Volume 42 — Tennessee Reports

FROM HAWKINS. This was a petition for a mandamus, to compel the plaintiff in error, a Justice of the Peace, to issue an execution on a judgment that was in favor of defendants in error, citizens of Pennsylvania, At the May Term, 1861, Judge David T. PatteRSON, presiding, an order was made upon the Justice to issue the execution, etc.; from which order he appealed.

PROM SÜLLIVAN. This cause was heard by Chancellor Seth J. W. Luckey, at the. May Term, 1861. There was a decree in favor of complainants, from which the- respondents appealed.

PROM JOHNSON. This cause was heard on bill and supplemental bill. The supplemental bill was dismissed, and the two slaves declared to be free, at the April Term, 1861. Chancellor Seth J. W. Lhckey, presiding. There was an appeal by the executor.

PROM GREENE. This is an action of trespass against Britton, for an illegal levy on the property of the defendant, at the October Term, 1860, Judge David T. Patterson, presiding. There was a judgment in favor of the plaintiff below; from which Britton appealed.

<p>PROM CARTER.</p> <p>The bill in this cause was dismissed at the April Term, 1861. Chancellor Seth J. W. Luckey, presiding. Complainant appealed.</p>

PROM SEVIER. This was an action brought in the Circuit Court of Sevier, and transferred, under section 4236 of the Code, to the Chancery side of the Court, and tried before Chancellor Seth J. W. Luchey, at the March Term, 1861, who pronounced a decree in favor of respondents. Complainant appeals.

PROM CARTER. This was an action for trespass to land, and submitted to a jury of Carter County, at the March Term, 1861. Judge Dayid T. Patterson, presiding. There was a verdict and judgment in favor of the plaintiff. Defendant appealed.

PROM SULLIVAN. This is an action of devisavit vel non, .tried at the March Term, 1861, before Judge David T. Patterson. ■There was a verdict in favor of the plaintiff. Defendant appealed.

PROM SULLITAN. These causes were consolidated, and beard together before Chancellor Seth J. W. Luckey, at the May Term, 1861, when there was a decree in favor of complainants. Respondents appealed.

FROM MEIGS. This cause was submitted to a jury, at the April Term, 1861, Judge JOHN -0. G-aut, presiding. There was a verdict In favor of the defendant. Plaintiffs appealed.

<p>FROM JEFFERSON.</p> <p>This cause was heard by Chancellor Seth J. W. Luckey, at the June Term, 1861. There was a decree and appeal.</p>

<p>PROM ROANE.</p> <p>This cause was heard by Chancellor D. C. Teewhitt, at the April Term, 1865. There was a decree' in favor of respondents. Complainant appealed.</p>

PROM KNOX. This suit originated before a Justice of the Peace, where there was a judgment in favor of the defendants, -and an appeal to the Circuit Court; and at the June Term', 1861, the Court gave a judgment against the plaintiff’ Judge G-eORGE Bíiown, presiding. Plaintiff ap»-pealed.

<p>FROM KNOK.</p> <p>This cause was tried before Judge Elijah T. Hall, •at the February Term, 1865. There was a verdict and judgment in favor of Hughes. Defendants appealed.</p>

FROM KNOX. This cause was tried at the October Term of the Circuit Court, 1861, before Judge GeoRGE BROWN. There was a judgment in favor of the Bank. The defendant appealed.

PROM GREENE. This cause was brought to the Circuit Court by certiorai; and at the February Term, 1861, the cause was dismissed, Judge David T. Patterson presiding. Plaintiff appealed.

PROM KNOX. This cause was heard by Chancellor Seth J. W. Luckey, at the April Term, 1865, when the bill of complainants was dismissed; from which they appealed,

PROM KNOX. This cause was heard by Chancellor Seth J. W. Luckey, at the April Term, T865, when a decree was made in favor of Complainant, from which defendant appealed.

.FROM WASHINGTON. Upon the hearing of this cause by the Chancellor, Seth J. W. Luckey, at the November Term, 18(50, there was a decree in favor of complainants. Defendant appealed.

PROM JEFFERSON. This canse was heard at a Special Term in March, 1861, Seth J. W. Luceey, Chancellor, presiding, dismissed complainant’s bill, and divided the cost equally between the parties. Both parties appeal.

