¶1Dissenting Opinion by
¶2With due respect to the majority’s position, I do not find a denial of due process occasioned by the inability to transcribe the trial judge’s charge to the jury. This case fits well within the ambit of Norvell v. Illinois, 373 U.S. 420, 83 S. Ct. 1366 (1963), and the decision of this Court in Com. v. Banks, 428 Pa. 571, 237 A. 2d 339 (1968) (per curiam). In both decisions, the trial proceedings were stenographically reported but were not transcribed. In the present situation, only the charge was not transcribed. As in Norvelland Banks, no appeal was initiated until long after the initial trial (in the present matter, eighteen years have elapsed). During the intervening period the stenographer has died, resulting in the inability to transcribe his recorded notes. As the Supreme Court stated in Norvell: “For, where transcripts are no longer available, Illinois may rest on the presumption that he who had a lawyer at the trial had one who could protect his rights on appeal.” 373 TJ.S. at 424. The majority contends the above statement is inapplicable to appellant’s situation since, although appellant was represented at trial by retained counsel, the PCHA judge’s determination that a Douglas violation had occurred rebuts the presumption that appellant’s retained counsel protected his appellate rights. Although a post-conviction hearing was conducted resulting in the finding of a Douglas violation, the basis for this determination was not articulated. Therefore, it is just as plausible, indeed more so in light of the current practice in PCHA proceedings, that leave to file post-trial motions nune pro tune resulted from the absence of any statement on the *521record that appellant had been notified of his right to appeal and the assistance of free counsel to perfect an appeal. The failure to so advise appellant is not surprising in light of the fact that appellant’s trial antedated Douglas by fourteen years. There has been no showing that appellant’s trial counsel refused to represent him on appeal or that petitioner’s indigency prevented him from retaining another. Norvell v. Illinois, 373 U.S. at 422. Thus, in my opinion, the presumption enunciated in Worvell that appellant’s counsel protected his appellate rights remains intact.
¶3The majority opines that appellant’s allegations of constitutionally ineffective counsel further erase any presumption that appellant’s counsel protected his appellate rights. Without attempting to indulge in a debate over what weight the presumption carries, suffice it to say that this Court has adopted stringent requirements which must be satisfied before the representation of counsel is deemed ineffective. See, Com. ex rel. Washington v. Maroney, 427 Pa. 599, 235 A. 2d 349 (1967). In my opinion, the majority should decide the ineffective counsel allegation before affording if any semblance of merit.
¶4I dissent.