Volume 43 — Tennessee Reports

FROM MEMPHIS. The petition for mandamus in this case, was heard hy Judge Smith, at the March Term, 1865, of the • Common Law and Chancery Court. The petition of relator was dismissed; from which he appealed.

FROM CARROLL. This is an appeal from the County Court of Carroll, at the December Term, 1865. There was a decree against the purchaser of the slaves; from which he appealed.

<p>1. Judge’s Charge to Juey. Delivery. It is error in the Circuit Judge to say to the jury, “That the proof showed that the defendant in good faith, intended to deliver the cotton, but did not deliver it, in fact.” The fact of the delivery should have been left to the jury, they being the peculiar judges of the facts, and should be left free to determine them, -without the weight and influence of the opinion of the Court.</p> <p>2. Contbact. Delivery of Articles. t No sale is c'omplete, so as to vest an immediate right of property in the buyer, so long as anything remains to be done as between the buyer and seller. The goods must . be identified, separated and distinguished from all other goods, or from the bulk or mass with which they are mixed. When the seller complies with all he was to do, the property is at the risk of the buyer, whose duty it is to be, by himself or agent, at the place fixed by- the contract for the delivery, ready to perform his part of the contract.</p>

<p>Ilieqai, Contracts. Confederate Treasury Notes. If the consideration of a contract is illegal and against public policy, the Courts will not lend their aid to enforce it. Therefore, a bill filed to foreclose a mortgage to secure the payment of two notes given for the loan of Confederate Treasury Notes, will be dismissed by the Court upon the illegality of the contract being made apparent.</p>

FROM M’NAIRY. This action originated before a Justice of the Peace, by attachment. There was a judgment for defendant. Plaintiff appealed to the Circuit Court; and at the March Term, 1866, there was a verdict and judgment for the plaintiff for $150. Defendant appealed. Judge F. Hurst, presiding.

FROM HAYWOOD. At the August Term, 1865, defendant filed a plea in abatement, to which plaintiff demurred. The Court overruled the demurrer and dismissed the suit as to the administrator. Plaintiff appealed. Judge Wm. P. BOND, presiding.

FROM MEMPHIS. At the January Term, 1861, the defendant’s demurrer was sustained, and the cause dismissed. From the action of the Court the plaintiff appealed. Judge John P. Caeuthers, presiding.

FROM HENRY. There was a judgment in this case, at the -- Term of the Circuit Court, for the plaintiff. The defendant files the record to reverse the judgment.

FROM SHELBY. Tbe petition in this case was filed in the County-Court of Shelby county to appoint a Trustee in the place of Deloach, deceased, at the February Term, 1866. The petition was dismissed. Petitioners appeal.

<p>FROM MEMPHIS.</p> <p>In tbis case there was a decree at the. ■- Term, 1861, and an appeal; Judge Johh P. Caruth-ERS, presiding.</p>

<p>FROM SHELBY.</p> <p>There was a judgment in this case for the plaintiff, at the-Term. Defendant appealed. Judge -, presiding.</p>

<p>FROM CARROLL.</p> <p>There was a judgment by default, at the August Term, 1865, and a final judgment for plaintiffs at a Special Term, in October, 1865. Defendants appealed. Judge LuoiaN L. HawkiNS, presiding.</p>

FROM KNOX. At the October Term, 1866, the plaintiff in error was committed for robbery, and sentenced to fifteen years’ imprisonment in the penitentiary. Judge E. T. Hall, presiding. Defendant appealed.

EROM GRAINGER. The plaintiff in error, was .convicted, at the August Term, 1866, of murder in. the second degree, and sentenced to fifteen years’ imprisoment in the penitentiary; from which he appealed. Judge James P. Swan, presiding.

FROM WASHINGON. The plaintiff in error was indicted for malicious shooting; and, after his arrest by art order of the Court, he was allowed to deposit $1,000 instead of bail. Having failed to appear at the next term, a judgment nisi was taken against him; and, after the return of one scire facias, “not found,” a final judgment was entered' against him, at tbe June Term, 1866.

