¶1concurring in result.
¶2On the basis of Ind.Code § 35-41-3-5(b) (Burns 1979 Repl.) and Norris v. State, (1981) Ind., 419 N.E.2d 129, I concur in the result reached by the majority; defendant’s voluntary intoxication was not a defense to the crime of battery, an offense which requires only general intent. Humes v. State, (1981) Ind., 426 N.E.2d 379.
¶3Consequently, we need not decide whether the two-step methodology outlined in Lawrence v. State, (1978) 268 Ind. 330, 375 N.E.2d 208, warranted that defendant’s instruction be given. If, however, voluntary intoxication were a factor relevant to the jury’s consideration, the evidence does reveal a dispute regarding the defendant’s *248mental state which, pursuant to step two of the Lawrencetest, would have required the trial court to give the instruction. See also, Easley v. State, (1981) Ind., 427 N.E.2d 435; Hester v. State, (1974) 262 Ind. 284, 315 N.E.2d 351; Hash v. State, (1972) 258 Ind. 692, 284 N.E.2d 770; Cole v. State, (1922) 192 Ind. 29, 134 N.E. 867; Murphy v. State, (1980) Ind.App., 414 N.E.2d 322; Roddy v. State, (1979) Ind.App., 394 N.E.2d 1098. Notwithstanding Justice DeBruler’s renunciation of step two of the Lawrencemethodology, it serves sound purposes, as explained in Hester v. State, supra :
“ ‘A jury might have power to stultify itself by returning a verdict contrary to what it knew to be the law …. But the court, when giving instructions, is not required to insult the jurors by a suggestion that they may do so.’ ” 262 Ind. at 289, 315 N.E.2d at 354, quoting Cole v. State, supra, 192 Ind. at 37, 134 N.E. at 870.
¶4Step two of the Lawrencemethodology insures that the final instructions given to the jury conform to the issues and evidence before it, which is the object of instructions. Harris v. State, (1977) 266 Ind. 661, 366 N.E.2d 186. See also, Hash v. State, supra; Roddy v. State, supra. For this reason, the two-step methodology outlined in Lawrence, although inapplicable here, should not be abandoned.
¶5It should also be noted that in McNary v. State, (1981) Ind., 428 N.E.2d 1248, this Court unanimously held that a defendant need not tender an instruction defining the term “included offense” in conjunction with an instruction on a lesser and included offense. We explained:
“[T]he term ‘included offense’ is clearly a word of art to which a layman would not attach a common meaning. Yet it is not necessary to the jury’s intellectual machinations that it understand the definition of ‘included offense’; rather, it is only significant that the jury understand the role an included offense plays in its deliberations. The jury must be informed that should it find the defendant did not commit the element or act which distinguishes the charged crime from the included offense, it may nonetheless find the defendant guilty of the lesser and included offense.” Id. at 1252.
¶6Here, defendant’s tendered instruction number 4 satisfied our McNaryanalysis, just as did the trial court’s instruction in McNary. Id.Statements in the majority opinion to the contrary are consequently misplaced.
¶7Furthermore, I am not convinced that an instruction which embodied the definitions of “knowingly,” “intentionally,” and “recklessly” was necessarily required of defendant, even if the resolution of that question were required for our disposition. It is true that as one basis for our holding in Smith v. State, (1981) Ind., 422 N.E.2d 1179, we indicated the terms “knowingly,” “intentionally,” and “recklessly” were words of art by virtue of the fact that they are statutorily defined. The fact that a word has been statutorily defined, however, does not ipso facto render it a term of art with special legal connotations; nor does the fact that a particular word is characterized as a “term of art” necessarily require that it be defined for the jury. See: Jenkins v. State, (1981) Ind., 424 N.E.2d 1002 (statutory definition of “sexual gratification” need not be communicated to jury since phrase is commonly understood); McFarland v. State, (1979) Ind., 390 N.E.2d 989 (trial court’s refusal to give instructions on “malice” and “sudden heat” upheld); Valentine v. State, (1971) 257 Ind. 197, 273 N.E.2d 543 (trial court’s refusal to give instruction on “great bodily harm,” as defined in Froedge v. State, (1968) 249 Ind. 438, 233 N.E.2d 631, upheld).
¶8The crucial test is not whether the word is defined by statute, but rather if a definition must be supplied to the jury in order for it to intelligently implement the term in its assessment of the evidence. McNary v. State, supra; Jenkins v. State, supra; McFarland v. State, supra. Utilizing this test, our neighboring jurisdiction of Illinois has rejected the conclusion that a jury does not readily understand the meaning of the term “recklessly,” which is in common usage. People v. Hairston, (1976) 39 Ill.*249App.3d 747, 350 N.E.2d 497. Consequently, while the issue is not dispositive here, we must recognize that our case precedent is imbued with distinctions lacking in substantive differences. An incongruity arises even within the context of this case, for while defendant is faulted for failing to tender instructions defining “knowingly” and “intentionally,” an understanding of those terms was as necessary to a conviction of the greater crime charged, battery, as it was to a potential conviction for the lesser offense of criminal recklessness. See Ind.Code § 35 — 12-2-1 (Burns 1980 Supp.); Ind.Code § 35-42-2-2(b) (Burns 1979 Repl.).
