirds to his three daughters, Harriet H. Burrall, wife of William P. Burrall, Mary Ann Lyman, wife of Moses Lyman, Jr., and Sally P. Robbins, wife of Samuel S. Robbins. In the distribution there was prefixed to the distribution of the lands and made a part of the same, the following provision:—“ It is understood and agreed by the children of the said John M. Holley, that all the iron ores which may be found in the land hereinafter distributed shall be owned by them in common, in equal seventh parts, and the distributors have accordingly distributed to each an equal undivided seventh part of any ores that may be found upon any of the following described real estate which has been distributed-to said widow and children, with the privilege of ingress and egress to each and all of' them for the purpose of digging said ores. It is also understood that if any damage is done to the land distributed to any heirs in searching for, digging, or transporting said ore, reasonable damage shall be paid to the owners of said land.”</p> <p>The children referred to in the provision were John M. Holley, George Holley, Alexander H. Holley, Harriet H. Burrall, Mary Ann Lyman, and Sally P. Robbins, and Maria Holley, afterwards the wife of Edwin B. Williams.</p> <p>Shortly after the distribution, and before any of the conveyances hereinafter stated, the interests of the said John and George Holley became vested in the said Alexander Holley, who thereby became the owner of three-sevenths of the ore interests referred to.</p> <p>On the 2d day of April,- 1839, William P. and Harriet Burrall, Moses and Mary Ann Lyman, and Samuel S. and Sally P. Robbins, conveyed to Elisha Lee the above two hundred and six acre tract, the deed containing th® following reservation:</p> <p>“ And we, the said grantors, do hereby except from the - deed of conveyance of said real estate, and reserve for our ■ own use and benefit, and for the use and benefit of our heirs : and assigns, and for the use and benefit of the other devisees :and heirs at law of the said John M. Holley, deceased, and .for their heirs and assigns, all of the iron ore in or upon said real estate, and also the right and privilege of entering upon the same with teams, carts and other vehicles, and with laborers, and of searching for, digging and raising said ore, and of transporting the same from said land, and also the right and privilege to the other devisees and heirs at law of said John M. Holley, deceased, and their heirs and assigns, of all their right, interest and estate in or to said ore or regarding the same. It is also understood if any damage is done to the land aforesaid in searching for, digging or transporting said ore, reasonable damage shall be paid to the then owner of said land by the person using said- privilege.”</p> <p>The same grantors, under a distinct arrangemént, on the same day, executed and delivered to said Lee, another deed of which the following is a part:—</p> <p>“ Know ye that we, &c. for the consideration of two hundred dollars received to our full satisfaction of Elisha Lee of Ac., do by these presents remise, release, and forever quitclaim unto the said Lee, his heirs and assigns forever, all such right, estate, title and demand whatsoever, as we have or ought to have in or to the one undivided seventh part of all the iron ore in or upon a certain farm of land lying in Furnace Tillage in said Salisbury, which farm was distributed jointly to the said Hai'riet, Sally, and Mary Ann, from the estate of said John M. Holley, deceased; said farm containing about two hundred acres of land, and is the same farm we, the said grantors, have conveyed to said Lee, and is called and known as the Porter farm ; and this deed is to convey our title and estate to one-seventh part of the iron ore on said farm and no more.”</p> <p>On the 1st day of May, 1843, the said Lee conveyed to James Blodgett a portion of the land conveyed to him by the deed last above described, the portion conveyed being described by metes and bounds and being about thirty-eight acres less than the whole tract, together with an undivided one-seventh of the ore right in the land conveyed, the land being conveyed subject to the six-sevenths of the ore right held by the Holley heirs.</p> <p>On the 2d day of April, 1867, Blodgett conveyed to the defendant a portion of the tract conveyed to him by Lee, the portion conveyed being described by metes and bounds, and being about eighteen acres less than the whole tract that had been conveyed to him; together with an undivided one-seventh of the ore right in the land conveyed, the land being conveyed subject to the six-sevenths of the ore right held by the Holley heirs.</p> <p>On the 30th day of October, 1867, the defendant entered into the following written agreement with H. Tudor Brownell, Henry B. Graves, and James Hiibbard, respecting the farm and ore rights purchased by him of Blodgett.</p> <p>“ This agreement made and entered into this 30th day of October, 1867, by and between Monroe Miller of the town of Salisbury, party of the first part, and Henry B. Graves of Litchfield, H. Tudor Brownell of the city of Hartford, and James Hubbard of said Salisbury, parties of the second part, witnesseth;</p> <p>“ That the said Miller, in consideration of the agreements and conditions hereinafter set forth, to be performed by the parties of the second part, hereby covenants and agrees to convey 'by a good and sufficient warranty deed, that certain farm situated in said Salisbury, in or near the village of Lakeville, bounded and described as follows : (describing it,) containing about one hundred and thirty-nine acres, being the same farm that I purchased of James Blodgett about one year ago ; also the undivided one-seventh part of all the iron ore in and upon said farm, which I own as tenant in common with A. H. Holley and others. But it is understood that said farm is subjected to the interest of said A. H, Holley and others, to the six-sevenths of the iron ore mines or minerals, in and upon said farm; and that my conveyance of said farm is subjected to said six-sevenths mineral rights; and deliver said deed to the parties of the second part, on or before the first day of April, 1868.</p> <p>■ “ Now the parties of the second part, in consideration of the foregoing, hereby covenant and agree to pay the said Miller, his heirs and assigns, the sum of twenty-five thousand dollars, in manner as follows (to wit) : ten thousand dollars on the first day of April, 1868, on the delivery of said deed to said parties of the second part, and five thousand dollars annually thereafter, on the first day of April in each and every year, until the whole sum of twenty-five thousand dollars shall be fully paid, together with the annual interest; the parties of the second part to secure by mortgage or otherwise the balance due after the payment of said ten thousand dollars.</p> <p>“ And it is further covenanted and agreed by the parties of the second part, that if they shall neglect or fail to pay said sum of ten thousand dollars, on the first day of April next, and secure the payment of the balance of said twenty-five thousand dollars on the delivery of said deed as hereinbefore provided; then the said parties of the second part hereby agree to forfeit and pay to the party of the first part the sum of five thousand dollars. Always provided that if the parties of the second part shall not be able to obtain a lease from said A. H. Holley and the other proprietors of said six-sevenths of the said mines or mineral interests in said land, on the terms and stipulations agreed to by and between said A. H. Holley and said Brownell this day, then this agreement shall be null and void, if the parties of the second part shall desire to have it null and void.”</p> <p>On the 12th day of June, 1868, the defendant executed and delivered to Louis H. Bristol, as trustee, a deed of which the following is the material part:—</p> <p>“ Know ye that I, Monroe Miller, of the town of Salisbury, Connecticut, for the consideration of twenty-five thousand .dollars, received to miy full satisfaction of Louis H. Bristol, of the city and county of New Haven, as trustee of and for the sole use and benefit of the Hartford and Salisbury Ore Bed Company, hereafter to be organized under the joint-stock laws of this state, do give, grant, bargain, sell and confirm unto the said Louis H. Bristol as trustee aforesaid, that certain tract of land situate in said Salisbury, in the village of Lakeville, bounded and described as follows: (describing it,) containing about one hundred and fifty acres ; excepting, and reserving to myself my heirs and assigns, the two acre lot lying directly in rear of the new academy, with a convenient right of way to and from the highway aforesaid. And I, the said Miller, do sell and convey the undivided one-seventh part of all the iron ore and other minerals in and upon said premises which I own in common with the lie.irs and devisees of John M. Holley, deceased. But it is understood that the said Holley heirs own the six-sevenths of said ore and minerals.”</p> <p>Subsequently the plaintiffs received a charter, and were incorporated by the General Assembly of this state, and thereupon afterwards Bristol as trustee, on the 26th day of August, 1868, released to the corporation all his interest as trustee under the conveyance last above described. The land described in, and purporting to be conveyed by, the last two deeds, is two acres less than the whole tract purporting to be conveyed by Blodgett’s deed to the defendant.</p> <p>On the 28th of April, 1868, Alexander H. Holley, owning thrqe-sevenths of the ore rights mentioned in the distribution, W. P. and Harriet Burrall, Moses and Mary Ann - Lyman, Samuel S. and Sally P. Robbins, and Mary Ann Holley, as trustee of Maria Williams, (in whom as such trustee the said Maria’s one-seventh ore right under the distribution was vested, with power to act in making the following instrument,) as party of the first part, made to Brownell, Graves and Hubbard, as party of the second part, a lease of all their interest in the iron ore mine on the land purchased by the lessees of Miller, for the term of twenty years, upon certain conditions as to the efficient working of the mine, and upon certain stipulations as to payment of a certain sum per ton for all the iron ore obtained. The land mentioned in said instrument “ as the farm recently owned by the Messrs. Miller of Lakeville, and being situated in Lakeville,” is the same described and purporting to be conveyed in said Blodgett’s deed to the defendant.</p> <p>All the interest of the said Brownell, Graves and Hubbard under the lease were soon after assigned to, and have ever since been held by the plaintiffs.</p> <p>On the 17th day of February, 1871, the plaintiffs made a lease of the property to P. W. Lippitt. Bristol, as trustee, Brownell, Graves and Hubbard, as lessees, the plaintiffs, and Lippitt their lessee, have had undisturbed possession and enjoyment of the premises purporting to be conveyed and leased to them in accordance with the terms of their respective deeds and leases. The only motive of Brownell, Graves and Hubbard in making their contract of October 30th, 18G7, with the defendant, and obtaining the defendant’s deed to Bristol, as trustee, and of the plaintiffs in obtaining the deed of the trustee to them, was the ore bed, and Miller’s supposed ownership of the one-seventh of the iron ore, purporting to be conveyed by his deed to the trustee ; and the mining of the ore was the object of the plaintiffs’ organization.