<p>1. Champerty. Code, sec. 1786. The fact of champerty being satisfactorily proven to the Court where a cause is pending, the suit shall be dismissed, and the attorney and attorneys guilty of the champerty, shall be stricken from the roll, and disqualified to practice in any of the courts of this State, for five years; but not until they have an opportunity to answer in equity, or upon interrogatories filed. The Statutes against champerty, being highly penal in their character, must be strictly construed.</p> <p>2. Same. Attorneys competent witnesses. An attorney -with whom a champertous contract is alleged to have been made for his services in behalf of a plaintiff, is a competent witness for the complainant to disprove the champerty. The fact of the alleged participation in the champertous contract, would go to the credit of the attorney as a witness, but would not render him incompetent.</p>

PROM WASHINGTON. Chancellor Seth J. W. Luckey, at the November Term, 1860, disallowed the demurrer of defendants, and dismissed their cross bill, and gave a deeree in favor of complainants. Defendants appealed.

PROM GRAINGER. There was a demurrer, in this cause, to complainants’ bill, which, on. argument, at the December Term, 1860, was allowed, Chanceller Seth J. W. Luckey, presiding; and an appeal • by complainants.

PROM GRAINGER. There was a verdict and judgment, in this case, against Whiteside, at the April Term, 1860, of the Circuit Court, Judge Thomas W. Turley, presiding. White-side appealed.

<p>1. Action. Trespass on the case. Held, by the Court, that when the cause of action, as stated in the declaration, is, that the defendant had illegally and maliciously arrested and imprisoned the plaintiff, or had caused him to be arrested and imprisoned, that the fair and natural construction of such allegation is, that if defendant had not himself maliciously and illegally arrested the plaintiff, he had maliciously and illegally procured it to be done.</p> <p>2. Pleading. Under the Code of Tennessee, sections 2884, 2906, 2913-14-15, reasonable certainty of meaning is all that is required in stating the cause of action, or the nature of the defense.</p> <p>3. Same. General issue and notice. By sections 2916-10 of the Code, it is manifest that the defendant, under a general plea, cannot avail himself of the matters of defense stated in his notice filed with his plea; but having given the notice as required, he may give such matter in evidence, and rely upon the same on the trial.</p> <p>4. Same. Replication. Oral demurrer. Motion to strike out. When the defendant pleads specially, the plaintiff must reply to the plea; but .if the defendant gives notice of such special matters of defense, as provided in section 2915 of the Code, no replication is necessary. The plaintiff may orally demur to such notice, by motion to strike it out, or elect to go to trial on the issue raised by the defendant’s plea and notice.</p>

PROM KNOX. There was a decree in this cause, on demurrer of defendant, dismissing complainant’s bill, at the July Term, 1861, Chancellor Seth J. W. Luckey, presiding. Complainants appealed.

FROM GREENE. This was a judgment by confession, at the February Term, 1861. Defendant offered, in open Court, to stay said judgment for twelve months,' under the Act of the 26th of January, 1861, which the Court refused to allow, holding that the Act was unconstitutional, and void. Judge David T. Patterson, presiding. Defendants appealed.

FROM SULLIVAN. At the May Term of the Chancery Court, 1861, Chancellor Luceey, presiding, there was a decree in this cause; from which both parties appealed.

PROM KNOX. There was a .verdict and judgment, in this case, at the October Term, 1860, for the plaintiff, Judge David T. Patterson presiding, by interchange with Judge George Brown. Defendant appealed.

<p>PROM BLOUNT.</p> <p>This hill was dismissed, on demurrer, at the April Term, 1861, Chancellor Seth J. W. Bucket presiding. Complainants appealed.</p>

<p>PROM KNOX.</p> <p>There was a decree in this cause in favor of complainants, at the July Term, 1861, Chancellor Seth J. W. Luokey, presiding. Respondent appealed.</p>

<p>EROM JOHNSON.</p> <p>This was a contested Will case. The Will was established by a verdict of a jury, at the November Term, 1860, Judge David T. Patterson, presiding. Contestant appealed.</p>

