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441 Pa. 150

KAUFFMAN v. Osser

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania

Decided November 12, 1970

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania · decided 1970-11-12

Relies on Baker v. Carr · United States v. Sisson · Butcher v. Bloom

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1970-11-12

How this case has been cited

Cited by 32 later decisions — most recently February 2021 · most notably Chester Upland School District v. Commonwealth (1985), South Whitehall Township v. Commonwealth (1984)

31 state decisions

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Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

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¶1Dissenting Opinion by

Mr. Justice Cohen:

¶2The legislature may enact laws governing the conduct of elections. Winston v. Moore, 244 Pa. 447, 91 *158Atl. 520 (1914). However, “no legislative enactment may contravene the requirements of the Pennsylvania or.United States Constitutions.” Shankey v. Staisey, 436 Pa. 65, 68-9, 257 A. 2d 897, 898, cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1038 (1970). Article VII, Section 14 of our Constitution provides that absentee ballots may be cast by those away from their election districts because “their duties, occupation or business require them to be elsewhere.” The Absentee Ballot Law, Act of December 11, 1968, P. L. , §3(z-3), 25 P.S. §2602(z-3) (Supp. 1970), provides that “duties, occupations or business” shall include, inter alia, vacations and thus electors and their spouses on vacation on election day are permitted to vote by absentee ballot. The statute is thus a clear and unconscionable violation of the Pennsylvania Constitution, which the majority condones and I must condemn. Absent a constitutional amendment, such enactment cannot constitutionally stand.

¶3This is such a clear constitutional violation and such an open invitation to fraud that justice and the sanctity of the ballot demand a remedy. In the sensitive area of the electoral process we should recognize, as the United States Supreme Court did in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 82 S. Ct. 691 (1962), and as our Court did in our own reapportionmént case, Butcher v. Bloom, 415 Pa. 438, 203 A. 2d 556 (1964), that what is justiciable and what is political is a mere fiction not to be applied unless justice so dictates. See, Jaffe, The Citizen As Litigant In Public Actions: The NonHohfeldian or Ideological Plaintiff, 116 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1033 (1968);1 Jaffe, Standing To Secure Judicial Re*159view: Public Actions, 74 Harv. L. Rev. 1265 (1961).2 We should reach the issues here and not retreat behind the facade of standing. If there is to be judicial protection of the sanctity of the ballot from the unconsti; tutional exercise of legislative authority in establishing voting procedures, standing should be permitted and the issues determined.

¶4I dissent.

Mr. Justice Eagen and Mr. Justice O’Brien join in this dissent.

¶5 “There are, however, cases where discrimination or repression is latent, where no particular individual is as yet a demonstrable object of such unconstitutional action. It is alleged, for example, that a civil service system discriminates against Negroes otherwise eligible. It is alleged that a threat to draft individuals who actively protest the draft discourages free speech. In neither of these *159cases is any particular individual the object of the illegal action. But if there is to be judicial protection of the individual from the impact of these unconstitutional exercises of power, it may be that an action by a plaintiff whose credentials are something less thhn traditional must be allowed.” 116 U. Pa. L. Rev. at 1045-46.

¶6 “The conclusion thus emerges that there should be a single form of citizen action—one which is competent to test state and local official conduct whether or not involving the expenditure of funds and whether negative or positive in form. The citizen, as the prime political unit of the democracy, should be the plaintiff. . . . [M]y thesis is that the public action is deeply imbedded in our system; that it performs an important function; and that unless other methods are devised, the public action should be rationally adapted to the performance of that function. ... I would attempt to formulate principles of caution based on the nature of the issue to be decided and the possibility of effective judicial action.” 74 Harv. L. Rev. at 1296.

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