</p> <p>On the 23d day of September, 1869, Alexander H. Holley executed to James P. Marsh a bond for a conveyance to him of the three undivided sevenths which he owned in the mine, subject to the lease before described to Brownell, Graves and Hubbard, together with all royalties and rents duo or to become due to him under the lease, for which Marsh was to pay him $20,000, of which $2,500 was to be paid down and $2,500 by note payable in ten days and the balance in one, two, and three years, with interest, a deed to be given on payment of the first of the three notes last mentioned and a mortgage back to secure the remaining notes.</p> <p>Marsh made the cash payment of $2,500, and the $2,500 note was also paid or otherwise arranged and settled ; but no other payments have ever been made or tendered by him, neither has Holley ever made or tendered to him any deed of the premises, Marsh questioning his title, but insisting on an equity right in the premises under the bond, which was put on record by him in the Salisbury records, October 17,1870. Marsh, when he made the contract with Holley was, and ever since has been, an officer of the plaintiffs’ corporation, and has been entrusted with the charge of prosecuting the present suit against Miller.</p> <p>The land distributed as above to Mrs. Burrall, Mrs. Lyman and Mrs. Robbins, was not the whole of the original Porter farm as conveyed to their father, and included other land not part of the Porter farm; but when the distribution was made, and before the decease of the father, an ore bed had been known and opened and somewhat worked in that part of the Porter farm so distributed in common with other lands to said three daughters, but no ore was then known on other lands of the estate, nor has any ore bed since been found or known to exist on such other lands, although indications of the existence of iron ore in such other lands have been observed. The deeds from Blodgett to Miller, and from Miller to Bristol, each conveyed less of the Porter farm land than was conveyed in the deeds to Blodgett and Miller respectively, and the ore bed is known to extend into a few acres of land not in the deed of Blodgett to Miller, but previously conveyed by Blodgett to another party. Otherwise, so far as known, the ore bed, so far as in the land of the Holley estate, is in the lands conveyed to’ Bristol as trustee.</p> <p>Before executing- the contract of October 30th, 1867, with Graves, Brownell, and Hubbard, and after stating $25,000 as his price for his land and one-seventh of the iron ore therein, Miller told the other party that he owned the one-seventh of the iron ore in the land, arid that the Holley heirs owned the other six-sevenths ; but that he did not know what the Holley rights were, and wished them to go to the records and look for themselves; and before they executed the contract, Brownell, Graves, and Hubbard, or some of them, did examine the Salisbury town records, and told Miller they had done so, and that if they could get a lease of the other six-sevenths they could “ handle the thingand they expressed no dissatisfaction with the Miller title. Bristol* before he took his deed, also examined the town records in reference to Miller’s title.</p> <p>Before the Miller contract was executed, and while the negotiations about it were pending, Brownell went to A. H. Holley and Samuel S. Robbins, who acted for the Holley heirs, to inquire as to the feasibility of himself and Graves and Hubbard obtaining a lease from them of the six-sevenths ore right in the Miller land and was encouraged to expect this, and on the 28th of April, 1868, they obtained the lease hereinbefore stated.</p> <p>From tlie date of the deeds to Lee, the title to one-seventh of the iron ore in the successive owners of the lands conveyed to Lee, Blodgett, Miller, Bristol, and the plaintiffs, has been recognized by the Holley heirs, the owners of the other six-sevenths, as a valid title, and the same seems not to have been questioned by any one but the plaintiffs, nor by them until on or about the commencement of the present proceedings. Since about 1843 the owners of these lands have been exercising such right as owners of the one-seventh, recognized as such by the Holley heirs, and dividing with them the proceeds of mining such ore on that basis, unquestioned by any one. This mining has not been constant until the plaintiffs undertook it, but has been repeatedly undertaken before, at intervals, and in one or two cases continued through quite a period. The plaintiffs, since taking their title to the land, have continued to possess and enjoy the oiie-seventh right by themselves and their tenants; but since some time after taking their title to it from Miller, through Bristol trustee, they have questioned its validity, as now in these proceedings, although continuing to possess and enjoy the right.</p> <p>With the purpose of assuring the title of the one-seventh to Miller, and so to the plaintiffs, A. H. Holley, Mrs. Burrall, Mrs. Robbins, Mrs. Lyman, and their husbands, and Maria L. Williams and her trustee, Mary Ann Holley, on the 14th day of August, 1873, executed and delivered to Miller a quitclaim deed of all their interest in the one-seventh ore right which the deed of Miller purported to convey to Bristol as trustee, which deed was the next day put on record. When afterwards notified of this deed, the plaintiffs refused to take anything under it by operation of law, and so notified the defendant, and tendered to him a reconveyance of whatever rights, by operation of law, the deed of the Holley heirs vested in them, which tender was declined.</p> <p>On the 6th of September, 1873, the defendant also executed and tendered 'to the plaintiffs a quitclaim deed of the one-seventh ore right in question, which deed the plaintiffs refused to accept.</p> <p>When Miller made his contract with Brownell, Graves and Hubbard, and gave his deed to Bristol, trustee, he set no separate valuation on the land and on the one-seventh ore right. His price, as stated and closed by him in the contract and deed, was $25,000 for the whole farm and one-seventh ore right together. Brownell, Graves and Hubbard, on their part, estimated the land at $10,000, and the ore right at $15,000, but it did not appear that Miller knew this. Of the $25,000, fifteen thousand has been paid, $14,000 to Miller, and $1,000 on a mortgage given by Miller to Blodgett, which the plaintiffs had assumed to pay as part of the $25,000. There remains' $4,900 principal due on the mortgage, with interest, and $5,100 with interest due to Miller.</p> <p>The deed to Bristol, trustee, was given by Miller in intended fulfilment of his contract with Brownell, Graves and Hubbard, at the request of these latter, who had not at the time brought about the incorporation of themselves and others as they had expected and were expecting to do, and as finally accomplished in the incorporation of the plaintiffs. When the incorporation and organization of the plaintiffs under their charter was effected, Bristol, as trustee, at the instance of Brownell, Graves and Hubbard, made his deed to the plaintiffs. The defendant objected to the plaintiffs offering any evidence of the breach of the covenant of seizin and against incumbrances in the deed of Miller to Bristol as trustee, on the ground that no right to sue in this action for such breaches belonged to the plaintiffs, and the evidence was received subject to the objection.</p> <p>If, at the time of the execution and delivery of the deed to Bristol, trustee, the defendant under the foregoing facts and deeds was not seized, as in the deed covenanted, of the one-seventh of the iron ore in the lands conveyed to him by the deed, the committee found the damage to the plaintiffs by reason of the breach of the covenant as follows:—The land alone, excluding all right in the iron ore therein, was worth at the time of the contract and deed given, $12,000. If by law the difference between that sum and $25,000, the price given to Miller for the land and one-seventh of the iron ore therein, should be held to be the rule of damages, the committee found the damage for the breach of the covenant of seizin to be the sum of $13,000, upon which he allowed no interest, because the plaintiffs had had the benefit of the one-seventh ore right to the time of trial. If, however, the committee was at liberty to decide the damage by the evidence of the values offered in connection with the price agreed upon, he was of opinion and found that, when the contract of October 30th, 1867, and the deed to Bristol were made, the value of the land and of one-seventh of the iron ore therein did not exceed $14,400, and he found the damage to the plaintiffs by the breach of the covenant of seizin to be at the time of the breach the sum of $2,400, without interest, as before. The above finding of damages in either case was made subject to the effect of the deed by the Holley heirs to Miller of August 14th, 1873, and that of Miller to the plaintiffs of September 6th, 1873. If, in the judgment of the court, these deeds, or either of them, operated to vest the title of the one-seventh of the ore right in the lands conveyed to Bristol in the plaintiffs, then the committee found the damage done the plaintiffs by the alleged breach of the covenant of seizin to be one dollar only.</p> <p>It did not appear that any of the parties to the agreement of October 30th, 1867, or to the deeds to and from Bristol as trustee, had, until after the plaintiffs received their deed from the trustee, any actual knowledge of the incumbrance now claimed by the plaintiffs to have existed when the Miller deed to the trustee was given, and which is alleged in the plaintiffs’ declaration.</p> <p>If upon the facts found the court should be of opinion that the incumbrances alleged by the plaintiffs existed when and as alleged, the committee found the breach of the covenant against incumbrances as alleged, and the damage for such breach to be the sum of $1,000.</p> <p>Upon the petition of the defendant Miller against the plaintiffs for .the reformation of his deed to Bristol, so that the land would be conveyed in express terms subject to the six-sevenths of the ore right in the Holley heirs and the right to dig for and transport the ore upon the land, the committee found, in addition to the foregoing facts, the following :—</p> <p>The deed to Bristol, trustee, was intended and understood by the parties thereto, and to the agreement of October 30th, 1873, to carry out the undertaking of the petitioner as expressed in the agreement, and no further or additional obligations in reference to the Holley heirs rights were meant to be assumed in the deed by the petitioner than those the agreement called for, and so far as the deed was drawn otherwise it was an accidental mistake of the scrivener, not. designed, and not known to exist by any of the parties until after the deed was delivered to Bristol, and after his transfer to the corporation.</p> <p>Upon these facts the cases were reserved for the advice of this court.</p>

