BIL'l"ON fl. GUYOTT.
249
HILTON et
al, v.
GUYOTT,
Official Liquidator, et 01.
(C'rcuit Court, S. D. Ntw York. April 28, 1800.) 1. FOREIGN JUDGMENT-WHEN CONCLUSIVE.
a
A judgment 'n pEn"80nam, rendered in a Murt ot a civilized country havfng,Jurtsdlction o! the sUbject-matter, in a cause involving the consideration of ordinary mercantlle transactions between the parties, and in which the defendant, one of our citizens and not domiciled there, appeared and defended for the purpose of protecting his property from seizure, cannot be impeached when sued on here, though the defendant was at the trial of such cause denied the benefit of our rul.es of evidence and procedure, and though the judgment was based on false testimony, and was erroneous. · Where one sued upon a foreign ju.dgIl1ent a bill in aid of his defense, setting up the erroneous character of the foreign Judgment, and praying discovery to enable him to establish the facts, the defense that the foreign judgment is conclusive, having been rendered in a court having jurisdiction both of the parties and of the subject-matter, may properly be presented by plea unsupported by an answer, when the jurisdictional -facts do not appear in the bill, and when the facts which an answer would tend to prove may be treated as proved in im· peachment of the plea,without destroying the defense pleaded.
EQUITY PLEADINGS-PLEA.
In Equity. On plea. JameJ3 C. CartEn" and Horace Russell, for complainants. W. D. Shipman and WiUiam G. Choate, for defendants. W J. The defendants have interposed a plea to a bill of dia-covery, and the plea has been set down for argument. The defendants are the representatives of Fortin & Co., and have brought a suit at law in this court against the complainants, who compose the firm of A. T. Stewart & Co., upon a judgment rendered in a court of France in favor of Fortin & Co. against Stewart & Co., for a money recovery in the sum of $195,122, and Stewart & Co. have filed the present bill in aid of their defense in the action at law. It is alleged in the bill that the complainants are not indebted on account of the matters for which the judgment was obtained by Fortin & Co., and that Fortin & Co. are indebted to them in a considerable sum, for which they are entitled to a judgment in their favor. All the facts to sustain these averments are SAt forth, and the bill alleges that the complainants have set up these facts by way of defense and counter-claim to the suit at law: and the bill prays fora dis-covery, upon interrogatories annexed, to enable the complainants to es-tablish the facts. The bill also contains averments by way of anticipation of the defense, and sets forth facts which are intended to show that the judgment of the French court is re-examinable, and that the complainants are at liberty to contest the merits of the original controversy. These averments are, in substance, that the suits which resulted in the judgment were brought by Fortin & Co. against Stewart & Co. before the tribunal of commerce of Paris, upon matters of contract and account arising from dealings between the two firms at Paris and New York; that when the suits were commenced the members of Fortin & Co. were citizens of France, and domiciled there, and the members of Stewart & Co. were citizens of New York, and were not within or resident within the
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vol. 42.