<p>1. Administrator. When Chancery Court may appoint. A Chancery Court, after the lapse of six months from the death of an intestate, has the power, upon application by bill of the distributees against the creditors, or the creditors against the heirs at law, stating that no one can be procured to administer, to appoint an administrator of the estate; and the administration of the estate shall be conducted under the same rules as that of insolvent estates. It is not intended, by this law, to give Chancery Courts concurrent jurisdiction with County Courts, in the administration and settlement of estates; but to pro'-vide a remedy in exceptional cases.</p> <p>% Accounts. Presumption of settlement. When the father was greatly embarrassed, the son takes charge of his affairs and farm, and for years they live together. The son, devoting his entire time to the' farm, by his skill and industry,, relieves his father of debt, and greatly enhances the permanent value of the estate. They will, in the absence of any proof to the contrary, be presumed to have settled their accounts, as they went along, to their mutual satisfaction; and having done so, the Court will not disturb them.</p> <p>3. Sale oe land by Court. A farm of two hundred acres,, in which there is four shares, with buildings, fields,- pastures, meadows, and divisions, with wood and water, all arranged for one farm, would Be more valuable than if divided into five parts. Adjacent to a town, or for other than agricultural purposes, it might be different;- and then a partition should Be ordered.</p> <p>4. Account. Whai allowed. Actual profits. In taking an account for rents and profits of a farm, it should be made with reference to the disturbed condition, of the country, during its occupation, and the profits actually realized.</p> <p>5. Master’s report. What to include. What superfluous. The office of the master is to inquire and report upon facts — not to decide. Inquisitorial, rather than judicial arguments and processes of reasoning, are out of place in his reports. They should give only results, stated clearly, succinctly, and intelligibly, with the proofs on which they rest. All else is superfluous.</p>

FROM KNOX. There was a judgment by default in this cause, at the June Term, 1865, of the Circuit Court, for $5,000, against the defendant, Judge E. T. Hall, presiding. Defendant appealed.

PROM KNOX. At the February Term, 1861, there was a verdict and judgment, in this case, for the defendants, Judge George Brown, presiding. Plaintiff appealed.

<p>FROM KNOX.</p> <p>This cause was heard by Chancellor Seth J. W. Luckey, at the April Term, 1865. There was a decree in favor of complainant. Respondents appeal.</p>

<p>1. Constitutional Law. Validity of judgments and decrees of Courts, after 6th May, 1861. 5th Sec. of Schedule. By Sec, 6th of the Schedule to the amendments of the Constitution of Tennessee, adopted on the 22d of February, 1865, all laws, ordinances and resolutions, as well as all acts done in pursuance thereof, under the authority of the usurped State Government, after declaration of Independence of the State of Tennessee, on or after the 6th day of May, 1861, were unconstitutional, null and void, from the beginning; provided, that this section shall not be construed as to affect any judicial decisions made by the State Courts, held at times differing from those provided by law, prior to May 6th, 1861; said judicial decisions being made pursuant to the laws of the State of Tennessee, enacted previous to said date, and between parties in Court, and litigating their rights. Held, that, notwithstanding the former provision, judgments and decrees of State Courts, holden since the 6th of May, 1861, and at times provided by laws enacted prior to that date, are valid; but that judgments and decrees of Courts holden since that date, and at times differing from those prescribed by laws existing before that time, are valid, in so far only, as they are made so by the latter portion of that section.</p> <p>2. Same. Power of Court to dismiss cause, when not at issue. If complainant's right to file the bill, depended upon some of the “laws, ordinances or resolutions declared unconstitutional, null and void, from the beginning;” or he sought to enforce some supposed right; or by virtue of some act done in pursuance thereof, it would he the duty of the Chancellor, upon the question coming regularly before Mm for his adjudication, to dismiss the bill; but, if the cause is not at issue, and no such facts appear in the record, it would be error in the Chancellor, upon his own motion, to dismiss the bill.</p>

FROM SEVIER. There was a verdict and judgment against the defendant in this case, at the July Term, 1865, Judge •---, presiding. Defendant appealed.

FROM PUTNAM. The plaintiffs in error were convicted at the December Term, 1861, as Commissioners of Common Schools, for employing an incompetent teacher, and fined five dollars each, Judge Samuel M. Fite, presiding. Defendants appeal.

PROM MAURY. The plaintiff in error was tried and convicted of rape, by a jury of Maury County, at the January Term, 1860. The Court, on motion, arrested the judgment, Judge Hileway Ward, presiding. The Attorney General appealed.

FROM RUTHERFORD. The defendant was convicted at the September Term, 1865, for horse-stealing, and sentenced to the Penitentiary for three years, Judge Thomas FT. Frazier, presiding. Defendant appealed.