<p>A proceeding by mandamus is an “action at law” within the meaning of the statute, (Gen. Stat., tit. 1, sec. 189,) which provides that, whenever any action at law shall be tried by the Superior Court without a jury, the court shall, upon the motion of either party, find the facts upon which its judgment is rendered and make the finding a part of the record.</p> <p>Where, upon a proceeding by mandamus to compel a railroad company to resume its use of a station which it had abandoned, the question was whether the place in question was a station within the statute applicable to the case, it was held that it was a question of mixed law and fact, and that a decision by the court below that upon certain facts found the place was a station, could be reviewed by this court.</p> <p>Where the place claimed to be a station was a mere platform at which certain daily trains had stopped to take or leave passengers, but the railroad company had never sold tickets to or from the place and kept no office or agent there, and had never placed it in their list of stations or on their time tables, it was held not to be “ a station ” within the meaning of the statute which forbids a railroad company to abandon a station without the consent of the railroad commissioners.</p>

<p>Bill in Equity, for the settlement of a partnership account ; brought to the Court of Common Pleas of Hartford County. The facts were found by a committee and on its report the court (Briscoe, J!,) passed a decree ordering the payment by the respondent to the petitioner of the sum of 1494.41. The respondent brought the record before this court by a motion in error. The case is fully stated in the opinion.*</p>