jurisdiction of the court; that Stewart & Co. had property in France liabythe proceSS 'of the court, and were obliged to appear ble to and defend the suits brought against them to protect it from seizure, and were obliged, in order to defend the 8\lits, to bring cross..suits to establish counter-claims against Fortin & Co. j that the trial of these controthe witIlesses not being sworn or affirmed, . versies hearsay.,evidence being the right of cross-examination of witnesses, and of compelling the production of books and papers, being denied, against the protlilstsand prejudice of the complainants; that false testimony was given on the trial by Fortin & Cc);, and books and evidence fraudulently suppressed by them, and in consequence thereof the court was misled in regard to the merits of the controversy; and: th,at the judgment was:basedupon'fi!lsaand fraudulent accounts and statements made by Fortin & Co., l;\nd is erroneous in fact and in law. The plea avers, and sets up the facts necessary to show, that the suits brought by Fortin & Co. were commenced and prosecuted in a court having jurisdiction of the subject-matter, and that Stewart & Co. duly appeared therein by attorneys and counsel, and brought several suits in the same court against Fortin & Co., claiming affirmative relief; that the several suits were consolidated, .and a. final judgment rendered inallj that both parties appealed to court of appeals of Paris from the judgment of the tribunal of commerce of Paris, and the judgment now sued l!pon in the action at law is the final judgment rendered by that court 'Q,pon such appeal. T4e plea avers that the suits in both tribunals were prosecuted and cond\lcted in all respects in accordance w:ith the course of practice and procedure prescribed for such tribunals by the laws of' :France, and that the final judgment of the court of appeals of Paris judicially decided and determined all the claims, matters, and controversies . ', between the parties. . The defense interpose<;l is properly broup;ht for.wardby a plea, and, if the judgment concludes the parties, it is an effiCient bar to the relief Bought by the bill., .· Although the bill sets forth the recovery of the judgment, it omits. facts affecting the jurisdiction of the court, and the judicial character of which would preclude t,he defendants from having the benefit of real case upon a demurrer, alld the defendants could not properly arid. fairly protect themselves by asserting their judgment as a bar without, supplying in their plea the facts which do not appear in the bill. 'ttbelongs to the clll.E!s of anomalous pleas., It is not necessarily to be overruled, is not supI:Jorted by an answer. A plea which itself aiuU to the bill ,need not be supported by an apSWer, whether the bill, does or does ,not aver facts for the purpose of the anticipated defense. It was formerly in cases ",he;re the anticipatory of the bill were sufficient to overthrow the defense. An anoIllulous plea is only good against the original subject-matter which constitutes the equity of the bill, and is' inefi'ectualagainst the averred to antiCipate and II.void the therefore the : matters in avoidance are not only , t ' 1,'1",., I : , , ' ,. .; .' .i " " .",
'0
':,
. . :,
V. GUYOTT.
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251
required to be ,Clanied in tHe plea,but by the former practice were rE'quired to be sustained by a full answer in respect to any discovery called for. Adams, Eq. 338. In modern practice, even though the bill contains8uch anticipatory averments, no answer in support of the plea is necessary, unless discovery upon.interrogatories is called for. Dawson v .. Pilling, 17 Law J. Ch. 394; Webster v. Webster, 1 Smale & G.489. If interrogatories are annexed to the bill, respecting material anticipatory facts, as to which the answers might tend or be evidence to countervail the plea, then the plea must be supported by an answer. The rule is stated in Heard, Eq. PI. 92, as follows: ,,'!lfthe bill admits the existence of a legal bar, but alleges some inequitable circumstances to avoid its effect, and interrogates as to those circumstances, it is not enough forthe defendant to plead the legal bar. He ijlust accom· his plea with a distinct answer and discovery as to every circumstance as to which he is interrogated. the admission of Which may tend to invalidate the plea."
