Volume 426 — South Carolina Reports

On a certified question from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, we find an insurer may maintain a direct malpractice action against counsel hired to represent its insured, under the limitations we will describe in the opinion.

In this case the Court clarifies that when a trial court dismisses a complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure, the trial court should allow the plaintiff leave to amend the complaint pursuant to Rule 15(a) before filing the final order of dismissal.

The Court certified the following question from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina: Under South Carolina law, does a drug testing laboratory that has a contract with an employer to conduct and evaluate drug tests owe a duty of care to the employees who are subject to the testing so as to give rise to a cause of action for negligence for failure to properly and accurately perform the test and report the results? The Court answers this question in the affirmative.

Denise Wright sued Respondents for negligence, alleging Respondents voluntarily undertook a duty to provide security to residents of her apartment complex and breached this duty, thereby causing her damages. The circuit court granted summary judgment to Respondents, and a divided court of appeals affirmed. The Court reverses the court of appeals and remands the matter to the circuit court for trial.

In this marital litigation, we clarify that in determining alimony, family courts should consider the effect of investment income on both parties.

The Court granted certiorari to review the court of appeals' decision in Sierra Club v. S.C. Dep't of Health & Envtl. Control, 414 S.C. 581, 779 S.E.2d 805 (Ct. App. 2015), wherein the court of appeals affirmed the administrative law court as to all issues, except as to four subsections of the regulation governing DHEC's issuance and renewal of Chem-Nuclear's license to operate a disposal facility for low-level radioactive waste. We affirm as modified in part and reverse in part the court of appeals. We remand this matter to DHEC for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Following her arrest for receiving stolen goods, Meredith Huffman filed a complaint against Sunshine Recycling, LLC, and Aiken Electric Cooperative, Inc., for negligence, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Sunshine and Aiken. The court of appeals reversed. Huffman v. Sunshine Recycling, LLC, 417 S.C. 514, 790 S.E.2d 401 (Ct. App. 2016). Both Sunshine and Aiken filed petitions for writs of certiorari to review the court of appeals' opinion. We granted the petitions, and now reverse the court of appeals' opinion as to Sunshine and affirm as to Aiken.

We find the workers' compensation commission's repeated, unwarranted delays in making a final decision requires our immediate review of an interlocutory remand order to avoid leaving the appellant with no adequate remedy on an appeal from a final decision. We reverse the appellate panel's remand order, and remand to the commission for an immediate and final review of the original commissioner's decision.

We granted certiorari to determine whether a family court order finding a common-law marriage was immediately appealable under our general appealability statute, S.C. Code Ann. § 14-3-330. Because the order involved the merits of the causes of action, we hold it was appealable and reverse the court of appeals.

In the Court's original jurisdiction, petitioner Conrad Slocumb argues his 130-year sentence, imposed as a result of multiple sets of nonhomicide crimes committed when he was a juvenile, violates the principles set forth in Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010). Because Graham's express holding is limited to de jure life sentences, and not de facto life sentences like Slocumb's, the Court is constrained to deny Slocumb relief.

This Court granted petitions for a writ of certiorari to review the decision of the Court of Appeals in Wilson v. Willis, 416 S.C. 295, 786 S.E.2d 571 (Ct. App. 2016), in which the parties dispute the applicability of an arbitration clause. The circuit court denied the motion to compel arbitration. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded, holding equitable estoppel should be applied to enforce arbitration against the nonsignatories. We now reverse and remand for further proceedings, finding the circuit court properly denied the motion to compel arbitration.

The Court granted Dennis Cervantes-Pavon's petition for a writ of certiorari to determine whether the court of appeals erred in affirming the circuit court's denial of immunity from prosecution under the Protection of Persons and Property Act, (the Act) S.C. Code Ann. §§ 16-11-410 to 450 (2015). State v. Cervantes-Pavon, Op. No. 2017-UP-258 (S.C. Ct. App. filed June 28, 2017). We write today to clarify several points regarding the Act and reverse and remand for a new immunity hearing.

The Court affirms as modified the court of appeals' decision in Marshall v. Dodds, 417 S.C. 196, 789 S.E.2d 88 (Ct. App. 2016).

The Court affirms the court of appeals as modified, holding the trial court did not abuse its discretion in evaluating the Colf factors as it did and in concluding Robinson's prior convictions were admissible under Rule 609(a)(1) of the South Carolina Rules of Evidence.

This case concerns when a claim for deficient notice of disposition of collateral under Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code accrues for statute of limitation purposes. We hold the limitations period begins only upon disposition.

We hold the Dorchester County referendum question granting authority to issue up to $30 million in bonds for library facilities and up to $13 million for recreational facilities contained two separate bond proposals and required voters to support both or neither, and as a result, it was unlawful.

Respondent, a licensed attorney in New Jersey and South Carolina, was suspended by the Supreme Court of New Jersey for one year for violating the New Jersey Rules of Professional Conduct. Following Respondent's failure to response to a certified letter notifying him he had thirty days to inform the Supreme Court of South Carolina of any claim that the imposition of identical discipline in this state was not warranted and the reason for any such claim, the Court reciprocally suspended Respondent from the practice of law for one year.

We hold the trial court erred by finding Heyward's counsel had opened the door to testimony that he had previously committed acts of domestic violence. Because the error was preserved and prejudicial, we reverse and remand for a new trial.

Daniel Hamrick appeals his conviction for felony driving under the influence resulting in great bodily injury. We find the trial court erred in admitting the opinion testimony of an officer on the subject of accident reconstruction. The officer's testimony was not admissible as lay opinion under Rule 701, SCRE, and the court failed to make the necessary findings the officer was qualified to give such an opinion under Rule 702, SCRE. We reverse and remand to the court of general sessions for a new trial.