<p>Trover, for a quantity of manufacturing stock, with counts in case for a fraudulent procurement and conversion of the stock and for a tortious conversion of stock received by the defendant as collateral security; brought to the Superior Court in Hartford County.</p> <p>The count in trover was in the ordinary form, describing the stock as lost by the plaintiff and found by the defendant. The second count was as follows : That on or about the 1st day of November, 1866, the plaintiff and defendant were each owners of a large amount of the capital stock of the National Screw Company, a corporation located in said Hartford; that its capital stock was five hundred thousand dollars, divided into shares of one hundred dollars each; that a portion of the stock so owned by the plaintiff was full paid stock and a portion was stock on which only twenty dollars per share had been paid in; that the defendant and the other stockholders also held large quantities of stock 'on which only twenty dollars per share had been paid, the remaining eighty dollars per share being payable whenever called for by the directors; that said corporation was also indebted to the plaintiff in the sum of sixteen thousand dollars; that the plaintiff and defendant were both direcors of the said corporation ; that said corporation had been but recently organized, and the plaintiff and defendant were engaged with the other directors and Stockholders in endeavoring to get the same into successful operation; that the plaintiff had invested therein nearly all his available means and was indebted to other parties for borrowed money besides his liability to said corporation on the stock so held by him on which only twenty per cent, had been paid, and the plaintiff relied upon said indebtedness of said corporation to himself to enable him to meet his said liabilities, all which was well known to the defendant; that the defendant was possessed of a large estate and good credit, and prior to said first day of November, 1866, had been accustomed to indorse and had indorsed the notes of the plaintiff, without any compensation, to enable the plaintiff to raise money to meet his obligations from time to time, and there was no other party on whom the plaintiff could rely to aid him in raising money, and the plaintiff had no other means to enable him to meet his said liabilities other than his said stock in said corpora' tion and said indebtedness so due to him, as the defendant well knew; that on or about the 1st day of November, 1866, the defendant and other directors of said corporation, for the purpose of increasing its working capital, proposed to the plaintiff that he should release to said corporation its indebtedness to him, and that in consideration thereof the defendant and the other stockholders of said corporation should each pay to the plaintiff such proportion of said indebtedness as the stock of each stockholder bore to the whole stock of said corporation, and that such payment should be made by each stockholder transferring to the plaintiff such number of shares of the stock of said corporation on which twenty dollars per share had been paid in as should be necessary for that purpose, and that such stock should be received by the plaintiff as of the value of twenty dollars per share in payment as aforesaid, and that the plaintiff should assume the liability to pay the remaining eighty dollars per share on said stock when the same should be called for by the directors; that the plaintiff refused to accept said proposition for the reason that by so doing he would deprive himself of the means to meet his outstanding obligations as they fell due, and that to assume such additional liability to said corporation would utterly destroy his credit and result in his financial ruin; that the defendant, contriving and intending to injure and defraud the plaintiff, in order to induce the plaintiff to accede to said proposition and release his said claim against said company and take in payment therefor stock as aforesaid from the defendant and the other stock holders, then proposed to and agreed with the plaintiff that if he would accede to said proposition, he, the defendant, would indorse the notes of the plaintiff so far as should he necessary to enable him to raise the money necessary to meet his liabilities and until such time as the plaintiff should be able by the sale of stock or otherwise to relieve himself from embarrassment, and the plaintiff relying upon said promise and agreement, and induced thereby and by the solicitation of the defendant, finally assented to said proposition, and thereupon released his said claim to said corporation, and the defendant and the other stockholders thereupon transferred to the plaintiff a large amount of said stock on' which twenty dollars per share had been paid, and thereupon the plaintiff became liable to pay into said corporation the remaining eighty dollars on each share of said stock whenever the same should be called for by the directors. And that afterwards, to wit, on or about the 15th day of November, 1866, the plaintiff found it necessary for him to raise about the sum of ten thousand dollars in order to meet his obligations as aforesaid, and thereupon called upon the defendant to indorse his notes to that amount, in accordance with.said agreement of the defendant, and that thereupon the defendant, with like intent to injure and defraud the plaintiff, and to obtain possession of the stock of said company belonging to the plaintiff, with intent to cheat and defraud the plaintiff out of the same, disregarding his said promise and agreement, wrongfully and fraudulently refused to indorse said notes unless the plaintiff would transfer to the defendant one hundred and ninety-five shares of full paid stock of said company then owned by the plaintiff, and the plaintiff was compelled to transfer, and then and there did transfer, to the defendant, said one hundred and ninety-five shares of said stock as collateral security for such endorsements, and. thereupon the defendant assented to endorse the notes of the plaintiff to the amount of ten thousand dollars, for the period' of six months, and did so> endorse for the plaintiff. And at the end of said six months, viz., on or about the 15th day of. May, 1867, the plaintiff had paid and taken up about thirty-five hundred dollars of said indorsed paper, but found it necessary to continue or renew the balance of said notes, to wit, about six thousand five hundred dollars, for a longer period, and the defendant then refused to indorse the plaintiff’s notes to renew said balance unless the plaintiff would transfer to the defendant twenty more shares of full paid stock of said company, and the plaintiff was compelled in order to avoid having his notes protested to transfer, and did transfer, to the defendant, twenty more shares of said full paid stock as further security for such indorsements, and the defendant did thereafter indorse said notes for the accommodation of the plaintiff, and that afterwards the plaintiff paid and took up all said notes so indorsed by the defendant, and the defendant was subjected to no loss or expense on account of said indorsements, and afterwards, to wit, on or about the 1st day of January, 1868, the plaintiff' demanded of the defendant a re-convcyance of said shares of stock so transferred by him to the defendant; that the defendant thereupon transferred to the plaintiff one hundred and forty-five shares of said stock, but refused to transfer the rest of said stock, claiming to retain the same as compensation for so indorsing said notes for the plaintiff. And the plaintiff says that the defendant was not entitled to any such compensation from the plaintiff, but said claim of the defendant was in violation of the agreement aforesaid between the plaintiff and defendant, and was fraudulent, oppressive, and extortionate. And the plaintiff says that the whole number of said shares which the plaintiff was compelled to place in the defendant’s hands was two hundred and fifteen shares of full paid stock of the par value of twenty-one thousand five ¡hundred dollars, and the whole number which the defendant transferred back to the plaintiff or to his order was one hun(dred and forty-five shares, which were so transferred back on rand before January 9th, 1869, but the defendant, contriving .and intending to cheat and defraud the plaintiff out of his just rights in said property, did refuse and ever since has .refused to deliver up to the plaintiff the remaining seventy-five shares, of the par value of seven thousand five hundred dollars. And the plaintiff says that the defendant obtained possession of his said property by falsely and fraudulently representing to him that he would indorse his paper without charge, and by means of said representations inducing him to take said stock on which twenty dollars per share had been paid instead of the money so due him from said company, and to take upon himself the obligations and liabilities thereby imposed upon the plaintiff, the defendant well knowing that the plaintiff could not carry or discharge said liabilities and obligations without receiving said money or without the aid of the defendant’s indorsements; and the plaintiff says that the defendant has suffered no loss or damage by reason of his said indorsements, and has given the plaintiff no value for said seventy-five shares, which are worth about eighteen thousand dollars, but the defendant has fraudulently converted and disposed of the same to his own use, and the plaintiff has wholly lost the same.</p> <p>The third count was as follows :</p> <p>That on or about the 1st day of January, 1867, the plaintiff had applied to the defendant to indorse the plaintiff’s notes to the amount of ten thousand dollars; that the defendant consented to make such indorsement for the plaintiff, but required of the plaintiff to transfer to the defendant certain shares of the stock of the National Screw Company, of said Hartford, as collateral security for such indorsements; and that on or about said day the defendant did indorse the plaintiff’s paper to the amount of ten thousand dollars; and that it was agreed between the plaintiff and the defendant that the plaintiff should transfer to and deposit with the defendant as collateral security, in order to save the defendant harmless from loss or damage by reason of his said indorsements, two hundred and fifteen shares of the capital stock of the said National Screw Company; and that accordingly the plaintiff did transfer to the defendant and deposit with him said two hundred and fifteen shares as collateral security as aforesaid; and that thereupon it became and was the duty of the defendant to safely hold and keep said shares of stock exclusively as collateral security against any loss or damage which the defendant might suffer by reason of said indorsements, and whenever all said notes should be fully paid by the plaintiff without loss or damage to the defendant, to' re-deliver and transfer said shares back to the plaintiff. And the plaintiff says that afterward, on or about the 1st day of January, 1869, the plaintiff fully paid all the said notes which the defendant nad indorsed for the plaintiff as aforesaid and took up said notes into his possession, and ' that the defendant was thereby relieved from all liability to pay any of said notes, and has never been subjected to any loss or damage by reason ol his said indorsements; whereby it became and was the duty of the defendant to re-deliver and transfer back to the plaintiff ail said shares of stock; but the defendant, not regarding his duty in that behalf, hath at all times ever since neglected and refused, and still does neglect and refuse to restore a.11 said stock to the plaintiff, though thereto often requested and demanded, particularly on the 1st day of June, 1873; but on the contrary has sold or otherwise disposed of seventy-five shares of said stock of the value of about eighteen thousand dollars, so that the plaintiff has lost and been wholly deprived of the same, and the defendant, contriving and intending to injure the plaintiff, hath fraudulently and wrongfully converted and disposed of said seventy-five shares to his own use; all which is to the plaintiff’s damage the sum of twenty thousand dollars, to recover which with costs this suit is brought.</p> <p>The defendant demurred*to all the counts of the declaration, and the questions arising on the demurrer were reserved for the advice of this court.</p>