,This is necessary, because, upon the argument of a plea, every fact stated in the bill,and not sufficiently denied, must be taken to be true, (Bogardus v. Trinity Church, 4 Paige, 178,) and the denial of e\"ery material fact must be as full and complete as the'bill requires. The complainant may read the answer to counterprove the plea, and is entitled to the facts he can elicit by his interrogatories, instead of the conolusions of the pleader; consequently when interrogatories are filed, and are not answered, the defendant loses the benefit of any denial in his plea of the matt('rs as to which he is interrogated. The rule is that a defendant must answer as to facts which would be evidence to dispute the plea, but he is not required to answer to those things which may be well admitted consistently with the bar pleaded. If he does not answer interrogatories, upon the of the plea, every fact which they would tend to prove is treated as proved in impeachment of the plea. But if a plea sets up a defense which appears to be a good bar, notwithstanding all these facts are admitted to be true, it is not necessary to support it by an answer. The interrogatories annexed to the present bill mainly relate to the merits of the original controversy between Stewart & Co. and Fortin & Co., and call for a discovery of facts for the purpose of showing that Stewart & Co. were not indebted to Fortin & Co., and that the latter are indebted to the former. The other interrogations call for evidence of what took place on the trial of the suit in the French tribunal. Tested by the rules which have been adverted to, the plea must be taken as admitting that when the suits were commenced against Stewart & Co., none of the members of that firm were or could have been personally served with process, but they were compelled to appear to protect their property in France from seizure; that they did not by their cross-suits invite the jurisdiction of the French court; that on the trial of the suit they were denied the benefit of the rules of evidence and procedure which 9btain in the courts of this country; that Fortin & Co. fraud,ulently s?ppressed evidence and gave false testimony'upon the trial, and the court was misled thereby, to the prejudice of & Co.; and
252
FEDERAL REPORTER,
that the judgment is erroneous, and should have been in favor of Stewart & Co. for a large recovery. If the pll:la is good, it must be sustained upon the ground that the judgment of the French tribunal, notwithstand· ing these hnpeaching facts and circumstances, is not now re-examinable. rrhefacts alleged in the bill are not inconsistent with the averment of the plea that the trial was conducted pursuant to the regular course of practice and procedure in the courts of France; and the interrogatories, if answered, would not tend to contradict that averment. It is eOI1Cededby all the authorities that such a judgment may be impeached for fraud, because fraud avoids judgments as well as contracts of every nature. But the term "fraud" is indefinite, and when it is said that a judgment is vitiated and may be nullified by fraud it is not to be understood that the fraud which consists in false testimony, or the suppre8sion ofthe truth, in respectto matters litigated upon the trial of the action which resulted in the judgment is sufficient to have this effect. It was said in U. S. v. Throckmarton, 98 U. S. 61, 68, "that the mischief of retrying every case in which the judgment or decree rendered on false testimony, given by perjured witnesses, or on contracts or documents whose genuineness or validity was in issue, and which are afterto be forged or fraudulent, would be greater, by reason wards of the endless nature of the strife, than any compensation arising from doing justice in individual cases." The court adjudged in that case that fraud of this description would not authorize the re-examination of a judgment, and the decision was placed upon the principle applicable to all domestic judgments, which is that the fraud which nullifies a judgment or decree cannot be predicated of false testimony, or forged documents, in respect to the disputed matter which has actually been presented to or considered by the appropriate tribunal. Vance v. Burbank, 101 U.:S. 514; Moffat v. U. 8.,112 U. S. 32, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 10. The contrary was held in Abouloffv.Oppenheimer, 10 Q. B. Div. 295, where the suit was upon a Russian judgment, and the defense was, in substance, that the judgment was obtained by,false testimony of the plaintiff as to a fact in issue upon the trial which misled the court; and it was held that this was a good defense. The authorities cited in the opinions of the judges, however, do not sustain any such doctrine, being cases in which no such question was discussed, like Ochsenbein v. Papelier, L. R.8 Ch. 695, where the fraud was entirely extrinsic to the trial, and Bank v. Nias, 16 AdoI. & E. (N. S.) 717, where the foreign judgment was held to be conclusive, and the particular question did not arise and was not alluded to. In Bigelow on Estoppel (5th Ed. p. 307) the proposition is stated thus: "Intleed, there is no doubt that it may be shown, against a foreign judg. ment in pe1'sonam, that it was obtained by some fraud not involved in the examination of the merits of the case, such as preventing the complaining party from presenting the merits of hisca,se, or imposing upon the jurisdiction of the court, or corruption of the court, or collusion between counsel, or the like. But it would seem to be a sound view of the law that this should be the limit, as appears to be the case in regard to questions of fraud relating to domestic jUdgments."
HII,TON V. GUYOTT.
