Commonwealth v. Davis

¶1OPINION OF THE COURT

¶2Appellant, Tyrone Davis, was convicted by a jury of murder in the second degree. Post-trial motions were denied and appellant was sentenced to a term of six to fifteen years’ imprisonment. This appeal followed.

¶3This appeal arises from the homicide of Vanessa Davis, wife of appellant, on November 12, 1972, in Philadelphia.

¶4The facts surrounding this homicide and confession are as follows: On November 12, 1972, appellant’s wife was found dead of multiple stab wounds. Pursuant to the investigation of this homicide, appellant was interviewed at the Police Administration Building on November 12, 1972, the night of the homicide, and again on January 13, 1973. Detective Brown, who was in charge of the investigation, testified that the interviews with appellant were for the purpose of obtaining background information on his wife. At the end of each interview, appellant was allowed to return to his home. On March 29, 1973, at 7:00 a. m., the police arrived at the residence of appel*30lant and asked to speak to him. Appellant was taken to the Police. Administration Building, arriving at 7:25 a. m. The police took appellant into an interrogation room, warned him of his Miranda, rights, and at 7:45 a. m. appellant confessed the homicide of his wife.

¶5Appellant first argues that his confession should have been suppressed because it was the product of an illegal arrest. Assuming arguendo that appellant was illegally arrested, we are nevertheless of the opinion that appellant’s confession was admissible, because the confession was not the product of the illegal arrest, but rather an independent act of his own free will.

¶6The testimony of appellant establishes the reason for his confession was not police interrogation; rather, it was his own sense of remorse. Appellant’s confession shows in two instances that remorse or conscience motivated his confession rather than his alleged illegal arrest. In his formal confession, appellant told police that he was confessing “because it is bothering me. I want to get it off my mind.” 1 At trial, appellant contested the voluntariness of his confession, but the jury resolved the issue against him. Finding the motivation for appellant’s confession as being his own remorse rather than the police interrogation, we find his confession was voluntary. Cf. Commonwealth v. Daniels, 455 Pa. 522, 317 A.2d 237 (1974). See also Commonwealth v. Bishop, 425 Pa. 175, 228 A.2d 661 (1967).

¶7 Appellant next argues that the court erred in permitting the district attorney to cross-examine him regarding a statement that he made to his mother-in-law related to his want of affection for his deceased wife. We do not agree. Evidence tending to show want of affection for one’s wife is admissible to show motive on the part of the husband charged with the homicide of his *31wife. See Commonwealth v. Littlejohn, 433 Pa. 336, 250 A.2d 811 (1969) and Commonwealth v. Westwood, 324 Pa. 289, 188 A. 304 (1936). Having found the above testimony relevant, we also find no error in the district attorney’s reference to the evidence in his closing argument to the jury.

¶8Appellant argues, based on our decision in Commonwealth v. McCusker, 448 Pa. 382, 292 A.2d 286 (1972), that since he introduced psychiatric evidence which tended to prove that he acted out of the heat of passion at the time he murdered his wife, the homicidej as a matter of law, could rise no higher than voluntary manslaughter. We do not agree. In McCusker, supra,we held that psychiatric evidence was admissible only to show that a person acted out of the heat of passion at the time he committed the homicide, but that psychiatric evidence, like any other evidence, was for the jury to consider and to determine what weight it should be given. In the instant case, the jury obviously rejected the psychiatric testimony presented by appellant and they were, therefore, left with ample evidence to convict appellant of murder in the second degree.