Trespass qu. cl. fr., brought to the Court of Common Picas for the county of Hartford, and tried to the jury on the general issue, with notice, before Briscoe, J. On the trial it appeared that the plaintiff and defendants were the owners of adjoining lots in the city of Hartford, and had been since and for sometime before the autumn of 1872, the plaintiff occupying as a residence a dwelling house upon his lot, located about eight feet from the division line.

<p>R was factorized as the debtor of F. At the time of the service of the process he owed F, but had at the time a contract with F upon R’s performance of which F would become largely indebted to him. This contract was not then performed and nothing was due upon it, but it had since been fully performed by R, and he had a claim upon it against F much larger than the debt originally owed by him to F. Held that R could not set off his claim against F.</p> <p>R’s right of set-off was the same that it would have been if a suit had been brought by F at the time the factorizing process was served.</p> <p>And held that it made no difference that F was insolvent.</p>

Assumpsit on a policy of insurance on the life of Patrick Ryan, for the benefit of the plaintiff; brought to the Superior Court in New London County, and tried to the jury before Foster, J. Yerdict for the plaintiff, and motion for a new trial by the defendants for error in the rulings of the court and on the ground that the verdict was against the evidence. The case is sufficiently stated in the opinion.

<p>General Assumpsit for work and labor, brought to the Superior Court in the County of New London, and tried on the general issue, with notice, closed to the court, before Foster, J.</p> <p>The bill of particulars filed by the plaintiff was as'follows:</p> <p>“ 1863, «June. To commission for purchase of Stone Mill, and service for starting the same, and advice with A. P. Sturtevant, $1,250.00</p> <p>Or.</p> <p>“ July 2. JBy cash on account of commission for purchase of mill, $100.00 •</p> <p>*</p> <p>$1,150.00”</p> <p>On the trial the plaintiff sought to recover a commission of twelve hundred and fifty dollars for purchasing of one Loomis, for and at the request of the defendant, a woolen mill known as the Stone Mill, situated on the river Yantic in the town of Norwich, and services for starting the mill and advising with A. P. Sturtevant on behalf of the defendant.</p> <p>It appeared from the evidence that in the month of Decernber, 1862, the plaintiff was employed by the defendant to negotiate with Loomis for the purchase of the mill, provided he could get it for a sum not exceeding $25,000; that soon afterwards the plaintiff entered into negotiations with Loomis or the purchase, and after spending some time in the negotiations, obtained from him a bond for a deed of the property upon the payment of $25,000, in consideration of which the plaintiff executed and delivered to Loomis a contract binding himself to take a deed of the property and to pay him that sum therefor; and that afterwards, on the 28th of December, 1862, he assigned the bond and all his interest in the contract to the defendant. There was no express agreement between the parties as to the compensation which should be paid the plaintiff for the service; it was the understanding that it should be what was usual and reasonable in such cases, and the defendant told the plaintiff that if he succeeded in purchasing the mill he would lower the dam six inches. The plaintiff was anxious that the dam should be so lowered, because he thought the mill next above on the same stream, in which he was largely interested, would be thereby relieved of back water and greatly improved in value.</p> <p>No services were rendered by the plaintiff in starting the mill or in advising with A. P. Sturtevant, as charged in his bill of particulars.</p> <p>The plaintiff was not a real estate broker, and was not employed by, and did not render any services for the defendant as such, but as a skillful person to make the purchase.. For the purpose of proving what his services in purchasing • the mill were reasonably worth, the plaintiff introduced, as a-witness, Jonathan W. Hooker, a real estate broker, residing in the city of Norwich, who testified that his charge for buying real estate outside of the city limits was two and a half per cent, of the purchase price ; that he should have- charged the defendant that commission if he had been employed to make the purchase in this case ; and that the time- spent in performing the service made no difference in his charges, and that it was not customary for him to take it in consideration., To this testimony the defendant objected, but the court admitted it.</p> <p>On the 2d day of July, 1863, A. P. Sturtevant, acting in behalf aiid at the request of the defendant, saw the plaintiff, and informed him that he wanted to settle with him for his services in purchasing the mill, and requested him to name the sum which he should pay him for that purpose. The plaintiff declined to name any sum; and thereupon Sturtevant paid the plaintiff $100 in a check of the Norwich Woolen Company, who were then the owners of the mill. The plaintiff, upon receiving the check, wrote and executed the following receipt and delivered the same to Sturtevant:</p> <p>“ Norwich, July 2d, 1863.</p> <p>“ Deceived from the Norwich Woolen Company one hundred dollars commission on purchase of mill.</p> <p>“ $100. William Elting.”</p> <p>The defendant claimed that this receipt was a receipt in full of the plaintiff’s commission for purchasing the mill, and requested the court so to rule. The plaintiff claimed that it was not given as a receipt in full, but on account only. The. court held that the plaintiff was not precluded by the receipt from recovering what his services were reasonably worth; and found from the evidence that they were worth $625, and. accordingly rendered judgment for that sum, less the $100 paid.</p> <p>The defendant moved for a new trial for error in the rulings of the court with regard to the evidence objected to and with regard to the receipt.</p>