263
If a fordgn judgment cannot be impeached for fraud of this kind, committed by the party who obtained it, much less would there seem to be any reason, when the. judgment is obtained in a court of a civilized country, for impeaching'it because in matters of evidence or procedure, not relating to jurisdiction of parties or subject-matter, the trial was conducted by rules and usages differing from those of our courts. The methods of investigation in different countries are adjusted to the conceptions of expediency and propriety that prevail in each, and it would be mere bigotry to assert that, upon the whole, the truth of disputed facts is not as well ascertained in France or Holland or Germany as it is in England or the United States. Our law of evidence is largely a series of negations, sedulously framed, to exclude from consideration aU indicia of the truth which do not fall within the class of those it regards as competent and safe, while in continental countrie!.' a larger latitude of investigation is indulged. In matters of evidence and procedure. to say nothing about the weightier matters of law, the wisdom of yesterday is the folly of to-day; and it is doubtful whether our present methods do not differ as greatly from those of the recent period, when parties were not permitted to testify, as they do from the methods of continental countries. \Vho can say with reason that our system of investigation is more infallible than that of France; or that a French citizen, sued here. could not as justly complain of our rules of evidence, or of a bill of discovery which compels him to exhibit his case in advance to his adversary, as one of our citizens sued in a French court could of the methods of procedure there? The judgment is not deprived of the usual efficacy of foreign judgments because the complainants did not owe allegiance to France, and were not originally amenable to the jurisdiction of the tribunal of commerce of Paris. The complainants appeared in the suits. and submitted their rights to the investigation of that court and of the appellate court. They did this because they deemed it for their interest to do so; and surely so long as they were given an opportunity to contest the claims of Fortin & Co., and availed ,themselves of it, the circumstance that they were unwilling litigants cannot impair the jurisdictional sanctions of the judgment. Rousillon v. RoUBillon, 14 Ch. Div. 370; Voinet v. Barrett, 55 Law J. Q. B. D. 39. They may not occupy the position of parties who have deliberately sought the jurisdiction of a foreign tribunal, compelled their adversary to litigate there, and, after litigating and being defeated, seek in the courts of another sovereignty to impeach the conclusiveness of the judgment; but they are in the category of those who have had a reasonable opportunity to be heard, and have been heard, upon the merits of their case. For these reasons, it seems that no exceptional grounds are f01.:nJ in the particular circumstances of the case for refusing to the present judgment the force and effect which foreign judgments ordinarily have in suits brought upon them in the courts of another country. The plea admits, however, that the adjudication was an erroneous one, and should have been in favor of the complainant for a large money recovery, instead of one against them. It is to be observed that the controversy
·betweert1tne parties wits: wl{t}lly hi' respect to coh1mercial transactions: betweentbettii growing O1Hof' tbe 'tn-anufacture 'of gloves in France by Fol'tin,&-Od;,aridthe:saie:of<them in New York by Stewart & Co. as consigriees for Fortin &iCo., artdirtvolt-ed merelyquestlon$of general com'merciai" IttW'and orillot, which thc1teiltiino'ny was principally in lhan!Ce!.' ,. The casethereforepres19nts the broad question how far a fol'eign judgmenf, not impeachable for fraud, and rendered by a court having completej:utisdictionof the parties lind the subject-matter, is re-examinable upon the merits in a suit: brought to enforce it here. The question hallheen much discussed by the courts in England, and by the commentators .here, with great diversity of opinion, and tbe result is 'Summed up by Prof. Greenleaf as follows: "The general doctrine main tained in the AmericancQurts, in relation to for'eign jUdgments in personam, certainly is that they are primajacie evidence, but that they are impeachable. But how far, and to what extent, this doctrine is to, be carried, does not seem to. be definitely settled. It has been declared that the jur!sdiQtion of the court, and its power overtl).e parties and the things in controversy, may be inquired into, and that the judgment may be im,"peached for fraud. Beyond this no definite lines have as yet been drawn.1> 1 Ev; § 547. The amount Involved in this case is large, and the question is one of so muc.hdoubt and interest that the judgment of this court will doubtless be taken to the supreme court for review, whichever way the question ma.y be decided; consequently it would seem to b'e quite useless to attempt in this opinion any extended discussion of the authorities or statemelitof the reasons for the conclusions reached. At the time of the adoption of the constitution of the United States, tbe rule established by the decided weight of judicial opinion in the English courts was tbat a foreignjhdgment sbould be regarded merely as prima facie evidence of the debt, and that tbe merits were always re-examinable. The earlier cases in the American courts followed the English authorities in recognizingtherule to be that foreign judgments were merely prima facie evidence'of the liability established. In sOp1e of them, notwithstanding the provision of the constitution of the United States giving full faith and credit in every state of the judicial proceedings of every other . state, domestic judgments of another state were treated as foreign judgments, and Were held to be re-examinable upon the merits. Hitchcock ·v. Aicken,l Caines, 460; Taylor v. Bryden, 8 Johns. 133. In others, and in the later cases with one or two exceptions, the question was as to :the conclusiveness of domestic judgments, and the expressions in the preceding cases were reiterated obiter; and the effect to be given to for'eign judgments did not receive the careful discussion which it subse'quently underwent in the courts of England, and which led the 'English courts to recede from -their former doctrine, and declare in favor of the 'general conclusiveness -'of such judgments. Thus it may properly be 'said that, altbough the adjudications in this country are replete with "dicta; to the effect that (oreign judgments are only prima facie evidence of ,indebtedness, the books contain very few cases in wbich the question
Bn..'l;'ON v. GUYOTT.
