Volume 42 — Federal Reporter

<p>IÍKMOVAL OR OAKSES — ClTIZJONSHIP.</p> <p>Under the act of March 3, 1887, an action pending in a state court maybe removed by defendant to the federal court, although neither party is a resident of the district. Following Kaunas City & T. It. Co. v. Interstate Lumber Co., 37 Fed. Rep. 3.</p>

<p>In Equity.</p> <p>Bill for an injunction filed by Harmon Barhorst and Mary Barhorst, his wife, against David Armstrong, receiver of the Fidelity National Bank of Cincinnati, Moses F. Brown, L. F. Brown, and Alfred Hill.</p>

<p>Railroad Mortgage — Car-Trust Lease — Priorities.</p> <p>An intervenor in proceedings to foreclose a railroad mortgage was the owner of cars in hands of the company under a car-trust lease which reserved to it a right to reclaim its property upon default in payment of rent. Upon the appointment of a receiver, the company being then in default, it petitioned the court, and demanded of the receiver that its cars be returned within 30 days. They were not returned, but were continuously used by the receiver, without objection of the bondholders or trustee, and payments were made on the rental by the application thereto of the freight earned by transportation for the petitioner. After a lapse of throe months, intervenor filed a second petition, stating the facts, and asking that the receiver be directed to pay the amount due under the car-trust contract, and that the same be declared a prior lien upon the earnings, as well as on the property embraced in the mortgages. Held, the retention and use of the cars by the receiver, and the non-action of the bondholders, did not amount to a conversion; that petitioner was not entitled to payment of the rental according to the terms of the car-trust lease, out of the corpus of the estate, but only to areturn of the cars within a reasonable time, if so demanded, and a quantum meruit for the use thereof.</p>

<p>Banks and Banking — National Banks — Insolvency.</p> <p>The comptroller having notified a national bank that its capital was impaired, it was agreed that it might continue business on the directors putting in 8100,000 in cash, and retiring 1-hat amount of objectionable securities. That sum was contributed; the account being oponed with trustees appointed by the directors to manage the fund, with full power, as far as the bank was concerned, and to account therefor to the contributors in such manner as to protect the equities of each individual and the bark, in relation to the bank and its legal rights. It was understood between the trustees and the examiner that the securities to be retired were to be designated by the comptroller or examiner, but there was no such understanding with the comptroller. The full amount of objectionable securities had not been selected and given to the trustees when the bank was closed, the receiver taking and proceeding to collect the whole assets. Held, that the receiver was not required to account for the balance of the S100,00() as a special trust fund, but merely as a debt.</p>

<p>1. Ripakian Rights — Impkovkmknts in Navigable Stbeams.</p> <p>The United Stales, tor the use of the fish commission, rented an island in the Chesapeake hay from the plaintiff, who was the owner by mesne conveyances from the grantees under a patent from Maryland. The United States was already the owner in fee by deed of a small area of the island, on which it maintained a lighthouse. During the tenancy certain extensions and improvements were constructed by the United States for the use of tho fish commission, extending out into the water on the north and west of the island, consisting of about half an acre, which was solidly filled in, and of certain wharves, crib-work, and inclosures. Upon the termination of the lease the United States removed, onto this newly-made land and extensions, all the buildings which it had erected on the island for the use of the fish commission, and refused to give up possession thereof, claiming title thereto as a structure built in the navigable water of the Chesapeake bay to protect the lighthouse, and also contended that the plaintiff had no title on which he could recover in ejectment, because of the restrictions of Act Md. 1835, c. 99, limiting the extent to which the island might he extended. Held, that by the Maryland act of 1803 (article 54, §§ 44. 45, Code Md.) the patentee of an island in navigable waters of the state has a right to improve out in front of his lands, provided the improvements do not interfere with navigation; that improvements and extensions made by such owner, or by his tenants, belong to him, although they may extend further than the law permits; they may be abated, to the extent that!they are unlawful, by proper proceedings, but the ownership cannot be wrested from him, and the promises usurped and used by another; that the same rule is applicable to the limitation imposed upon the extension of Edmondson’s island by the Act of 1835, c. 99.</p> <p>3. Samis — Impkovements Made pok Pkoteotion op Light-House — Title to the Eee— Ejectment.</p> <p>As to the title set up by the United States to the locus m quo, as a structure made by it in navigable wafer required for the protection of the light-house, held, that, as the right of tho United States to use the bed of a navigable water without compensation is restricted to the uses of commerce and navigation, it can use the extensions of this island made by it only so far as their use is necessary to maintain the light-house, and not for the purpose of tho fish commission; and that, as it appears that the only use of the extensions and structures in question, in connection with the light-house, is to defend it against freshets and ice, the United States is entitled to maintain them for that purpose, and Cor no other; and that the plaintiff, as the owner of the island, is entitled to such reasonable use of them as can be made without interference with the enjoyment of that easement by the United States. Held, that the plaintiff, as the owner of the fee subject to this easement in the United States, is entitled to maintain an action of ejectment, and is entitled to a verdict in his favor for tho locus in quo, subject to the easement in tho United States.</p> <p> (Syllabus hy the Court.) </p>

<p>At Law. On demurrer to criminal information. The opinion covers points made on original hearing and rehearing.</p>

<p>1. Public Lands — Void Entries — Action to Pecóver Price.</p> <p>Actions are maintainable in the national courts, against the government of the-United States, to recover the purchase price paid upon void entries of public land, under the provisions of the act of congress of March 3, 1887, authorizing suits against the United States. -</p> <p>2. Same — Actions bt Assignees.</p> <p>Such actions cannot be maintained by assignees of the parties who made the void entries; assignments of all claims against the government being declared void by section 3477, Kev. St., unless made with prescribed formalities, after issuance-of wai-rants to pay the claims.</p> <p>3. Same — Pleading.</p> <p>A petition to recover the purchase money paid to the United States for land, which shows an allowance of the proposed entry by the register and receiver of the proper district land-office, and the issuance of a certificate to the entry man, and fails to allege a surrender of such certificate, or to account therefor, or to allege a relinquishment of all claims to the land under such entry, is insufficient.</p> <p> ■(Syllabus by the Court.) </p>

<p>Life Insurance — Application—Answer by Agent.</p> <p>Insured was not asked as to his income, but after he had signed his application, the statements in which were warranted, the agent, without his knowledge, inserted a statement that it was not less than 8100 a week. This statement was in a different handwriting from the rest of the application, and the policy was issued by the home office. Meld, that the company was liable, though insured was practically insolvent, and his income was much less than $100.</p>

<p>1. CMmiK&s or Passengers — -Presumption op Negligence.</p> <p>The injury of a passenger raises a presumption that the carrier was negligent.</p> <p>2. Same--Evidence — Subsequent Precautions.</p> <p>Evidence that after the injury a skilled mechanic connected with defendant’s road devised a patent to prevent similar accidents is immaterial, unless by reasonable diligence defendant could have discovered the new device befoi’e the injury.</p> <p>3. Samp, — Dueeottve Appliances.</p> <p>If defendant, a cable-car company, procured the best grip it know of, after duo investigation, and subjected it to the best tests known, and thoroughly examined all the machinery of its cars each night by competent men, it is not liable for an injury occasioned by the breaking of the shank of the grip from some latent defect, causing the car to run rapidly down hill and collide with another car, it having diligently applied all known brakes to hold the car on the hill.</p>

<p>At Law. ■ On demurrer to complaint.</p>

<p>Mandamus — Notici:—Alternative Wkit.</p> <p>An alternative writ of mnndamm commanding a city, and certain of its officers, to perform certain acts necessary to the raising of a tax to satisfy relators’ judgment against tlie city, and “ such persons as may be elected to fill vacancies in the board of revision and assessment ” to accept that office, qualify, and assess a tax, is bad on demurrer, it showing that some against whom it is directed have had no notice, and are not ascertained.</p>

<p>Extradition — Embuzzuemrnt of Pdbijo Funds.</p> <p>Under the Penal Code of Cuba, art. 401, which makes it a crime for a public employe to take public funds of which he has charge by virtue of his office, a public officer who, by falsely certifying the invoices in which certain coupons aro inclosed, obtains possession of money paid out by the Spanish bank, which could not pass from the bank’s possession to his own except as a consequence of his official act, is guilty of an extraditable offense.</p>

In Equity. Final hearing. Suit was brought for alleged infringement of eight patents, and proofs made as to seven, to-wit; Nos. 56,793, to H. Pierce; 201,646, to C. M. Brown; 243,343, 243,545, 246,608, 250,656, to P. W. Gates, known in the record as Gates’ patents Nos. 1,2, 3, and 4, respectively, all of which were for improvements in stone or ore-crushers: Nos. 110,-397, to J. H. Rusk, and 237,320, to G. & A. Raymond, for improvements in break-pins for grinding-mills.

<p>Patents yob Inventions — Want oe Novelty.</p> <p>Thimble skeins.of sheet metal for wagon axles, having been previously well-known, and made of oast metal of any shape, a bill for infringement of letters patent No. 256,744, issued to Joshua Sandage, April 18,1882, for a wagon-axle skein, is demurrable for want of novelty; the alleged invention consisting in cutting a blank sheet of metal in such shape that, when rolled into cylindi'ioal form, it will fit not only the spindle section of the axle, but also extend over the shoulder, with a wing along the under side of the axle, back of the collar.</p>

<p>Patents nor Inventions — Infringement.</p> <p>Complainant’s president being the owner of letters patent, under which it manufactured split pulleys, assigned an interest therein, with the right in the assignee to manufacture, and any improvements were to be joint property. An employe of complainant instructed the assignee in the manufacture, and, it appeared, used substantially the forms claimed in a patent for which he applied, but assigned to the president, who assigned immediately after its issue to complainant. Meld, that complainant could not dispute the right of the assignee to manufacture under the last patent.</p>

<p>In Equity to Enjoin Infringement of Patent, by William M. Smith and James Caldwell against Edward Partridge.</p>

<p>Patents for Inventions — Infringement.</p> <p>In a suit, to restrain the infringement of letters patent No. 897,259, issued Pebru ary 5, 1889, to Adolph Tsheppe, for naphthaline paper, where the only question at issue was as to infringement, and the uneontradicted testimony of an expert showed that defendant’s paper was manufactured in the 'manner described in said patent, held, that an injunction and an accounting would be decreed.</p>

<p>Patents nor Inventions — Infbin&ement—Pleading.</p> <p>Under Rev. St. U. S. § 4886, which provides for patents for inventions which have not been known or used by others in this country, and not patented or described in any printed publication in this or any foreign country, and not in public use or on sale for more than two years before the application, a bill for injunction which alleges that the patentee was the original inventor of the patented improvement, which had not been patented to himself or to others with his knowledge or consent in any country, and had not, to his or the orator’s knowledge, been in pub-lie use or on sale in the United States for more than two years before his applies tion for patent, and had not ever been known or used or described in any printed publication in this or any foreign country before his application, sufficiently shows the patentability of the invention.</p>

<p>1. Tkade-Mares — Intonotioít.</p> <p>The manufacturer of an uncooked pudding, put up in packages, under the trademark name of “Puddine, ” cannot enjoin the maker of a similar preparation from using the word “Pudding” in describing it.</p> <p>2. Same.</p> <p>The use of the word “Rose, ” in connection with the word “Vanilla, ” as a trademark, is no ground for enjoining a rival maker of similar products, containing those well-known flavors, from using those words in describing his goods.</p> <p>3. Same.</p> <p>A manufacturer who falsely represents the composition of his goods by the labels on his packages is in no position to enjoin a rival manufacturer from using similar labels and packages, on the ground that the latter thereby deceives the public.</p>

<p>In Equity. On demurrer to bill.</p>

<p>Salvage — Compensation.</p> <p>As the steamer P. was entering Massachusetts bay, at sunrise, the coal-barge A. was sighted three miles to the windward, apparently in distress. The P. changed its course, and took the A. in .tow. The A. had been left at 1 o’clock in the morning by the B., it being the rear of a tow being taken to Boston, and the hawser having broken in the rough sea. When found the wind was high, her rudder was disabled, her sails useless, heavy seas were washing over herx and her hatches in danger of being carried away. She was towed by the P. to a place of safety, and left; the B. having returned and met them. The cargo of the P. was worth §147,000, and she was delayed 11 hours. The A. and cargo were worth §30,700, and was towed with great difficulty, from the roughness of the sea and the loss of her rudder. Seld, that the P. should be allowed 84,000, the amount being increased by the attempted defenses that the A. was not in great peril, was not taken to a place of safety, and that the P. agreed to bring her in at towage rates, which were shown to be false by the testimony of the master, who, though swearing to the answer, said he did not know it contained such statements.</p>

<p>Seamen—Personal Injuries—NaffLiaENCE on Fellow-Servant.</p> <p>A vessel and her owners are not responsible for injuries to a seaman caused by the negligence of another seaman.</p>

In Admiralty. On appeal from district court. 34 Fed. Rep. 546. FINDINGS OF FACT. First. On the 19th of November, 1886, about 10 o’clock a. m., a collision occurred in the harbor of Now York, at the month of the East river, between the steam-ships Britannia and Beaconsfield, by which'the Beaconsfield was shortly afterwards sunk. Second.' The Beaeonsfield was a British iron steam-ship, 270 feet long, 84 feet wide, and 24£ feet deep.

<p>Collision — Evidence.</p> <p>. The steam-lug Gen. Boseerans and the steam-tug Delaware were crossing East river in the same direction, in parallel courses, about 300 feot apart. The steamboat St. Johns, coming- up the river on their starboard, agreed by signals to cross the bow of the Delaware, and pass under the stern of the Boseerans. As soon as the St. Johns crossed the bow of the Delaware, she changed her course so as to pass under the stern of the Boseerans; but the Boseerans, thinking- the maneuver impossible, reversed her engine. The St. Johns immediately reversed her engine, and hailed the Boseerans to go ahead. The Boseerans then started ahead, but was struck and injured by the St. Johns. But for stoppage of tho Boseerans, the St. Johns would have passed 75 or 100 feet under her stern. Held, that the St. Johns was not in fault.</p>

<p>Admiralty. — Proceedings in Rem — Collision—Death oe Seaman — Intervention or Administrator. .</p> <p>An administrator may intervene in a suit in rem to recover tRe damages allowed by a law of the state for the death of his intestate, caused by the wrongful act or omission Of the persons in charge of the res.</p> <p> ÍSyllabus by the Court.) </p>

<p>Collision—Mutual Fault—Libel bt Carso-Ownee—Costs.</p> <p>Where suit was brought against a steamer by the owners of a sailing vessel totally lost by collision with the steamer, and the owners of the cargo lost with the sailing vessel joined in her libel against the steamer, and both vessels were held in fault for the collision, it was held that the defendants should be adjudged to pay only one-half of the cargo owner’s bill of costs, and that the latter must look to their co-libeiants for indemnity against the other half.</p>

<p>On Motions to Dismiss for Want of Jurisdiction.</p>

In Equity. Sur petition for an interlocutory order of sale, and demurrer to same. Motion for an order of sale under said petition.

<p>Corporations—Liability op Stockholdlrs.</p> <p>Where a corporation-which is authorized by its charter to buy land, and pay for it in full-paid stock, issues such stock in payment for land to an amount greatly in excess of the value of the land, and the stock is sold to a purchaser for value, such purchaser is not liable to the creditors of the corporation on the ground that his stock is not fully paid for, where there was no fraud in the original transaction, and the corporation has taken no stops to rescind it.</p>

<p>Foreign Corporation — Taxation.</p> <p>Under Acts La. 1886, No. 76, which provides that if the capital of a foreign insurance company shall not have been taxed in any other state the company shall be taxed on its gross receipts, but provides no method for ascertaining the amount of the gross receipts, and fixes no rate of taxation, the gross receipts cannot be taxed.</p>

<p>1. Equity — Pleading and Proof — Variance.</p> <p>Where a bill prays that a deed be set aside on the ground that its execution was procured hy fraudulent representation of one oí the defendants that it was simply a power of attorney, and the evidence shows that complainant had never executed the deed, and that her signature thereto was a forgery, the variance is fatal.</p> <p>2. Same — Laches.</p> <p>Complainant took no steps to set aside the alleged fraudulent deed for Jive years after its execution, when she instituted an action which at the end of two years and a half was dismissed because not brought to a hearing. She then remained inactive for 10 years longer, during which time the land greatly increased in value, and passed to third persons, who made valuable improvements thereon. Held, that complainant’s laches barred any equitable relief.</p>

<p>Injunction — 'Vipiation—Contempt.</p> <p>A defendant who, when enjoined from selling a certain cordial in certain bottles with a particular label, sells its entire stock of the cordial, bottles, and labels to a third person, under an arrangement that he would fill such orders for the cordial as the defendant might receive, is guilty of a violation of the injunction, though the defendant did not share in the profit of filling such orders, and though it had received the advice of counsel that it might sell its stock in bulk without violating the injunction.</p>

<p>At Law. On motion for new trial.</p>

<p>On Exceptions to the Master’s Report.'</p> <p>Suit by the Central Trust Company of New York against the Sheffield & Birmingham Coal, Iron & Railway Company, and others. Intervention of the Watt Mining Car-Wheel Company.</p>

<p>Husband and Wib — Community Property.</p> <p>A wife having' inherited money, and the community being indebted to her, her husband, in payment of such debt, conveyed certain land to her. This land was afterwards exchanged for another piece of land, title to which was made to the husband, though afterwards husband and wife, and the person with whom the exchange had been made, united in a notarial act, declaring that the transfer was intended to have been to the wife, and that the land transferred was exchanged for her paraphernal estate. Held, that the land belonged to tho community, and was subject to a writ against the husband.</p>

<p>Writs—Service or Process—Foreign Corporations—Jurisdiction or State Court.</p> <p>In an action by a resident of New York against a foreign corporation, which does not do business, or h'ave office, agent, or property within the state of New Yovk, service of process upon an officer of such corporation, while temporarily within this state, does not confer jurisdiction upon the state court from which process issued.</p>

<p>t. Habeas Cop.rus—Custody of Infant.</p> <p>By the common law, both of England and the United States, in virtue of the authority of the sovereign as parens patrice, the writ of habeas corpus will issue to determine the right to the custody of an infant as between parents, who are living apart.</p> <p>8. Constitutional Law—Incidents of Sovereignty—Peksonal Rights.</p> <p>The government of the United States has no inherent common-law prerogatives. It possesses only such as are conferred upon it by the constitution, and therefore has no power to interfere in the personal or social relations of citizens by virtue of authority deducible from the general nature of sovereignty.</p> <p>8. JURISDICTION OF FEDERAL COURTS.</p> <p>The circuit courts have not, as incident to their constitution as such, any common-law jurisdiction. They possess no other jurisdiction than that concurrently conferred by the constitution and congress of the United States.</p> <p>Same—Construction of Statute.</p> <p>The judiciary act of 1789, (1 U. S. St. at Large, c. 20, § 14,) provides “that all the before-mentioned courts of the United States shall have power to issue writs of scire facias, habeas corpus, and all other writs not specially provided for by statute, which may be necessary for the exercise of their respective jurisdictions, and agreeable to the principies and usages of law, and that either of the justices of the supreme court, as well as judges of the district courts, shall have power to grant writs of habeas corpus for the purpose of inquiring into the cause of commitment: provided, that writs of habeas corpus shall in no case extend to prisoners in gaol, unless where they are in custody under or by color of the authority of the United States, or are committed for trial before some court of the same, or are necessary to be brought into court to testify. ” Held, the power of the circuit courts to issue writs of habeas corpus is thereby limited to cases of commitment under process or authority of the United States; and they derive therefrom no authority to issue the writ for the purpose of determining, as betweon parents living apart, the right to the custody of an infant child.</p> <p>5. Same—State Law to Govern—Custody of Infant.</p> <p>If, under section 11 of said act, the cucuit courts have jurisdiction of personal rights and duties because of diverse citizenship, or the alienage of a party, then, on application of a citizen of a foreign country residing without the United States for a writ of habeas corpus to have awarded to him the custody of his child, as against its mother and grandmother, who aro citizens of the state of New York, the court will be governed in its decision by the law of New York as determined by its statutes and decisions.</p> <p>6. Same—Alienage of Party—Habeas Corpus—Custody of Infant.</p> <p>Under 2 Rev. St. N. Y. p. 466, § 23, on habeas corpus, and the decisions of the court of errors on the same subject, the fact that a mother, having in nurture her female child under seven years of age, keeps it from the father, who lives apart from her, and in a foreign country, does not entitle the father to a writ of habeas corpus to have its custody awarded to him.</p>