EROM UNION. Afc the May Term, 1866, Hutchinson was convicted of robbery, and sentenced to five years’ imprisonment in the penitentiary. Defendant appealed. Judge Jas. P. Swan, presiding.

PROM BLOUNT. At the September Term, 1866, there was a motion made to re-tax the cost. The Court refused the motion. The Attorney General for the District, appealed. Judge E. T. Hall, presiding.

EROM BLOUNT. The plaintiff in error was indicted for , feeding “armed prowlers, robbers and guerrillas.” The defendant demurred to the indictment, which was disallowed. At the September Term, 1866, the defendant was convicted and sentenced to the penitentiary for seven years. Defendant appealed. Judge E. T. Hall, presiding.

FROM ANDERSON. At the' November Term, 1866, the Circuit Judge made an order, requiring all attorneys at law, before they could appear in a case, to take an oath, prescribed by him, (which oath appears in the opinion of the Court.) The plaintiff in error declined to take the prescribed oath, and the Court refused to allow him to appear in any cause pending in said Court; from which ruling of the Court he appealed. Judge L. 0. Houk, presiding.

PROM MONROE. The plaintiff was convicted at the May Term, 1866. Judge E. T. Hall, presiding. There was a motion for a new trial, and appeal by defendant.

EROM POLK. The plaintiff in - error was indicted and convicted, at the September Term, 1866, for obstructing a public road. Judge William L. Adams, presiding. Defendant appealed.

FROM CARTER. The plaintiff in error, was convicted, at the March Term, 1866, for selling spiritous liquors .to slaves. A motion for a new trial, and in arrest of judgment, was made, and overruled. Defendant appealed. Judge R. R. Butler, presiding.

FROM KNOX. The plaintiff in error was convicted at the October Term, 1866, for stealing Ocoee Bant notes, and sentenced to three years’ imprisonment. Defendant appealed. Judge E. T. Hall, presiding. ■

FROM JEFFERSON. The plaintiff in error was convicted for robbery, at the April Term, 1866. A new trial was aslred for and refused; and an appeal in error by the defendant. Judge James P. Swan, presiding.

FROM KNOX. At the February Term, 1865, a judgment was taken against the defendant, and upon an inquiry of the damages, at the same term, they were assessed at $25,000. At the June Term, 1865, defendant, Cox, and others, presented an application to set aside the judgment. The Court refused to set aside the judgment. Cox appealed. Judge E. T. Hall, presiding.

FROM BRADLEY. At the May Term, 1865, the plaintiff recovered a judgment against the defendant, for $22,500; and, at the September Term, 1865, Boggess presented a petition, supported by his own, and the affidavits of others, ashing that the judgment by default, be set aside. The Court refused the application, and Bog-gess alone, appealed. Judge G. W. Bbiggs, presiding.

FROM GRAINGER. This suit originated before a Justice of the Peace, and was carried, by appeal, to the Circuit Court of Grainger. At the August Term, 1865, there was a judgment for the plaintiff. M. L. Hall, special Judge, presiding. Defendant appealed.

EROM HAMILTON. The defendants in error recovered a judgment on the 17th of March, 1843, for $704.85, and on the 27th of May, 1859, a fi. fa. was issued upon the judgment. The plaintiff in error obtained a supersedeas, and at the February Term, 1861, there was a judgment against the plaintiff in error. To reverse the judgment of the Circuit Court, he brmgs this here, by writ of error. Judge JOHN C. GIauT, presiding.

FROM KNOX. There was a judgment in this cause, at the February Térm, 1865, for $5,000, in favor of the plaintiff. Judge E. T. Hall, presiding. This cause is brought, here by writ of error.

