Commonwealth v. Young

¶1Opinion by

¶2On November 16, 1962, Thomas Young, the appellant, was convicted by a jury in Philadelphia County *361of murder in the first degree and punishment was fixed at life imprisonment. Motions in arrest of judgment and for a new trial were denied by a majority of the court en banc. After sentence was imposed in accordance with the jury’s verdict, an appeal from the judgment was entered here.

¶3The motion in arrest of judgment was not pressed at oral argument or in the printed brief. We will, therefore, limit our consideration and discussion to the motion for a new trial. It is our considered conclusion that two of the assignments of error must be sustained and a new trial granted. We will, therefore, reverse the judgment.

¶4For purposes of impeaching the credibility of Young’s trial testimony, the Commonwealth, in rebuttal, identified a record purporting to show his prior conviction of the crime of robbery in another county. This evidence was introduced through the testimony of the clerk of courts of said county who produced files from his office, consisting of a transcript, an indictment dated January 14, 1952, and a guilty plea thereto by “Thomas Young”, a male, colored man who was then 19 years of age. Not another iota of evidence was introduced to show that the Thomas Young involved was the same individual then on trial.

¶5The Commonwealth’s position, sustained by the court below, was that the identity of names, in the absence of contradiction,1 was sufficient in itself to support a finding by the jury that the Thomas Young convicted in 1952 was the same individual on trial. To this, we cannot subscribe.

¶6The importance of evidence establishing prior convictions of serious crimes for impeachment purposes cannot be overemphasized. It can, and often does, de*362stroy a witness’s credibility and significantly influences the outcome of the trial. In view thereof, it appears to us that the identity of the person should be established by something more than mere similarity in name. The name Young is not uncommon; in fact, a perusal of the current Philadelphia city telephone directory manifests fifteen listings for “Thomas Young”. Under the circumstances, we conclude that it was prejudicial and reversible error to permit the jury to make such an important finding on the basis of inconclusive evidence.

¶7The Superior Court of Pennsylvania adopted our view in this respect in an analogous situation. See, Commonwealth v. Falgiatore, 165 Pa. Superior Ct. 235, 67 A. 2d 674 (1949). Also, in every case within our knowledge wherein this Court has approved the admission of a record of prior convictions for impeachment purposes, evidence other than the record itself was introduced to show identity. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Snyder, 408 Pa. 253, 182 A. 2d 495 (1962), and Commonwealth v. Holley, 358 Pa. 296, 56 A. 2d 546 (1948). Moreover, while concordance of names is always evidence of identity, and in some instances sufficient in itself to cast upon the other party the duty of producing evidence to the contrary, a stricter rule is followed in most jurisdictions where the object is the identity of one convicted of crime. See, 9 Wigmore, Evidence §2529 (3d ed. 1940), and cases therein cited.

¶8We also find serious error in the trial court’s instruction to the jury. He charged in part, “My comment, members of the jury, and I have a good reason for making it, is that I think the defendant is guilty, and that it would be a miscarriage of justice to find him not guilty.” (Emphasis supplied.) While the above underscored instruction was, undoubtedly, inadvertently expressed by the learned trial judge, the conse*363quences thereof are impossible of assessment and of such serious import that they cannot be ignored.

¶9Certainly, the jury could reasonably conclude therefrom that the trial judge was in possession of facts, not disclosed by the evidence, that proved the guilt of the accused. It is established beyond argument that the guilt must be determined from the trial testimony and the court must not inject, through its charge, inferences unsupported by the evidence in the case: Commonwealth v. Chambers, 367 Pa. 159, 79 A. 2d 201 (1951), and Commonwealth v. New, 354 Pa. 188, 47 A. 2d 450 (1946). See also, O’Toole v. Braddock Borough, 397 Pa. 562, 155 A. 2d 848 (1959), and Miller v. Montgomery, 397 Pa. 94, 152 A. 2d 757 (1959). Whether the instruction under discussion influenced the jury’s verdict is, of course, problematical. However, if it appears that an erroneous instruction might have been responsible for the verdict, a new trial is mandatory: Vaughn v. Philadelphia Transportation Co., 417 Pa. 464, 209 A. 2d 279 (1965).

¶10Judgment reversed and new trial ordered.