<p>1. Post-Office — Use of Mails to Defraud — Spiritualism—Evidence.</p> <p>Defendant was indicted for using the mails in furtherance of a scheme to defraud, by soliciting money upon the representation that by an unknown power be was able to answer sealed letters addressed to spirit friends. The government, to show the fraudulent character of the defendant’s business, introduced admissions of defendant that the business was fraudulent. Held, not competent for defendant to show by the 'testimony of persons sending him such letters that in particular instances he had answered them satisfactorily, and that the questions wei’e of such a character that he could not have answered them except by supernatural power.</p> <p>2. Same — Demonstrations of Occult Power.</p> <p>In such a case the defendant will not be permitted to give a test or exhibition of his unknown power in open court.</p> <p>8. Same — Fraudulent Intent — Evidence—Beliefs.</p> <p>The belief of the defendant as to his capacity or power to get answers to questions contained in sealed letters from the spirits of the departed is one of the questions of fact bearing upon intent.</p> <p>4. Same — Conduct—Effect.</p> <p>A man may believe what he will, and the right of association for the promulgation of his belief is complete; but he will not be allowed to carry his belief into conduct which is injurious to the public, and contrary to law. This is the difference between belief and action, of opinion and conduct, in practical matters.</p> <p>5. Samis — Fraudulent Intent.</p> <p>Upon the question whether there is an intent to devise a scheme to defraud, the rule is this: If the scheme be adapted in its plan to work a fraud upon others, and the defendant knew that a material representation therein contained, and calnlated to deceive, was not time, or if he did not believe that it was true, then the intent is in ade out.</p> <p>6. Same — Province oe Human Understanding;.</p> <p>No man has a right to embark in a business, and insist that the legality of it shall be tested by principles beyond the understanding of others, and not by the apprehension of the courts and juries of the country, if when tried and tested by common human understanding' the purpose is found mischievous and unlawful. The jury are not to disregard their own convictions by reason of a cloud of mysteries which they cannot penetrate.</p> <p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p>

Indictment for Retailing Liquors without Paying the Special Tax. Defendant was a druggist at Eaton Rapids. The indictment charged sales of liquor at various times from April 1, 1887, to January, 1890. The evidence on the part of the government tended to show that, for a period of about two years, defendant had been selling to a dentist, at frequent intervals, alcohol for burning in a lamp, used by the dentist in his business.

<p>Indictment for Smuggling.</p>

<p>1. Patents fob Inyentions — Fraudueent Application — Injunction.</p> <p>A complainant who alleges that defendant indneod the commissioner of patents to decide in his favor, as to the priority of an invention, by means of false testimony and misleading statements, but who nowhere particularizes the falsehood or perjury, and who introduces practically the same evidence on the hearing of a motion to restrain defendant from receiving letters patent that had already been considered by the comissioner, is not entitled to a preliminary injunction.</p> <p>2. Same — Unsuccessful Application — Equitable Jurisdiction.</p> <p>Rev. St. U. S. § 1915, which gives an unsuccessful applicant for a patent the right to apply to a court of equity, and which provides that an adj udication by the court in the applicant’s favor “shall authorize the commissioner to issue such patent” to to the applicant, confers on the court no power to enjoin the commissioner from issuing letters patent in favor of one whom he has adjudged entitled thereto.</p> <p>3. Same — Injunction.</p> <p>Rev. St. U. S. | 4921, which confers power on courts having jurisdiction of patent cases to grant inj unctions to prevent the violation of any right “ secured by patent, ” does not confer any authority on such courts to issue an injunction in favor of one who has failed to secure a patent.</p> <p>4. Federal Courts — Jurisdiction—Commissioner op Patents.</p> <p>tjnder Act Cong. March 3,1815, (18 II. S. St. 470,) as amended by Act March 3, 1887, (24 U. S. St. 553.) and by Act Aug. 13, 1888, (35 U. S. St. 434,) which provide that no civil suit shall be brought in the federal courts against any person by any original process or proceeding in any other district than that whereof he is an inhabitant, the circuit court of Now Jersey has no jurisdiction over the commissioner of patents, whose official residence is tho District of Columbia.</p>

<p>1. Patents for Inventions — Extent of Claim — Prior State of Art — Illuminating Gas.</p> <p>Letters patent No. 380,747, granted to Roland H. Smith on November 17, 1885, for a process oí producing a iixed compound illuminating gas “by beating natural gas to a sufficient temperature to decompose and convert a fluid hydrocarbon into a fixed gas, and then bringing such hydrocarbon into contact with the heated natural gas, ” in view of the prior state of the art of gas making and the proceedings in the patent-office, must be confined to a process in which the natural gas is first heated to the required degree, and the fluid hydrocarbon is then brought into contact with the natural gas thus heated.</p> <p>2. Same — Infringement.</p> <p>In the process practiced by the defendant, water gas hot from the generator, hydrocarbon oil and natural gas in its cold state, enter a sub or mixing chamber at the sama time, and, there intermingling, the gases and petroleum vapor pass up into a superheater, where they are subjected to a second heating, and combined fixedly. Meld, that this is not an infringement of Smith’s patent.</p> <p>' 8. Same — Anticipation.</p> <p>The patent granted to Asa W. Wilkinson on June 17,1S73, describes and covers a process for manufacturing an illuminating gas by taking “the natural light car-bureted hydrogen gas escaping in some places from the earth, ” and, after purifying it in the usual way, passing the purified gas into and through retorts kept at or near a cherry-red heat into which a rich hydrocarbon, such as petroleum, is introduced. Meld, that Wilkinson’s process was an anticipation of Smith’s patent.</p> <p>4. Same.</p> <p>Smith was also anticipated by the process practiced as early as the year 1878 at the Beaver Falls Gas-Works.</p>

<p>In Equity. Bill to determine priority of invention.</p>

<p>Patents eor Intentions — Novelty—Ineringement—Mantel Frames.</p> <p>Letters patentNo. 389,340, granted September 11,18S8, to Schuette& Co., assignees of Robert B. Thompson, for an improvement in the construction of mantels, whereby one size of mantel- frame may be fitted to fire-places of different sizes, do not disclose an invention of any primary character; the same general result having already been achieved. The patentees are to be confined to their specific form of construction ; and their rights are not infringed by mantels made under letters patent No. 409,596, granted to William Anderson on August 30, 1889.</p>

<p>Motions for Preliminary Injunctions.</p>

<p>Customs Duties—Incoming Vessels—Obstructing Boarding Oeeicer.</p> <p>Where it was proved that the steam-ship B., on entering the Bay of New York, was signaled by the revenue cutter to slacken her speed, in order that a hoarding officer might be put aboard of her, but that the B. did not slacken her speed, but continued to increase the distance between herself and the cutter, until the latter sheered off, and that during this time the master of the B. was on the bridge, it was held, on proceedings brought against the B. by the government, under sections 3068, 3088, Rev. St.-, that the action of the B. was a hindering and obstruction to the boarding officer, within the meaning of the statute, and that the vessel should be fined $250.</p>

<p>In Admiralty. Appeal from district court.</p>

<p>Shipping — Charter-Paktt—Actios for Breach.</p> <p>Under a charter-party providing that the ship should carry “a full cargo of tim-hor, * * * not exceeding what she can reasonably stow and carry over and above her cabin, crew, and fuel spaces, * * * the entire carrying capacity * * * to be at the disposal of the charterers; * * * charterers to have privilege of shipping a deck-load of timber, provided surveyor permits, ” the charterers are entitled to damages for refusal to carry a deck-load, those acting as surveyors agreeing that the ship was able, when the master uses the deck to carry coal for the voyage, and there is no evidence of any custom allowing it.</p>

<p>1. Marine Insurance — Loss—Perils op Eívee.</p> <p>A river steam-boat ran upon a bar, and. upon being taken off, it was found that her seams had opened, and that she was leaking badly. To keep her from sinking, she was beached upon another bar. While there the river rose rapidly, and destroyed the vessel. that she was lost by a peril of the river.</p> <p>2. Same — Negligence.</p> <p>The night being dark when the vessel ran upon the first bar, and the act of running her upon the second bar having been done in good faith, to keep her from sinking, the facts do not show negligence on the part of the master.</p> <p>3. Same.</p> <p>The fact that help could have been obtained after the vessel was grounded the second time, and before she was destroyed, does not make the failure to procure such help negligence, when it is not shown that the help would have heen effectual, or that the master knew of its existence.</p> <p>4. Same — Abandonment.</p> <p>Where insurers are notified that a wrecked vessel is abandoned to them, and the owners and master believe that the insurers will take possession of her, the fact that the master and owners take no further steps to save the vessel does not relieve the insurers from liability on the policy of insurance.</p> <p>5. Same — Premium Note.</p> <p>The fact that part of the insurance premium has been paid by a note which is overdue and unpaid at the time of the loss does not avoid the policy, but the amount due on the note should be deducted from the amount of the insurance.</p>

<p>In Admiralty. On appeal from district court. 40 Fed. Itep. 330.</p>

<p>1. SEAMEN — COXTIIAOT—CONSTBITCTION.</p> <p>Upon a review oí the testimony in this ease, the court finds that the libelants entered into a contract to serve as seamen on board the British ship Craigend íor a definite period, during which time the vessel was to make one or more voyages within specified limits, and to a port oí discharge in Europe; and pursuant to said contract they served as seamen on the vessel until their arrival at Tacoma, when, before the expiration oí the term oí service, the libelants voluntarily left the vessel, and the contract was terminated by mutual consent oí the libelants and the master.</p> <p>2. Same — Disciiabge—Mutual Consent.</p> <p>A contract of shipment, after part performance, may be lawfully abrogated as to the unperformed part by mutual consent ol the seamen and master, and such consent may be implied from the conduct and actions of the parties.</p> <p>3. Same — Wages.</p> <p>If a seaman’s contract of service be terminated by mutual consent after part performance, a court of admiralty will neither decree payment of extra wages or damages as in case of a wrongful discharge, nor forfeiture of the wages earned by services rendered pursuant to the contract, as in case of desertion, but will allow wages at the rate fixed by the contact for the time of actual service.</p> <p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p>

<p>Admiralty—Appeal—Costs—Pkootor’s Docket Fee.</p> <p>As an appeal in admiralty suspends the original decree, and there is no final hearing until that in the appellate court, the proctor’s docket fee of 830, allowed (Rev. St, § »24) on final hearing in admiralty, accrues in case of appeal only in the circuit court, and should he charged hut once.</p>

<p>1. Shipping — Limiting Liability — Suit Begun in State Court — Jurisdiction.</p> <p>. Xu a ease of application for limitation of liability of the owners of a steam-boat which'liad been sued in the state courts in actions given by the statute of Maryland for loss of life arising out of a collision in the harbor of Baltimore, held, that after the stehirier' had been appraised, and stipulation given in the district court for the payment into court of the amount of the appraisement when ordered, the induction of the amounts sued for in the state courts so as to reduce the aggregate of the amounts claimed in those suits below the amount of the appraisement and stipulation could not take away the jurisdiction of the district court, even conceding that the claims so reduced were all that the owners of the. steam-boat could be made liable for.</p> <p>S. Same — Torts Committed on Navigable Waters — Highways—Jurisdiction oe Federal Court.</p> <p>Held, further, that, as the liability of the. owners of the steam-boat arose out of a maritime tort committed on water which was a navigable highway of commerce, the district court had jurisdiction of it in admiralty, and that the rule of limitation of the liability of the owners of the steam-boat with respect to such a tort was a rule of admiralty procedure prescribed by congress, the power to enact which was not necessarily referable to the commercial clause of the constitution, and therefore the fact that the vessel was customarily employed solely in Maryland waters, and not in foreign or interstate commerce, was immaterial.</p> <p>8. Same — Allowance or Suits ra State Court.</p> <p>Held, further, that after the stipulation was given the court had in its possession a fund to which, under the rule of procedure enacted by congress, all claims wore transferred, and proceedings against the owners were forbidden; that therefore the court had no discretion to allow the suits in the state courts to go on for the purpose of aseei-taining the amount of damages, even though the plaintiffs in those suits might have reason to anticipate difficulty in asserting in the district court the right of action given by the state statute for the loss and injury sustained by them by reason of the death of the persons drowned in the collision.</p> <p>A Same — Txjuxctiok.</p> <p>JJeld, further, that the district court, having in it's control the only fund to which claimants have a right to resort for payment of their claims, and being the only court competent to administer the admiralty rule for the limitation of the liability of the owners of the vessel, it has the authority and jurisdiction, in order to prevent that administration and its decree from being nugatory, to issue an order-restraining the further prosecution of the suits in the state courts,</p> <p> (Syllabus by the Gov,rtf) </p>

<p>1. COLLISION—PliAOTICE—EXCEPTIONS TO ANSWER—SPECIFICATIONS.</p> <p>When exceptions to a pleading are drawn with several specifications, the failure to sustain any specification is fatal to the exception.</p> <p>2. Same—Exceptions—When Allowed.</p> <p>Exceptions to pleadings in collision cases are permitted only when made in good faith, for the sole purpose of obtaining the full statement of facts which the law requires.</p>

<p>Collision-—Practice—Joint-Defendants—Cross-Libel—Costs.</p> <p>The owners of the steam-ship A. libeled the steam-ship W. for damages by collision. The W., by petition under the fifty-ninth rule, made certain tugs co-defendants with'herself in this suit, and also brought a cross-suit against the A. and the tugs, jointly. The A. was represented by one proctor; the tugs all appeared by another proctor. On the trial the W. was declared solely in fault for the collision. Held, that the tugs, and also the A., were entitled to tax against the "W. a single bill of costs in each action.</p>

<p>1. Collision—Fog—Perilous Navigation—East River.</p> <p>Tugs which navigate the East river in dense logs do so at their peril.</p> <p>2. Same—Deranged Compasses.</p> <p>The tug M. was held in fault for entering a dense fog in the East river, knowing, as she did so, that her compasses were out of order.</p>

In Admiralty. Actions for damages by collision. The suit of Reed and others was to recover for the loss of the Sea Gull. The collision broke the float loose from the Transfer No. 5, and it drifted against a Long Island Railway Company float, lying at a wharf. To recover for the damages thereby occasioned, the second suit was brought.

<p>In Admiralty. Action for damage by collision.</p>

<p>1. Banks and Bankinc — Kechiyku— Tkust Fund.</p> <p>Checks and drafts sent Irom one bank to another were indorsed “for collection,” and credited “subject to payment, ” according to the dealings between the banks. Part of them were paid to the receiver of the latter bank after its failure, and the balance were credited to it by the payors. Held, that the amount paid the receiver should bo accounted for as a trust fund, but the balance as a general debt.</p> <p>2. Same — National Banks — Okganizatiox.</p> <p>U nder Rev. St. IT. S. § 5180, providing that no banking association shall transact any business except such as is incidental and necessarily preliminary to its organization, until it has been authorized by the comptroller to commence the business of banking, correspondence between one bank and the person who became the president of a bank afterwards formed cannot constitute an agreement controlling the business between the hanks, but may be referred to, in connection with other evidence, to show what was their understanding.</p>

<p>In Equity. On demurrer to bill.</p>

<p>At Law. On motion to strike out special plea.</p> <p>Plaintiff's petition contains two bounts, the first laying the damages at $525 and the second at $3,000, for other violations of the contract. Act Gong. March 3, 1887, c. 859, § 2, provides that the circuit courts shall have concurrent jurisdiction with the court of claims in all actions against the United States where the amount involved exceeds $1,000, and does not exceed $10,000.</p>

At Law. This was an action brought by an importer to recover an alleged excess of duty imposed by the collector.

<p>Malicious Prosecution — Wiiat Amounts to — Filing Accusation.</p> <p>An action for malicious prosecution will not lie for preferring an accusation before a magistrate charging plaintiff with a criminal offense, if he was not apprehended, and no process was issued for his arrest.</p>

<p> Habeas Corpus. </p> <p>This was a petition for a writ of habeas corpus based upon the following i'acts: Petitioner was arraigned upon an information in the circuit court for the county of Calhoun, charging him with embezzlement, he “being then and there, agent to John E. Dunning and Daniel-W. Hall, the executors of the last will and testament of Rice Hall, deceased.” Upon such arraignment petitioner pleaded to the information in the following language:' “As an attorney at law', I am guilty of embezzlement of $3,500, that being the amount collected and received by me, less my reasonable fees as such attorney for collecting the money.” Thereupon the court, having made the usual private examination of the accused required by statute after a plea of guilty, sentenced him to five years’ imprisonment, in pursuance of section 9151, How, St., which provides that “if any clerk, agent, or servant of any private person * * * shall embezzle, * * * without consent of his employer or master, any money or other property of another, which shall have come to his possession, or shall be under his charge, by virtue of such office or employment, he shall be deemed, by so doing, to have committed the crime of larceny.” The next succeeding section (9152) provides that “if any attorney at law * * * shall collect or receive in such capacity, any money belonging to another, and shall neglect or refuse to pay the same to the person entitled thereto, within a reasonable time after demand thereof, the person so neglecting or refusing shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and on conviction thereof shall be punished by imprisonment in the county jail not more than one year.” Petitioner claims that as the information was framed under section 9151, for the crime of embezzlement by an agent, and he had pleaded guilty to the offense of withholding money which he had collected as attorney at law, which was only a misdemeanor under section 9152, his sentence was illegal, and his imprisonment without due process of law.</p>

<p>In Equity.</p> <p>Suit to restrain infringement of letters patent, brought by the Holmes Burglar Alarm Telegraph Company and the Municipal District Telegraph Company against the1 Domestic Telegraph & Telephone Company, George W. Hubbell, Enos Runyon, F. T. Fearey, and Jabez Fearey.</p>

<p>Libel in Admiralty to Recover Damages for Breach of a Charter-Party.</p>

<p>In Admiralty. Action to recover demurrage.</p>

<p>In Admiralty. On motion to dismiss the libel.</p>

<p>In Admiralty. On appeal from district court. 40 Fed. Rep. 367.</p>

In Admiralty. This was a libel in rem for personal injuries received under the following circumstances. In January, 1889, the steam-barge H. S. Pickands was lying in winter quarters at her wharf in Detroit, hemmed in by the ice.