This suit originated before a Justice of the Peace, and by appeal was taken to the Law Court of Chattanooga. At the June Term, 1866, there was a judgment for the plaintiff. Defendant appealed. Judge William L. Adams, presiding.

<p>FROM BLOUNT.</p> <p>At the September Term, 1866, there was a verdict and judgment, in favor of Taylor, for $5,000. Judge E. T. Hall, presiding. Cochran appealed.</p>

FROM BRADLEY. This is an action for trespass, and imprisonment of the defendant in error, at the May Term, 1866. There was a verdict and judgment in his favor, for 135,000. Judge William: L. Adams, presiding. Defendants appealed.

EROM UNION. At the September Term, 1865, there was a judgment final, by default, in this cause, for the plaintiff. Judge James P. Swan, presiding. Defendant appealed.

FROM KNOX. At the October Term, 1860, there was a verdict and judgment against the plaintiffs in error, from which they appealed. Judge David T. Patterson, presiding, by interchange with Judge George Brown.

FROM COCKE. This case originated before a Justice of the Peace, and by appeal taken to the Circuit Court, at the August Term, 1866, the case was submitted upon an agreed state of facts. Judge Jas. P. Swan, presiding, gave judgment for the plaintiff. Defendant appealed.

FROM M’MINN. This was a motion' against the plaintiff in error, as the former Trustee of McMinn County. There was a judgment against him and his; sureties, at the December Term, 1865. Judge Geo. W. Bkidges, presiding. The case is brought up by writ of error.

FROM BRADLEY. At the September Term, 1862, the defendant demurred to plaintiff's declaration, which was allowed by the Court. Judge John C. Gatjt, presiding. Plaintiff appealed.

FROM POLK. The jury, in this case, at the January Term, 1861, found for the plaintiff, and assessed his damages at one dollar. Plaintiff appealed. Judge JohN C. G-aut, presiding.

FROM GREENE. At the October Term, 1860, there was a judgment and verdict in favor of the plaintiff, and an appeal by the defendant. Judge David T. Patterson, presiding.

FROM GREENE. This was a motion to correct the taxation of costs. At the February Term, 1866, the Court overruled the motion. Arnold appealed. Judge R. R. BtitleR, presiding.

<p>1. Assault and Battery. Special damages. Entire transaction. In actions for an assault and battery, the plaintiff can only recover such special damages as are strictly the consequences of the trespass committed. The acts done must constitute a part of one entire transaction, of which the principal trespass was the commencement.</p> <p>2. Same. Case in judgment. The defendant was with a party of others, who used abusive and violent language to the plaintiff, and the plaintiff, in a few days, left for Kentucky. While absent, his dwelling house and out-houses were destroyed. Held, that in an action for an assault and battery, it was error in the Circuit Judge to admit the proof as to plaintiff’s absence in Kentucky, and the subsequent burning of his property, unless it appeared as part of the original trespass, and one transaction, and the defendant was present aiding and abetting in the destruction of the property.</p>

<p>Ceekk: & Mastbb. Money in Ms hands can only he paid out by order of the Court. A fund in custodio legis, and under the control, and subject to the orders and decrees of the Chancery Court, cannot be paid out by the Clerk & Master, to any one, except in obedience to the order of the Court; and a party cannot resort to a different forum and recover of the Clerk & Master of the Chancery Court, and his sureties, the money, and thus oust the Chancery Court of its jurisdiction of the same.</p>

FROM SHELBY. This was an application, on behalf of the Memphis Freight Company, to have certain lands, owned by the City of Memphis, condemned for their use. At the September Term, 1866, the petition was dismissed. Judge Geo. W. Rea yes, presiding. By consent of the parties, and upon the prayer of the petitioners, an appeal was allowed,' by the Court, to the Supreme Court then sitting at Knoxville.