4as been necessarily considered and authoritathrely decided. It is suffi· cient tOJ:efer to Bissell v. Briggs, 9 Mass. 462; Wood v. Gamble,!1 Cuah. 8; RobiWlou v.P,rescott, 4 N. H. ,451; Taylor v.Barron, 30 N. H. 95; Williams v. Preston, 3 J. J. Marsh. 600; Aldrich v. Kinney, 4 Conn. 382; Graham v. Grigg, 3 Har. (Del.) 408. In the late case of Hanley v. Donoghue, 116 U. S. 4,6 Sup.. Ct. Rep. 24·2. Mr. Justice GRAY says: "Judgments recovered in one state of the Union, when proved in the courts of another, differ from judgments recovered in a foreign country in no other respect than that of not. being. re-ell:aminable upon the merits, nor impeach. able for fraud in obtaining them. if rendered by a court haVing jurisdiction of the cause and of the parties." ' . . AccQrding to Mr. Bigelow, only two of the reported cases in the American courts (Burnham v. Webster, 1 Woodb. & M. 172, and Rankin v. Goddard, 54 Me. 28) are direct, adjudications that such judgments are inconclusive. ,Bigelow, Estop. (5th Ed.) 264. Most of them, in which . such judglJileuts have beenstated to be inconclusive, are cases in which dOtnestic judgments ware under consideration, or where the court rendering judgmellt did not acquire jurisdiction, or where the real question was whether 1Lforeign judgrnerlt:was ,not prima facie evidence of indebtedness. l3esides the cases mentioned by Mr. Bigelow, two have been cited by counsel, those of Anderson v. Haddon, 33 Hun, 435, and De Brimo'l1t v. PlJ'(Lniman, 10 Blatchf. 436. Anderson v. Haddon seems to have .been a case in which the judgment was obtained without any jurisdiction of the person .of the defendant. In Dc Brirnont v. Penniman the decree was a peculiar one, and Judge WOODRUFF assumed that it was not material whether thejudgment was to be regarded as conclusbre, or only as prima facie evidence of an indebtedness of the defendant; and he held that it'was not prima facie evidence, because it only declared a conditional liability of the defendant, depending upon the continuance of a state of facts not alleged to be then existing, saying: "There iano award of any sum certain. to be presently paid, and the declaration does not show that any sum whatever could even there (in France) be collected without a further application to the court." Although the case of Rankin v. Goddard is treated by Mr. Bigelow ajl a direct adjudication that a foreign judgtpent. is not conclusive, it seems only to decide the familiar propositions that the jurisdiction may be inquired into, or the judgment be impeached for fraud. See same case, 55 Me; The case of Burnham v. Webster isa-carefully con-' sidered judgment of the circuit court of the United States; but if the views adopted there, were' to be applied to the 'present caSe they would not necessarily lead ,to a re-examination of the merits of the original controversy. Mr. Justice WOODBURY declared in that that he would al10}V the obligation of judgment to be rebutted by show-. jng that the merits of the claim to the controversy were not in fact consid-, ered ,owingtqsome mistake, or agreement oftbeparties, or owing ,be would discrhninate in favofof per" sons whuhad,not to the courtsof a foreign country, and, agaipj'l,t tpose whq4ad voluntarily submitted. themselves to such. \,.', -'J ' · . · ,:
256
courts; and that he would not allow the prima fame obligation togo far, if the judgment was that of a court of a barbarous or semi-barbarous government, acting on no established principles of civilized jurisprudence. ·If there are few authoritative rulings in this country which decide that foreign judgments are not conclusive when noL impeachable for fraud or want of jurisdiction, there are few which decide that such judgments conclude an inquiry into tbe merits. Two cases adjudge the point directly; and it was beld in Lazier v. Westcott, 26 N. Y. 146, and iIi Bakerv. Palmer, 83 Ill. 568, tbat a Canadian judgment was entitled to the same conclusiveness when sued on bere as a domestic judgment would be. The case of Railway Co. v. McHenry, 21 Blatchf. 