PROM FRANKLIN. The plaintiff in error was presented, in ten cases, for gaming, and by an arrangement with the District Attorney General, at the November Term, 1865, he secured the costs in eight of the cases, and submitted in two. During the term, he made a motion to set aside the judgments, which motion was overruled by the Court, Judge William P. Hickekson presiding. Defendant appealed.

FROM FRANKLIN. The plaintiff in error in this case, submitted, and was fined by the Court for a common assault and battery, at the November Term, 1865, from which judgment he appealed, Judge William P. Hickerson, presiding.

<p>EBOM DAVIDSON.</p> <p>The plaintiff in error was convicted at the April Term, 1865, of the Criminal Court of Davidson County, for hog stealing, Judge Thomas E. Ekaziee, presiding. Defendant appealed.</p>

<p>Indictment. Descriptive words. Usury. The' words in the indictment were, that the defendant “did exact” usurious rates of interest. Held,, to be sufficiently comprehensive of the offense of usury.</p>

PROM SUMNER. The plaintiffs in error, with two others, were convicted of grand larceny, at the October Term, 1865, Judge Thomas Barry, presiding. Defendants appealed.

FROM SMITH. The plaintiff in error was indicted and e©©vi©tedy at the July Term,. 1865, of an assault with intent ‘to commit murder in the first degree* and sentenced to-five years in the penitentiary, Judge Andrew McCbiAib presiding. Defendant appealed.

FROM DEKALB. The defendant was indicted and convicted, at the October Term, 1865, for betting on a horse race, on a track not legally licensed. On motion of defendant, the judgment was arrested, Judge Andrew McLain, presiding. The State appealed.

PROM DAVIDSON. .There was a judgment, in this case, at the May Term, 1865, of the Circuit Court, in favor of the defendant, from which plaintiff appealed, Judge Manson M. Beien, presiding.

<p>FROM BEDFORD.</p> <p>At a Special Term of the Chancery Court, at Shel-byville, in November, 1865, Chancellor John P. Steele, presiding, a decree was pronounced in this cause. Both parties appealed.</p>

<p>Dowee. Trust Deeds. A widow is entitled to dower in all lands which the husband may have mortgaged, or conveyed, to secure debts, when the mortgage has not been foreclosed, or sale made, under the deed. Her claims are paramount to the creditor’s secured, and will be enforced.</p>

PROM BEDFORD. At the November Term, 1865, of the Chancery Court, there was a decree abating the amount of Wood’s note, equal to the value of that portion of the land recovered from him after his purchase, Chancellor John P. Steele, presiding. Complainants appealed.

FROM BEDFORD. There was a verdict and judgment in 'this cause, in favor of the defendant, at the April Term, 1865, Judge Henry Cooper, presiding. Plaintiff appealed.

PROM DAVIDSON. This is an action of replevin. At the September Term, 1864, the plaintiff took a voluntary non-suit, which the Court refused to set aside, but proceeded to render judgment for the value of the articles replevied, Judge Mansom M. Beien, presiding. -Plaintiff appealed.

<p>1. Evidence. Records. A record is one whole, and 'when produced as evidence, it can not be garbled.</p> <p>2. Same. Same. The verity of a record cannot be impeached by testimony aliunde.</p>

<p>FROM MONTGOMERY.</p> <p>This cause was heard by Chancellor Samuel D. Frierson, at the October Term, 1859. The Court dismissed complainants’ bill; from which they appealed.</p>

PROM JACKSON. This was a motion against the principal Sheriff and his sureties, for the non-return of an execution that came to the hands of one of his deputies. At the -Term, 1861, the motion was dismissed, Judge Gardenhire, presiding. The plaintiffs appealed.

EROX DEKALB. In this causé there was a judgment for the plaintiff below, at the —- Term, 18.61, Judge Samuel M. Eite, presiding. The defendant appealed.

FROM SMITH. There was a verdict and judgment in this case, at the-Term, 1860, for the defendant, Judge Samuel M. Eite, presiding. Plaintiff appealed.

<p>EROM DEKALB.</p> <p>At the April Term, 1861, Chancellor Beomeield L. Ridley dismissed the hill of complainants. Complainants- appealed.</p>

<p>FROM WHITE.</p> <p>Upon demurrer of defendants,' at the September Term, 1861, complainants' bill was dismissed, Chancellor BROMfield L. Ridley, presiding. Complainants’ appe aled.</p>

FROM SMITH. In this case, there was a verdict and judgment, at the November Term, 1860, of the Circuit Court, for the plaintiff; from which the defendant appealed, Judge Samuel M. Eite, presiding.

