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417 Pa. 475

Wilcox v. Regester

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania

Decided March 16, 1965

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania · decided 1965-03-16

Relies on Feitz Estate · Pichler v. Snavely

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1965-03-16

How this case has been cited

Cited by 68 later decisions — most recently March 2019 · most notably Exton Drive-In, Inc. v. Home Indemnity Co. (1969), Westinghouse Electric Co. v. Murphy, Inc. (1967)

3 federal appellate · 37 state decisions

160196519701980199020002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

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¶1Concurring Opinion by

Mr. Justice Cohen :

¶2While I join in the majority opinion I feel that a few additional observations might be merited.

¶3The Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board Act, as amended, 47 P.S. §4-468 provides that: “licenses issued under this article may not he assigned(Emphasis supplied.) On the other hand, the Act does permit a licensee to transfer under conditions provided for in the Act and the rules and regulations established by the Board. We recognized this right in Feitz Estate, 402 Pa. 437, 167 A. 2d 504 (1961), where we held that the value of the statutory right to apply after death for the transfer of a restaurant liquor license owned by a decedent at the time of his death is taxable for inheritance tax purposes. We further recognized this right by holding that where a licensee contracts to transfer his license to another an action will lie for specific performance of that contract. Pichler v. Snavely, 366 Pa. 568, 79 A. 2d 227 (1951). But never have we held that the right to transfer a license was itself assignable under the Act. Such right of transfer is available only to a present licensee.

¶4The instant litigation provides a good example of why we should adhere firmly to the idea that a liquor license is a privilege personal to the licensee, that it is not an asset to be traded through the usual market mechanisms, and that its transfer is permitted only to the degree and in the manner provided by the Act and Board regulations.

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