FROM RHEA. Upon motion of tbe plaintiff, the petition of defendant for certiorari and supersedeas was dismissed, at the March Term, 1861, and gave judgment against the petitioner and his securities, for the cost only, and awarded a procedendo to the Justice. To which the plaintiff in the execution, excepted, and appealed in error. Judge JOHN C. Gaut, presiding.

FROM KNOX. At the June Term, 1866, of the Circuit Court for Knox, the motion of the relator to set aside a judgment rendered against him at a former term, upon an attachment, was disallowed. The relator, by his counsel, appealed. Judge E. T. Hall, presiding, refused to sign the hill of exceptions; and a petition for a mandamus is filed in this Court, to compel the Circuit Judge to sign the hill of exceptions, or show cause why he should not.

FROM JEFFERSON. At the June Term, 1865, there was a decree pronounced in favor of complainant; from which Mariah L. Holston, one of the defendants, appealed. Chancellor Seth J. W. Luokey, presiding.

<p>FROM GREENE.</p> <p>Chancellor Seth J. W. Luckey, at the November Term, 1865, pronounced a decree in favor of complainants. Respondents appealed.</p>

FROM WASHINGTON. This cause was heard at the May Term, 1866, before Chancellor Seth J. W. Luokey; who, believing the assignment was made to hinder and delay the creditors of defendant, set the same aside. Defendant appealed.

FROM HAWKINS. There was a decree, in this case, at the May Term, 1866, in favor of complainant, and directing the lands of respondent to be sold; an appeal was asked and refused, and the case was brought up by writ of error. Chancellor Seth J. W. Luckey, presiding.

<p>1. Lies or Judgment. Statute of Limitations. A lien of a judgment, is, in no sense, a Statute of limitations, and if not enforced within the time allowed by law, (a year and a day,) it cannot he, upon land conveyed by the defendant, after the judgment.</p> <p>2. Same. Same, ith Section of Schedule. Act of 1865, ch. 10, sec. 1. The lien of a judgment at law, or a decree in equity, upon the land of the judgment debtor, is not comprehended within the meaning of the 4th section of the Schedule, or the Act of 1865, ch. 10, see. 1, in reference to the Statute of limitations.</p> <p>3. Equitv or debtob, in bead estate. Lien upon that equity. Sow created. A judgment creditor, if his debtor has only an equity in land, must, to create a lien upon that equity, within sixty days after his judgment, or decree, cause a memorandum of the same, with the amount and date thereof, and parties thereto, to be registered in the county where the real estate lies.</p>

<p>FROM GRAINGER.</p> <p>Chancellor Seth J. W. Luckey, at the December Term, 1860, dismissed complainant’s bill; from which he appealed.</p>

FROM SULLIYAN. There was a decree at the May Term, 1861, against the complainants, for certain State and County taxes, collected by the former Sheriff and Collector of the County; from which complainants appealed. Chancellor Seth J. W. Bucket, presiding.

<p>Yoiüiítaey Contracts. Courts of equity. Cestui que trusts. A con-trafit or conveyance, made by A, for the benefit of B, and purely voluntary in its character, requiring the aid of a Court of equity to constitute the party claiming its benefits cestui que trust, the aid of a Court of Chancery will be withheld from the party seeking to enforce it.</p> <p>[This case should have appeared with the Jackson Opinions in this Yolume, hut was not furnished in time for insertion at its proper place. — Repobter.]</p>

<p>Constitutional Law. Act of Congress, 30th June, 1864. Revenue Stamps. The Act of Congress, passed the 30th of June, 1864, provided, that, “On and after the first day of August, 1864, there shall be levied and paid upon each writ, or other original process by which any suit is commenced in any court of record, either in law or equity, the sum of fifty cents.” Held, that the courts of the State do not exist by the authority of the United States, or by its permission, and are not objects over which its sovereign power extends, except, perhaps, for the purpose of protection. It does not possess over them even the incidental power of taxation. The Act is, therefore, invalid, and not binding upon the courts of this State.</p>

EROM SMITH. At the November Term, 1866, plaintiffs in error were convicted, and sentenced to three years’ imprisonment in the penitentiary. Judge ANDREW McLain, presiding. Defendants appealed.