<p>FROM JACKSON.</p> <p>Chancellor Jos. C. Guild, at the February Term, 1861, dismissed complainant's bill. Complainant appealed.</p>

FROM DEKALB. There was a judgment in this case for the defendants in error, at the February Term,'1861, and a motion for a new trial, on account of the incompetence of one of the jurors, which motion was overruled; and the plaintiff in error appealed, Judge Samuel M. Fite, presiding.

<p>FROM DEKALB.</p> <p>At the February Term, 1861, the sci. fa. against R. Magness was dismissed, Judge Samuel M. Fite, presiding. Plaintiffs appeal.</p>

FROM GILES. At the April Term, 1861, there was a verdict and judgment in favor of the plaintiff, from which judgment the defendant appealed, Judge W. P. Martin, presiding.

PROM COFFEE. At the January Term, 1861, of tbe Circuit Court, Jones recovered a judgment against George Lane et als., and they appealed in error to this Court, Judge Andrew J. Marchbanks, presiding.

<p>FROM DAVIDSON.</p> <p>The presentment in this case, was, on motion, quashed, at the January Term, 1865, Judge Thomas N. Frazier, presiding. The State appealed.</p>

FROM MONTGOMERY. The plaintiff, in error, at the January Term, 1861, withdrew their plea, and permitted judgment to go against them, Judge Wisdom, presiding. Defendants appealed.

FROM MONTGOMERY. ' There was a judgment in this case by default, at the January Term, 1861, against the plaintiff in error; H. H. Allen, Special Judge, presiding; from which' judgment he appealed.

FROM MONTGOMERY. At the September Term, 1861, there was a verdict and judgment in favor of the Bank, Judge Wisdom, presiding; • from which defendants appealed

FROM DEKALB. There was a verdict and judgment in this case, at the ——- Term, 1865, in favor of Overall, for the entire amount of the note, not allowing a credit for the three hundred dollars in Confederate money plaintiffs in error had paid him- and which, by the receipt given at the time the Confederate money was paid, was to be credited on the note, which was not done;. Judge ÁNdbew MoLain, presiding. Defendants appealed.

PROM DAVIDSON. There was a verdict and judgment in this case, at the May Term, 1865, for the defendant; Judge M. M. Bkies, presiding. Plaintiff appealed.

<p>FROM DAVIDSON.</p> <p>There was a judgment in favor of the plaintiff, in this case, by the presiding Judge, John M. Lea, at the September Term, 1865. Defendant appealed.</p>

<p>FROM SMITH.</p> <p>At tlie August Term, 1865, of the Chancery Court, •Chancellor J. 0. Shackeleowd dismissed complainant’s bill, from which Sterling Ward appealed.</p>

<p>Agent. Responsibility of. In this State, as at common law, a public agent is not personally liable for contracts or undertakings made by him, within the scope of his agency,.or in conformity to the established and known course of business he is employed to transact.</p>

FROM CANNON. There was a judgment in this case, at the June Term, 1865, in favor of Stone, for the value of the gun, Judge HeNRY Coopee, presiding. Defendant appealed.

<p>PROM DAVIDSON.</p> <p>Chancellor Samuel I). Fkieeson, at the May Term, 1865, dismissed complainant’s bill. Complainant appealed.</p>

<p>Conventional Interest. Act 21 st February, 1860, constitutional. The Act of the 21st of February, 1860, allowing parties to contract for the loan of money, up to the time payment is made, at a rate of interest not to exceed ten per cent, per annum, is constitutional, being equal and uniform to every member of society in the State, who was able to bring himself within the provisions of the law.</p>

<p>1. Answer os? one Defendant. Effect of. It is a principle well settled by the Courts, that, if a joint defendant answers a hill and removes the equity set up against himself and the other defendant, who does not answer, no decree can he rendered against the defendant failing to answer.</p> <p>2. Payment. Presumption of, on judgment or decree. If a hond or note, judgment or decree, be permitted to lie dormant for sixteen years, with no demand or payment of interest, or an attempt to enforce the collection, presumption of payment will arise.</p>

FROM MONTGOMERY. There was a decree in this cause, at the April Term, 1860, in favor of the respondents; Chancellor Samuel D. Frierson, presiding. The cause is brought here by writ of error.