400,17 Fed. Rep. 414, did not necessarily involve the point, as it does not appear in that case that tbe defendant offered any evidence to dispute the debt, and the only question necessarily under consideration was whether the foreign judgment was prima facie evidence of the debt. The doctrine of the general conclusiveness of such judgments is maintained by the American commentators, among them some of our most distinguished jurists, and also by the more modern English cases, and it is placed upon the principle that OM court should not permit the re-examination of a cause upon its merits when the party seeking to impugn the judgment bas been fully heard, and the cause decided against him by another court. Mr. Justice Story (Confl. Laws, § 607) refers to the difficulties which would arise if a different tioctrine were maintainable to the full extent of opening all the evidence and merits anew in a suit upon a foreign judgment when some of the witnesses might be dead, some of the vouchers lost, and the merits of the cause as originally presented re-examined upon a partial presentation of the evidence. He says: "Indeed. the rule that the judgment is to be prima facie evidence for the plaintiff would be a mere delusion, if the defendant might still question it by opening aU or any of the original merits on his side; for, under such circumstances, it would be equivalent to granting a new trial. It is easy to understand that the defendant may be at liberty to impeach the original justice of the judgmellt, by showing that the court had not jurisdiction; or that he never had any notice of the suit; or that it was procured by fraud; or that upon its face it is founded in mistake; or that it is irregular and bad by the locallaw,-forl reijudicatce. To such an extent the doctrine is intelligible and practicable. Beyond this, the right to impugn the jUdgment is, in legal effect, the right to retry the merits of the original cause at large, and to put the defendant upon proving those merits." And in Taylor v. Bryden, supra, Chancellor KENT, treating a domesjudgment, observed that to try over again, as tic judgment as a of course, every fact which had once been decided by a competent tribunal,would be carrying the doctrine of re-examination to an oppressive extent. The later English cases undoubtedly assert that foreign judgments, whether against English subjects or foreigners, when obtained in suits of which the foreign court had jurisdiction, and in which the defendant appeared, are in all respects as conclusive as the judgments of
:fIILTQN fl.
257
their own courts. They take the ground that the courts 'of one country should not sit to rehear causes which have been tried in other, and that a, party against whom a foreign judgment has been obtained should not be permitted to allege errbr in the judgment, and tiy the controversy oyer again,but should resort to the mode of review or retrial in the foreign forum which is provided for by every. system of jurisprudence in civilized countries. They decide that any matters conRtituting a defense to the judgment, which might have been tried in a foreign court, cannot be again brought forward for the purpose of impeaching the validity ot the judgment. This is the emphatic result of the more recent adjudications, although much diversity of opinion among the judges is found upon the general subject. Scott v. Pilkington, 2 Best & S. 11; Martin v. Nicolls, 3 Sim. 460; Bank v. Mas, 16 AdoL & E. (N. S.) 717; Henderson v. Henderson, 3 Hare, 100; Godard v. Gray, L. R. 6 Q. B. 139; Schibsby v. Westenholz, Id. 165; Rousillon v. Rousillon, 14 Ch. Div. 351; Voinet v. Barrett, 55 Law J. Q. B. D.39; Trafford v. Blanc, 36Ch. Div. 600; NouvWn'v.Ji1reeman, 37 Ch. Div. 244. In Godard v. Gray it was held that the judgment of a French court was not re-examinable, although the judgment proceeded on a mistake of English law in the construction of an English contract, which was apparent on the face of the judgment; and the principle of the decision was that a question of foreign law is' a question of fact, and the party could not complain who had neglected to produce sufficient evidence to enable the dourttodecide it correctly. In Voinet v. Barrett it was held that the judgment was conclusive, notwithstanding the defendant was not registered or domiciled, or under allegiance to the foreign country, and a ppeared in the foreign court merely to protect his property from seizure incase judgment should be given against him by default; and the judges cited with approval De Cosse Brissac v. Rathbone, 6 HurL & N. 