Volume 427 — South Carolina Reports

The Court accepted the Agreement for Discipline by Consent entered into between Respondent and the Office of Disciplinary Counsel (ODC) in which Respondent admitted his conduct violated numerous provisions to the South Carolina Rules of Professional Conduct and Rule 11 of the Resolution of Fee Disputes Board, Rule 416, SCACR. The Court suspended Respondent from the practice of law for one year, and ordered he pay (1) the costs incurred by ODC during its investigation and prosecution and (2) restitution to a former client.

We reverse the court of appeals and find the trial court lacked jurisdiction to hear Respondent's second Rule 29(a), SCRCrimP, motion.

The Court affirms the court of appeals' decision as modified, finding the trial court properly refused to charge the jury on the lesser-included offense of assault and battery in the first degree and additionally correctly charged the jury on the doctrine of transferred intent.

In answering a certified question from the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit regarding an insurance bad faith claim, the Court holds denying liability or asserting good faith in the answer does not, standing alone, place a privileged communication "at issue" in the case so as to waive the attorney-client privilege.

The Court granted certiorari to review the Court of Appeals' decision In re Care & Treatment of Campbell, Op. No. 2016-UP-198 (S.C. Ct. App. filed May 11, 2016), wherein the Court of Appeals upheld a jury's determination that Kenneth Campbell met the statutory definition of a sexually violent predator (SVP) under South Carolina's SVP Act, S.C. Code Ann. §§ 44-48-10 to -170 (2018). We reverse and remand for a new commitment proceeding.

In this appeal from a conviction for murder, we hold the trial court properly refused to charge the law of self-defense. The defendant shot and killed the victim with an unlawfully-possessed pistol the defendant intentionally brought to an illegal drug transaction. We find the defendant was at fault in bringing on the violence. We affirm.

In this medical malpractice case concerning the statute of repose, the Court holds that Respondent's argument is preserved and that there is evidence to survive summary judgment that Petitioners were negligent during the repose period.

In this case, we decide whether notice clauses in automobile insurance policies are rendered meaningless by Section 38-77-142(C) of the South Carolina Code (2015). The trial court found the clause in this policy void and accordingly required the insurance company to pay the full default judgment entered against its insured. The insurer appealed, and we now reverse.

The Court affirms the court of appeals as modified, finding the court of appeals erred in determining which calendar years fell within the Charleston County Assessor's reassessment cycle, but correctly determined the value of the taxpayer's property.

On a certified question from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, we hold, under the present facts, the insurance company was not required to make an additional offer of underinsured motorist coverage.

In this appeal from the workers' compensation commission, we address the timing requirement in South Carolina Code subsection 42-17-90(A) (2015) for a claim based on a change of condition.We hold the timing requirement is satisfied upon the filing of a Form 50 to initiate the claim.

This is an appeal arising from a McBee Town Council election contest commenced by candidate Glenn Odom. We affirm the circuit court's decision to remand the proceedings to the McBee Municipal Election Commission. We modify the circuit court's order in two ways: first, we hold section 5-15-130 of the South Carolina Code (2004), standing alone, requires the four votes to be counted second, to the extent that the circuit court's decision can be read to order the Commission to declare Odom a prevailing candidate without the four votes first being counted, we hold the four votes must first be counted before the results of the election can be determined. We remand to the Commission and order it to unseal the four provisional votes and apply those votes to the vote totals of the candidate(s) for whom the votes were cast, with the results of the election to then be declared accordingly.

In this appeal arising out of Anderson County Council's approval of a severance agreement, the Court vacates the decision of the Court of Appeals finds the Severance Agreement invalid due to the County's lack of a quorum and remands to the circuit court to determine the exact amount that Preston must refund the County.

Section 38-77-144 of the South Carolina Code (2015) provides that no-fault personal injury protection (PIP) insurance coverage "is not subject to a setoff." This appeal requires us to consider whether section 38-77-144 prohibits an automobile insurance carrier from reducing its obligation to pay PIP benefits to its insured by the amount of workers' compensation benefits the insured received for medical expenses. We hold that it does.