<p>FROM CANNON.</p> <p>At the April Term; 1861, of tbe Chancery Court, Chancellor B. L. Ridley rendered a decree in favor tbe complainants. Respondents appealed.</p>

<p>Tenant by the Courtesy. Executive devise. John Lockridge made the following devise: “I give and bequeath to my daughter, Anna E. Cooper, the following tracts of land, *" * * for and during her life, and at her death, to go to .the heirs of her body.” By this devise, Mrs. Cooper took an absolute estate in the lands, and having died, leaving issue of the marriage, the husband is entitled to a life estate in the lands, as tenant by the courtesy.</p>

<p>FROM DAYIDSON.</p> <p>At the November Term, 1861, of the Chancery Court, Chancellor S. D. EeiersoN pronounced a decree in favor of complainant. Repondents appealed.</p>

PROM DAVIDSON. This cause was tried before Judge Nathaniel Baxter, at the May Term, 1860, on agreed state of facts. The Court gave judgment in favor of the plaintiff, for one-third of the slaves. Defendants appealed.

<p>FROM WILSON.</p> <p>Chancellor Beomfield L. Ridley, at the October Term, 1860, of the Chancery Court, dismissed comr plainant’s hill. Complainant appealed.</p>

PROM STEWART. At the January Term, 1866, the motion of plaintiff against defendants in error, for official delinquency, was dismissed, Judge JohN A. Campbell, presiding; plaintiff appealed.

EROM MONTGOMERY. At the January Term, 1866, of the Circuit Court, the Clerk, by motion, obtained a judgment against the plaintiffs, and their sureties for costs, from which judgment the sureties appealed; Judge J. A. Campbell, presiding.

PROM COPPEE. Chancellor Bromfield L. Eidley, at a Special Term, in April, 1861, pronounced a decree in favor of complainants. The record has been filed in error, and supersedeas ordered, and bond given.

FROM smith; At the March Term, 1861, of the Circuit Court, there was a verdict and judgment in this case in favor of the defendants; Judge Samuel M. Eite, presiding. Plaintiffs appealed.

FROM DAVIDSON. There was a judgment by default in this case, against the plaintiff in error, at the September Term, 1864, and á writ of inquiry and final judgment at the May Term, 1865, for $900, in favor of the defendant in error. Plaintiff appealed. Judge M. M. Beien, Se., presiding.

PROM DAVIDSON. This is an agreed case, submitted by the parties to the decision of the Circuit Judge, at the September Term, 1865, who gave a judgment in favor of the Tax Collector; Judge John M. Lea, presiding. The County appealed.

<p>1. Attachment. Description qf property. It is not necessary that the property shall be specifically described in an attachment. The language of the Code, 3473, is, that the writ be issued against the “estate of the defendant.”</p> <p>2. Same. Transfer of property after issvxmce, void. A transfer of property after the filing of the attachment- hill, or after the issuing out of an attachment at law, of property described in the attachment, against the defendant, is inoperative and void: Sec. 3507 of the Code.</p> <p>3. Same. Liberal construction now given to attachment laws. The former rule of construction applied to our attachment laws, under the present legislation of the State, has been changed from one of strictness, to great liberality.</p>

EEOM DEKALB. At the March Term, 1860, Chancellor BeoMfield L. Ridley, presiding, there was a decree pronounced in this cause directing a sale of the life estate in the slaves. Complainants and respondents appealed.

FROM CANNON. At the February Term, 1861, there was a verdict and judgment in favor of the plaintiffs, for $1,080 damages, for injuries to the Wife. Defendants appealed; Judge H. L. Davidson, presiding.

<p>A trustee may purchase property of the cestui' que trust. A cestui que trust may sell the trust property to the trustee, and the trustee may thus acquire a right to the property, denuded of the trust; provided it can he shown, by clear and satisfactory proof, that the transaction was fair ■without concealment or imposition; and that the cestui que trust in-téndedto part with his interest, and that the same should be acquired by the trustee. In such a case the transaction will be held valid.</p>

<p>PROM BEDFOBD.</p> <p>At the April Term, I860,.- there was a judgment by default, against the plaintiff in error; Judge H. L. Davidson, presiding.</p>

FROM SMITH. This action of ejectment was tried in the Circuit Court of Smith County, at the March Term, 1861. Under the charge of His Honor, the jury rendered a verdict in favor of the defendants, from which plaintiff appealed; Judge Samuel M. Fite, presiding.