<p>In Equity. On motion to remand.</p>

<p>1. Removal of Causes— Citizenship of Plaintiffs.</p> <p>Act March 3,1887, (St. IT. S. 1885-87, c. 373, § 1,) provides that a suit in a state court, “in which there is a controversy between a citizen oí ths state in which the suit is brought and a citizen of another state, ” may, under certain circumstances, be removed on the ground of local prejudice to the United States circuit court, by any defendant who is a citizen of such other state. Held a petition for removal will be dismissed when it does not show that all the plaintiffs are citizens of the state in which the suit is brought.</p> <p>2. Same — Local Prejudice — Sttffioienoi' of Affidavit.</p> <p>Under said act such defendant may remove the cause “when it shall be made to appear to said circuit court that, from prejudice or local influence, he will not be able to obtain justice in such state court, or in any other state court” to which he might under the state law remove the case. Held that, where the petitioners might remove the ease to any one of seven counties adjoining that in which it was brought, an averment in general terms that, on account of local prejudice, they will not be able to obtain justice in such courts, is insufficient.</p> <p>3. Corporations — Individuals Süin» as Trustees.</p> <p>Under the laws of Ohio, where individuals sue by their own names, “as trustees of the Printing Establishment of the United Brethren in Christ, ” which is averred to be a corporation under the laws of Ohio, the individuals, and not the corporation, are the real plaintiffs.</p>

<p>1. Eokbigit Jotwmejti' — Whist Cojtcmtsive.</p> <p>A foreign judgment, in personam, rendered in a emirt of a civilized country having jurisdiction of the subject-matter-, in a cause involving the consideration of ordinary mercantile transactions between the parties, and in which the defendant, one of our eitizens and not domiciled there, appeared and defended for the purpose of protecting his property from seizure, cannot be impeached when sued on hero, though the defendant was at the trial of such cause denied the benefit of our rules of evidence and procedure, and though the judgment was based on false testimony, and was erroneous.</p> <p>2. Equity Pleadings — Plea.</p> <p>Where one sued upon a foreign judgment brings a bill in aid of his defense, setting up the erroneous character of "the foreign judgment, and praying discovery to enable him to establish the facts, the defense that the foreign judgment is conclusive, having been rendered in a court having jurisdiction both of the parties and of iho subject-matter, may properly be presented by plea unsupported by an answer, when the jurisdictional facts do not appear in the bill, and when the facts which an answer would tend to prove may be treated as proved in impeachment of the plea, without destroying the defense pleaded.</p>

<p>1. Corporation — Dissolution—Stockholder.</p> <p>Where a stockholder, proceeding under Gen. St. Conn. 1888, § 1942, files a bill in a federal court to have the affairs of the corporation wound up, and its effects distributed, on the ground that it has abandoned the business for which it’ was organized, leave will be granted plaintiff to file a supplemental bill setting up that since the institution of his suit defendant, acting under seetionl943, has voted to discontinue its business, and to distribute its capital stock among the stockholders, and has obtained an order from a state court, limiting the time within which claims of creditors shall be presented, and praying an injunction to restrain it from acting thereunder.</p> <p>2. Same — Jurisdiction—Injunction.</p> <p>But a motion for temporary injunction to restrain defendant from proceeding under this order will not Be granted, as it merely limits the time for presenting creditors’ claims, and in no way conflicts with or impairs the jurisdiction of the case first acquired by the federal court.</p>

In Equity. On motion for injunction pendente lite. Suit by the Texas & Pacific Railway Company to restrain the Interstate Transportation Company from taking a larger tow than two barges through the draw of complainant’s bridge, at high water.

<p>At Law. On demurrer.</p>

<p>TRAT)E-MAIiKS — lírERIXGEMEJST—JURISDICTION OF CIRCUIT COURT.</p> <p>Under Act Cong. March 3, 1881, relating to registration of trade-marks used in foreign commerce, the circuit court has no jurisdiction of a bill for infringement where both parties reside in the state, and it does not appear that the trade-mark is used in foreign commerce.</p>

<p>In Equity. For infringement of copyright.</p>

<p>In Equity. On exceptions to master’s report, 38 Fed. Rep. 846.</p>

<p>Connisiox — Betwef-x Steam and Sait. — Evidence.</p> <p>A steamer and sloop wore approaching nearly end on; the former going 10 miles an hour, the latter 6. The master and watchman of the steamer testified that the sloop was first seen S miles distant, and l point on their starboard bow, both lights being visible; that the steamer kept her course for 2 or 3 minutes, when, the sloop’s red light disappearing, they altered their course one-half point to port, exposing their green light, and kept this course for a few minutes, when the sloop, being about 100 yards away, changed her course, and came up into the wind, exposing her rod light; that the steamer stopped and backed, but was struck on her starboard bow by the sloop’s port. The three persons on the sloop denied having changed their course. Meld, that the steamer had not sustained the burden on her to show that the collision was not hor fault.</p>

<p>Collision—Mutual Fault—Ste a mee and Sail-Boat Becalmed—Lack or Row-Locks.</p> <p>When a small sail-boat lay becalmed, her condition being visible to a steam-boat with a barge along-side, which approached her head on, between the Brothers and Riker’s Island, in the East river, and collision ensued between the vessels, held, that the steam-boat was in fault for running down the sail-boat; but also held, that tho latter was to blame for the lack of proper oars and row-looks in place, to aid in getting out of danger in such an emergency. The damages were therefore divided.</p>

In Equity. On motion for an injunction. This was a bill in equity to enjoin the use of electricity by the street railways of Nashville under any system which makes use of the earth for its return circuit.

<p>Ejectment — Title to Sustain — State Oektittcate op Pukchase.</p> <p>Recovery in ejectment being only on strict legal title, ejectment cannot be maintained on a state certificate of purchase, which is but a contract for a patent on compliance by the purchaser -with its terms, though such certificate is made by the state statutes prima facia evidence of title.</p>

<p>At Law. On demurrer to the answer.</p>

At Law. Motion by defendant to instruct the jury to find a verdict for defendant. The facts in this case are as follows: On November 3,1886, at 11:15 p. m. , there was a collision between an east and a west bound freight train of the defendant, at Tower City, Dak., seven-eighths of a mile east of Tower City station, whereby the plaintiff, a fireman on the west-bound train, was injured, and this action is brought recover damages for such injuries.

<p>At Law. On writ of error from district court.</p>

<p>Patents — Novei/it—Electric Gas-Lighting Apparatus.</p> <p>In patents No. 225,071, to Henry F. Packard, and No. 232,301, to Prank V. Sanford, for improvements in electric gas lighting apparatus, the claims consisted of a combination of a gas-burner, a fixed electrode, a ratchet, a pawl, a spring, a lever pivoted loosely on the stem of a stop-cock, and having two arms, to one of which was attached an elastic contact point, and stop-pin; the combination, being so arranged as to open and close the gas passage to the tip at each alternate movement of the lever, and, conjointly with such opening, to ignite the gas by an electric spark, generated by such movement, — devices which should, without actuating the gas-cock, repeat' the electric spark by the return movement of the opening devices to their normal position for further use. Held that, though some parts of the mechanism were old, the combination was new and useful, and the invention was patentable.</p>

<p>1. Patents fob Inventions --IWtentability — Aggregation—Impbovement m Oil-Cabs.</p> <p>Letters patent No. 210,500, granted to M. Campbell Brown on June 17,1879, lor an improvement in oil-cars, consisting in the division oí the ear-space into two or more compartments, each end compartment containing an oil-tank, the partitions he.tween all the compartments being-removable, and readily adjustable, are not void as being a mere aggregation oí devices, since they obviate the necessity of hauling hack empty tank-ears, thereby cheapening transportation.</p> <p>2. Same — Action fob Infringement — Pbactice.</p> <p>Where the question of the validity of a patent is doubtful, a demurrer to a bill for its infringement will be overruled, ana the question reserved lor further consideration on final hearing.</p>

<p>Infringement of Patents — Treble Damages — Profits.</p> <p>Rev. St. U. S. § 1921, which aUows a court of equity to treble the recovery of damages formerly recoverable in actions at taw, in suits for infringements of patents, does not authorize an increase in the recovery of profits realized from the infringement, since such profits were not recoverable at law. Following Campbell v, 'James, 5 Fed. Rep. 807.</p>

In Admiralty. The steam-tug Gratitude, belonging to this port, was libeled for supplies by the Oonnnunipaw Coal Company, and by the Hoboken Coal Company, on August 26, 1889. She was arrested by the marshal on August 29th, and sold on the 3d of October, 1889. The not proceeds, after defraying the expenses of sale and the marshal’s fees, were paid into the registry of the court, amounting to $3,343.72. In all, 10 libels were tiled against the tug, or her proceeds.

<p>Collision — Mutual Fault.</p> <p>Between 8 and 9 o’clock on a foggy night the schooner M. and the brig E. collided on an exposed and frequented part of the ocean, sinking the M. Neither vessel had a proper fog-horn sounded by mechanical means. The wind was southerly, and the M. was sailing close-hauled on the starboard tack, S. S. hi. The E. was sailing on the port tack, N. N. W., six knots an hour. No horn was heard on the M., but on the E. a horn was heard just as the green light of the M. showed on the starboard bow, and the wheel was starboarded. The M., though having the right of way, lulled across the bows of the E. On the M. the skipper and nine men were below; the only men on deck being the man at the wheel, who had had but little experience, and the lookout, who also had charge of the navigation and the duty of sounding the horn. Held, that the damages should be divided. , , , ■</p>

<p>In Admiralty. Action to recover damages for collision.</p>

<p>In Admiralty.- Cross-actions for damages by collision.</p>

<p>1. Removal of Causes — 1Time of Application.</p> <p>Act Cong. Aug. 13, 1888, § 3, (25 IT. S. St. at Large, 435,) provides that a petition for removal must be filed at or before the time the defendant is required to plead “by the laws of the state, or the rules of the state court. ” Rev. St. Mo. § 3514, requires the defendant to plead on or before the third day of the term, “unless longer time be granted by the court. ” Held, that such a petition could not be filed after the third day of the term, though the defendant’s time for answering had been extended by order of court, since such an order is not a rule of court, within the meaning of said act.</p> <p>2. Same — Separable Contkoveesy.</p> <p>An action for a tort against two railroad companies, — one a lessor and the other a lessee, — being joint and several, may be removed by one of the defendants on the ground of non-residenee, though the other defendant is a resident of the same state as the plaintiff.</p>

<p>At Law. Petition for habeas corpus.</p> <p>On motion to remand the prisoner to the state authorities.</p>

<p>1. Municipal Coepoeations — Fiscal Management — Indebtedness—Oedinance.</p> <p>An ordinance of a municipal corporation, which provides for the payment of money by the town without providing the means wherewith to make such payment, creates an indebtedness against such corporation, within the meaning of section 5, art. 11, of the constitution of the state.</p> <p>8. Same — Injunction op Legislative Act.</p> <p>A court of equity will not enjoin a municipal corporation in the exercise of its legislative function, unless the proposed act is beyond the scope of its power, and its passage would work irreparable injury.</p> <p>3. Same — Injunction op Oedinance Ceeating Indebtedness — Taxes—Jurisdictional Amount.</p> <p>In a suit by a tax-payer to enjoin the passage of an ordinance creating an indebtedness against the town on account of its alleged illegality, the matter in dispute is the sum of the taxes which the plaintiff would probably have to pay in discharge of said indebtedness; and it must appear with reasonable certainty from the facts stated in the bill that such taxes exceed in value the sum of §2,000.</p> <p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p>

<p>At Law. On motion for a new trial.</p> <p>Action by Elizabeth Wooldridge against Jonas A. Stern. Verdict for plaintiff. Defendant moves for a new trial.</p>

<p>At Law. Action to recover land.</p>

Indictment against Sarah Althea Terry for resisting, by assaulting, an officer, in the execution of an order to remove her from the court-room.

<p>Indians — Criminal Offenses — Half-Breed.</p> <p>The son of a negro father by an Indian mother is not an Indian, within the mean ing of Act Cong. March 3,1885, (23 St. at Large, 385,) providing for the punishment of Indians committing certain offenses, as the child follows the .condition of the father.</p>

<p>1. Patents tok Inventions — NcmOE—Infringement.</p> <p>Rev. SI. IT. S. *> 4900, provides tliat the public shall be notified that an article is patented by a notice attached to it, and that in absence thereof damages cannot be recovered for infringement “except on proof that the defendant was notified of the infringement, and continued after such notice” to infringe. Held, that, in the absence of proof to the contrary, it would be inferred that the notice was attached to the patented article. Following Rubber Co. v. Goodyear, 9 Wall. 788.</p> <p>2. Same — Rueden of Pkoof.</p> <p>It is only when defendant has proved that the notice was not attached to the patented article that it is incumbent on complainant to prove that actual notice was given to defendant.</p> <p>3. Same — Pkesumfiton.</p> <p>Act Cong. Feb. 4,1887, (St. IT. S. 1886-87, c. 106,) isolating to design patents, provides for the recovery of certain damages against persons who shall “apply the design secured by such letters patents, or any_colorable imitation thereof. ” Held that, though the act applies only to persons infringing with actual knowledge of the patent, yet, where the design has been copied, it will be presumed that it was with knowledge of the patent, in the absence of proof that a notice was not attached to the patented article.</p>

<p>Patents — Foreign Inventions — Dotation op Right.</p> <p>Rev. St. U. S. § 488?, provides that ‘‘every patent granted for an invention which has been previously patented in a foreign country shall bo so limited as to expire at the same time with the foreign patent.” Held that, where a foreign statute, under which a foreign patent has been extended, was in force at the time a Dnited States patent for the same invention was applied for and issued, and where by such statute the extension of the foreign patent was, in the absence of unfulfilled conditions, a matter entirely of right, at the option of the patentee, on his payment of a required fee, and such fee has been accepted by the foreign government, and the patent extended, the United States patent does not expire until the expiration of such extension, though the foreign patent, before the extension was granted, had lapsed by the non-observance or the happening oí a subsequent condition prescribed by the statute.</p>

In Equity. This was a suit for the infringement of letters patent of the United States No. 361,438,' granted April 19, 1887, to the firm of Mesker & Bro., for an improvement in sheet-metal ceilings, walls, or panels, by ceiling manufactured and sold by defendants, made in accordance with the letters patent No. 376,926, granted to Charles Thuener, January 24, 1888.

<p>In Admiralty. On hearing of petition for limitation of liability.</p>

<p>Shipping—Charter-Party—Construction—Furnishing Cargo—Delays by Weather.</p> <p>Under a contract of charter, absolute in its terms, to deliver to a vessel a certain quantity of cargo per day, the charterer assumes the risk of the weatherbeing such as to forbid handling cargo.</p>

<p>In Admiralty. Cross-actions for damages by collision.</p>

In Equity. Bill to foreclose a mortgage on real estate. Rev. St. U. S. § 737, relating to the jurisdiction of federal courts, provides that, “when there are several defendants in any suit at law or in equity, and one or more of them are neither inhabitants of nor found within the district in which the suit is brought, and do not voluntarily appear, the court may entertain jurisdiction, and proceed to the trial and adjudication of the suit between the parties who are properly…

<p>In Equity. Bill to foreclose mortgage on real estate.</p>

In Equity. Supplemental petition on behalf of the Omaha & St. Louis Railway Company to recover from the Wabash Western Railway Company rental claimed to he due for use of certain rolling stock.

<p>Pubi.ic Lands — Grant in Aid or Wagon Hoad — Comfhaxcb with Conditions — Suit to Enforce Forfeiture. "</p> <p>In 1806 congress made a grant of lands to the state of Oregon, to aid in the construction of a wagon-road from Albany through the Cascade mountains, to the eastern boundary of the state, and provided that the land might be sold, as the work progressed, on the certificate of the governor of the state that the portion of the same eotorminns with said lands was “ complete. ” The state transferred the grant; without further condition or qualification, to the W allamet Valley & Gaseado Mountain Wagon Road Company, which undertook the construction of the road, and within the five years allowed therefor, procured certificates from the governors of the state that the road was completed as required by law. Soon after the company sold the lands to the defendants Weill and Cahn, who are now the legal owners thereof, except a small portion which has been disposed of. In 1874, congress authorized the issue of patents for these lands to the state or its assignee, when it was shown by the certificates of the governor that said road was “constructed and complot cd. ” Between 1878 and 1883 a question was made before the department of the interior whether the company had completed the road according to law, and testimony was received thereon, pi o and con; and after argument tlio secretary of the interior directed patents to issue to the company, which was done on October 80, 1883, for 440,856 acres, in addition to a patent for 107,893 acres issued on June 19, 1875. In consequence of this action by the secretary the defendants believed that the due construction of the road was admitted by the complainant, and were thereby induced to expend a large sum of money on and about said property. In 1889, congress passed an act requiring the attorney general to bring a suit in this court, againt all persons claiming an interest in this grant, to determine the question of construction of the road, the legal effect of the governor’s certificates, the right of the United States to resume the grant, and to obtain judgment declaring the land coterminous with any uncompleted portions of the road forfeited, saving the rights of an j bona fide purchasers; the suit to be tried and adjudicated like other suits in equity. On August 39, 1889, in pursuance of this authority, this suit, was commenced to obtain the relief therein specified. The defendants Weill and Cahn filed two pleas to the bill, in one of which they set up the foregoing facts as an estoppel, and in the other the defense of a bona fide purchaser for a valuable consideration, and without notice of any failure on the part of the company to comply with the terms and conditions of the grant. Held, (L) that this suit must be tried as a suit between private persons, in which the defendants may set up any defense, inoludinar estoppel and the statute of limitations, that they could if the complainant was merely a private person; (2) that the claim of the complainant to set aside these patents, and declare these lands forfeited, is, under the circumstances, a stale one, and therefore ought not to be allowed; (3) that the complainant, by the passage of the act of 1874, either accepted the certificates as conclusive-evidence of the due construction of 'the road, or thereby waived all further performance of the condition on which the grant was made; (4) that the complainant, by the action of its executive department, in issuing the patent of 1882, impliedly recognized and accepted the performance of such condition, and, having thereby induced the defendants to change their relation to said property by expending a large sum of money thereon and thereabout, is now estopped to allege or claim that said condition was not performed; (5) that the certificate of the governor of Oregon was made by the act of 1866 the only evidence of the compliance1 with the terms of the grant by the completion of the road; (6)- that upon the facts stated in the plea, the defenclants are purchasers in good faith and for a valuable consideration, within the saving clause of the act of 18S9, and within the general principles of equity jurispradence; and (7) that, on the case made by the bill and first plea thereto, it appears that the complainants ought not to prevail in this suit, and therefore it is dismissed.</p> <p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p>