<p>Under the statute (Gen. Statutes, tit. 38, sec. 6,) which gives a hoarding-housekeeper a lien upon the personal property of a boarder kept in the house for the amount due for his board, with a right to retain the property till the debt is paid, and, in case of non payment for sixty days after due, to sell it and apply the proceeds, no special notice to the debtor of the time and place of sale is necessary.</p> <p>The limitation of the statute gives the debtor sufficient notice.</p> <p>The creditor must of course proceed reasonably, and without concealment or unfairness.</p>

Writ op error from a judgment of the Superior Court in New London County.

Appeal by the administrator of the estate of G-ustavus Pratt from the report of commissioners on the estate allowing a claim of the town oi Essex against the estate; taken to the Superior court in Middlesex County. The court found the following facts:— Gustavus Wo Pratt, a son of the deceased Gustavus, was duly appointed collector of taxes for the town of Essex, for the years 1865, 1866,1867 and 1868, respectively.

Bill in equity to compel tlie conveyance of real estate; brought to the Superior Court in Middlesex County. The following facts were found by a committee. The petitioner, who is poor, is a niece, and the respondent, who is in comfortable circumstances, is a nephew, of Frances M. Hayden, who died Sept. 3d, 1870.

Assumpsit to recover the amount of a tax claimed to have been illegally assessed ; brought to the Superior Court in Middlesex County. The court made the following finding of facts. The plaintiff, on the 25th day of July, 1870, was the owner of a lot of land, in the city of Middletown, upon which were two dwelling houses, the basement of one of them being occupied as a store.

The petitioner made the application in the name of the state as well as in his own name. Held: or that may hereafter he held, in or against said railroad company, by said Chatham, in each and every meeting of the stockholders of said railroad company. “ Voted that Philo Bevin, Horace Johnson, John Carrier, A. H. Conklin, Harrison Brainard, Cyrus Hurd, Charles A. Strong, and Warren Veazey, be appointed a financial committee to…

Trespass on the case for obtaining money by fraud; brought to the Superior Court in Middlesex County.

Ejectment ; brought to the Court ot Common Pleas of New Haven County, and tried to the jury on the general issue before Pardee, J. Verdict for the plaintiff and motion for a new trial by the defendant for errors in the rulings and charge of the court. The case is sufficiently stated in the opinion.

The application was as follows:— To the Superior Court, now sitting, &e., come Humphrey Lyon [and twenty-three others,] all residents of the town of Meriden, in said county of New Haven, and show to said court that on the 21st day of October, 1873, they were, and now are, electors and inhabitants and taxpayers of said town of Meriden, and duly qualified to vote in town meetings of said town; that on said 21st day of October, and while such electors, inhabitants and…

Case, for an injury to the plaintiff’s intestate, through the negligence of the defendants, by which he lost his life; brought to the Superior Court in New Haven County, and tried to the jury, on the general issue, before Pardee, J. On the trial the plaintiff claimed to have proved that on the evening of the 12th of November, 1871, Adam Lamb, the intestate, with his daughter, started from Montowese, in North Haven, for New Haven, riding in a business wagon, and that while…

Bill in Equity to compel the conveyance of certain stock in a manufacturing company or the payment of its value; brought to the Court of Common Pleas of New Haven County. The respondents were the Birmingham Axle Company, William Hawkins, administrator of the estate of Lucie P. Colt, and Charles E. Colt, surviving husband of the said Lucie. The following facts were found by a committee. Lucie P. Colt died on the 21st day of May, 1872.

Case, for an injury from a defective highway of the defendant town; brought to the Superior Court in New Haven County, and tried to the jury, on the general issue, before Pardee, J. Verdict for the plaintiff, and a motion by the defendant to set aside the verdict for the misconduct of a juror, with a motion for a new trial for errors in the charge of the court.

Bill in equity to set aside an exchange of lands; brought to the Superior Court in New Havén County. Pacts found by a committee and the case reserved for advice. The case is sufficiently stated in the opinion.

Bill in equity for a sale of certain real estate claimed to be owned by the parties jointly, and for an injunction; brought to the Superior Court in New Haven County, and heard before Crrang&r,. J. The following facts were found by the court.

Bill to foreclose a mortgage; brought to the Superior Court in New Haven County. Facts found and case reserved for advice. The case is fully stated in the opinion.

Action on the case for fraud; brought to the Superior Court in New Haven County.

Replevin to recover personal property unlawfully detained; brought to the Court of Common Pleas in New Haven County, and tried on an issue closed to the court, before Stoddard, J. Pacts found and the finding made a part of the record. Judgment for the defendant, and motion in error by the plaintiff. The case is sufficiently stated in the opinion.

Superior Court. The respondent demurred, the demurrer was overruled, a receiver appointed, and the case brought before this court by the respondent by a motion in error. The case is fully stated in the opinion.

Trespass quare clausum fregit; brought to the District Court of Litchfield County, and tried upon the general issue, with notice, closed to the court, before Hitehcoch, J. Yerdict for tlie plaintiff, and motion for a new trial by the defendant for error in the rulings of the court. The case is fully stated in the opinion.

Trespass, for an assault and false imprisonment, brought to the District Court of Litchfield County, and tried to the court on the general issue, with notice. The court found the following facts.

