¶1Dissenting Opinion
¶2March 20, 1970:
¶3In 1894, this Court stated the terms upon which a killing might be excused as having been an act of self-defense: “Life may be lawfully taken in self-defence; but it must appear that he who takes it was in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm and that no other way of escape from the danger was open to him. It is the duty of one who is assailed to flee, if flight is possible ; and it is only when he is persuaded that he must suffer death or grievous bodily harm at the hands of his assailant, or take the life of his assailant that he may save his own, that he can justify his act as done in self-defence.” Commonwealth v. Breyessee, 160 Pa. 451, 456, 28 Atl. 824 (1894). The understanding of self-defense articulated in Breyesseehas remained the law of the Commonwealth up to the present. Commonwealth v. Lawrence, 428 Pa. 188, 236 A. 2d 768 (1968) and Commonwealth v. Collazo, 407 Pa. 494, 180 A. 2d 903 (1962). It reflects the deeply felt belief that life is sacred and should not be taken, even in self-defense, except as a matter of the last resort when there is no reasonable alternative. As the Court held in Commonwealth v. Vassar, 370 Pa. 551, 88 A. 2d 725 (1952) and *493reiterated in Commonwealth v. Collazo, supra,where it is a question as to “ ‘whether one man shall flee or another shall live, the law decides that the former shall rather flee than the latter may die.’ ”
¶4Both in this and in other jurisdictions, however, it has been consistently held that one is under no duty to retreat when feloniously attacked or placed in danger while in one’s own home. Commonwealth v. Wilkes, 414 Pa. 246, 199 A. 2d 411 (1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 939 (1964); Commonwealth v. Fraser, 369 Pa. 273, 85 A. 2d 126 (1952). That exception is based on our common sense that the home is the last place of safety, that one there assaulted is already “at the wall” and no further retreat is required.
¶5In the present case, the Court holds that the rule that he who is being assailed is not obliged to retreat if in his own home is applicable also when the threatened party is lawfully in “his office or place of business,” and this notwithstanding that a way of retreat was immediately at hand. I am not persuaded that this extension of the “no retreat rule” is either necessary or wise. No reason of policy or of logic has been advanced in support of this extension, nor is if suggested that the present limitations placed upon the claim of self-defense unduly jeopardize any legitimate public interest. It is true, as the majority notes, that some other jurisdictions have embraced the rule here adopted, but I do not see any indication that this Commonwealth has suffered from the want of such a rule. Absent strong countervailing considerations which are not here present, I would not adopt a rule of law which more easily justifies the taking of human life.
¶6Moreover, I believe that significant definitional problems are inherent in the majority’s rule and indicate the unwisdom of the Court’s present holding. What is one’s home, and where it is, is generally a simple matter of fact, and not a matter of dispute. *494One’s “office or place of business”, on the other hand, is not so susceptible to easy definition; and the collateral determination of the person, or the class of persons, able to claim the “place of business” exception will prove still more elusive. It is easy to imagine the troublesome problems which may arise when the courts of this Commonwealth attempt to apply this no-retreat rule to a street corner newsstand, a small store or a large one, an office building, a factory, a mine or a farm, to suggest a few examples. Precisely because the present rules relating to self-defense are adequate, these problems are unnecessarily created.
¶7Because I can find no real merit to the present holding and believe the rule will leave considerable problems in its wake, I dissent.