¶2I agree that appellant’s motion to suppress should have been granted because the magistrate was not informed “. . . of the underlying circumstances from which the officer concluded that the informant. . . was ‘credible? or his information ‘reliable.’ ” Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 114, 84 S. Ct. 1509, 1514 (1964) (footnote omitted), and concur in the decision of the Court on that basis.
¶3For the reasons stated in my dissenting opinion in Commonwealth v. Milliken, 450 Pa. 310, 318, 300 A. 2d 78 (1973), however, I think appellant should prevail also on the first ground here advanced, viz., that the procedure which allows the suppression hearing judge to undertake to cure a defective search warrant by evidence of sworn oral testimony supposedly presented earlier to the issuing officer is constitutionally defective.