<p>1. Accounting — Evidence—Corporate Debts.</p> <p>Plaintiff and defendant made a contract by which defendant was to take bonds of certain ditch companies, in which they were interested, in payment of all debts duo defendant from tho companies, and lor advances thereafter to be made to them. Plaintiff was to surrender the obligations of the companies and those given by plaintiff for the benefit of tho companies. This agreement did not apply to tho private debts of plaintiff to defendant. On an accounting directed in a suit to enforce tb o contract, the master included in tho debts of the companies certain notes, on their face the personal obligations of plaintiff to defendant. All the other obligations were notos executed by the companies, and indorsed by plaintiff. Atthetiine plaintiff applied for the loan of defendant, for which all these notes were given, he stated that he wanted for personal uses an amount equal to that for which the individual notes were given. Moreover, some of it was paid by defendant for the purpose of obtaining the releaso of stock owned by plaintiff individually. Furthermore, in a statement of plaintiff’s personal resources made after the loan, and under plaintiff’s direction, for defendant, those individual notes were'included in his personal liabilities. Held, that they were improperly included in the statement of the companies’ debts.</p> <p>2. Same — Construction op Contract.</p> <p>Defendant is entitled to receive bonds of the companies for advances made, since, the commencement of this suit, for the completion of the companies’ canals.</p> <p>3. Same — Collateral Notes.</p> <p>Plaintiff gave defendant certain chattel notes as collateral security for “past, present, or future indebtedness. ” Held that, in the absence of negligence, defendant should bo charged only with such amount as it had collected.</p> <p>4. Same — Interest.</p> <p>As judgments in Colorado draw interest, defendant should have been allowed interest on such judgment to the time of its payment.</p> <p>5. Same.</p> <p>Defendant should he allowed interest on its claims against plaintiff to the date of the master’s report, and, on its claims against the companies, to the time it received, or should have received, bonds in payment.</p> <p>6. Same — Account-Book—Evidence.</p> <p>In the absence of proof that an entry in defendant’s books, showing that a certain claim against plaintiff was paid, was made without the direction of some officer or agent of defendant having authority to direct it, it will be presumed to have been made by its authority, and to be correct.</p>

<p>1. Priority of Labor and Supply Liens — Mortgage Bonds.</p> <p>By the general principles of equity, claims for materials, supplies, and labor furnished to a mining and manufacturing company are not entitled to priority over the mortgage bonds thereof.</p> <p>2. Decision of State Court — Priority of Liens.</p> <p>The decision of the court of appeals of Virginia, tFidelityIns.,etc., Co. v. Shenandoah Val. R. Co., 9 S. E. Rep. 759,) declaring the acts of Virginia of March 21,1877, and April 2,1879, unconstitutional, so far as they attempted to give material and supply claims priority over mortgage bonds, furnishes the rule for this court, and an exception to a master’s report which gives priority to such claims will he sustained.</p> <p>8. Constitutional Law — Object Expressed in Title of'Act.</p> <p>The act of April 2,1879, entitled “An act to amend and re-enact the first and second sections of an act approved March 21,1877, entitled ‘ An act to secure the payment of the wages or salaries of certain employes of railway, canal, steam-boat, and other transportation companies,’ ” is in violation of Const. Va. art. 5, § 15, which provides that “no law shall embrace more than one object, and that shall be expressed in its title, ” in so far as it attempts to give the claims of employes of mining and manufacturing companies a superior lien to that of the mortgage bondholders, because the object expressed in the title relates to transportation companies only.</p> <p>4. Exceptions to Master’s Report — Allegations.</p> <p>Where a master’s report had given priority to certain labor and supply claims under an unconstitutional statute, which was in contravention of the general rules of equity, it was not necessary, on exception thereto, to allege the unconstitutionality of the act.</p> <p>5. Receivers’ Certificates — Construction- of Order.</p> <p>Under an order authorizing the issuance of receivers’ certificates to pay taxes, “wages, and freights due and to become due, ’’certificates given to secure a debt to a merchant, incurred by giving orders upon him to employes in payment of wages, were invalid.</p> <p>6. Same — Costs.</p> <p>One who signs exceptions to a master’s report, as trustee for numerous bondholders, is responsible for the costs, and an objection thereto for want of a party so chargeable is invalid.</p> <p>7. Same — Time of Filing.</p> <p>Under the rules of practice in equity promulgated by the supreme court in 1842, r. . 83, exceptions to a master’s report may be filed at any time within a month after the filing of the report.</p>

<p>1. Rehearing — Final Decree.</p> <p>Where a decree declaring the lien of certain labor and supply claims to be superior to that of mortgage bondholders was founded upon Acts Va. March 21,1877, and April 2, 1879, which were in contravention of the common law, and which have , since been declared unconstitutional by the court of appeals of Virginia, (Fidelity Ins., etc., Co. v. Shenandoah Val- R. Co., 9 S. E. Rep. 759,) a rehearing will be granted, when it appears that no final decree has been entered.</p> <p>2. Same — Bill or Review.</p> <p>The existence of the above facts presents a question of error on the face of the record, and where a final .decree has been entered the petition for rehearing will be treated as a bill of review.</p> <p>3. Final Decree.</p> <p>A decree of sale entered by consent of parties pending a reference to settle the receiver’s accounts, while the priority of certain liens claimed were undetermined, and before any distribution was ordered among ante-receivership creditors, was not a final decree.</p>

<p>1. MORTGAGES — CONSIDERATION—RkI.ATIONSIIII’.</p> <p>The relationship existing between father and daughter is sufficient to uphold a mortgage given by her to Mm as security for her deceased husband’s debts, though they could not have been enforced as against her.</p> <p>2. Same — Delivers:.</p> <p>On foreclosure proceedings, testimony by the daughter that she handed themort-gage to her mother, who occupied rooms in hor house with the father, and that she afterwards saw it in a bureau drawer in their room, shows that she intended the mortgage for the father; and, as it reached and was accepted by him, the transaction constitutes a delivery to the father.</p> <p>3. Same — JPkiorities—Recording.</p> <p>The mortgage, though unrecorded when the daughter made a voluntary conveyance of the premises to her second husband, who had, however, theretofore discharged an attachment against them, is entitled to priority over the conveyance, but subject to the amount paid on the attachment.</p>

<p>1. Master and Servant — Fellow-Servants— Trainmen — Conductor and Fireman.</p> <p>In an action against a railroad company for injuries received by a fireman on a locomotive in a collision with another train, it is no defense that the negligence of the conductor of the latter train, In passing a station without stopping for orders, caused the collision, since he is the representative of the railroad in charge of the train, and not the fellow-servant of the employes on either train.</p> <p>2. Same — Engineer and Fireman.</p> <p>Nor is the engineer in charge of the engine on which plaintiff was fireman a fellow-servant of plaintiff, and that his negligence caused the collision is no defense to the action.</p> <p>3. Same.</p> <p>The conductor is the superior of the fireman on the other train, within the meaning of Comp. St. Mont. § 697, providing that “the liability of a corporation to an employe acting under the orders of his superior shall be the same in the case of injury sustained by default or wrongful act of his superior, or to an employe not appointed or controlled by him, as if such servant or employe were a passenger. ”</p>

<p>Promissory Note Payable in Blank — Subsequent Holder — Action in Federal Court.</p> <p>A promissory note, payable “to tbe order of-, ” which was made and delivered for a valuable consideration, is, in legal effect, payable to bearer; and one who buys it from a lawful owner and holder, and afterwards fills the blank by writing his own name therein as payee, which he may lawfully do, is a “ subsequent holder, ” within the meaning of the phrase as it is used in the act of congress defining the jurisdiction of the circuit courts of the United States, and therefore not entitled to sue in this court upon such a note, the original holder and the maker both being citizens of Oregon.</p> <p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p>

<p>3'. United States Commissioners — Compensation—Docket Fees.</p> <p>Under theprovision in the deficiency appropriation bill of August 4,1886, (34 St. at Large, 374,) denying docket fees to commissioners, such docket fees cannot he allowed. Following Crawford v. XT. S., 40 Fed. Rep. 446.</p> <p>3. Same — Ackowledgments to Recognizances.</p> <p>Rev. St. U. S. | 847, which allows commissioners 35 cents for “taking an acknowledgment, ” applies to acknowledgments to recognizances. Following McKinstry v. XT. Si, 40 Fed. Rep. 813.</p> <p>S!. Same — Subecenas.</p> <p>The commissioner may charge for issuing two subpoenas in the same case, where the witnesses reside in opposite directions, and have to be subpoenaed by different officers. Following Jones V; XT. S., 39 Fed. Rep. 410. '</p> <p>4. Same — 'Warrants.</p> <p>He may also charge for issuing several warrants in a case where there are several defendants.</p> <p>5. Same — Hearing.</p> <p>Where a defendant is brought before a commissioner, and upon hearing the complaint read waives examination and gives bond, such proceedings constitute a hearing for which the commissioner is entitled to fees.</p> <p>6. Same — Drawing Recognizances — Returns.</p> <p>Under Rev. St. U. S. | 847, which allows commissioners “for issuing any warrant or writ and for any other service the same compensation as is allowed to clerks for like services, ” a commissioner is entitled to fees' for drawing recognizances and complaints and entering returns on writs in criminal cases. Following Rand v. U. S., 36 Fed. Rep. 671.</p> <p>7. Clerk op Court — Compensation in Criminal Cases.</p> <p>The clerk’s fees for entering orders approving accounts of commissioners and the district attorney, for entering report of money paid into court and filing vouchers pursuant to a standing order of the court and Rov. St. U. S. § 798, for making transcripts required by 24 St. at Large, p. 507, § 10, when ordered by the district attorney, and for entering an order appointing an attorney to defend a poor person, are all chargeable to the United States.</p> <p>8. Same — Attachment por Contempt.</p> <p>An attachment against a witness for contempt, in not obeying a subpoena, is a criminal proceeding, in which the United States is plaintiff, and the cost of the proceeding, including a docket fee, is chargeable to the United States. Following Erwin v. U. S., 37 Fed. Rep. 470.</p> <p>9. Same — Deputy as Jury Commissioner.</p> <p>Where a deputy-clerk acts with the jury commissioner in drawing juries while the courtis not in session, he is entitled to the same compensation allowed the jury commissioner for like services, where such compensation is shown to be a reasonable charge for the work performed. Following Erwin v. (J. S., 37 Fed. Rep. 470.</p> <p>10. Same — Clerk an» Commissioner — Per Diem.</p> <p>A clerk who is also a commissioner may charge a per diem for his attendance at court, and a per diem for hearing a cause as commissioner on the same day. Following Erwinv. XT. S., 37 Fed. Rop. 470.</p> <p>11. Same — District an» Circuit Courts — Transfer.</p> <p>Foes earned by the clerk in the district court cannot be transferred by the comptroller to his account as clerk of the circuit court. Following Goodrich v. XT. 8., 35 Fed. Rep. 193.</p> <p>12. Writs — Warrant op Commitment — Seal.</p> <p>The warrant of commitment of a defendant under final judgment should be under the seal of the court. Following VanDuzee v. XT. S., 41 Fed. Rep. 571.</p>

<p>Intoxicating Liquors — Intis rstate Commerce — Original Packages — Commitment in Default of Bail — Habeas Oorfus.</p> <p>Upon the return of a writ oí habeas corpus, it appeared that under a criminal proceeding- against the prisoner íor a violation of a local statute prohibiting the sale of malt or brewed liquors, etc., in the borough oí Leeehburg, in Armstrong county, Pa., and also íor a violation oí the general license law oí said state, restraining and regulating the sale of vinous, spirituous, malt, or brewed liquors, be was committed, in default of bail, to the jail of said county for trial. The prisoner alleged, and at the hearing on the habeas corpus undertook to show, that the liquors for the sale of which he had been arrested and committed had been imported by a brewing company of the state of Ohio from that state into the state of Pe’rin-sylvania, and that he, as the agent of said company, had sold the same in the original and unbroken packages; and be claimed his discharge under the decisions of the supreme court in Leisy v. Hardin, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 681, and Lyng v. People, Id. 725. It was not alleged that the prisoner was unable to give bail, nor was any special reason shown why a court of the United States should interfere with the judicial proceeding in advance of the trial in the state court. Held, that it was not to be doubted that the state court would recognize the binding force of the said decisions of the supreme court, and give the prisoner the benefit of them; and, following the practice sanctioned by the supreme court in Ex parte Royall, 117 Ú. S. 241, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 734, and acted upon by that tribunal itself in Ex parte Royall, 117 U. S. 254, 6 Sup.-Ct. Rep. 742, the court refused to discharge the prisoner in advance of his trial, and remanded him to the custody of the authorities of the state, without prejudice to his right to renew his application thereafter, should the circumstances r-ender it proper for him to do so.</p>

<p> Habeas Corpus. </p>

<p>Shipping- — -Tonnage Duties — Penalties—Enfokoement.</p> <p>A proceeding before a district judge, to procure a remission of a fine, penalty, or forfeiture, incurred under the customs revenue la w, does not include the case of a tonnage tax, alleged to have been levied in excess of the lawful rate.</p> <p> CSyllabus by the Court-) </p>

Assumpsit by Thomas Martindale against John Cadwalader, Collector. This was a suit brought by the plaintiff to recover certain customs duties alleged to have been improperly exacted upon tin boxes in which crackers or biscuits were contained.

Assumpsit by Anton Winters against John Cadwalader, Collector. This was a suit brought by the plaintiff to recover certain duties alleged by him to have been improperly exacted upon an importation of cubic picture blocks in boxes, upon the lids of which was pasted a picture into which the. contents could be arranged. The appraiser returned them as being for use other than the bona fide transportation of the goods, and assessed the duty at 100 per cent.

<p>In Equity. On bill for injunction.</p>

<p>In Equity. On bill for injunction.</p>

<p>Patents eor Inventions — Combination—Former Patent.</p> <p>A second patent, which involves the same elements as are combined in a former patent to the same person, with such modifications and changes only as the use of the original form would suggest to any skilled mechanic, and as require no inventive skill, is void.</p>

<p>Mabttimh Liens — Damages by Collision — Rbiokity.</p> <p>On intervention by matorial-mon in libel against vessels for damages from collision, tiio objection, that the preference given maritime lions created by collision over prior liens for repairs and supplies ought not to apply because the collision was caused partly by 1 bo fault of the vessel injured, and that such vessel should not ho allowed to profit by its wrong to the detriment of innocent material-men, cannot be considered, where the only evidence that the injured vessel was at fault is the record of a judgment in another suit declaring her at fault, which is set up in an answer by interveners, motion to hie which has boon denied.</p>

In Admiralty. Action to recover salvage. The steam-ship Italia, bound from Hamburg to New York, broke her tunnel shaft while laboring in a heavy sea. The shaft was temporarily repaired, and the vessel continued slowly on her course at a speed of .about three knots per hour. The weather at this time was favorable. The Italia’s sails were of no practical use, and her shaft was liable to break again at any time, especially if the weather should become bad.

<p>1. Federal Courts — Jiuíisdictiox—Canoeling Decree op Natuealization.</p> <p>The United States can sue in a iederal court for the cancellation of a certificate or decree of naturalization, which has been obtained by fraud in a state court.</p> <p>2. Same — Fraud—Pleading.</p> <p>A bill by the United States in the federal court, to cancel the decree of naturalization of a state court, which merely alleges that defendant was admitted to become a citizen on his own application, without the examination of witnesses, and without inquiry by the court as to his qualifications; that defendant knew the facts stated in the decree were false; and that the decree was obtained by fraud practiced on the court, — is demurrable, though it shows the decree to have been erroneous, since defendant would not be guilty of fraud merely because he applied for naturalization, knowing that he was not entitled to it. Facts must be shown by the bill from which the court may judge whether the decree was fraudulently obtained, and the court imposed upon.</p>

<p>Removal oe Causes — Prejudice—Jubisdiotional Amount.</p> <p>Act Cong. March 3,1887, (24-U. S. St. 552,) amending Act Cong. March 3,1875, provides, in section 1, that circuit courts oí the United States shall have original cognizance, concurrent with the state courts, of all civil suits in certain cases, among which are suits between citizens of different states, when the matter in dispute exceeds §2,000. Section 2 provides that any suit of which the circuit courts are given original jurisdiction by the preceding section may be removed by defendant from the state to the circuit court; and further declares: “ And where a suit is- now pending, or may be hereafter brought, in any state court, in which there is a controversy between” citizens of different states, defendant, being a non-resident, may remove the suit to the circuit court of the United States, at any time before trial, “when it shall be made to appear to said circuit court that, from prejudice or local influence, he will not be able to obtain justice in such state court. ” Meld, that the prejudice and local influence clause in section 2 is to be read in connection with section 1, and does not give the circuit court jurisdiction on such grounds unless the amount in dispute exceeds §2,000.</p>

<p>In Equity.</p> <p>This is a controversy as to the right of possession of 22 bonds, of the denomination of $500 each, issued by Oswego township, of the state of Kansas, which, at the date of the filing of the bill, were in the actual custody of the Union Savings Association of St. Louis, Mo. Wilson claims them as purchaser and assignee under Edward Burgess. His contention is, in brief, that the bonds were duly issued by the township of Oswego in aid of the building of the Memphis, Carthage & Northwestern Railroad, and were delivered to the railroad company about December 1, 1872; that the bonds were thereupon placed by the railroad company in the joint custody of Burgess, who was the contractor for building its road through Osw'ego township, and 0. Montague as trustee for the railroad company, upon the understanding that they should be turned over to Burgess, in payment fc>r work done, on the completion by him of certain -work then in progress, up to the amount and value of said bonds; and that Burgess and Montague lodged them for safe-keeping in the mean time wdth the Union Savings Association, taking therefor its receipt, by the terms of which they could only be obtained on the joint order of the depositors. He claims that Burgess subsequently did the work, on the completion whereof his right to the bonds became absolute, but that Montague has ever since wrongfully refused to join in an order whereby the bonds could be obtained from the association. On the other hand, Oswego township denies, both in its answer and cross-bill which has been filed, that the bonds in question v'ere ever by it delivered to the Memphis, Carthage & Northwestern Railroad Company, or that the railroad company ever delivered them to Burgess and Montague under the circumstances stated in the bill, or that they were ever deposited with the Union Savings Association in the manner and for tne purpose alleged. The contention on the part of the township is that the bonds in question are part of an issue of 160 bonds that were originally executed in the name of the township without consideration, and without authority of law; that the whole issue was fraudulently delivered to one Joseph Nelson, at the time township trustee, who fraudulently procured them to be registered by the auditor of the state of Kansas, and then took them to St. Louis, Mo., and deposited the 22 bonds now in controversy with the Union Savings Association, taking therefor a receipt by which they were to be surrendered by the association on the joint order of Edward Burgess and himself as township trustee; that the agreement between Burgess and Nelson was that Burgess should have the 22 bonds so deposited when the Memphis, Carthage & Northwestern Railroad was completed through the township of Oswego and into the city of Oswego, and a depot had been there constructed, and when Burgess, and those engaged with him in the work of construction, had paid all debts contracted for labor and supplies; that the delivery of the bonds by the township to Nelson, its trustee, was on the express condition that they should not be delivered to Burgess until he had complied with the terms last mentioned; that the receijjt so given by the association to the order of Burgess and Nelson, trustee, was subsequently surrendered, and a similar one executed by the association in favor of Burgess and C. Montague, trustee, when the latter had succeeded Nelson as township trustee; that the Memphis, Carthage & Northwestern Railroad was not constructed by Burgess through Oswego township, as contemplated, when the bonds were deposited, ¡jind the receipt taken therefor, nor was a depot built, nor did Burgess ever pay the labor and supply claims by him contracted, and hence never became entitled to the bonds under the terms of his agreement with Nelson as township trustee, even if the bonds were lawfully executed. The controversy is thus seen to be between Wilson, assignee of Burgess, on the one hand, and the township of Oswego on the other. Tho township, by its cross-bill, prays that tho bonds may be surrendered to it for cancellation. The Union Savings Association disclaims any interest in the controversy except as a mere stakeholder.</p>