FROM OVERTON. At the May Term, 1866, the defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree, and sentenced to be executed. Defendant appealed. Judge L. M. Houk, presiding.

EROM SUMNER. At the June Term, 1866, there was a verdict and judgment against the defendants; from which they appealed. Judge Thomas Baeut, presiding.

EROM MACON. The plaintiff in error was convicted at the November Term, 1866, and sentenced to. three years’ imprisonment in the penitentiary; from which judgment he appealed. Judge Andrew MoClain, presiding.

FROM SMITH. Plaintiffs in error, were, at tbe March Term, 1866, convicted of horse stealing, and sentenced to thirteen years each, in the penitentiary; from which sentence they appealed. Judge ANDREW MoClain, presiding.

FROM CANNON There was a verdict and judgment in this case, at the October Term, 1866, in favor of the plaintiff. Defendant appealed. Judge Thomas N. Erazier, Judge of the Criminal Court for Nashville, presiding, by interchange with Judge, Henry Cooper.

<p>Banks. Assignment of. Set-off. The Act of 1860, oh. 27, sec. 30, provides, that, in all oases of insolvency of any bank, or banking association, the bill-holders shall be entitled to preference in payment, to all other creditors of such bank or association, and no transfer or assignment of any note, bill of exchange, or other evidence of debt by the bank, shall prevent the debtor from paying the same into the hands of the assignee, in the currency of the bank. Held, that this law applies to a general assignment by the'bank, and, also, to any assignment made by the bank, of its notes, bills of exchange, or other evidence of debt.</p>

FROM DAVIDSON. This cause was brought to the Circuit Court by certiorari. At the January Term, 1866, there was a judgment in favor of Chadwell, Ex’r. Defendants appealed. Judge John M. Lea, presiding.

<p>1. Release of one joint obligor discharges all. The release of one or more of several joint obligors, operates as a release of all, and the holder of the bond or note is barred of his right of action, and recovery against the other co-obligors. The debt being extinguished as to one, it discharges all, whether the parties intend it or not.</p> <p>2. Same. Need not be under seal, to make it valid. Since the passage of our Act abolishing the distinction between written instruments, whether under the private seal of the party, or without it, a release need not be under seal to make it valid. See Code, secs. 1804-5.</p>

PROM WILLIAMSON. ' This cause originated before a Justice of the Peace, where there was a judgment against the constable and two of his sureties, and an appeal to the Circuit Court. At the January Term, 1866, there was a judgment for plaintiffs, from which the defendant appealed. Judge Henry Cooper, presiding.

<p>FROM BEDFORD.</p> <p>There was a judgment in favor of the plaintiff below, at the August Term, 1866. Defendant appealed. Judge HeNry Cooper, presiding.</p>

<p>PROM SMITH.</p> <p>There was a verdict and judgment in favor of the plaintiffs for $150.00, at the November Term, 1866. Judge AndRew McClain, presiding. Defendant appealed.</p>

EROM BEDEORD. This cause was brought, by appeal, from a Justice of the Peace to the Circuit Court; and, at the August Term, 1866, there was a judgment for the defendant; from which plaintiff appealed. Judge Henry Cooper, presiding.

EROM DAVIDSON. At the January Term, 1866, the questions at issue, were submitted to the Circuit Judge, waiving the intervention of a jury. The Court gave a judgment in favor of the children, for four-fifths of the amount claimed, and against Helen Shurer.' Both parties appealed. Judge Andeew McClain, presiding, by interchange with Judge M, M. Beien.

PROM WHITE. At the May Term, 1866, there was a verdict and judgment, in favor of the defendant, from which the plaintiff appealed. Judge W. W. Goodpasture, presiding.