FROM SMITH. This case originated before a Justice of the Peace, who rendered a judgment against the Sheriff. The cause was brought to the Circuit Court of Smith County, by cetiorari; and at the July Term, 1865, the petition for certiorari and supersedeas was dismissed. Defendant appealed. Judge W. W. GrOOD-ipastuRE, presiding, by interchange with Judge An-dbew McLain.

FROM DAVIDSON. In this cause there was a suit pending in the Chancery Court, for á divorce, when Joseph M. Swan, the husband of complainant, died, before any decree was entered granting a divorce or alimony, and pending the reference of the matter to three arbitrators, who had made no award. Complainant filed ber bill to revive the pause against her deceased husband’s executors.

<p>Intention of the testator carried out, if not in violation of law. The rule of law is, that the intention of the testator shall prevail, if it can he carried out by the Courts, without conflicting with the laws of the land. In this case, the intention of each of the testators being so manifest upon the face of each Will, that they intended to emancipate their slaves, and that the slaves should have their property, after the payment of their debts, they are entitled to the bequests, and to remain in Tennessee; and since the adoption of the amendment to the Constitution, on the 22d of February, 1865, it is not a condition precedent that they should go to Liberia, before taking the legacies under the • Will.</p>

FROM BEDFORD. At the September Term, 1861, complainants’ Will was dismissed, and complainants ordered to be delivered to the administrator. Chancellor Bromfield L. Ridley, presiding. Complainants appealed.

<p>FROM SMITH.</p> <p>This was a motion, made in the Supreme Court, at the December Term, 1865, by the sureties of J. H. Thomas, for judgment against him.</p>

FROM BATID SON. In this case there was a verdict and judgment for the plaintiff, at the May Term, 1860, of the Circuit Court. Defendants appealed. Judge Nathaniel Bax-tee, presiding.

FROM WILSON. This is an appeal from the Circuit Court of Wilson County, from an order made at the September Term, 1865, Judge Henry Cooper, presiding, dismissing an appeal from the County Court to the Circuit Court, and also ajn appeal from the County Court of said County. Both cases, by agreement, were heard together.

FROM FAYETTE. The plaintiff in error was found guilty of tippling without license, under the charge of the Circuit Judge, at the-Term, 1866, and appealed in error to this Court. Judge Geo. W. Reaves, presiding.

<p>1. Constitutional Law. Section 5 of the Schedule, does not abrogate the Courts. The 5th section of the Schedule to the amendments of the Constitution of the State of Tennessee, ratified by the people on the-22d of February, 1865, in no way interferes with, or abrogates, the Courts, in this State, or the privilege of parties to sue and litigate-tiheirrisrhts in said Court, if held Under the laws, as they existed prior to the 6th of May, 1861; and all acts donein pursuance of such laws,, ordinances and resolutions, after the 6th of May, are valid and-binding.</p> <p>2. Same. Parties might sue in the Courtsiof this State after the 6th of May,. 1861. The plaintiff in error brought his suit in the Circuit Court on the 14th of October, 1861, for a right that accrued before the 6th of' May, 1861, and in no way dependent. upon any laws subsequently passed by the usurped State Government. Held, that there is nothing'in the Sth seotion of the Schedule prohibiting the bringing of the suit, and prosecuting it to a recovery.</p>

FROM FAYETTE. There was a judgment by default in this case against the defendants, at the October Term, 1865, and subsequently Lee and Day filed their petition, alleging that the writ had not been served on them ■five days before the Court at which the judgment by default, was taken against them, and asking that it be set aside and they allowed to plead.

PROM MEMPHIS. This cause was tried in the Common Law and Chancery Court, of the City of Memphis, at the -Term, 1861,- when there was a judgment for the plaintiff. Defendant appealed. Judge John P. Caeuthees, presiding.

FROM MEMPHIS. This bill was filed by the complainant, in the Common Law and Chancery Court of the City of Memphis, to set aside a deed. made by the husband of complainant, under a power of attorney from her, executed during coverture. At the hearing, Judge JohN P. Caeuthees dismissed the bill. Complainant appealed.

PROM MEMPHIS. This cause was heard in the Common Law and Chancery Court of Memphis, at the November Term, 1865, Judge Thomas Gr. Smith, presiding. Respondents’ demurrer was disallowed, and they appealed.