<p>Ill Equity. Bill to restrain collection of tax, and to cancel same, as void and illegal.</p>

<p>1. Taxation — Suit to Set Aside Tax-Deed — Parties.</p> <p>In a suit in Mississippi to set aside a deed from the tax collector, of land sold for non-payment of taxes, on the ground that complainant, within 13 months after the deed was filed for record, tendered to the purchaser all taxes, damages, interest, and costs, and because the tax collector failed before the sale to publish a list of the delinquent land as required by law, and further on the ground that, at the time of the sale, complainant had sufficient personal property, which it was the collector’s duty to first exhaust, the collector is not a proper party.</p> <p>2. Same.</p> <p>Where the suit is also to set aside a subsequent deed from the purchaser at the tax sale, such purchaser is a necessary party.</p> <p>6. Same — Tax-Sale.</p> <p>It is not necessary in Mississippi that the tax collector, before selling land for delinquent taxes, shall first exhaust the personal property of the delinquent.</p> <p>4-, Same — Validity op Sale — Presumptions.</p> <p>Section 23 of the charter of Pass Christian, in Mississippi, as amended by the act of 1886, providing that in sales for taxes all presumptions of law shall he in favor of everything having been done by the officer, previous to and in making the sale, to communicate a good title to the purchaser, and the sale and title acquired shall only he set aside on satisfactory proof that the taxes for which the land was sold were actually paid before the sale, does not prevent the owner of land sold for taxes from suing to set the tax-deed aside on the ground that the tax collector failed to publish a list of the delinquent land as required by law.</p> <p>5. Same — Redemption—Recording- Tax-Deed.</p> <p>Such charter provides that within three days after the sale the tax collector shall execute and deliver to the purchaser a deed conveying the land to him, and providing for its redemption by the owner at any time within 13 months from the day of sale. Tax-deeds are required to he filed for record with the clerk or other officer, and to remain there during the time limited for redemption. Held that, where tho purchaser fails to lile his deed until l'our months alter the sale, the time limited for redemption begins to run from the date tho deed is filed, and not the date of sale.</p>

<p>Taxation of Costs — Feinting.</p> <p>Though there may have been agreements of counsel on both sides in relation thereto, costs for printing the bill, answer, and evidence in a suit in the circuit court of the TJnited States cannot be taxed, since there is no rule of court on the subject, and nothing is said about such costs in Kev. St. U. S. § 823, providing the fees which may be taxed.</p>

<p>1. Taxation — Collection—Demand.</p> <p>Under Rev. St. Mo. 1889, § 7008, which provides that no seizure of personal property for taxes on real estate “shall be made until the collector has made demand for the payment of tho tax, either in person or by deputy, to the party liable to pay tho same, or by leaving a written or printed notice at his place of abode * * * with some member of the family, ” a demand upon an agent in charge of the taxed property is insufficient to justify a seizure, though the owner is a non-resident, and it, is impossible to make demand on him in either of the statutory modes.</p> <p>8. Replevin — Pkocess—Taxation.</p> <p>A tax-book authenticated by the seal of the court, under which a tax collector is authorized by statute to seize and sell property to enforce the collection of taxes, is process, within the meaning of Rev. St. Mo. 1889, § 7-179, which limits the right to bring- an action of repLevin to cases where the property “has not been seized under any process, execution, or attachment against the property of the plaintiff. ”</p> <p>3. Same.</p> <p>Where property is held by the collector under the authority of such book, the fact that he seized such property without first making proper demand for tho taxes does not authorize the owner against whom tho tax was levied to maintain replevin therefor.</p>

<p>At Law.</p> <p>Action by John B. Farve, use, etc., against the Louisville & Nashville Railroad Company, for personal injuries.</p>

<p>Customs Duties— Construction or Laws — Classification—Flowering Bulbs.</p> <p>Crocus, gladiolus, hyacinth, narcissus, tulip, and other bulbs, which are not me* dloiiuil.and not odible, are in a crude state, and not advanced in value or condition by refining, grinding, or by other process of manufacture, and are used for the purpose of producing flowers, are not free of duty' under the provision for “bulbs and bulbous roots, * * * any of the foregoing of which are not odible and are in a crude state, and not advanced in value or condition by refining or grinding, or by other process of manufacture, and not specially enumerated or provided for in this act, ” contained in the free-list of the tariff act of March 3, 1883, (23 U. S. St. 488; Tariff Index, Now, par. 636.1 but, are dutiable at the rate of 20 per cent, ad valorem under the provision for “bulbs and bulbous roots, not medicinal, and not specially enumerated or provided for in this act, ” contained in Schedule N of the same tariff act, (Id. par. 405.)</p> <p> (Syllabus by llie Court.) </p>

<p>1. Customs Duties — Construction of Laws — Trade Osase.</p> <p>The trade usage which is to determine the meaning of a word or words in the tariff must be a well-known and general one.</p> <p>2. Same — Evidence—Bias of Witnesses.</p> <p>In weighing the testimony of witnesses as to trade usage, the jury should consider the extent to which any of the witnesses may have an interest in the result of the litigation which might color their evidence.</p> <p>3. Same — Classification—Oil of Petit Grain — Oil Nekoli.</p> <p>Oil of petit grain, distilled from the leaves, twigs, and immature fruit of the orange tree, was found by the jury to have been generally known and recognized in trade and commerce in 1883 as one of the subdivisions of oil neroli, (mentioned in the free-list.)</p> <p> {Syllabus by the Court.) </p>

<p>At Law. On demurrer to indictment.</p> <p>Indictment of Herman A. Morsman for alleged violation of the interstate commerce act as the agent of the Pacific Express Company.</p>

<p>Patents eok Inventions — Who Untitled to — Evidence.</p> <p>On application of two claimants for letters patent for tlie same invention, it appeared that complainant had the plan of the invention in mind for some years, and was the first to embody it in a drawing; that afterwards two drawings were made by respondent containing modifications of the proposed machine, and finally a machine was constructed and put in successful operation by him. Complainant testified that he showed respondent- a plan of the work, and respondent told him .to go ahead and make a drawing in accordance with it. In regard to the same drawing, respondent testified that it was made by his direction, and in accordance with his suggestions. At the time respondent was superintendent, and complainant an employe under him, in a manufacturing company, the work of which suggested the invention. Held, that complainant was entitled to the patent.</p>

<p>In Equity. Bill for infringement of letters patent.</p>

<p>Patents eok Inventions — Infringement—Accounting foe Profits.</p> <p>An interlocutory decree, after finding an infringement of plaintiff’s patents by defendant corporation, directed the master to take an account of the profits which had arisen or accrued to the corporation thereby; and on suggestion that the individual defendants were all the stockholders and officers of such corporation, and might, under the guise of a new name and form of a new corporation, continue to infringe, the decree further directed the master to also take an account of profits that had accrued to such individual defendants over and above the profits of the corporation. B.eld, that the decree did not direct an accounting of profits arising from infringements by other previously existing corporations, in which defendants were stockholders, or by corporations which had previously been formed in good faith, and not for the purpose of evading the decree, though defendants were controlling stockholders therein.</p>

<p>In Admiralty. Libel in personam,.</p>

<p>1. Colusión—Tugs with Tows—Liability oe Tugs.</p> <p>Whore tugs having tows in charge pass, and allow sufficient room, if their tows follow them, to pass safely, they cannot bo charged with fault if the tows, through bad steering, collide, although they could have allowed more room.</p> <p>2. Same—Liability oe Tows.</p> <p>When a tow fails to follow her tug, and as a result a collision takes place, she must respond in damages.</p>

<p>1. Removal of Causes — Citizenship—Pokeirst Ookpokation Defendant.</p> <p>A corporation organized under the laws of aforeign country, and having its chiof office there, does not become a resident of a state of the United States by doing business and having an office therein, so as to defeat its right to remove a case against it from the state to the federal court, under the act of 1888, (¡35 St. IT. S. 434,) S 2, providing that an action brought in a state court may be removed to the circuit court of the United States “by the defendant or defendants therein, being non-residents of that state. ”</p> <p>2. Same — Waives.</p> <p>The court having jurisdiction of the subject-matter and the parties, the right of a defendant to object to being sued in a district of which he is not an inhabitant is personal to himself, and he may insist upon or waive that right as he chooses.</p>

<p>In Equity. Demurrer to bill.</p>

<p>1. Mechamos’ Liens — Pkopeutt Subject to — Railways.</p> <p>The general phrase in the act of 1885, “any other structure, ” following, as it does, a specific enumeration of works declared to he subject to a lien for labor and materials furnished for their construction, such as a “building, ” “ditch, ” “flume, ” and “tunnel, ” held to include a raiLway.</p> <p>2. Same — Pkopoktion op Railkoad Subject to Lien.</p> <p>A person entitled to a lien on a railway for materials furnished for its construction may, in his notice of lien, confine his claim to that portion or section of the road in the construction of which his material was used.</p> <p>3. Same — Matekials—Gtant-Powdek.</p> <p>Giant-powder furnished by the manufacturer to a contractor for the construction of a railway, and used by the latter in the progress of such work, is “material, ” within the purview of the lien law of 1885, for the value of which, such manufacturer is entitled to a lien on the railway, or such portion thereof as the powder was used in the construction of.</p> <p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p>

<p>Pmnoipal and Agent — Notion to Agent.</p> <p>In a suit for dower it appeared that complainant’s son induced his mother, who was not familiar with business affairs, to sign a quitclaim deed for her dower interest in land to which ho was entitled as heir, by misrepresentations as to the nature of the instrument. The son borrowed money, and mortgaged the land without reservation of his mother’s interest. The money loaned belonged to defendant, but tho note and mortgage were made to her husband, acting as her agent, and were immediately transfered to her. Her husband knew of complainant’s interest in the land. Held, that complainant was entitled to recover the value of her dower interest from defendant, who was bound by the notice, her husband had of such interest.</p>

<p>Pahtkekship — Sukvivitto Partner op Fium — Sale op Real Estate.</p> <p>Land purchased by a surviving partner at sheriff’s sale, under an attachment in a suit by such partner on a debt due the partnership, does not become partnership real estate, which will descend to the Heirs of the deceased partner, so as to prevent the surviving partner from con veiling it into money by a sale.</p>

<p>At Law. Action for damages for assault.</p>

<p>1. Witness — Transactions with Deceased Person — Suits against Executors.’</p> <p>Under Rev. St. U. S. §858, providing that in actions against executors no witness who is a party to the action shall be allowed to testify as to any transaction with the testator, a witness who is not a party, but is interested in the result of an action, may testify concerning transactions between himself and the testator.</p> <p>3. Same — Conplicting State and Federal Laws.</p> <p>This statute covers the case; and under the rule that, where congress has enacted a law covering a particular case, such law must prevail in the federal courts, though it differs from the state law, Rev. St. Mo. § 8918, on the same subject, does not apply.</p>

<p>At Law. Motion to set aside summons.</p>

<p>At Law. Action to recover back duties.</p> <p>During the year 1888 the plaintiffs made nine importations from Kirk-caldy, ¡Scotland, into the port of New York, of so-called “cork carpet or carpeting.” This cork carpet or carpeting was classified by the defendant, as collector of customs at that port, as, or as assimilating to, “oilcloth,” under the provision for “all other oil-cloth except silk oil-cloth,” contained in Schedule J of the tariff act of March 8, 1883, (22 U. S. St. 507; Tariff Index, New, par. 340,) and pursuant to this provision duty was exacted thereon at the rate of 40 per cent, ad valorem. Against this classification and exaction the plaintiffs duly protested, claiming that, by force of treasury decision S, 1,436, made February 28, 1873, and of the provision for “'corks and cork hark, manufactured,” contained in Schedule N of the same tariff act, (22 U. S. St. 512; Tariff Index, New, par. 422,)this cork carpet or carpeting was dutiable at the rate of 25 per centum ad valorem. Thereafter the plaintiffs, having made due appeals, duly brought, this suit to recover the difference between the duties at the rate exacted by the defendant as said collector, and duties at the rate claimed by them in their protests. Upon the trial of this suit it appeared that this cork carpet or carpeting was composed of ground cork, mixed with ■linseed-oil and gum, and applied by rollers to a loosely woven jute fabric as a back; that this ground cork was waste cork bark produced during the manufacture from cork bark of corks.for bottles, floats for seines, and other articles, and ground fine in burr-stone mills; that the bulk of this ground cork was greater than the bulk of the other component materials of the cork carpet or carpeting combined, and that its value was about one-sixth of that of the linseed-oil and gum, and one-fourth of that of the jute fabric, or, in other words, about one-eleventh of that of the entire cork carpet or carpeting; that oil-cloths for floors, stamped, painted, or printed, were composed of jute burlaps, or other like foundations, as backs, ochre mixed with linseed-oil and gum, were generally painted on their backs, and stamped, or painted and stamped, or painted and printed, on their surfaces; that there were other oil-cloths composed of cotton cloths as backs, painted and printed, or printed and stamped on their surfaces, and used for table covers, for stairways, and sometimes for other purposes; that the oil-cloths for floors, above described, and cork carpet or carpeting of the kind of that in suit, were both used for the same purpose, viz., to cover floors.</p> <p>Both sides having rested, the defendant’s counsel moved the court to direct the jury to find a verdict for the defendant, on the grounds: (1) That the cork carpet or carpeting in suit was in fact oil-cloth, and, as such, was dutiable at 40 per centum ad valorem, as assessed by the defendant collector, under the provision “for all other oil-cloth, except silk oil-cloth,” contained in Schedule J of the tariff act of March 3, 1883, (Tariff Index, New, par. 340.) (2) That, ifit was not oil-cloth, it was in fact“a carpet or carpeting” of “other material,” and as such was dutiable at the rate of 40 per' centum ad valorem, under the provision for “carpets and carpetings of wool, flax, or cotton, or parts of either or other material, not otherwise herein specified,” contained in Schedule K of the same tariff act, (Tariff Index, New, par. 378.) (3) That, if it was neither such oil-cloth, nor such carpet or carpeting, it assimilated, under section 2499 of the same act, in use, and to a considerable extent in texture and material, to, and was dutiable at the same rate, 40 per centum ad valorem, as, some one of the “oil-cloths for floors, stamped, painted, or printed,” or “all other oil-cloth, except silk oil-cloth,” as provided in said Schedule J. (4) That if it was neither such oil-cloth, nor such carpet or carpeting, nor assimilated to such oil-cloth, it assimilated in use to the carpets and carpetings provided for in said Schedule K. (5) That the plaintiffs had not proven facts sufficient to entitle them to recover.</p>

<p>1. Bankruptcy — Federal Jurisdiction — Rights or Assignee.</p> <p>Under Act Cong. June 7,1878, (20 St. U. S. p. 99, c. 160,) and act of March 8,1887, (24 St. U. S. p. 552, c. 373,) repealing the bankrupt law, except as to cases pending, including rights of debtors and creditors, “and rights of and suits by or against assignees ” in any matter or case which had arisen, or which might thereafter arise, and saving the jurisdiction of the United States circuit courts in such cases, the circuit court has jurisdiction of a suit by an assignee in bankruptcy to prevent a person from establishing on the bankrupt’s property, by proceedings in a state court, the lien of a fraudulent judgment obtained in 1869.</p> <p>3.Same — Suit to Enjoin Enforcement or Judgment — Evidence.</p> <p>In such suit, though the judgment was rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction, and is regular on its face, the oral admissions and declarations of defendant that it was fraudulently obtained are sufficient to defeat its operation, where such statements wore deliberately made, in answer to inquiries by interested persons, and with such detail of circumstances and reasons as to leave no doubt that he fully understood what he said.</p> <p>3. Save — Interest or Assignee in Bankrupt’s Property.</p> <p>Rev. St. IT. S. § 5046, vests in the assignee in bankruptcy the title to all property of uhe bankrupt conveyed in fraud of creditors; and Code Civil Proc. ST. Y. § 382, provides that actions founded on fraud, except for the recovery of money, do not accrue until the fraud is discovered. Held, that an assignee in bankruptcy has sufficient interest in property conveyed by the bankrupt in fraud of creditors, where the bar of the statute of limitations is not completed, from the time the fraud was discovered, to maintain a suit to prevent such property from being subjected to the lion of a fraudulent judgment.</p> <p>4. Same — Possession or Property by Assignee.</p> <p>It is not necessary, to entitle the assignee to maintain such suit, that he have actual possession of the property.</p> <p>5. Same — Limitation or Actions by Assignee.</p> <p>The two-years limitation on suits “between an assignee in bankruptcy and a person claiming an adverse interest, touching any property or rights of property transferrablo to or vested in such assignee, ” imposed by Rev. St. U. S. § 5057, does not apply, in such suit, where the suit is brought within two years after defendant commenced proceedings to establish the lien. The assignee seeks to prevent the establishing of the lien, and not to set aside the judgment.</p> <p>8, Same — Possession by Assignee.</p> <p>The objection that the assignee may not he able to obtain possession of the property on which the judgment is sought to he established as a lien cannot he sustained by defendant where he is a party to the proceedings in bankruptcy, since, if the proceedings go through without reaching the property, the assignee’s right to it ceases, and defendant can then enforce his judgment.</p>

<p>1. Patents fob Inventions — Patentable Invention.</p> <p>Reissued letters patent No. 0,739, issued November 16,1875, to James Polev, for an improvement in waste-valves and overflows, consisting in bringing up the outer pipe of the overflow through the casing contiguous to the basin or bath-tub, and securely attaching it to a removable cap resting upon the outside of the casing, is not invalid for want of invention.</p> <p>2. Same — Reissue ov Letters.</p> <p>The claim of said reissue being substantially tho same as that of the original patent, except that it gives a statement of the prior state of the art, so as to limit the scope of the patent, and omits the element of a rubber ring around the valve, which was only an incidental feature of the invention, and was inserted in the original claim by mistake, the reissue is valid.</p> <p>8. Name oe Patent as Trade-Mark.</p> <p>A bill alleging that defendant has infringed a patent owned by complainant, and originally granted to James Foley, for an improvement in waste-valves, and that complainant has sold said valves under the trade name and style of “Foley’s” and “Foley’s Patent,” and “that said trade name, during the life of said letters patent, is identified therewith, and of great value * * * in describing said patented valves as a trade-mark, and that the defendant has sold his infringing valves under the trade name of ‘Foley’s Patent Valves,’ ” and praying, inter alia, that defendant bo enjoined from selling any waste valves under the name of “Foley’s ” or “Foley’s Patent Valves,” states only one good cause of complaint, i. e., for infringement of a patent. The name of the patented device is not, properly speaking, a trade-mark. Following Adee v. Peck, 39 Fed. Rep. 209.</p>

<p>In Equity- Bill to restrain infringement of letters patent.</p>

<p>In Admiralty.. On exceptions to commissioners’ report.</p>

<p>In Admiralty. Libel for damages.</p>

<p>Admiralty — Libel—Jurisdiction.</p> <p>The circuit court of the United States has no jurisdiction of a libel, where, at the time of the service of the warrant of arrest, the vessel was without the limits of the district.</p>

<p>Shipping—Freight—Shortage in Delivery—Evidence.</p> <p>Two vessels delivered sugar in bags to the respondent, and thereafter, on suit brought to recover their freight, the defense of short delivery was interposed. The vessels proved that their hatches were kept battened down until the unloading was taken charge of by the respondent, and that all the sugar received was delivered. The evidence showed rough usage of the bags by the respondent in unloading, whereby some bags and their marks were destroyed. No direct proof was given by respondent of the number of bags actually received. Meld that, though the ship was bound to account for the numbor of bags shipped, under such circumstances, the burden of proving shortage being on the respondent, the mere absence of a few marks was not sufficient proof of shortage, and that the alleged offset failed, and the vessels were entitled to recover their freight.</p>

<p>1. Attachment — Continuation of Lien Rendís» Appeal.</p> <p>In Wisconsin, an appeal by plaintiff from a judgment ior defendant on the merits, in a case in which an attachment has been issued on land, does not preserve the attachment lien pending the appeal, unless immediate notice of appeal is given, a proper bond tendered, and the lien continued by special order of the court. Rev. St. Wis. § 8748, as amended by Laws Wis. 1881, e. 157, providing that, when defendant in the writ of attachment shall recover judgment in cases where real estate has been attached, the clerk shall certify the judgment to the register of deeds, who “shall enter such certificate upon the records of his office in satisfaction of the lien of such attachment, ” is inconsistent with the continuance of the lien propria rAgore.</p> <p>2. Sami; — Discharge of Lien.</p> <p>The lien of the attachment is discharged by the rendition of a judgment against plaintiff, and cannot be continued by the failure of the clerk to perform the merely ministerial duty of certifying the judgment to the register of deeds.</p> <p>3. Same — Continuation of Lien.</p> <p>Rev. St. Wis. § 8061, providing that, on the giving of an undertaking on appeal from an order “vacating or modifying” an attachment, the court shall order the attachment to be continued, does not apply where the judgment is against plaintiff on the merits.</p>

<p>At Law. Trespass to try title.</p>

At Law. Action by Owen Evans, guardian of William Lewis, against the American Iron & Tube Company, for personal injuries sustained by said ware] while in defendant’s employ.