¶9Finally, it should be acknowledged that the prosecutor’s comments during final argument were improper. His statements to the effect that “the only amazing thing is that Brian Jones wasn’t killed and we’d be here on a murder case, and the only other amazing thing is that the defendant isn’t charged with attempted murder” do not reflect his analysis of the facts in evidence, nor was the subject matter of the comments relevant to the question before the jury.
¶10Vested in the public office of the prosecutor is discretion to charge a suspect with the commission of any crime appropriate to the facts. Regardless of whether defendant might have been charged with the attempted murder of Brian Jones, that option was foresaken — for whatever reason — and the crime of battery was charged. It was not appropriate then to suggest that a conviction for battery was warranted because defendant’s culpability exceeded that crime, for that was a matter outside the scope of the issue before the jury and the evidence relevant thereto. Washington v. State, (1979) Ind., 390 N.E.2d 983. It is not proper to invite jurors to consider matters outside the evidence, nor is it appropriate to phrase arguments in a manner designed to implant prejudice within them. Limp v. State, (1982) Ind., 431 N.E.2d 784; Remsen v. State, (1981) Ind., 428 N.E.2d 241.
¶11While the prosecutor’s statements were improper, the trial court properly admonished the jury to disregard the comments. For that reason, I join the ultimate conclusion that defendant was not placed in grave peril by the remarks. Id.; Maldonado v. State, (1976) 265 Ind. 492, 355 N.E.2d 843.
¶12I concur in result.
¶13concurring in result.
¶14Indiana Code § 35 — 11—1—2(3), effective at the time appellant committed the offense of which he stands convicted, defined “included offense” among other things as an offense that “differs from the offense charged only in respect that ... a lesser kind of culpability, is required to establish its commission.” Appellant was charged with battery, with having knowingly touched the putative victim in a rude, insolent, and angry manner, and with having inflicted serious bodily injury, a gunshot wound to the chest, upon him with a deadly weapon. The offense of criminal recklessness in one of its manifestations is the reckless infliction of serious bodily harm. Criminal recklessness is in this case a lesser and included offense in the battery, by reason of the above quoted statute, since it differs from the battery charged only in that it requires a lesser kind of culpability, i.e., recklessness. Appellant was therefore entitled, upon request and proffer thereof, to a correct instruction defining criminal recklessness as an offense which the jury might find him guilty of, in lieu of battery. I agree however, that the instructions which were tendered were insufficient for this purpose.
¶15The two-step analysis in Lawrence v. State, (1978) 268 Ind. 330, 375 N.E.2d 208, to be applied by the trial court in determining whether to give a lesser included offense instruction was formulated as an attempt to deal rationally with the holding in Hash v. State, (1972) 258 Ind. 692, 284 N.E.2d 770, which requires the court to examine the proof in the case as well as the statute defining the crime charged, the statute defining the crime argued as being lesser and included, and the charging instrument. I dissented to that holding on *250the basis that the added requirement of considering the status of proof in a case was ill-conceived and harmful. Further experience with the rule has reaffirmed my belief that the Hashholding is mischievous, and should be abandoned, and I have retreated from that belief in opinions of this Court only in obeisance to stare decisis. I remain convinced that the determination of lesser and included offenses should be independent of the proof presented at trial. I do not share in the sense of disappointment with the jury system, which is central to the rationale of the Hashholding.
¶16Indiana Code § 35-41-3-5, in the form in which it existed at the time of the crime charged, provided in section (b) that “voluntary intoxication is a defense only to the extent that it negates specific intent.” Under this formulation of the rule, drunkenness does not excuse any offense. However, if in proving the elements of an offense, the prosecution must prove a particular intent or state of mind, drunkenness may be considered, as it may show the incapacity of the mind to have formed that intent, and thereby negate the existence of a fact necessary to conviction. In proving the offense charged in this case, the prosecution was bound by the statute to prove not only that he touched the victim by discharging a weapon into his body, but that at the time of doing so, “he was aware of a high probability that he is doing so.” Ind.Code § 35^41-2-2. Such an awareness in my opinion is, under our present battery statute, a fact necessary to conviction. The trial court therefore did not, as I see it, contravene the law when it gave an instruction to the jury on the manner in which it should consider proof of intoxication.