301, where it was ruled that if a defendant voluntarily appears in a foreig,ncourt, and takes the chances of a judgment in his favor, he is bound by a judgment against him. These adjudications ignore any considerations of comity as a factor in influencing the effect of foreign judgments. They rest wholly on the practical and sensible doctrine, which is applied to domestic judgments, that a litigant who had had a fair opportunity to try his cause 'before a competent tribunal, and has availed himself of it, should acquiesce in the result, and, if he has reason to complain, should pursue those means far correcting error provided by the jurisprudence of the tribunal,instead of resorting to another court. This is a much safer and more reasonable doctrine than that of the earlier adjudications, and if it works injustice in occasional instances, works less hardship generally, and promotes justice upon the whole. I t is not necessary to consider whether. a foreign judgment against one of our own citizens served with lJrocess while casually within the country of the jUdgment, and who did not appear to defend, is not re-examinable in a suit brought upon it here; nor whether. such a judgment would be enforced here, although the defendant litigated his cause in the foreign court, when it adjudges a liability which our laws do not sancv.42F.no.4-17
J'EDERAL ·ltEPomD, yolo 42. tiao. ItSri1$llEiS to hold, and it is'nowheld for the purpose of this that aforeiglil. judgment in :personam; rendered ina court of a civilized countrY',>havin-g jUrisdiction of the in a cause involving the ,collsiderll:tion of· ordinary mercantile transactions between the parties, and inwMch the defendant appeared and litigated, is, when sued on here, conclusive to the sarne extent that a domestic judgment is conclusive. Judgment isordel'ed for the defendants upon the plea.
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iKJl:asumet.,al. v. CONTINENTAL CoNSTRUCTION &: IMPROVEMll:NTCO. <OirCtl,it Court, D. OCY1I:necti,cUt. A'pril 7. 1890.) .. ' " Where a stockholder, proceeding under Gen. St. Conn. 1888. § '111es a bill in a ' to ,have the affairs .of the. cQrporationwound up; ana its :effects dis. .federal tributed, on the ground that it h/1s abandoned the business for which it was izoo l l'ea-ve will be plaintiff to ille a supplemental· bill setting up that S1008 'i ,t!le his spit defe1;1dal1t,. under sectionl948, 'Voted to discon. t10ue Its bus1Oess, and to distrIbute Its capital stock among the stockholders, and "has obtained ·an order from a st-ate court. limiting the time within which claims of :ereditors shall be presented, anq prayjug' an injunction to it from acting thereunder.' '. ., . 2; SAME-JURISDICTION"':'INJUNCTION. But a (or temporary injunotion to restrain defendant, from proceedinA' under will not De as it merely limits the time for presenting creditors' claims, and in no way oonfticta With or impairs the jurisdiction of the caseftr1jt acquired by the fedeml court. . '. ,." : L :., (. ,
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InEquity·. : On motion for to file supplemental complaint and. for an injunction. F. J. Stimson and Morris W. Seymour, for plaintiffs. , Adrian H. Joline, for defendant. SHiPMAN,J. A statute of the state of Connecticut authorizes the superior cour:t of the state, as a court of equity, on the application of a stockholderlOfa organized under its laws, to wind up the fairs of suchc@rporatJion, and to dissolve it, if said court shall find that said corporation:: has voted, to wind up its affairs,. or has abandoned the business for which it W/IS organized,'81nd has thereafter neglected within areasonllble tiule,tocloseJts business 'and distribute its effects, and said cOurt is authorized to appoint a receiver for that purpose. In May, 1888, the complainants, who are stockholders in the defendant corporation,. which was organized under the laws of said state; brought their bill in that the corporation had abandoned th:ebusinessfor which it was organized; and had'neglected for.an 800able timethereafter to wind up its a1faits\ and praying,for the appointmentofa. receiver·.who should close its bllsiness; linder, the orders of this courh' A motioidbr a temporary injunction, and for the appointment of a tempomryreceiv-er, was ,The cpmplainants have taken