At' Law. This was a suit brought for the recovery of certain customs duties alleged to have been unlawfully exacted upon certain earthenware, mugs, cups, saucers and plates claimed by the plaintiffs to be dutiable at the rate of 35 per cent, as toys, under paragraph 425, Tariff Tndex, (Yew.) the appraiser having returned them as decorated earthenware at 60 peí’ cent, under paragraph 125, Tariff Index, (Yew.) The samples produced upon the trial of the importation consisted of…

At Law. This was a suit1 brought by the Lemaire Feeder Company, Limited, to recover certain customs duties alleged to have been improperly exacted in an importation of iron hooks used in the construction of carding-maehines.

At Law. This suit was brought to recover charges for cartage, storage, and labor, alleged to have been improperly collected by the collector upon certain importations of merchandise under the following circumstances: Goods were brought to the port of Philadelphia, and entry made for immediate consumption, together with an application under Rev. St. § 2859, (article 328, General Customs Regulations of 1884,) under oath to enter dutiable goods of less than $100 in value by…

<p>Patents for Inventions — Infringement—Hollow Knife Handles.</p> <p>Letters patent No. 365,819, July 5,1887, to Horatio Jordan, for an art of welding the ends of metal tubes, had particular reference to the manner of shaping and bending the oval or round ends of the hollow handles of steel cutlery, so as to but-weld the handles, and make a perfect seam, which would not leak. The improvement consisted in shaping the blank so as to form at the end of the tube double lips or projections, which were adapted to be bent inwardly, and welding them together by the use of dies. Eelá, that the patent was not infringed by the use of a similar plan of turning the ends of the tube inward, and but-welding them, since before the patent was issued such a plan was known and practiced, though it was not carried out well enough to be a commercial success.</p>

<p>In Admiralty. Libel for advances. On appeal from district court, 39 Fed. Bep. 823.</p>

<p>In Admiralty. Libel for salvage.</p>

<p>Intoxicating IjIQtjoks — Illegal Sale — Original Packages — Habeas Cobpus.</p> <p>The laws oí Kansas prohibiting the sale of intoxicating liquors within the state being void, as in contravention of the interstate commerce clause of the federal constitution, in so far as they apply to sales by an agent of an importer outside of, the state of liquor in the original packages in which it was brought into tho state, without regard to the size of such packages, an agent imprisoned for such sales is deprived of his liberty in violation of the constitution of the United States, and will be discharged by the circuit court on habeas corpus.</p>

In Equity. On bill for injunction. This litigation grows out of substantially the following state of facts : 'Che supreme court of the United States having recently decided, under the prohibition law of the state of Iowa, that non-resident manufacturers or vendors of liquors, wines, and beer had the right to import such articles or commodities into the state of Iowa (Leisy v. Hardin, 10 Sup. Ct.

In Equity. Bill for injunction. The complainant is a corporation of the state of Missouri. The respondents are residents of the state of Kansas. The respondent Welch is the acting county attorney of Shawnee county, in Kansas, and the respondent Wilkerson is the acting sheriff of said county.

In Equity. Bill for injunction. The complainant M. Wollstein is a citizen of the state of Missouri, engaged there in the business of a wholesale liquor dealer, and since the 13th day of May last past has been engaged in shipping from said state,' into the state of Kansas, such liquors, in original packages. Said liquors were shipped to Topeka, Kan., consigned to the co-complainant Sicher, as his agent, to sell the same in the original packages in which they were so shipped.

<p>1. Equity Jurisdiction— Remedy at Law — Setting Aside Settlement.</p> <p>Where a creditor has received a portion of his claim in full settlement, but has given no release under seal, a bill in chancery to sot aside the settlement will not lie, since he still has the right to sue at law for the residue of his claim. .</p> <p>3. Same — Statute os Limitations — Fraud.</p> <p>The fact that a creditor has been induced by the fraud of Ms debtor to defer bringing suit until Ms claim is barred at law by the statute of limitations does not give a court of chancery jurisdiction of the cause of action.</p>

In Equity. This bill was filed by Gibson county, Tenn., to recover of the Pullman Car Company a privilege tax of §50, and $75 on each of its sleeping-cars run through Gibson county on the Louisville & Nashville and the Mobile & Ohio Railroads, for the years 1877 to 1888, inclusive, amounting, with interest and penalties, to $5,102.50.

<p>1. Nesligenge — Evidence—Burning Slack Pile — Personal Injuries.</p> <p>The defendant dumped the slack coal from its mine In a space 400 feet long, and 60 feet wide, between the mine and a town 500 yards distant, containing 600 inhabitants. The slack pile took fire by spontaneous combustion, and, slack being constantly deposited, burned continuously. The slack-pile was not fenced, as required by a law of the state. The children, and others, living in the town, and strangers, were in the habit of visiting the mine by a rough, irregular, and narrow path leading from the town to the mine, which ran along the edge of the burning slack-pile. In clear, calm weather the slack-pile emitted no smoke or steam, and, the surface or top being covered with ashes and other incombustible matter, the fire could not be seen, and persons having no previous knowledge of its existence could not detect its presence. The plaintiff, a boy under 13 years of age, who was a stranger in the town, and who had no knowledge of the fire in the slack-pi] e. having gone from the town to the mine to witness its operation, was frightened by some of the workmen, and, in running towards the hotel in the town where he and his mother were stopping, ran into the burning slack-pile, and was severely burned. Held, the defendant was guilty of negligence, and Hablo in damages to the plaintiff for the injuries he sustained.</p> <p>2. Same — Damages—Province oí Court and Jury.</p> <p>It is the province of the jury, having due regard to the instructions of the court applicable to that issue, to assess the damages for a personal injury; and this is one of the functions of a jury which the court has no right to invade or interfere with, except w'here it has reason to believe that the verdict is the result of passion or prejudice, or of a misunderstanding of the instructions, or a disregard of them; and for a judge to substitute the damages he would assess, acting himself as a jury, in the place of the damages the jury have assessed, for no other reason than that he thinks he is a better judge of the facts than the jury, is an invasion of the province of the jury, and a violation of the constitutional rigb t of the suitor to have his cause tried by a jury, and the questions of fact in it determined by their verdict.</p> <p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p>

<p>Judgment — Res Adjudicate — Identity op Point at Issue.</p> <p>On the plea of res acLjudicata in an action by a principal against his agent for the purchase of land, to recover $18,000 alleged to have been received by the agent of the moneys paid by plaintiffs to his vendor, it appeared that in a former action by the principal against the agent for fraudulent representations as to the value of the land, a judgment was recovered against the agent, but it did not appear that any issue was raised as to the $18,000 received by the agent, or that at that time plaintiffs had any knowledge of it. Held, that the former suit was not a bar to the second.</p>

<p>1. CONSTITUTIOXAL LAW — DUE PROCESS OF LAW — FORMER JEOPARDY.</p> <p>Since it. is a principle of the common law that no one shall be twice placed in jeopardy for the same offense, the trial and commitment of one who has already been tried and acquitted of the same offense is depriving him of his liberty “without due process of law, ” within the meaning of Const. TJ. S. Amend. 14.</p> <p>2. Same — Discharge of Jury — Former Acquittal.</p> <p>Where, after a person has pleaded not guilty, and been put on trial for a felony, and evidence has been introduced by the state, the judge adjourns the case to take up the trial of another set for that day, and on the adjournment day, on the ground that he is unwell, discharges tho jury without the prisoner’s consent, the discharge is equivalent to an acquittal; and he cannot be again tried for tho same offense.</p> <p>3. Same.</p> <p>Const. Mo. | 23 of the bill of rights, providing that “no person, after having been once acquitted by a jury, ” shall again be put in jeopardy, but, if the jury “fail to render a verdict, the court before which the trial is had may, in its discretion, discharge tho jury, and commit the prisoner for trial at the next term of the court, ” etc., does not give the court a right to commit aprisoner for a second trial after discharging tho jury without legal cause.</p> <p>4. Same.</p> <p>Const. U. S. Amend. 14, providing that no “state” shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, applies equally to the act of a state judge.</p>

At Law. Charge to the jury. Indictment of William Means and John R. De Camp for a violation of Rev. St. U. S. § 5209, which provides that “every president, director, cashier, teller, clerk, or agent of any association * * * who makes any false entry in any book, report, or statement of the association, with intent, in either case, to injure or defraud the association, * * * or to deceive any officer of the association, or any agent appointed to examine the affairs of any…

In Admiralty. On libel for seamen’s wages. The Burchard is a German vessel, and the crew were shipped at Bue-nos Ayres before the German consul. Upon the filing of the libel at Mobile, the German consul entered a protest, claiming jurisdiction of the matter under the treaty of December 11, 1871, now in force between the United States and Germany. Public Treaties, etc., 258.

In Equity. Bill for partition. On motion to stay proceedings until complainants establish their title at law. This is a bill for the partition of 161.4 acres of land situate on Price hill, within the corporate limits of the city of Cincinnati. There are between two and three hundred defendants, but, the contested questions being common to all, they are to be heard upon the answers of William Henry Elder, archbishop of Cincinnati and trustee of Ht.

<p>In Equity. On bill for injunction.</p>

In Equity. Bill for an injunction. Rev. Ht. If. S. § 2322, provides that the locators of all mining claims shall have the exclusive right of possession and enjoyment of all the surface included within the lines of their location, and of all veins, lodes, and ledges throughout their entire depth, the top or apex of which lies inside of such surface lines extended downward vertically, although such veins, lodes, or ledges may so far depart from a perpendicular in their course…

In Equity. Motion for injunction pendente lite. Action by Nathaniel Whitman against W. L. Hubbell, as treasurer of the Adams Express Company, to compel the removal of ail awning, on the ground that it interfered with the view of plaintiff’s signs. Law's N. Y. 1882. c. 410, (Consolidation Act,) § 86, subd. 8, provides that the city council of New York shall have power “to regulate the use of the streets for signs, sign-posts, awnings,” etc.

<p>1. Vendor and Vendee — Contract—Waiver op Vendor’s Lien.</p> <p>An agreement between vendor and vendee, that, on the payment of a certain sum, the title to the property sold will be registered “free from'all charges and in-cumbrances, ” is not a waiver by the vendor of his lien for the balance of the purchase money. Such agreement relates to the state of the title at that time, and not to anything growing out of the sale itself.</p> <p>B. Same.</p> <p>The facts that a vendor withholds the deed, and afterwards retains possession of the property, and has stock of the corporation to whom he sells the property pledged to secure the purchase money, are not of themselves sufficient to constitute a waiver of his vendor's lien.</p> <p>8. Same — Estoppel.</p> <p>A vendee who accepts title and makes part payment, according to the terms of an agreement between the vendor and the broker through whom the sale is made, is estopped to afterwards deny the broker’s authority to make the agreement.</p>

<p>At Law. On petition for mandamus.</p> <p>On the 28th day of August, 1889, there was filed in the district court of Larimer county, in this state, a petition, 'the material parts of which are as follows:</p> <p>“Tour petitioner, Isaac N. Van Dyke, on behalf of the people of the state of Colorado, respectfully represents unto your honor that he is informed and believes that heretofore, to-wit, on the 12th day of May, A. D. 1884, the Colorado Central Railroad Company was a corporation of the state aforesaid; that said railroad extended- through and from the city of Fort Collins to the northern line of said state, and from said northern line of said state through and to the city of Cheyenne, in the territory of Wyoming, and was then being run and operated under one management from said city of Fort Collins to said city of Cheyenne, aforesaid, and was by its being run and operated of great financial yearly value to the plaintiff, the people of said state, which was then, and has been hitherto, and is now, well known to the defendants hereto.”</p> <p>The petition then alleges that the company mortgaged its road to the defendants Jay Gould and Frederick L. Ames; states that-, about the 20th of February, 1879, the Colorado Central Company leased its railroad to the defendant the Union Pacific Kailroad Company for the term of 50 years, and sets out the terms of the lease, and avers “that the leasing of the said Colorado Central Railroad to the Union Pacific Railroad Com-, pany was done at the instance of Jay Gould and Frederick L. Ames; that when accomplished it was the selling and leasing of a competing line, and done in violation of the statute laws of the state of Colorado.” It is averred that for a period of “five years last past” the defendants have failed and refused to equip, operate, and run that part of the Colorado Central Railroad extending from Fort Collins to the northern line of the state of Colorado, and from thence to the city of Cheyenne, in the territory of Wyoming, and that, by reason of the failure to operate said line of road, “the people are compelled, when they wish to travel to Cheyenne, to go upon and use another line of railroad operated by the Union Pacific Railroad, making the distance much longer, with loss of time, change of trains, and other inconveniences too numerous to enumerate.” It is alleged the people have been damaged by the neglect and refusal to operate the line of road mentioned in the sum of $500,000, for which a judgment is asked; and the petition concludes with a prayer that the defendant may, by writ of mandamus, be required and compelled to put said line of road in repair and operation, and to operate the same.</p> <p>On the petition of the defendant the Union Pacific Railroad Company, a corporation of the United States, the cause was removed into this court on the authority of Pacific Railroad Removal Cases, 115 U. S. 1, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1113. An alternative writ of manda,mus, substantially in the terms of the petition, issued out of this court. The respondents filed a general demurrer and answer to the alternative writ.</p> <p>Among other defenses, the following are set up in the answer:</p> <p>“That the relator in this case has no right or authority whatever to make or file the petition herein, or to maintain this action. That this action purports to relate to a line of railroad from Fort Collins, in the state of Colorado, to Cheyenne, in the territory of Wyoming, and that this court has no jurisdiction over the subject-matter stated in the petition and writ herein. Admit that there may at one time have been a lease made by the Colorado Central Railroad Company to the Union Pacific Railroad Company, but deny that it is as stated in said petition and writ; and allege that, if there ever was any such lease, that the same was never in effect or operative on said companies; and further allege that the said the Colorado Central Railroad Company had no right or authority to lease, and the said the Union Pacific Railroad Company had no right to take a lease of, said premises, and that, as a matter of fact, it never did take the same; and that such lease, if any there is or was, is not now, and never has been, in force or effect. That defendants are not, neither is either of them, under any obligation whatever to construct, maintain, or operate said railroad under their charter or charters or otherwise. That there is no necessity whatever for the repairing, maintaining, and operating of said railroad described in said petition and writ. That the people of Fort Collins and vicinity have direct and adequate railway connections with said Cheyenne by railroad constructed, operated, and maintained between Fort Collins and said Cheyenne by way of Greeley, and thence directly to Cheyenne, and that they have not been damaged in any way or manner whatsoever. That said railroad between said Fort Collins and Cheyenne runs through a very thinly settled country, and there are very few settlers along the line of said railroad, and very little local travel, and that the same could not, when operated, and could not now, if repaired, maintained, and operated, be made to pay the running expenses thereof; and this is especially true from the fact that all of the business is now done without any inconvenience whatever over and by way of the line of railroad above described.”</p> <p>Testimony has been taken from which it appears that the line of road from Fort Collins to Cheyenne was operated until the year 1882, when trains were discontinued, and have not since been run; that the country between Fort Collins and Cheyenne is sparsely settled, and that the road between these points could not be made to pay running expenses; that the citizens of Fort Collins and vicinity can reach Cheyenne by rail via the Greeley, Salt Lake & Pacific and Denver Pacific Railroads, — the distance by these roads from Fort Collins to Cheyenne being 79 miles, and by the line of the Colorado .Central, as formerly run, 48.1 miles. The general direction of the Denver Pacific and the Colorado Central between Fort Collins and Cheyenne is the sanie, but to reach the Denver Pacific from Fort Collins passengers have to pass over the Greeley, Salt Lake & Pacific Railroad, a distance of 24 miles, in a south-easterly direction, to Greeley.</p>

<p>1. SCHOOL-DISTRICTS — REFUNDING INDEBTEDNESS — ISSUE OF BONDS.</p> <p>The refunding of an outstanding valid bonded indebtedness of an independent school-district, under Act 18th Gen. Assem. Iowa, c. 133, allowing any independent school-district, having abonded indebtedness outstanding, to issue negotiable bonds for the purpose of funding the same, is not the creation of a debt, within the inhibition of Const. Iowa, art. 11, § 3, providing that “no countjr, or other political or municipal corporation, shall be allowed to become indebted in any manner, or for any purpose, to an amount in the aggregate exceeding five per centum on the value of the taxable property within such county or corporation. ”</p> <p>3. Same — Increase of Indebtedness — Burden of Proof.</p> <p>In an action against the district on such refunding bonds, the burden is on defendant to show that at the date of the original issuance the outstanding indebtedness of the district exceeded the constitutional limitation.</p> <p>8. Same — Application of Proceeds — Duty of Purchaser.</p> <p>The right of the owner to recover on such bonds cannot be defeated because a part of the proceeds of their sale was misapplied. The statute authorizes a sale of the bonds in open market, and a purchaser cannot be charged with the duty of seeing that the proceeds of the sale are properly applied.</p>

<p>At Law. Action on bonds.</p>

<p>Amendment oe Pleadings — Laches.</p> <p>In an action against several defendants upon a contract signed by one of tbem for the benefit of all, a joint answer was interposed which practically admitted the execution of the contract. Six years after the making of such answer, and after the evidence had all been taken, and some of the witnesses had died, one of the defendants asked leave to file an amended answer denying the authority of his co-defendant to execute the contract for him. Held, that the application came too late.</p>

<p>1. Principal and A gust — Liability op Principal.</p> <p>Upon making division oí several oil leases in which plaintiffs and defendants were jointly interested, plaintiffs took a lease for land which had not been tested for oil, and received a written agreement, signed by one defendant in behalf of all the defendants, to pay plaintiffs 81,000 in ease the oil-wells on the land transferred to plaintiffs should be unproductive. The defendants who did not sign this agreement knew of the exchange, and acquiesced in it. Their answer did not deny the execution of the agreement, and there was evidence to show that they authorized their co-defendant to sign the agreement, and afterwards ratified his act. Held, that they were bound by the agreement.</p> <p>2. Contract — Evidence—Oil-Well.</p> <p>Said agreement having defined an unproductive well as one in which oil is not produced in paying quantities, evidence that the wells were drilled through the stratum in which oil was found, if at all, in that county, at an expense of about 83,000, and only a trace of oil discovered, is sufficient to show that the wells were unproductive.</p>

<p>Mandamus — Judgment—Limitations.</p> <p>The holders ol' a judgment against a county obtained a writ of mandamus commanding the supervisors to levy a tax to discharge tho judgment. The decree awarding the writ was reversed by the supreme court, and the cause remanded, whereupon an amended petition for mandamus was filed. Pending the proceedings in the supreme court the period during which, under Code Iowa, § 8025, an execution could issue on the judgment, expired. Held, that the collection of the judgment could not be enforced by mandamus, since the judgment was no longer operative, and the pendency of the mandamus proceedings created no lien.</p>

At Law. This was an action brought by the United States to recover $3,894.38, alleged to be due as additional duty upon an importation of 221 bales of so-called “Smyrna wool,” imported at Philadelphia, April 9, 1889. The wool was entered as carpet wool, and "was valued at 51 pence per pound, dutiable at 2} cents per pound.