Trover, for a photographer’s car, with a count in trespass; brought to the District Court for the County of Litchfield, and tried on an issue joined to the court, before Sitchcooh, J. The court found the following facts :— The plaintiff had two sons, Thomas S. Hodge, who was a photographer by trade, and Andrew Hodge.

Replevin to recover property unlawfully detained; brought to the District Court of Litchfield County. Held: and that the court had therefore no jurisdiction. The court (HitchcocTc, «7.,) overruled the motion, and after a judgment against them upon the merits the plaintiffs brought the record before this court by a motion in error, assigning as error the ruling of the court upon the motion to erase from the docket.

Hicks, deceased, in disallowing a claim of the appellant; taken to the Superior Court in Litchfield County, and tried to the court, before Sanford, J. The claim as presented to the commissioners by the appellant was as follows :— “ Estate of R. D. Hicks to Dana L. Hungerford, Dr. “Feb. 1st, 1870, To my services in your business, endeavoring to sell the Clark House in Winsted, from the first day of December, 1869, to the first day of February, 1870, and cash expenses in said…

Stiles, deceased. While the appeal was pending in the Superior Court the appellant died, and her administrator moved to be allowed to enter and prosecute the appeal. The appellees at the same time filed a written motion that the appeal abate and be dismissed on account of the death of the appellant, and denied the right of her administrator to enter.

Case, against the defendants as common carriers, for an injury to a horse carried by them; brought to the District Court of tlie County of Litchfield, and tried to the jury, on the general issue, with notice, before Hitchcock, J. On the trial it was proved that the plaintiff at Whitesboro, in the state of New York, delivered the horse to the New York Central Railroad Company for transportation, with a card attached to his halter, marked “Dr. William W. Welch, care of Dr.…

Assumpsit upon a bank check; brought m the Court of Common Pleas for Hartford County. The court made a finding of the facts and reserved the case for the advice of this court. The facts are sufficiently stated in the opinion.

Petition for an injunction against tlie abandonment of a railroad station by the respondents; brought to the Superior Court in Middlesex County. A temporary injunction was issued, and the respondents applied for a dissolution of it, and upon the hearing upon this motion it was agreed by the parties that the facts might be found and the case in all respects treated as if it were a hearing upon the principal petition. The following facts were found.

Replevin, to recover possession of a horse unlawfully detained; brought to the Court of Common Pleas of Hart-. ford County, and tried, on an issue closed to the court, before Briscoe, J. The following facts were found by the court and made a part of the record. The plaintiff at the time the present suit was brought was, and for six years had been, a resident of Berlin, in Hartford County.

Bill to foreclose a builders’ lien; brought to the City Court of the city of Hartford. The facts were found and a decree passed for the petitioner, and certain of the respondents who were later incumbrancers brought the record before this court by a motion in error. The case is sufficiently stated in the opinion. Two other cases against the same respondents and founded upon, similar liens, were heard at the same time with this, the facts being the same in all.

Assumpsit, to recover for goods sold and for work done; brought to the Court of Common Pleas of Hartford County and tried on the general issue, closed to the court, before jBriscoe, J. The court found the following facts : The plaintiff’s bill of particulars consisted of an account for articles of clothing sold, and for work done in making and repairing clothing, from April 24th, 1867, to June 6th, 1868.

Bill in Equity for tlie marshaling of securities and for an account; brought to the Superior Court in Hartford County.. Pacts found by a committee and decree for the petitioner, (Beardsley, J.~) Motion in error by the respondent. The facts are sufficiently stated in the opinion.

Bill in equity asking for advice as to the construction of the will of Chandler Owen, deceased; brought to the Superior Court in Hartford County. The petitioner was a trustee under the will. The facts were found and the case reserved for the advice of this court. The case is fully stated in the opinion.

Assumpsit on a policy of life insurance; brought to the Superior Court in Hartford County.

Writ op Error to reverse a decree of the Court of Common Pleas of Hartford County, rendered in a suit for the foreclosure of a mortgage.

Assumpsit, to recover for board furnished the defendant; brought to the Court of Common Pleas of Hartford County. Facts found by a committee, and judgment rendered for the plaintiff, (Briscoe, J.) Motion in error by the defendant. The case is sufficiently stated in the opinion.

Assumpsit for money liad and received; brought to the Superior Court in Hartford County, and tried on the general issue, closed to the court, before P-ardee, J. The court found the following facts :— The plaintiffs are a manufacturing corporation located in Bristol in Hartford County, and have been long in the habit of keeping their account in the defendant bank by depositing checks, drafts and notes.

Information, charging the defendant with misspending his earnings and not supporting his family; brought by appeal from the City Court of the city of Bridgeport to the Superior Court in Fairfield County, and tried to the jury, on the plea of not guilty, before Foster, J. On .the trial the public prosecutor offered evidence to prove that on the 28th of April, 1874, the accused was lawfully married to Marina Campbell; that about the middle of July, 1874, she was delivered of a…

Trespass for an assault; brought to the Court of Common Pleas of Fairfield County. The plaintiff was a minor and sued by a next friend.

■ The application alleged that the petitioner, on the 24th day of May, 1873, was a policeman of the city of Bridgeport; that on said day the board of police commissioners of said city, -in the discharge of their duties, nominated William Anderson of said city as a policeman in the place of the petitioner, and made report thereof with other nominations by them made to the common council of said city, at their meeting on the 26th day of May, 1873 ; that upon the presentation…

Bill for the foreclosure of a builders’ lien; brought to the Court of Common Pleas of Fairfield County. Held: on the facts, that the first and second mortgages attached to the land and the depot building, and were an incumbrance prior to the lien and incumbrance of the petitioner, and had a prior and superior equity; and therefore dismissed the petition as against the trustees of those mortgages.

Assumpsit on a promissory note; brought to the Superior Court in Fairfield County. Facts found by a committee, and judgment rendered for the plaintiff by Beardsley, J. Motion in error by the defendant. The case is fully stated in the opinion.

The first case was a petition for an injunction against the removal of a building erected on leased premises; the second a writ of error from the judgment of a justice of the peace upon a summary process brought by the defendant in error to recover possession of the same premises.

Bill in equity to compel the re-conveyance of certain real estate; brought to the Superior Court in Fairfield County. The following facts were found by a committee. About the last of February, 1870, a minor son of the petitioner was prosecuted for an assault and battery on one Warren, and was found guilty and fined.

Assumpsit by an officer on a receipt for attached property, appealed by the defendant from the judgment of a justice of the peace to the Court of Common Pleas of Fairfield County.

