¶1Dissenting Opinion by
¶2The majority opinion prostitutes equity jurisdiction. As a general rule, equity will not enforce a restrictive covenant which is of no benefit to the dominant tenement or is an absurd, futile, and ineffective attempt to achieve a desired end. Daniels v. Notor, 389 Pa. 510, 515, 133 A. 2d 520 (1957) ; Kelly v. Philadelphia, 382 Pa. 459, 115 A. 2d 238 (1955); Katzman v. Anderson, 359 Pa. 280, 59 A. 2d 85 (1948) ; Price v. Anderson, 358 Pa. 209, 56 A. 2d 215 (1948) ; Henry v. Eves, 306 Pa. 250, 159 Atl. 857 (1932). Furthermore, equity will deny relief to a party seeking enforcement of a restrictive covenant “if the harm done by granting the injunction will be disproportionate to the benefit secured thereby.” Restatement, Property, §563 (1944). It is important to note that these equitable principles evolved from the legal maxim that restrictions on the use of land are not favored by the law because they constitute an interference with the free use and alien-ability of real property: Ratkovich v. Randell Homes, Inc., 403 Pa. 63, 169 A. 2d 65 (1961); Siciliano v. Misler, 399 Pa. 406, 160 A. 2d 422 (1960); Food Fair Stores, Inc. v. Kline, 396 Pa. 397, 152 A. 2d 661 (1959) ; McCandless v. Burns, 377 Pa. 18, 104 A. 2d 123 (1954).
¶3Here the enforcement of the restrictive covenant would result in no benefit, economic or otherwise, to the parties seeking its enforcement. It would be an *488anachronism to interpose equitable relief in support of a restriction which on the one hand prohibits more than two detached dwelling houses, while at the same time permits every other conceivable use of the property. (The apparent interpretation of the restrictive covenant now permits the property to be utilized for apartment complexes and/or commercial or industrial purposes.)
¶4Assuming arguendo that such an absurd result actually was intended by the contracting parties, equity, nevertheless, should not support the enforcement of a covenant which, now, due to the expiration of the other use restrictions, makes little, if any, sense, involves no benefit to the property owner seeking its enforcement, and only serves to seriously hamper a reasonable use of the property. When the twenty-five year period expired eliminating the other use restrictions, the usefulness and benefit of the proviso prohibiting more than two detached private dwellings likewise expired. The fact that a technical violation of the agreement may be committed is not sufficient under this covenant to warrant a court of equity to enjoin such violation.
¶5Moreover, the majority’s sole reliance upon Peters v. Davis, 426 Pa. 231, 231 A. 2d 748 (1967), for the proposition that restrictive covenants are enforceable without a showing of benefit to the property owner is utterly without justification. There we were concerned with a violation of building line restrictions in a deed, the violation of which encroached upon the property owner’s easement for light, view and air. In contradistinction to the instant case, the enforcement of the building line restrictions in Petersobviously entailed some benefits to the party seeking enforcement and involved no change in circumstances or conditions which rendered enforcement absurd or futile. Since the law does not favor restrictions in the use of land, and since *489the restriction here is irrational and devoid of any practical benefit to anyone, I am compelled to conclude that equity should not sanction its enforcement.
¶6I dissent.