<p>At Law. Action to recover back duties.</p> <p>During the year 1886 the plaintiffs imported from Vienna, Austria, into the port of New York, certain Austrian bent-wood furniture in pieces. This furniture was classified for duty under the provision for “cabinet ware and house furniture, finished,” contained in schedule D of the tariff act of 1883j (Tariff Index, New, 280;) and duty was exacted thereon at the rate of 35 per centum ad valorem, by the defendant as collector of customs at that port. Against this classification and exaction the plaintiffs duly protested, claiming that this furniture was “in pieces, and not finished,” and therefore dutiable at the rate of 30 per cent, ad valorem under the provision for “house or cabinet furniture in piece or rough, and not finished,” contained in the same schedule. Id. 229. The plaintiffs thereafter, having made due appeals, duly brought this suit to recover the difference between duties at the rate of 35 per cent. ad valorem as exacted by the defendant as said collector, and duties at the rate of 30 per cent, ad valorem as claimed in their protest.</p> <p>Upon the trial, it appeared from the evidence produced by the plaintiffs that this furniture, though in pieces, consisted of all the parts of chairs, settees, tables, and other varieties of house furniture, including the backs, seats, and one or more other portions thereof, that were each put together in permanent form; that each of these parts was completely shaped, smoothed, and fitted to go together without further work thereon, was polished and varnished, or polished, painted, and varnished, had the usual holes therein for the necessary screws and bolts used in fastening these parts together, and was accompanied with all such necessary screws and bolts, so that all these parts were ready to be put together and fastened so as to constitute completed chairs, settees, tables, and other varieties of house furniture, as used by everybody, the putting together and fastening only remaining to be done; that these parts, in the condition described, together with the aforesaid screws and bolts, as imported, were wrapped with or packed in straw or paper, and placed in boxes or cases; that they were so wrapped or packed and placed for convenience of transportation, and to save, as fár as possible, the expense of freight; that after their importation the only thing done to them besides putting together, and fastening them so as to constitute completed chairs, settees, tables, and other varieties of house furniture, as used by everybody, was to touch up the ends of the aforesaid screws and bolts, paint or varnish them, in order to make them match such furniture, unless the woodwork had been jammed or crushed or bruised, and, if it had been, then the wood-work was touched up where jammed or crushed or bruised, but otherwise the wood-work was not touched; that the difference between the price at which this furniture was sold when sold as imported from Austria, and the price at which it was sold when put together and fastened so as to be ready for use, was about 3 per cent, of the wholesale price as sold in this country. It appeared from the evidence produced by the defendant: That at and prior to the passage of the aforesaid tariff act, in the furniture trade of this country, furniture like plaintiffs, after the parts thereof were made and fitted, was put together and fastened, shellaced, or varnished, or painted, or painted and varnished, etc., then generally taken to pieces, and afterwards packed for shipment in boxes or cases in the manner in which plaintiffs’ was when imported. That at those times, in that trade, each of the terms “set up,” “knocked down,” “finished,” “finished set up,” “finished knocked down,” and “finished and boxed,” as applied to furniture, had a particular and specific trade meaning, as follows: “Set up” furniture meant furniture whose parts had been fitted, put together, and fastened so that it was in the form in which ordinary furniture was used. “Knocked down” furniture meant furniture that had been set up, and then taken to pieces again. “Finished ” furniture meant furniture that had received a shellac or varnish or paint, or paint and varnish, etc., after having been set up, but did not mean completed furniture. “Finished set up” furniture meant set up furniture that had been finished, such as plaintiffs ’ would be if set up. “Finished knocked down” furniture meant furniture that had been set up, finished, and then knocked down, such as plaintiffs’ was when taken from the boxes or cases in which it was imported; and “finished and boxed ” furniture meant furniture that had been set up, finished, knocked down, wrapped with or packed in straw or paper, and placed in boxes or cases, such as plaintiffs’ was when imported. That in the furniture trade at those times the phrase “furniture in the rough” meant furniture “in the white” or “in the wood,” i. e., not finished. That the phrase “in piece” or “in pieces,” at those times, was not a term used by that trade with a trade or technical meaning. Both sides having rested, counsel for plaintiffs moved the court to direct the jury to find a verdict in their favor, and counsel for defendant made a motion for a like direction in his favor.</p> <p>The court denied both motions.</p>

<p>Patents non Inventions — Assignment and License — Suit eok Royalties — Pleading.</p> <p>A patentee who grants a license to manufacture and sell the patented article, under a contract by which the licensee is to make monthly reports, and pay a stipulated royalty, and for failure to comply with which the licensor may declare a forfeiture, cannot sue in equity to compel the licensee to make reports and account for royalties due, or, on his failure to do so, to enjoin him from further manufacturo or sale. By such prayer, he waives the forfeiture clause, and is left to his action at law for the royalties.</p>

<p>1. Patents toe Inventions — Novelty—Cable Railways — Conduit Tubes.</p> <p>Claim 1 ol letters patent 179,016. to A. S. Hallidie, lor a device used in operating cable railways, was lor the combination of a diagonal tube, interposed between tlie main tubes containing the cable, with a longitudinal slot therein connecting with the slot on the cable-bearing tubes, so that when a cable-car passed from one track to another the grip device could pass through it from the tube on one track to that on the other. Meld, that the claim was not novel, since bofoi-e tho patent was issued cars were passed from one track to another by means of a track diagonally between them, and all that was necessary in the case of cable-cars was to construct under such track, and diagonally between the two cable-bearing tubes, a similar tube to conduct the grip.</p> <p>2. Same — Pivoted Switch Rail and Spring.</p> <p>The third claim in the patent was for a pivoted switch rail and spring, so arranged as to obviate the objection of tho opening made at the meeting of the slot in the branch tube with that in the main tubes. The rail was pivoted on one end, and worked freely at the other, so that the grip, in passing from the branch tube, would press it aside, the spring pressing it back into place, thus leaving the slot in the main tube unobstructed. Held, that the combination was novel and patentable, though there was used before a switch rail on railroad tracks pivoted at one end and free at the other, kept against the rail by a spring, so that the flange on the wheels of cars passing in one direction on the tracks would press it from the rail, and pass through, while cars in coming from the other direction would cross on it to the other track.</p> <p>8. Same — Conduit—Endless Cable.</p> <p>The first claim of letters patent No. 195,505, September 26, 1817, to A. S. Hallidie, which is for a combination of pulleys and a single tube, so arranged that an endless cable can be run through it, making two cables running in different directions, is not patentable for want of novelty, since before the patent was issued a combination was known by which the same result was reached by the use of two separate tubes.</p>

<p>Patents foe Inventions—Action foe. Infeingement—Defenses.</p> <p>Under Act Cong. March 3,1839, (5 St. at Large 354,) which provides that any, person who has purchased or constructed any newly-invented machine before the in.-ventor’s application for a patent may use and sell such machine without liability to the inventor, it is a complete defense to an action for infringing a patent that the machine used by the defendants was constructed for them by the patentee before he applied for the patent, though after obtaining it he demanded compensation for the use of said machine, which was refused.</p>

In Admiralty. These libels were filed by the Union Insurance Company and the Marine Insurance Company against the steamer Pierrepont, to recover damages for injuries received by the schooner Ellsworth while being towed by the steamer. The libelants, having policies of insurance upon the schooner, paid the amount of damages to her owners, and were subro-gated to their rights.

Preliminary Examination on habeas corpus cum causa. Rev. St. U. S. § 648, provides that, “when any civil suit or criminal prosecution is commenced in any court of a state against any officer appointed under or acting by authority of any revenue law of the United States, * * * on account of any act done under color of his office, * * * the said suit or prosecution may, at any time before the trial or final hearing thereof, be removed for trial into the circuit court next to…

<p>1. Removal or Causes — Divebse Citizenship — Pbactice.</p> <p>A petition for the removal of a cause from the state to the federal court, on the ground of diverse citizenship, stated that plaintiff was a resident of Kansas, and that defendants were, and still are, non-residents, and citizens of states other than Kansas, “as will more fully appear by the affidavit of the plaintiíf C. for an order of publication filed herein. ” S.uch affidavit recited that defendants (giving their names) were non-residents, and the complaint in the cause referred to certain of defendants as residents of Vermont and Missouri. Held, that the diverse citizenship of the pai’ties sufficiently appeared from the whole record, and a motion to remand because the petition for removal failed to show the citizenship of defendants should be denied.</p> <p>2. Same — Jubisdictionab Amount.</p> <p>Where the petition for removal, in such case, alleges that the action is on a. fraudulently executed mortgage, and to cancel bonds fraudulently issued and secured by it, to the amount of §43,000, and states that the amount in controversy exceeds $2,500, exclusive of interest and costs, and the controversy is sufficiently-stated in the complaint, a motion to remand to the state court on the ground that the petition for removal and the record do not show that the amount in controversy exceeds $2,000 will be denied.</p> <p>8. Same — jubisuiotion—Suits by Receivebs.</p> <p>The rule that the court appointing a receiver will reserve the right and power to' control him, and the property under his charge, cannot prevent a receiver ap-poinlcd by a state court [rom bringing in the federal courts suits affecting the re-oeivershij) property.</p> <p>4. Same — Tb'Beg'üi.akitiiss ix Removal Boxd.</p> <p>Where a cause is once removed from a state to a federal 'court, and there are no jurisdictional objections to its remaining there, the facts that a defendant bank has signed the removal bond as surety, and the other surety had no authority to sign, are not, where the bond is otherwise ample, sufficient grounds for remanding the cause.</p>

<p>Motion to Remand.</p>

<p>Quieting Title — Bmedt at Law.</p> <p>A purchaser of land at execution sale cannot bring suit to quiet other purchaser of the same land under a subsequent execution, in mine which has the better title, since the respective rights of the determined at law.</p>

<p>Mortgages — Deed Absolute in Form — Evidence.</p> <p>In a suit to declare a deed absolute on its face a mortgage, and to redeem therefrom, it appeared that O., who was complainant’s mother-in-law, was indebted to defendant and to complainant; that she executed to defendant an absolute deed to all her land, which was not at the time worth more than the debt, and received from him all evidences of debt. This deed complainant claimed to have been intended as a mortgage, under an agreement by which he was to have the right to redeem the land thereby conveyed on his subsequent payment of all the indebtedness. O. testified that the deed was intended as an absolute conveyance, and letters from her to defendant and to complainant tended to show that this was the understanding. There were letters from complainant to defendant and to O., running through several years, during which he made no claim that the deed was a mortgage. His testimony was contradictory and improbable. Defendant, and other members of his firm, testified that the deed was absolute. Held, that the deed was an absolute conveyance.</p>

<p>X. Municipal Cokpobations — Public Xmpbovements — Electric Light.</p> <p>Under Acts 22d Gen. Assem. Iowa, e. 11, which authorizes cities to establish and maintain electric light plants when the majority of the voters oí the city shall by vote approve the same, a city may e,rect an electric plant for the purpose of furnishing-light to its inhabitants in their stores and-houses, as well as for lighting the streets and public places of the city.</p> <p>2. Same.</p> <p>The action of a city in authorizing a private corporation to erect an electric plant for the purpose of lighting the city, without any grant of exclusive rights, does not depi-ive the city of the right, under said statute, to erect an electric plant itself for the same purpose.</p> <p>3. Same — liosos—Submission to Vote.</p> <p>Where it is intended to pay for said plant by the issuance and sale of city bonds, it is proper to submit to vote the entire matter of erecting the plant and issuing the bonds in one proposition.</p> <p>4. Same — Okuinance.</p> <p>Under that provision of said act which provides that the city council may order the submission of the question of electric lighting to a vote, or that the mayor may do so upon petition of a certain number of tax-payors, the adoption of an ordinance providing for the erection of an electric plant is not a condition precedent to the submission of the question.</p> <p>5. Same — Constitutional Limit ot Debt.</p> <p>Where, at the time the issuance of city bonds is authorized by vote, the issuance of such bonds would increase the city debt beyond the constitutional limit, but the bonds are not issued until the debt has been so reduced that their issuance does not bring it beyond such limit, the bonds are not void, since no debt is created till the bonds are issued.</p> <p>5. Same — Injunction.</p> <p>The fact that city bonds were sold and delivered before the ordinance providing for issuing them took effect is no ground for enjoining their payment at the suit of a tax-payer.</p>

<p>JSquitv Pleading — Suits against Cohpobations.</p> <p>under equity rule 91, which provides that every bill brought by one or more stockholders against a corporation and others, rounded on rights which may properly be asserted by the corporation, must set forth with particularity tho efforts oí the plaintiff to secure such action as he desiros on the part of the directors, and, if necessary, of the shareholders, and the causes of his failure to obtain such action, tho court has no jurisdiction of a bill to enjoin the transfer of part of the stock of the defendant to another corporation, which fails to set forth such efforts, though it allege that the directors of the one corporation are also directors of tho other, that it”would have been useless for plaintiff to demand that they would bring suit, and that plaintiff would have made such demand had he not known that they would refuse. Following Hawes v. OaJdand, 104 U. S. 4(50.</p>

<p>t. Railroad Companies — Municipal Aid — Constitutional Law.</p> <p>The use of a railroad, though owned by a private corporation, is public to such a degree as to authorize taxation in its support; and Laws Wis. 1883, c. 150, approving and ratifying the act of Douglas county in conveying to a railroad company lands which it held under tax-titles, to aid in the construction of the road through the county, is valid.</p> <p>8. Quieting Title — Pleading—Demurrer.</p> <p>A bill by a railroad company to set aside deeds of various tracts of land previously conveyed to it, and to quiet the title, is not demurrable on the ground that complainant is only in actual possession of a portion of the lands, and cannot maintain the suit as to that portion of which it has no possession. The demurrer goes to the entire bill, and does not lie if the bill is maintainable as to part of the lands embraced in it. ,</p>

<p>1. Railkoads — Municipal Aid — Delivekt op Bonds.</p> <p>18 St. at Large S. C. 366, authorized certain townships to issue bonds in aid of a railroad, which was done; and they were deposited with a trust company to be delivered to complainant, which was building the railroad, when the road was shown to be complete by certificate of its engineer, indorsed by the chairman of county commissioners of the county in which the township was. The chairman refused to make such indorsement on the strength of a decision of the state supreme court that the issue of bonds was void, as there was no law conferring on townships corporate functions, they being merely territorial divisions. But thereafter the legislature passed an act (20 St. at Large, 13) expressly recognizing the bonds as a township debt, and authorizing the levy of a tax to pay them. Held that, as the road had been completed, the delivery of the bonds to complainant should be decreed.</p> <p>•2. Appeal — Bond—Amount.</p> <p>On appeal from such decree for the specific delivery of the bonds, the amount of the supersededs bond, under supreme court rule No. 29, will be fixed to cover the coupons already due and to mature in four years, with 7 per cent, interest, 10 per cent, damage on the aggregate of interest, and the costs.</p>

<p>At Law. Ejectment.</p>

At Law. This is an action against tho government under the act of March 3, 1887, (24 U. S. St. 505,) and it has been submitted for decision on an agreed statement of facts, which obviates the necessity of any special ■findings, as would otherwise be required by the seventh section of the act.

<p>At Law.</p> <p>This was a suit in two counts, the first count being on coupons of certain county bonds, and the second count on a judgment recovered by the plaintiff against the defendant in the United States circuit court for the western district of Missouri, in the year 1883, before Macon county was attached to the eastern judicial district of Missouri. Defendant disputed the right to recover oil the judgment, for the reason that an execution might yet he sued out on the judgment in the western district, and' also for the reason that, under the fourth section of the act of .February 28, 1887, (24 St. U. S. 425,) the case might be transferred from the western district to this, the eastern, district of Missouri.</p>

<p>At Law. On demurrer to replication.</p>

At Law. Action by William F. Bowe against the United States under the act of March 8, 1887, (c. 359,) which provides that actions may be brought against the United States “upon any contract, expressed or implied, with the government of the United States, or for damages, liquidated or un-liquidated, in cases not sounding in tort.” Rev. St. U. S. § 3737, provides that no public contract shall be transferred by the party with whom it is made, and that any such transfer shall…

<p>1. Cabkihks or Passengers — -Ejection or Passengers — Refusal to Pat Extra Pare.</p> <p>■Where a passenger sought to buy a ticket, but could not, because the agent had left the office, and gone to meet the train, then standing at a wateritank some 20(i feet away, and the passenger refused, willfully and captiously, to pay the conductor 35 cents in excess of the regular fare, and take a rebate check, (the requirement of the conductor being in accordance with his instructions, and having tho sanction oí the railroad commission of the state,) and this refusal being persisted in until the train was stopped, the conductor was authorized to put the passenger off the train.</p> <p>3. Same — Offer to Pay after Ejection.</p> <p>A passenger, who know the duty of the conductor, and willfully and captiously-refused to pay extra fare demanded of him because he had no ticket, cannot reinstate himself, after the train has been stopped to put him off, by offering to pay.</p> <p>3. Same — Assault by Conductor-Provocation.</p> <p>A passenger cannot claim damages on account of the conductor drawing a pistol on him, and speaking of him as a coward to the other passengers, if the conductor’s conduct was provoked and caused by the acts of the passenger.</p>

<p>Seamen—Wages—Lien—Pilots.</p> <p>One who is engaged and ships as pilot of a vessel, whereon another stands as registered master, has a lion on the boat for his wages, although he may he in entire charge of her navigation.</p>

<p>In Admiralty. Libel to recover assessment under a general average bond.</p>

<p>Courts — Jurisdiction—Act-tons against National Banks.</p> <p>Under Bev. St. U. S. § 563, giving district courts jurisdiction “of all suits by or against any association, established under any law providing for national banking-associations, within the district for which the-court is held, ” and Act Cong. Aug. 18,1888, § 4, making national banking associations, forthe purpose of all actions, citizens of the state wherein they are located, “and in such cases the circuit and district courts shall not have jurisdiction other than such as they would have in cases between individual citizens of the same state, ” district courts have no jurisdiction of an action on a promissory note, brought by a national bank in a district other than that in which the bank is located.</p>

At Law,. On motion to remand. The defendant is a corporation organized under the laws of Wisconsin. It was sued in the district court of this state, in and for Cedar county; service of process being made, under section 2613 of the Code of Iowa, upon an agent. The cause was removed to this court upon a petition which averred the necessary citizenship of the parties, but which contained no averment that defendant was a non-resident of the state of Iowa.

