¶1(dissenting). I cannot subscribe to the result reached by the majority.
¶2Although defense counsel’s motion for psychiatric evaluation of the defendant was not a masterpiece of draftsmanship and admittedly could have been drawn with more precision, its overall tenor nonetheless indicates that in addition to an expert opinion regarding the defendant’s sanity at the time the alleged offense was committed, defense counsel sought a determination of the defendant’s competency to stand trial. This is borne out by language contained in the motion, the order of the circuit court committing the defendant to a diagnostic facility, and the resultant diagnostic report issued after the defendant had been examined.
¶3Defense counsel’s motion reads in pertinent part:
"Please take notice that the defendant in the above entitled cause proposes to offer in his defense testimony to establish his insanity at the time of the alleged *145offense and hereby gives notice of his intention to claim such defense.”
¶4After requesting that two psychiatrists examine the defendant and testify at trial regarding the defendant’s sanity, the motion continues:
"That the defendant’s attorney … after conversing with and observing the defendant with regard to the criminal charge, UDAA, [unlawfully driving away an automobile, MCLA 750.413; MSA 28.645] pending against said defendant, during the preparation for and course of the preliminary examination of said charge that said defendant may be experiencing emotional stress and strain which will impair or even prohibit any meaningful participation in the preparation of a proper defense on his behalf. ” (Emphasis added.)
¶5From an examination of the circuit court’s order committing the defendant to a diagnostic facility, it is patent that the court below treated the motion in question as requesting a determination of the defendant’s competency to stand trial. The order states inter alia:
"Upon reading and filing the defendant’s motion praying for the examination of the defendant to determine whether or not said defendant is capable of understanding the nature and object of the proceedings against him, of comprehending his own condition in a rational and reasonable manner … .”
¶6In compliance with the circuit court’s order requesting a determination of the defendant’s ability to understand the nature and object of the proceedings against him, i.e., his competency, the report from the diagnostic facility following the examination of the defendant concludes that the defendant was sane at the time' the alleged offense was committed and that:
*146"(1) Mr. Blocker [defendant herein] is entirely capable of fully 'understanding the nature and object of the proceedings against him …
¶7It is readily apparent in view of all the foregoing that the defendant was committed to a diagnostic facility for a determination of his competency to stand trial. Under these circumstances, the duty of the trial court is clear and inescapable. Section 4 of MCLA 767.27a; MSA 28.966(11) provides:
"Upon receipt of the diagnostic report and recommendations the sheriff shall immediately return the defendant to the committing court and the court shall immediately hear and determine the issue of competence to stand trial. The diagnostic report and recommendations shall be admissible as evidence in . the hearing, but not for any other purpose in the pending criminal proceedings.”
¶8Even though it is clear that the defendant was committed to a diagnostic facility for an evaluation of his competency to stand trial, the majority relying upon People v Sherman Williams, 38 Mich App 370 (1972), unnecessarily and erroneously dwell upon whether the defendant should have been so committed. This Court in People v Chase, 38 Mich App 417, 420-421 (1972), distinguished Williams on precisely this basis. In Chase we held:
"The genesis of our present competency to stand trial statute was recently considered by this Court in People v Sherman Williams, 38 Mich App 370 (1972). This case is to be distinguished from Williams where we considered the question of the degree of showing of incompetency necessary before commitment to a diagnostic center is required.
"Here we deal with the failure of the court to hold a competency hearing upon the return of the accused from the diagnostic facility.
"We must, of necessity, hold that the learned trial *147judge was in error when he declined to hold the competency hearing mandated by the statute on the theory that 'the conducting of a formal competency hearing would have added nothing unless it was contested by the defendant.’
"The irreducible fact is that once commitment to the center pursuant to statute is ordered, the ultimate determination of the question of one’s competence to stand trial, or to enter a plea, cannot rest merely on the conclusion reached there. The weight to be accorded to findings made, and the legal effect of such findings, must be the subject of a judicial determination and order. Absent such a requirement, a serious constitutional issue would arise. The proceedings were fatally infirm. We add, perhaps unnecessarily, that if neither the State nor the defendant chooses to introduce other testimony, the trial judge may make the judicial determination and base his order solely upon the report of the center.”
¶9Therefore, inasmuch as the trial court in the instant case failed to conduct the requisite hearing, I vote to reverse and remand for a new trial.