Trespass qu. cl. fr., and for an assault, and taking of goods; brought to the Superior Court in Fairfield County.- The defendants pleaded the general issue, with notice that they should defend under a judgment rendered in a summary proceeding to recover possession of leased premises, one of the defendants as the magistrate who rendered the judgment and issued the execution upon it and the other defendants as the officer and his assistants who served the execution, and that…

Bill to redeem mortgaged premises and to remove a cloud from a title ; brought to the Superior Court in Eairfield County. The following facts were found by a committee;— On the 14th day of June, 1812, the petitioner was married to one Zalmon Hanford, with whom she lived thereafter till his death, which took place March 15th, 1869. There was issue of the marriage born alive, and- capable of inheriting the property hereinafter mentioned.

Assumpsit, for money advanced, and on an account stated ; brought to the Superior Court in Fairfield County. The facts were found by a committee, and the case reserved for the advice of this court. The case is fully stated in the opinion.

Bill in Equity for an injunction and to set aside a conveyance of real and personal property; brought to the Superior Court in Fairfield County. The facts were found by a committee and the case reserved for the advice of this court. The case is fully stated in the opinion.

Bill for foreclosure of a mechanic’s lien, brought to the Court of Common Pleas for Fairfield County. The following facts were found by the court: The petitioner claimed a lien, originally in favor of A. Knox & Co., and held by him by an assignment from them, under the statute with regard to mechanics’ liens on buildings, upon the property of the respondent Raymond, described in the petition.

Assumpsit, for keeping horses for the defendant; brought to the Court of Common Pleas for Fairfield County and tried on the general issue, closed to the court, before Brewster, J. Judgment for the defendant, and motion for a new trial by the plaintiff. The case is sufficiently stated in tlie opinion.

Petition for a mandamus, to compel the admission of the petitioner to the office of committee-man of a school distinct; brought to the Court of Common Pleas for Fairfield County.

Bill to foreclose a builders’ lien ; brought to the Superior Court in Fairfield County. The facts were found by a committee and the case reserved for the advice of this court. The case is sufficiently stated in the opinion.

Bill in Equity, for an interpleader, under the 324th section of the act regulating civil actions; brought to the Court of Common Pleas of New London County, and tried before Holbrook, J. The petition, which was dated September 4th, 1878, alleged that the petitioner, on the 20th day of August, 1873, was the owner of certain articles of jewelry, which were described in the petition, of the value of five hundred dollars, which were on that day put up in a package marked “ C. N.…

Assumpsit ; brought to the Court of Common Pleas of New London County.

Information against the defendant as registrar of voters, for acting officially without having taken the oath required by the statute ; brought to the Superior Court in New London County and tried to the jury, on the plea of not guilty, before Park, Q. J. Verdict guilty, and motion in arrest of judgment by the defendant, for the insufficiency of the information, which motion was reserved' for the advice of this court. The case is fully stated in the opinion.

Action for the recovery of the amount of certain interest coupons upon bonds of the defendants ; brought to the Court of Common Pleas of New London County.

The appellant was administrator of the.estate. The court (Hitchcock, J.') found that on the 13th day of September, 1869, Fowler loaned $620 to Maria Donovan, then the wife of the appellant, with the knowledge and consent of her husband; that she borrowed the money to purchase in her own name certain real estate in Naugatuck; that she did, with the knowledge and consent of her husband, purchase the real estate, took the title in her own name, and owned the same until her…

Trespass on the case, for an injury by the negligent driving of tlie defendant; brought to the Court of Common Pleas of New Haven County. Facts found and case reserved for advice. The case is sufficiently stated in the opinion.

Assumpsit, for goods sold; brought to the Court of Common Pleas of New Haven County, and tried on the general issue, closed to the court, with notice of the statute of limitations, before Robinson, J. The court found the following facts:— The debt for which suit was brought was the only debt ever due from the defendant to the plaintiff, and was- incurred more than six years before the commencement of the suit; and the defendant had resided in the state for six.years or more…

General Assumpsit, brought to the Court of Common Pleas of New Haven County, and tried to the court before Peck, J. Judgment for the plaintiff and motion for a new trial by the defendant. The case is fully stated in the opinion.

. Action upon the statute concerning the driving of carriages, .brought by the plaintiff in his own behalf and in behalf of the .town of Waterbury. The suit was originally brought before a justice of the peace. .The defendant pleaded the general issue, and the justice rendered judgment against him. He then appealed to the Superior Court,* in which court he moved to be allowed to file a demurrer, and, permission being given, filed a special . demurrer to the declaration.

Replevin for goods unlawfully detained; brought to the Court of Common Pleas of New Haven County, and tried to the court before Peck, J. Facts found and judgment rendered for the defendant. Motion for a new trial by the plaintiff. The case is fully stated in the opinion. *

Assumpsit, upon the common counts; brought by appeal from a justice to the Court of Common Pleas of New Haven County. The following facts were found by the court:— In the latter part of the year 1872, Mrs. W. C. Robinson called at the store of~ the defendant to look at pianos which he kept for sale.

Indictment for murder in the second degree; brought to the Superior Court in New Haven County, and tried to the jury on the plea of not guilty, before Loomis, J. Verdict guilty, and motion for a new trial by the defendant for error in the charge of the court. The case is sufficiently stated in the opinion.

Information for a violation of a by-law of the city of Meriden, imposing a penalty for keeping open a shop where liquors were sold, after half past ten o’clock at night; brought to the Superior Court in New Haven County by appeal of the defendants from the police court of the city of Meriden. The defendants demurred to the information, and the questions arising on the demurrer were reserved for the advice of this court.

Information for theft; brought to the Superior Court in New Haven County, and tried to the jury, on the plea of not guilty, before Loomis, J. The information charged that at the town of New Haven, on the 3d day of May, 1873, William S. Fenn of said town, with force and arms, one certain promissory note, dated November 6th, 1872, signed by the said Fenn, for the payment of twenty-three hundred dollars, for value received, to F. J. Whittemore or order, on the first day of May,…

McKenzie to the appellant; brought to the Superior Court in New Haven County, and reserved, upon facts found, for the advice of this court. The case is fully stated in the opinion.

Bill to foreclose a builders’ lien ; brought to the Superior Court in New Haven County, and heard before Hitchcoclc, J. Decree passed for petitioners, and motion in error by respondents. The case is sufficiently stated in the opinion.

Assumpsit on a promissory note ; brought to the Court of Common Pleas of New Haven County, and tried to the jury on the general issue with notice, before Briscoe, J. The defence was that the note in question had been obtained of the defendant by fraud by one Ira Brown, in connection with the sale of a patent right, and had been purchased by the plaintiff with full knowledge of the fraud.

Petition for the foreclosure of a builders’ lien; brought to the Court of Common Pleas for New Haven County.

Two actions of assumpsit on promissory notes; brought to the Court of Common Pleas of New Haven County. The general issue was pleaded in both cases, with notice of a claim of usury. The facts were found by a committee. Both cases being governed by the same principles of law, they were argued together before this court.