<p>1. Receivers — Arpointment.</p> <p>On motion for the appointment oJE a receiver ol' the property of a decedent in possession of one claiming to be his son and heir, complainants alleged that they were the next ol kin and collateral heirs of decedent, who died without lineal heirs, and that defendant was his illegitimate son. Defendant answered that he was decadent’s legitimate son and heir, and there was evidence showing that decedent had lived for many years with defendant’s mother, recognizing her as his wife, and defendant as his son. After living thus together, defendant’s mother entered into illicit intercourse with another man, and was repudiated by decedent, and after-wards both he and the woman staled that they had never been married. Decedent deeded all his property to defendant, and the deeds were attacked by complainants as invalid. Held that, as defendant could suffer no great harm by holding that complainants had established a prima facie right to tho estate, a receiver would be appointed until final hearing on the merits of the case.</p> <p>2. Same.</p> <p>In such case, defendant, being shown to be competent to manage the estate, wiXs appointed receiver on giving bond.</p>

<p>In Equity. On demurrer.</p>

<p>In Equity. On demurrer to bill.</p>

<p>Railroad Bonds — Bona Fide Holder.</p> <p>Whore overdue railroad mortgage bonds, whieh belong to the railroad company, are bought at 40 cents on the dollar from the vice-president of the company after suit to foreclose has been begun, and a receiver has taken possession of the mortgaged property, the purchasers of such bonds are not bona fide holders where inquiry on their part would have shown that the vice-president had no authority to sell the bonds.</p>

<p>Wtnes and Mining — Patent—Adveese Suits — Limitations.</p> <p>Rev. St,. U. S. § 2386, provides that a suit upon an adverse claim to a mining location must he begun within 30 days after the claim is iiled. Gon. St. Golo. 1883, p. 673, 118, provides that, in ease of failure of a suit from certain causes, tho plaintiff may renew his suit at any time within one year. Held, that the fact that an adverse suit had failed for a reason within the purview of said state statute did not authorize the plaintiff to begin another suit after the expiration of such 30 days, since said United States statute could not bo affected by state legislation.</p>

<p>Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus.</p>

<p>1. Crimtnai. Law — 'Territorial Courts — Cumulative Sbutewces.</p> <p>Rev. St. Idaho, § 7237, providing that cumulative sentences may be Imposed on a person convicted of two or more crimes, applies to offenses against the United States tried in tho territorial courts.</p> <p>2. Same.</p> <p>Cumulative sentences are valid, if they are definite and certain.</p>

<p>Error to District Court.</p>

<p>Error to the District Court.</p>

<p>1. Post-Office — Laiicekx fbom Mails — Constiíuction of Statute.</p> <p>Rev. St. U. S. § 5407, provides: “Any person employed in any department of the postal service who shall secrete, embezzle, or destroy any letter "* * * which shall contain any note, bond, *' * *, ’’ — but provides no penalty after such clause. After a semicolon, it further provides: “Any such person who shall steal or take away of the things aforesaid out of any letter, * * * shall be punished, ” etc. Meld that, since there is no penalty attached to the first clause, the section only covers the offense described in the second clause, of stealing or taking away.</p> <p>2. Same — Indictment.</p> <p>Where an indictment under such section charges that defendant “did secrete, embezzle, and destroy” certain letters, etc., “within the intent and meaning of section 5167, Revised Statutes of the United States, ” the recital of such section will be considered surplusage, and the indictment, though not good under said section 5467, will be considered sufficient under section 3891, which provides that “ any person employed in any department of the postal service who shall unlawfully detain, delay, or open any letter, packet, * * * or who shall secrete, embezzle, or destroy any such letter, packet, * * * shall be punished, ” etc.</p>

<p>1. Patents fob Inventions — Patentabuaty—Invention.</p> <p>Letters patent No. 216,187. issued June 24, 1879, to George C. Gill for an improvement in apparatus for stopping and reversing machinery, consisting of two pulleys on the driving shaft, one fast and one loose, a belt, with a fork and lover for shifting it, and a vibrating frame, carrying a frictionally acting wheel, the shaft of which is geared with the loose pulley, are not invalid for want of invention.</p> <p>3. Same — Infringement.</p> <p>Said patent is infringed by a device which differs from the patented machine only in using a friction wheel instead of a- cog-wheel in the gearing.</p>

<p>Patents nor Inventions — Who Entitled to — Conflicting Claims.</p> <p>Suit was brought under Rev. St. U. S. § 4915, to determine whether A. or G-. & C. were the inventors of a machine for which a patent was granted to G-. & C., claiming “in a tack-strip heading-machine, the combination of a support for the tack-strip, consisting of a disk having peripheral teeth to engage between the shanks of the strip, a clamping jaw, and a header. ” The evidence showed that A. was the first, to suggest the use of a wheel having teeth to engage between the shanks of the strip, but that the wheel was to have a positive movement, which was found to work imperfectly, while in the perfected machine of G-. and C. the strip is not fed by the positive movement of the wheel, but the wheel is moved by the strip. Meld, that A.’s claim to he the inventor of the complete machine is not sustained, and his bill will be dismissed.</p>

<p>Patents eon Inventions — Patentability.</p> <p>• The second claim of letters patent granted September 31,1880, to Albert A. G-ehrt for balidg-press, which, consists of “a friction plate or pressure contrivance for applying friction to the traverser, to retard its backward movement, ” is invalid, because not limited to any specific devices.</p>

<p>1. Patents for Inventions — Locomotive Head-Lights — Infringement.</p> <p>The first claim of letters patent issued August 1,1882, to Edward Wilhelm, for an improvement in locomotive head-lights consisting of a reflector, provided with an opening behind the burner, whereby light is omitted backwardly into the head-light case for illuminating signal plates, is not infringed by a device wherein the light passes into the head-liglit case through an enlargement of the burner hole, since such claim must be restricted to head-lights in which there is a hole in the reflector distinct from the burner and chimney holes, in order to give it novelty.</p> <p>2. Same — Patentable Invention.</p> <p>The second claim of said patent, for the combination with such reflector of “an auxiliary reflector whereby the light emitted backwardly through such opening is directed towards'tlie signal plates, ” is void for want of patentable invention.</p>

<p>1. Patents eor Inventions — Combinations—Want oe Noveltt — Fountain-Pens.</p> <p>Letters patent No. 347,961, August 24,1886, to George H. Sackett, for an improvement in fountain-pens, consists of a reservoir, or tubular holder, constructed with longitudinal grooves in the inner walls of its lower end, in combination with a pen, the lateral edges of which fit into the grooves, so as to hold the pen in place. Neld, that the use of grooves for holding the pen in place, having been long known, was not patentable.</p> <p>2. Same.</p> <p>Such, patent, in so far as it consists of a slitted pen so fixed in the holder that the slit comes in contact with the ink held in the reservoir, so that the ink will bo directed by capillary attraction down the split to the point of the pen, is not infringed by the use of a pen the slit of which is below the ink space in the reservoir. 5. Same.</p> <p>Letters patent No. 853,162, November 23, 1886, to George H. Sackett, for an improvement in fountain-pens, consists of an ink-reservoir closed air-tight at its top, and open and internally unobstructed at the bottom for the passage of air and ink, the ink being kept in the reservoir by the air pressure, a slitted pen attached to the bottom of the reservoir, and a lip or tongue, the inner surface of which is applied parallel with the pen, to form, conjointly with the surface and the slit of the pen, a channel for conducting the ink to the point of the pen. Held, that the patent must be confined to the precise form and arrangement of parts described in the specification and to the purpose therein indicated, since the use of the parts to accomplish similar results in analogous combinations was known before the date of the invention.</p> <p>4. Same.</p> <p>Such patent, where it calls for a tongue or feeding-stem located within the reservoir, with its upper end extended to or near the closed upper end of the reservoir, is not infringed by the use of a pen with a feeding stem which only extends pai’t of the way up the reservoir.</p> <p>5. Same.</p> <p>Nor is a patent, the specifications of which call for an ink reservoir “open, and unobstructed ” at the lower end, infringed by the use of a pen-holder into the bottom of the reservoir of which is screwed a perforated nozzle, through which tho ink is conducted to the pen, since such a nozzle forms an obstruction.</p>

<p>1. Sam — 'When Title Passes.</p> <p>Libelant contracted to sell and deliver along-side oí a chartered vessel, for loading, a quantity of phosphate rock. He had a copy'of the charter-party in his possession, and selected the stevedore and lighterman himself to deliver the rock. After several lighters had been delivered and made fast to the vessel, one of them capsized. Libelant took bills of lading to his own order, and surrendered the receipts of the ship-master Cor ail the rock except the load thus lost, the.receipt for which he retained. Held, that libelant showed an intent not to pass the property in the lost rock, but to retain the jus dísponend/i, and a suit therefor against the vessel was properly brought in his own name as owner.</p> <p>2. Admiralty — Phooeedins in Kem.</p> <p>The charter-party provided for delivery of the rock, “the cargo to be brought along-side and taken'from along-side free from expense and risk to the ship,” and the charterer resort ed “the option of appointing stevedore for loading at the ship’s expense. ” There was no provision that the stevedore was to act under the master’s orders. Part of the rock was towed to the ship in lighters, and made fast, and receipts therefor were given by the master. One of the lighters, after being fastened, capsized, losing her load. Held, that an action in rent for the lost rock could not he maintained against the vessel.</p>

<p>1. MARINE tXSURAXOE — TnSURABEE INTEREST — CHARTERER.</p> <p>One in possession of a vesso) under a written contract with the owners which provides that he shall man and run her for a commission, and hold her as security for his disbursements, has an insurable interest.</p> <p>2. Same — Seaworthiness.</p> <p>A vessel made a voyage from New Orleans to Frenchman's Harbor, where there ■ was no opportunity to make repairs, took on a load, started back, and almost immediately sprung aleak, and was lost, without encountering any sea peril. Held, that the evidence showed the vessel was not seaworthy.</p> <p>3. Same — The Pomcy — Sea Per».</p> <p>.Encountering heavy seas is not a sea peril, within the meaning of a policy of marine insurance.</p>

<p>Shipping—Chaetek-Pabty—Substitution—Evidence.</p> <p>Libelant chartered a vessel to bring a cargo of lumber from Fernandina. When the vessel arrived at Fernandina, it was agreed between the parties by a further arrangement, not in writing, that she should take a different cargo to Philadelphia, which she accordingly did. Respondent contended that the Philadelphia voyage was a substitute for the voyage named in the.charter; libelant claimed that it was an agreement for an independent voyage, to be made before executing the written charter. 11 eld, that the burden of proof rests on the party that alleges the substitution; and, where the evidence on that point is evenly balanced, the written charter must prevail.</p>

<p>Shipping—CABHiA.eE op Gooi5s—Bill op Lading—Negligence—Fobeign Law.</p> <p>Glycerine was stowed on a British ship at Genoa, Italy, and brought to this country under a bill of lading, which, besides the ordinary exception of perils of the sea, contained an exception against'liability for loss occasioned by leakage or stowage, or by negligence of any person in the service of the ship. This latter exception is valid both by English and by Italian law. The vessel had a very long and boisterous passage, and out of 116 drums 5 were delivered damaged by outs, with some consequent loss of glycerine by leakage. Held, the foreign law governed as to any negligence within the foreign jurisdiction, and whetherthe damage was occasioned by perils of the sea, or by negligent stowage at Genoa, the libelant could not recover; there being no negligence shown or presumed, in this country, or from acts committed on the high seas.</p>

<p>Kemovau os' Causes— Logau Pkejudioe.</p> <p>Under Rev. St. TT. S. § 641, providing ior removal oí a cause before final hearing, “when any civil'suit or prosecution is commenced in any state court, for any cause whatever, against any person who is denied, or cannot enforce in the judicial tribunals of the state, * * * any light secured to him by any law providing for the equal civil rights of a citizen, ” a prosecution against a Chinaman for having in his possession a lottery ticket, under a law applying to “any person, "cannot be removed on the ground of local prejudice or maladministration of the law.</p>

In Equity. Bill by Morgan and others, as assignees of certain heirs at law of Riley Garrett, to restrain Huggins, his administrator, from selling or otherwise disposing of the property of the estate, and praying an accounting.1

<p>Stockholders — Sam oe Cokpokate Pkopfiíty — Purchase ey Majority.</p> <p>The stockholders of a corporation financially embarrassed, resolved to wind np the business, and authorized the trustees to sell the property to pay debts. Ata sale duly advertised, of which the stockholders had notice, and at which many wore present, the property was struck off to the secretary, who was also one'oi the trustees, and bought in the interest of a combination of stockholders formed in good faith, for their own protection, after it seemed probable that the property would not sell except at a great sacrifice. It appears to have been sold for all that u it was worth, and the purchase by the secretary was approved by a majority of the stockholders, — by all except the complainant. Held, that it is not shown that the action of the majority was oppressive or in bad faith, that the sale would not be set aside on those facts, and" a preliminary injunction will be refused.</p>

<p>1. Taxation — Assessments—National Banks.</p> <p>* Under Kev. St. U. S: § 5219, which declares that nothing in the national banking act shall prevent all the shares o£ stock of a national bank from being included in the assessment of the personal property of the owners of such shares, an assessment of the entire stock of a national bank in solido against the bank itself is invalid.</p> <p>9. Same — Constitutional Law.</p> <p>Act Va. Jan. 27,1890, which, attempts to legalize taxes levied upon such invalid assessment, is void.</p>

<p>Banks and Banking — Collections—Payment.</p> <p>An indorsee for collection for account of a prior indorsee for collection is liable to tbe owner of tbe draft for tbe amount collected, and not remitted to tbe owner or tbe prior indorsee, though credit for tbe amount was given tbe latter, and be charged the collector, and credited tbe owner, and was charged for tbe same by tbe owner, and though the collector, by virtue of an agreement with its indorser, whereby the amount due from one to the other for collections was to be placed to the latter’s credit with a certain bank, wrote to that bank to place the amount to the credit of the prior indorsee, which order it could have countermanded after no tice of the latter’s failure.</p>

<p>At'Law. On demurrer to the indictment.</p>

<p>Error to District Court.</p>

<p>1. Patents eoe Inventions — Ineíungement—Profits.</p> <p>A finding as to the profit realized in certain months from sales of an infringing article cannot be based solely on a comparison of sales during the corresponding months for the previous and following years.</p> <p>2. Same — Extent oe Claims. ,</p> <p>Claims in letters patent for a stove grate “as a whole, when * * * constructed and combined to operate in the manner and for the purpose shown and described, ” are for the entire grate, and not for an improvement on the grate; and it being sold separately, and designed for use in many different patterns of stoves, the pat-entee, in case of infringement, is entitled to all the profits realized.</p>

<p>Patents eók Inventions — Extent cot Claim.</p> <p>Letters patent No. 156,352, issued October 27, 1874, to John W. and Smith Hyatt for an improvement in" manufacturing solidified oollodion “by mixing pyroxyline ■with a latent liquid solvent, which becomes active only upon the application of heat, ” do not cover liquid solvents which are active as respects the pyroxyline with which they are brought into actual contact, but are used with such a relatively large mass of pyroxyline that the mass will not be converted into solidified collodion at ordinary temperatures.</p>

<p>Patents fob Inventions — Infringement—Pile-Drivers.</p> <p>Patent No. 205,244, granted June 25, 1878, to George H. Cavanagh, for an Improvement in pile-drivers, was'for an extensible guide-way adapted to be projected or extended below the platform or frame, to permit the hammer to follow and operate upon the head of the pile, to drive it below the level of the base of the pile-driver. Held, that this is not infringed by patent No. 284,282, granted September 4, 1888, to Boys J. Cram, for a steam pile-driver having a combined cylinder and hammer, the whole within a frame having on each side continuous vertical grooves adapted to work in guides formed on,'or rigidly fixed to, the uprights.</p>

<p>Patents bob Inventions — Patentability—Pences.</p> <p>Patent No. 397,110, granted February 5, 1889, to John B. Cleaveland, claims “in a fence the combination of a corner or end post, or intermediate, and a distance rod screwed to said posts at or near their summits, with a guy secured to said intermediate posts at or near distance rod, at its top end, and anchored to the ground at its bottom end. ” Held, that the claim embodies no patentable novelty.</p>

<p>In Admiralty. Libels for salvage.</p>

<p>1. Salvage — Subject—Raft Adrift.</p> <p>A raft of timber found drifting with the tide on deep water in a harbor, and out, of the control of the owners, is a subject of salvage.</p> <p>2. Same — Who are Salvors — Actioks.</p> <p>Persons finding a raft so situated, who secure it for the owners, render a valuable service, for which a claim of salvage is enforceable in admiralty.</p> <p> {Syllabus by the Court.) </p>

<p>Admiralty Practice — Cross-Libel.</p> <p>In a suit for salvage by the crew and owners of a tug for saving a fleet of coal barges ■whibb had been loosened from their moorings and scattered by the wind, a counter-claim for the wrongful mooring of the tug to the outer l)ai‘ge of the fleet, whereby the accidenf, occurred which exposed the barges to the danger from which the tug savéd then! is ndt the proper subject of a cross-libel.</p>

<p>Wharves—Damages to Vessel from Obstruction—Liability of "Wharfinger.</p> <p>A wharfinger is not liable for injuries occasioned to a vessel, while mooring, by reason of recent obstructions in the water along-side the dock caused by the sinking of a dredge, when the circumstances are as well known to the agents of the vessel as to the wharfinger, and they, and not the wharfinger, undertake to dock the ship in a manner to avoid the apprehended obstructions.</p>

<p>In Admiralty. On exceptions to libel for wages.</p>

<p>Seamen—Liability of Ship to Care por Injured.</p> <p>A sailor, in boarding his ship at Antwerp, fell and dislocated his shoulder. Although. he soon afterwards informed the master of the accident, he received no attention at the time, and was not put ashore at Mushing, or at the Downs, as he requested, at both of which places the vessel stopped, but was taken on the voyage to New York, where, on going to the hospital, resection was found necossary in order to reduce the dislocation, to his permanent injury. Held, that the master had failed in the ordinary maritime obligation to provide for the seaman’s hurts while in the service of the ship, and that the vessel was liable for the damages, which were fixed at §1,250.</p>

<p>In Admiralty. On appeal from district court. See 35 Fed. Rep. 367.</p>

<p>In Admiralty. On appeal from district court. See 37 Fed. Rep. 897.</p>