FROM DAVIDSON. At the September Term, 1866, defendant’s demurrer to complainant’s petition for a mandamus, was disallowed, and defendant allowed time to plead or answer, which he declined to do; and thereupon a peremptory writ of mandamus, was awarded, commanding the defendant to receive of the petitioners, in payment of ,the tax due the State, the notes or issues of the Bank of Tennessee, issued prior to the 6th of May, 1861, and to issue them a license as wholesale…

FROM SUMNER. There was a judgment at the October Term, 1866, for the plaintiff, less the usurious interest included in the note. Defendants appealed. Judge Thomas Barry, presiding.

<p>1. Evidence. Receipt. Res gestee. A receipt, given to a third party who was not a party to the contract after the making of the contract, and not connected with the identical contract, which is the subject matter of the controversy, is not admitted as part of the res'gestas.</p> <p>2. Save. Same. Declarations and circumstances contemporaneous with the main fact or the identical contract that is in controversy, and so connected with it as to illustrate its character, are distinguished from hearsay evidence, and are admitted as part of the res gestee, when they constitute parts of the transaction, contract or main facts; and it is upon this ground that they are admitted as evidence.</p> <p>3. Case in judgment. A purchased a mule from B, and the mule was af-terwards taken from A by a Government detective, (as property belonging to the Government,) who gave him a receipt or statement showing that fact. Held that, in a suit of B against A, to recover the value of the mule, that the receipt or statement is not a part of the res gestas, nor admissible evidence for the plaintiff.</p>

FROM 'WHITE. There was a judgment, at the May Term, 1866, for the plaintiff, for the value of the Southern bank notes included in the note sued on, the principal part of the consideration for the note being Confederate money. Defendant appealed. Judge W. W. Goodpasture, presiding.

FROM SUMNER. At the - Term, 1866, a motion was made in the County Court, to revive a judgment rendered at the March Term, 1861, in favor of J. L. Bugg, Clerk and Commissioner; which motion was not allowed by the Court, because a satisfaction of the same judg-men! appeared on the execution docket of the Clerk. Bugg appealed.

<p>FROM DAVIDSON.</p> <p>At the November Term of the Chancery Court, 1866, Chancellor David Campbell, on demurrer, dismissed complainant’s bill. Complainant appealed.</p>

<p>FROM DAVIDSON.</p> <p>At the - Term, 1865, the complainant’s hill was dismissed by Chancellor Samuel D. FRIERSON. Complainant appealed.</p>

<p>from rutherford.</p> <p>Chancellor John 'P. Steele, at tbe April Term, 1866, dismissed complainant’s bill; from which decree he appealed to this Court.</p>

FROM DAVIDSON.» The hill of complainant, was, at the November Term, 1865, demurred to, and the demurrer sustained, and the bill dismissed, from which an appeal in error is prosecuted to this Court, by complainant. Chancellor Samuel D. Erierson, presiding.

<p>Plea in Abatement. Answer to the merits, .upon a plea of abatement being overruled by the Court, the defendant should have leave to plead or answer to the merits. See Code, sections 2091-2-3.</p>

<p>L. Insolvent Estates. Injunction, when removed. An injunction having been granted, upon the filing of an insolvent bill enjoining the prosecution of suits by creditors against the estate, the Chancellor may, under the general powers of a Court of Chancery, to, and by virtue of, sees. 2383-4 of the Code, so modify the injunction, as to allow the Clerk & Master to prosecute a motion to a final judgment, upon a note given to him for a slave sold by decree of the Chancery Court.</p> <p>2. Purchasers at Master’s sale become a party to suit. A purchaser at a Master’s sale of property, under a decree thereby, makes himself a party to the proceedings in the case, so that a judgment may be had against him and his sureties, by motion; and his death, or the death of one of the parties to the note, would not defeat a Court of Chancery in the exercise of its essential jurisdiction.</p> <p>3. Same. Same. Personal representatives. Scire facias. A purchaser at a Master’s sale is not a party to the cause in such a way as to make it necessary, on his death, to revive against his personal representatives; but a motion cannot be prosecuted against the personal representatives without notice, or scire facias.</p> <p>4. Notice, in lieu of scire facias. A scire facias is the more regular proceeding against a personal representative, but a notice •which informs the party of the nature of his liability, the time, place, and manner in which the plaintiff will seek to enforce it, is sufficient.</p>

