¶1Concurring Opinion by
¶2Although I join in the opinion of the Court, I believe it is necessary to emphasize the controlling considerations which support the Court’s holding that this case is an appropriate one for criminal sanctions. There can be little question that the record before us not only supports the findings of the court below but leads to the almost unalterable conclusion that appellant knew (or should have known) of the toxic nature of the product he was selling and knew of the exact use to which the Sterno would be put. Appellant was dealing with a product which when taken internally *574clearly was a dangerous instrumentality. By selling it to the persons to whom he sold it, knowing that they would use it in a way that was certain to cause serious harm to themselves, appellant exhibited the indifference to and reckless disregard for human life that is the classic element of the involuntary manslaughter offense. No causation problem is presented by the allegedly “intervening” acts of the victims, since those acts are exactly what appellant knew would take place when he sold the Sterno to these customers.
¶3In my view, it is crucial that this record presents no question whether appellant investigated — or was obligated to investigate — the use to which his customers would put the product. It is clear that appellant knew that the skid-row alcoholics to whom he dispensed the Sterno would extract the alcohol for drinking purposes. As the majority correctly points out, our decision and the decisions below did not impose “a duty on all sellers of Sterno to determine how their customers will use the product. The Court was merely saying that if a seller of Sterno is aware that the purchaser is an alcoholic and will use Sterno as a source of alcohol, then the seller is grossly negligent and wantonly reckless in selling Sterno to him.”