<p>FROM DEKALB.</p> <p>At the September Term of the Chancery Court, 1866, there was a decree pronounced in this cause. Chancellor JohN P. Steele, presiding. Complainants appealed.</p>

<p>1. PKAcricn in Chancee*. Revivor within three years, does not apply y> decrees for divorce. Where a decree is rendered against a defendant, without personal service or process, and he does not appear, the decree is not absolute for three years, unless a copy of the decree is served on the defendant, and he fails to appear and make defense, in six months; then it becomes absolute. Held, that, upon a proper construction, it has no application to causes for divorce.</p> <p>2. ■ Same. In cases for divorce, appeal must he taken. After a decree of divorce from the bonds of matrimony, and the death of one of the parties, there is no Statute authorizing a revivor of the cause — it can only be revived by an appeal.</p>

<p>PROM WHITE.</p> <p>Upon the demurrer of defendant, at the September Term, 1866, Chancellor JohN P. Steele dismissed complainant’s bill, from which he appealed.</p>

FROM DAVIDSON. At- the November Term, 1866, Chancellor David Campbell, directed, by decree, that tases due the corporation of Nashville, from the Rutledge estate, within the corporation limits of Nashville, for the years 1862-3-4-5, to be paid by the Clerk & Master; from which decree there was an appeal.

FROM RUTHERFORD. The petition for a mandamus, was, at the November Term, 1866, dismissed by the Circuit Judge; from which order the relator appealed. Judge Heney Cooper, presiding.

<p>FROM DAVIDSON.</p> <p>This cause was beard before Chancellor Samuel D. Frierson, at the May Term, 1865. Decree in favor of complainant; from which respondent appealed.</p>

<p>1. Internal Revenue. Instruments to be stamped. Void when not stamped. Schedule B of the Act of Congress, approved July 1, 1862, provides, that where the indebtedness secured in a bond, exceeds $5,000, and not over $10,000, the stamp duty thereon shall be $10,00; and by the Act of the 30th of June, 1864, where the sum of money secured in the deed, exceeds $100, and not $500, the stamp duty shall be fifty cents; $500, and not exceeding $1,000, a duty of $1; and for every additional $500, or fractional part thereof in excess of $1,000, fifty cents. And unless the deed was thus properly stamped, its registration was void, and could not be used in evidence, and did not pass the title to the property conveyed as against creditors.</p> <p>2. Same. Case in judgment. On the 14th of September, 1865, Morrow conveyed, by deed, to J. J. Polk, as Trustee, certain lands, stock, etc., to secure the payment of his debts, amounting to $10,000, due by note etc. The deed was registered, according io the laws of the State, in the Register’s ofSce for Hardeman County, the residence of the grantor. Before its registration, united States revenue stamps, to the value of $7.50, were placed upon it and cancelled. On the 21st of February, 1866, complainants filed their attachment bill against the maker, trustee, and beneficiaries in the deed, seeking to set the same aside for the want of the proper amount of revenue stamps required by the Acts of Congress. Held, that the deed securing the payment of $10,000 of debts, was not properly stamped, and was therefore void; and the complainants haying acquired rights in good faith in the property conveyed in trust, no re-stamping of the deed with the proper amount of stamps, can in any manner affect their rights.</p>

EROM MEMPHIS. This hill was filed' on the Chancery side of the Common Law and Chancery Court, of Memphis. The defendants demurred to the bill. Chancellor W. W. Smith, presiding, overruled the demurrer; and the defendants appealed.